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This research deals with a parcel of the protests that have been taking place over 
the last few years, particularly since 2010: those protests in which the protesters, 
instead of rebelling against the legitimacy of the system, have preferred to accept 
the regime’s remaining in place and consequently have manifested their discontent 
via playing by the constitutional rules of the game. Although governmental 
responses have varied in degree, in the end they have all focused on limiting the 
right of the people to publicly assemble and express their views. As this work 
contends, when governments restrict protests (sometimes violently doing so) they 
ignore the fact that protests involve the exercise of rights and arbitrarily restrict 
the voices that shape constitutional understanding. 
By resorting to a mixture of theoretical and comparative approaches, this thesis 
argues that protests which manifest their acceptance of the regime’s remaining in 
place have, when dealing with matters “a lot of people care a lot,” the potential of 
becoming popular interpretations of constitutions. 
The thesis is composed of three main argumentative lines. The first argumentative 
line rests on the sociology of social movements and from there proposes some 
conceptual definitions as to what playing by the rules means to social protests. The 
second argumentative line builds on a comparative analysis to show what 
constitutional rights are (usually) involved in protecting social protests and what 
other rights should be considered in enhancing that protection. Finally, the third 
argumentative line explains that accepting the regime’s remaining in place poses 
politico-constitutional duties on both sides, that of the citizens and that of 
institutions. Whereas citizens find themselves committed to submitting their 
popular understandings to institutions, institutions are bound to open their venues 
and dialogue with (and not merely to be, depending on circumstances, influenced 
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INTRODUCTION: THE PENGUIN’S CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
 
“You say you'll change the constitution 
Well, you know 
We all want to change your head”. 
John Lennon – Paul McCartney∗ 
 
In 2006, thousands of secondary public school students went out to the streets of 
several cities in Chile. Under banners such as ‘enough already,’ ‘education is not a 
commodity,’ and ‘let’s put Pinochet’s education to an end,’ they demanded a 
comprehensive educational reform. The Penguin Revolution—named after the 
uniforms students wear in Chilean schools, an opaque mixture of grey and white—
contested what, until then, was a bedrock constitutional interpretation, namely 
that education was a commodity and that private schools were businesses to be 
run under the auspices of free-market commandments.1 
This understanding, followed by a market-oriented model of legislative and 
administrative rules, permitted the instauration of a two-tier system for accessing 
education and other social goods as well. It eventually allowed for-profit 
                                                        
∗ Revolution, on HEY JUDE (APPLE Records 1968). 
1 See generally, Sofia Donoso, Dynamics of change in Chile: explaining the emergence of the 2006 
Pingüino movement, 45 J. LAT. AMER. STUD. 1 (2013) (framing the substantive claims students posed 
as an opposition to the neoliberal education model); Donna M. Chovanec & Alexandra Benitez, The 
Penguin Revolution in Chile: exploring the intergenerational learning in social movements, 3 J. 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN EDUCATION 39, 43-4 (2008). It is worth noting what might sound 
counterintuitive: some of these private schools are part of the public education system as they are 
financed through public funds. 
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organizations, whose profits were obtained from public funds, to govern the 
provision of education.2 Public education, on the other hand, remained a mainly 
residual arena to the vast majority of families that could not afford private 
education3 This two-tier system had generated segregation, stratification and 
inequalities that students stood up against,4 claiming the State needed to be more 
actively involved. They demanded the State provide free quality public education 
and a stricter control over the funds the State transferred to privately owned 
corporations involved in education.5 
While a first response to protests was an educational reform passed in 2009—the 
so-called General Educational Law6—it did not tackle the main issues students 
sought to change. As a result, students went to the streets once again in 2011, this 
time joined by higher education students. The main claim of the 2011 
mobilizations was to prevent for-profit corporations having recourse to public 
funds for education, access which was described as “the core of the education 
system.”7 On January 26th 2015, Congress passed a bill which, among other things, 
prohibited these private corporations from running schools profiting from public 
                                                        
2 Cristián Bellei & Cristian Cabalin, Chilean Students Movements: Sustained Struggle to Transform a 
Market-oriented Educational System, 15 CURRENT ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE EDUCATION 113 (2013). 
3 See generally, Natalia Angel-Cabo & Domingo Lovera Parmo, Latin American social 
constitutionalism: courts and popular participation, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE: CRITICAL INQUIRIES 85, 95-6 (Helena Alviar et al. eds. 2015). 
4 See generally, Cristian Cabalin, Neoliberal education and student movements in Chile: inequalities 
and malaise, 10 POLICY FUTURES IN EDUCATION 219 (2012); Donoso, Dynamics of change in Chile, supra 
note 1, at 13-8.  
5 Bellei & Cabalin, supra note 2, at 112-4. 
6 Law 20370 (D. Of. 02 Jul. 2010). 
7 FRANCISCO FIGUEROA, LLEGAMOS PARA QUEDARNOS. CRÓNICAS DE LA REVUELTA ESTUDIANTIL [WE ARE HERE TO 
STAY. CHRONICLES OF THE STUDENT REVOLT] 17 (2013) (my translation). 
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funds.8 This law, a regulation that decisively weakened Pinochet’s educational 
legacy, was possible because of massive political pressure that led to the 
transformation of constitutional understanding. This new understanding was 
precisely what the penguins first proposed as a constitutional reading in 2006. 
Needless to say, the text of the Constitution remained unaltered. 
 
I. Liberal constitutionalism: the context 
 
All this was, of course, not easy to achieve not only because of all the formal (legal) 
complexities a parliamentary decision of this significance involved, but mostly 
because of the fact that it was on the streets, and not in a judicial chamber, where 
constitutional matters were being addressed. It was common people, not lawyers 
wearing suits or pretended experts, who were claiming what the correct 
understanding of the Constitution was; it was thousands of students, not an elite 
group of representatives, who were proposing a change in constitutional 
understanding; it was through protests, not concept papers, that the constitution 
was being shaped; and it was passion and emotions, not calm conversations, what 
were informing constitutional comprehension.9  
                                                        
8 Law 20.845 (D. Of. 8 June 2015). 
9 I have made these comparisons drawing on Adam Tomkins’ description of the “tenets of Legal 
Constitutionalism.” ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 10-25 (2005).   
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Despite the prominent role that both direct participation of the people and 
passions have played in politics and institution building,10 they have been largely 
ignored,11 when not actively outlawed, by liberal theory.12 In fact, liberal theory 
privileges representative democracy, as opposed to direct participation, and 
reason, as opposed to passion, as the driving forces behind Western politico-
constitutional schemes. Indeed, the main thrust of liberal theory has been that of 
obscuring the role of politics, sentiments, and that which is sacred in the 
understanding of democracies, translating them into the constitutional order of 
law, logical deduction and reason.13  
Liberalism’s constitutional counterpart, liberal constitutionalism, is identified with 
three core characteristics: (a) a written constitution, (b) provided with a set of 
basic constitutional rights and other open-ended provisions, (c) whose 
enforceability and definition depend, in the last instance, on some high court 
decision. In this equation, the political commitments a community values the most 
are replaced by legal documents and their reading is reserved to those who claim 
to hold the professional expertise needed to understand (and explain) those law-
like provisions. Thus, the forum of politics—a forum normally deemed to be open 
to all—gets transferred to judicial chambers where laypersons are seldom 
                                                        
10 ANDRÁS SAJÓ, CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS 11-4 (2011) (arguing reason and emotions function, and 
have functioned, in an intertwined fashion in shaping our constitutional institutions). 
11 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS: WHY LOVE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE 4-5 (2013). 
12 REBECCA KINGSTON, PUBLIC PASSION: RETHINKING THE GROUNDS FOR POLITICAL JUSTICE 5-6 (2011).  
13 PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 23-7 (2011). 
See ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATIZED (2009). See also, STEVEN D. 
SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION & THE PRIDE OF REASON (1998). 
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admitted. This has resulted in ‘juricentric constitutions’14 whose interpretation has 
been colonized by judges, lawyers, courts and their allegedly impartial means of 
decision.15 In fact this is what liberal constitutionalism has created: a model of 
constitutional interpretation that under the banners of objectivity, determinacy 
and progressivity,16 hides and privileges the hegemonic political understanding of 
an elite who is driven by fear against popular pressure.17 Consequently, liberal 
constitutionalism “limits the modes of political engagement to the constitutional”.18 
Opposition to current constitutional understandings is to be channeled either 
through the constitutional amendment process or accountability mechanism 
already included in the constitutions.19 What about those means of contention that 
fall outside? They are “rendered illegal, illegitimate or nonsensical.”20 
                                                        
14 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions 
on Section Five Power 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003) (“The juricentric Constitution imagines the judiciary as 
the exclusive guardian of the Constitution. It allows the Court's coordinate branches to enforce the 
Constitution only insofar as they enforce judicial interpretations of constitutional meaning …”).  
15 “Liberal constitutionalism,” as professor Nadia Urbinati put it, “thought that the dualistic space of 
citizens and representatives institutions produced by elections was the sine qua non of impartial 
and competent lawmaking because it protected the deliberative setting from both the tyrannical 
passions of the majority and the particular interests of factions.” NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE 
DEMOCRACY. PRINCIPLES & GENEALOGY 25 (2006). See also Allan C. Hutchinson & Joel Colón-Ríos, 
What’s Democracy got to do with it? A Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism 5-6 (Comparative 
Research in Law and Political Economy Research Paper 29 Vol. 3 No 05, 2007) (explaining liberal 
constitutionalism’s obsession with permanence and its consequent suspicion of constituent 
assemblies). 
16 Allan C. Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf (or the beatification of the Charter), 41 U. TORONTO L.J. 332, 
332-52 (1991). 
17 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 
38-49 (2004). See also Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf, supra note 16, at 354-5. 
18 Christopher May, The rule of law as the Grundnorm of the new constitutionalism, in NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER 63, 69 (Stephen Gill & A. Claire Cutler eds. 2014). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 70. 
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Considering this constitutional background, it is no wonder elites in power felt 
uncomfortable with the constitution being taken away from institutional 
avenues,21 and with social protests as the main means to achieve this shift. As 
Charles Tilly claimed, “[t]o this day, national authorities throughout the world 
generally resist granting a legal right to demonstrate as such”.22 In fact, and 
different from the right to associate and union rights, protests are regularly 
deemed as a form of exercise of general rights “with police as the main 
enforcers.”23 Governmental responses to many recent social protests movements, 
ranging from severely restricting to criminalizing protests, are testimony of this.24 
Take two similar, though distant, cases: student protests in Chile and Quebec. 
Inspired, in part, by the massive student protests witnessed in Chile, Québécois 
students went out to the streets en masse to complain about a proposed rise in 
university tuition fees starting in the fall of 2012.25 Hundreds of arrests, most of 
them illegal, were reported in both cases, all against a background of fierce police 
brutality which included riot police forces entering into McGill campus for the first 
                                                        
21 To paraphrase MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
22 CHARLES TILLY, REGIMES AND REPERTOIRES 191 (2006). 
23 Id., at 191-2. 
24 Legislation, narrowly directed at specific groups, opens wide spaces to question the fairness of 
those measures and legitimacy of laws passed. See, JEREMY WALDRON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE 
MEASURE OF PROPERTY 12-24, 44-51 (2012) (discussing the alleged virtues of the Rule of Law 
understood in a morally or substantive detached fashion).  
25 See, Fédération étudiante universitaire du Québec, “La communauté universitaire solidaire 
contre la hausse des frais de scolarité un plan de financement des universités sur le dos des 
étudiantes et des étudiants”, March 30, 2011, http://feuq.qc.ca/spip.php?article195&lang=fr.  
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time since 196926 (a landmark year for student protests) and a 16-year-old student 
shot dead by the police in Santiago, Chile.27 Governments have responded with 
more (legal) violence by filing bills containing restrictive criminal laws—the most 
brutal Sate intrusion. The Chilean government, for instance, submitted a bill where 
it conceptualized public order as “social tranquility.”28 It also proposed to sanction 
with up to three years imprisonment those who have “taken part, incited or 
promoted disorder or any other act of force and violence through which: (iii) free 
circulation of persons or vehicles were impeded or altered.”29 Anyone picketing on 
the streets or, as vague as the terms of the proposed bill are, calling to protest 
against governmental decisions (resulting in protests that may end in streets or 
with bridges being blocked) could end up in prison. The National Assembly of 
Québec did no less and passed Bill 78, an emergency law that—besides suspending 
academic terms in progress—accorded authorities, particularly the police, ample 
powers to prevent, regulate, alter, and dissolve demonstrations.30 The police 
arrested 518 students taking part in protests only just five days after it was 
passed.31 
 
                                                        
26 Student’s Society of McGill University, “SSMU Statement & Information Regarding November 10th 
Riot Police on Campus”, November 11, 2011, http://ssmu.mcgill.ca/blog/2011/11/ssmu-
statement-information-regarding-november-10th-riot-police-on-campus/. 
27 Chilean police officers dismissed after fatal shooting, BBC NEWS, August 30, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-14717934 
28 Gobierno de Chile, Mensaje No 196-359, September 27, 2011. 
29 Id., at 12.  
30 National Assembly of Québec, Bill 78 (2012, Chapter 12) “An Act to enable students to receive 
instruction from the postsecondary institutions they attend,” May 18, 2012. 
31 Jacqueline Kennelly, The Quebec student protests: challenging neoliberalism one pot at a time, 28 
CRITICAL ARTS: SOUTH-NORTH CULTURAL & MEDIA STUDIES 135 (2014). 
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II. Social protests and constitutions: the argument 
 
This dissertation is not about the Chilean (or Québécois) student protests 
specifically, but more generally about the role that social protests play in 
constitutional interpretation. Social protests, this work contends, are direct and 
popular forms of interpreting constitutions, that is, forms of proposing a certain 
comprehension of constitutions. Through protests—although certainly not only by 
their means—the people (or the peoples) directly take over the struggle to define 
constitutional contours. It is by means of protests that the people directly propose 
a certain understanding of constitutions. As such, I shall insist, protests work as a 
means for negotiating constitutional exposition. In this sense, protests as 
constitutional interpretations are forms of power struggle or contentious politics; 
they are aimed, as Tarrow put it, at “bring[ing] ordinary people into confrontation 
with opponents, elites, or authorities,”32 as to how the constitution should be 
understood. More specifically, citizens’ public displays through protests are a tool 
through which expressions of popular will call into question a particular 
understanding of constitutions that otherwise may have appeared to be obvious or 
undisputed.33 Protests, therefore, perform the critical function of making explicit 
the relations of power upon which current constitutional understanding have been 
built, proposing a new alignment of the constitutional dimensions of power.34 
                                                        
32 SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 8 (2011 3rd ed.). 
33 JUDITH BUTLER, NOTES TOWARD A PERFORMATIVE THEORY OF ASSEMBLY 1-2 (2015). 
34 Id, at 6-11. 
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However, constitutional understandings proposed through protests alone are not 
constitutional interpretations until after they take institutional form. It is only once 
they take institutional form that (what before were) popular understanding of 
constitutions become (properly speaking) constitutional interpretations. As I 
argue in this work, it is by dialoguing with democratic institutions that popular 
readings can be attributed to the people as a whole. 
To do this, this work proceeds in a two-step argument. It will first explore the 
constitutional legitimacy of protests as a means of political participation, and only 
then it will move to present the way in which these constitutionally protected 
means of participation can inform the understanding of constitutions. This is the 
reason why this work envisions two kinds of relations between constitutions and 
social protests. First, constitutions relate to social protests by (constitutionally) 
shielding protests. Second, constitutions relate to social protests by becoming 
objects of influence by popular contestations. This means that constitutions are 
open to be interpreted not only by way of institutional mechanisms, say a piece of 
legislation or a judicial opinion, but that they are also open to be construed in a 
bottom-up fashion by the people resorting to non-institutional means of 
participation, just what the Chilean students were doing when proposing how to 
properly understand the education provisions of the Constitution.35 In fact, as I 
shall insist later, popular constitutional interpretation requires a constant and 
                                                        
35 Where properly here stands for a politically attributable understanding, rather than a legal 
fashion where meanings remain hidden and waiting to be correctly discovered. See also, Donoso, 
Dynamics of change in Chile, supra note 1, at 21-3 (explaining the participatory bottom-up fashion 
the Penguin Revolution had and its probable causes).  
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balanced interplay between institutional and non-institutional forms of 
constitutional understanding—protests included. This work contends that social 
protests that aim at constitutional interpretation interact, although in a tense 
relation, with institutions. Rather than abandonment of institutional politics 
(withdrawal), constitutional interpretation requires the people to engage with 
institutions.36 This is far from a trivial condition and actually a key to differentiate 
the sort of social protests this work draws upon. 
As Chilean students were marching onto the street (again) in 2011, the globe was 
witnessing large mobilizations in North Africa and massive street occupations in 
Europe and North America. Almost every large, and global,37 city experienced 
some sort of social protest during the years that followed 2010. In no particular 
order, Cairo, New York, London, Madrid, Athens, Toronto, Moscow, Montreal, 
Tokyo, and, more recently, Rio de Janeiro, were all cities where large political 
protests took place. A remarkable indication of this wave was Time’s decision to 
name The Protester as the Person of the Year in 2011.38 
However, despite their phenomenological similitude, these protests were not all of 
the same constitutional kind. In fact, for protesters taking part in some of these 
mobilizations, the constitutional schemes in force in their communities were a 
target they sought to overthrow. These protesters actually embraced the 
                                                        
36 See CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS: THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY 163-89 (2013). 
37 In Sassen’s global city framework, one of the facts that explains why protests occurring during 
2010 and 2011 got so much attention was precisely because they were taking place in cities that 
during ‘regular’ times signal the worldwide networks of economic globalization. SASKIA SASSEN, THE 
GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO 3-5 (1991). 
38 TIME, Dec. 14, 2011. 
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constituent power (and in some cases were successful in doing so). For them, 
change was not just a matter of interpretation, but of decisively altering the locus 
of constituent power and political legitimacy. These protesters had already lost 
faith in the possibilities of bringing about change under the constitutional/legal 
systems they were living under.39 
For many other protesters, on the other hand, the constitutional schemes in force 
at the time they were mobilizing were a different sort of target. They saw 
constitutions (in some cases unconsciously) as open grounds inviting popular 
readings of what were common, yet essentially contested, commitments.40 They 
still believed these common commitments were open to welcome what so far were 
(recall the Chilean students) off-the-wall interpretations of the Constitution.41 Put 
differently, these were protesters who, paraphrasing Robert Cover, kept faith in 
their constitutional schemes, for they saw these schemes as not only showing “the 
‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ but the ‘is,’ the ‘ought’ and the ‘what might be’.”42 
Thus seen, the kind of social protests I am interested in here are those that take 
place within a constitutional scheme protesters do not seek to replace nor 
overthrow, but to influence and shape.43 This work argues constitutional schemes 
                                                        
39 JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION. POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011). 
40 GRÉGOIRE C. N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION. ON THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 1 (2009). 
41 Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the 
New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 52 (2005-2006).  
42 I took Robert Cover’s citation from Gerald Torres & Lani Guinier, The Constitutional Imaginary: 
just stories about we the people, 71 MD. L. REV. 1052, 1052 (2012).  
43 As professor Nadia Urbinati recently put it, these waves of protests were not aimed at 
establishing direct democracies around the globe, but actually at controlling what their 
representatives were doing. Waves of protests, in other words, were not directed at withering 
institutions away, but at shaping political opinions and “experiment[ing] with new styles of 
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are open to be interpreted by means of social protests and shows how the people 
themselves can play an important role in proposing their own readings of 
constitutions. However, precisely because this is a work on constitutional 
interpretation it does not, because it cannot, disregard democratic institutions. 
Rather, as I will argue by the end of this dissertation, institutions prove crucial as 
they represent a common ground where popular constitutional understandings 
advanced through protests are expounded, tested and, eventually, endorsed.44 This 
is the moment, I shall contend, when a popular reading can be attributed to the 
people as a whole.  
This is also the moment that signals social protests’ success. At a procedural level, 
social protests succeed when they increase the bargaining power of those who 
resort to the streets.45 Precisely because constitutional meanings are negotiated 
among different (both institutional and noninstitutional) actors, the level of 
bargaining power that protesters enjoy indicates the probability of having their 
popular views considered on-the-wall readings of the constitution. At a 
substantive level, social protests succeed when they are able to reshape the 
meaning of constitutional principles and consequently that of the practices 
                                                                                                                                                                  
representation.” Nadia Urbinati, A Revolt against Intermediary Bodies, 22 CONSTELLATIONS 477, 478 
(2015). 
44 MICHAEL WALZER, POLITICS AND PASSION. TOWARD A MORE EGALITARIAN LIBERALISM (2004) (“Civil 
society cannot become a home for either freedom or pluralism without state action.”). 
45 Paul Burnstein et al., The Success of Political Movements: A Bargaining Perspective, in THE POLITICS 
OF SOCIAL PROTEST: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON STATES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 275, 279-80 (J. Craig 
Jenkins & Bert Klandermans eds. 1995). 
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governed by those very same principles.46 This occurs when, as a result of 
mobilizing, “political and institutional circumstances” combined transform 
formerly implausible constitutional interpretations into “natural and completely 
obvious” constitutional claims, therefore commanding legislation that follows.47 
 
III. Dissertation plan 
 
The plan of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 1 takes and explores insights 
from the sociology of social movements. The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it 
seeks to enrich the all-too-formal understanding of politics in constitutional law 
(and law, more generally). It points out the different forms social movements—and 
particularly new social movements—have resorted to in order to expand both the 
concept of politics and democracy. Whereas politics used to be restricted to the 
formal avenues of power and democracy meant participation through delegation, 
new social movements included non-institutional means of participation and 
forms of direct action. Social movements came to challenge “the boundaries of 
institutional politics.”48 
                                                        
46 See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
927 (2006). 
47 Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution, supra note 41, at 51-2; 
Balkin & Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, supra note 46, at 929 (at the same time, 
“[p]rinciples once uncontroversially accepted become counterintuitive and produce uncomfortable 
results as they are applied to new situations and problems…”). 
48 Claus Offe, New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics, 52 SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 817 (1985). 
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Second, relying on the same literature, this chapter seeks to show that social 
movements accept the State, its institutions, its formal avenues, and its extremely 
detailed procedures of will-formation as spaces of conquest, struggle, 
disagreement, deliberation, and decision. In other words, social movements do not 
replace formal avenues of politics and institutions with non-institutional forms 
and pure direct democracy, but rather complement them. Chapter 1 wraps up by 
identifying social protests as one of the non-institutional means popular 
movements can resort to, distinguishing social protests from civil disobedience 
and drawing some main characteristics that social protests exhibit that may inform 
an adequate constitutional understanding of these phenomena. 
Chapter 2 builds upon the distinction between protest events that occur within a 
constitutional scheme that protesters do not seek to overthrow and those events 
that aim at enacting new constitutions. As a matter of fact, and actually as a matter 
of constitutional fact, some of the protests that began in 2010 resulted in putting 
new constitutions in place. However, other protests, most notably those that took 
place in the West, did not. 
This constitutional distinction, as I call it, is relevant, for it will allow to distinguish 
the setting where popular constitutional interpretation takes place. Indeed, this 
distinction permits differentiating among protest events that, although sharing the 
same causes for discontent and some phenomenological manifestations (people on 
the streets picketing, blocking, camping, and so on), are of a varied constitutional 
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nature.49 While some of these protests, such as those the ‘Arab Spring’ produced, 
were radical claims seeking to activate the constituent power, others, such as those 
of the ‘Occupy’ movement and Chilean students, played within the constitutional 
rules of the game.50 In other words, the former protesters sought to alter the 
constitutional landscape by establishing new constitutions. It is of course hard to 
talk in this context of constitutional interpretation, rather than that of constitution 
making.51 The latter sort of protests, on the other hand, sought to alter the 
constitutional landscape by influencing the understanding of constitutions, along 
with political regimes, that remained in place. In this last scenario, it was the 
possibility of advancing a popular interpretation, and therefore interaction with 
institutions, what drove mobilizations.52 
The following three chapters explain the two-direction flow between social 
protests and constitutional law. As I explained above, constitutions relate to social 
                                                        
49 See, JOEL COLÓN-RÍOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE QUESTION OF 
CONSTITUENT POWER 175 (2012) (noticing the execution of constituent power may be, and actually 
need to be, triggered by “informal political practices like … street assemblies, and mass protests.”).  
50 Playing by the rules of the game entails, as the very nature of challenging movements under 
scrutiny here, contesting and influencing those very same rules and not only the understanding of 
those rules, but eventually their institutional manifestations. 
51 See, WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 43-52. 
52 Two caveats should be mentioned here. First, it is true that some of these mobilizations, most 
notably those of the ‘Occupy’ and European indignados, refused to pose before authorities any 
specific claim and to engage in any sort of dialogue. However, from a constitutional viewpoint they 
did not end up producing new constitutions. I explain this in more detail in Chapters 1, 2 and 5. 
Second, with the advantage of time we can now see, at least in the European experience, that those 
movements that refused to engage with institutions were not actually seeking to establish a parallel 
polity, but have those institutions account for the people’s actual needs. The rise of alternative 
political organizations such as Syriza in Greece or Podemos in Spain tells this. Of course, I am not 
saying that these very same protest movements transformed into political parties, but that these 
political organizations were able to read the indignados political claims and give them a political 
voice and (a more tangible) impact. Lobera talks of “certain continuities between the 15-M and the 
emergence of new parties …”. Josep Lobera, De movimientos a partidos. La cristalización electoral de 
la protesta [From movements to political parties. The electoral crystallization of protest], 24 REVISTA 
ESPAÑOLA DE SOCIOLOGÍA [SPANISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY] 97 (2015). 
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protests by (constitutionally, and up to a point legally) shielding protests, on the 
one hand, and by becoming objects of influence by popular contestations, on the 
other. Chapters 3 and 4 explore how constitutions (should) protect protests. 
Chapter 3 presents what I call the constitutional foundations of the right to 
protests. As noted above, this work relates to protests that aim at proposing their 
own constitutional reading, meanwhile assuming “the regime’s remaining in 
place.”53 Therefore, the chapter begins by emphasizing that the right to protest I 
am talking about here is a constitutional (=positive) right. It is a right composed by 
different constitutional rights which confer its bearer a variety of subjective rights 
to something, liberties and powers.54 The freedoms the right to protest is based on 
are the freedoms of expression and of assembly. Although they are analyzed in one 
single chapter, they are two distinct freedoms. While freedom of expression is 
mainly concerned with the protection of speech, particularly when taking place in 
public spaces, freedom of assembly emphasizes the protection of public 
gatherings: the right we have to join others in reunions that might, or might not, 
have speech (in the sense that freedom of expression understands it) involved. As 
it will be explained, this chapter contends social protests are not to be exclusively 
framed as a right to speak in a public forum, for this approach overlooks the fact 
                                                        
53 Philip Pettit, Legitimacy and Justice in Republican Perspective, 65 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 59, 62 
(2012). 
54 ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 120 (Julian Rivers trans., 2010). 
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that assemblies need their own ‘breathing room.’ Put differently, it asks not to 
collapse freedom of assembly into freedom of expression.55 
Although an important part of this chapter deals with doctrinal approaches to both 
freedoms of expression and of assembly, they are also illustrated through different 
judicial opinions ruled by different courts of different jurisdictions. Rather than 
intended to expose the up-to-date judicial rulings regarding the right to protest, 
these decisions—aimed at expanding, rather than shrinking, the protection of 
avenues for political participation—show what could be called the best practices 
to protect protests that are both (at the same time) expressions and public 
gatherings. 
However, the fact that there are what might be called best practices, and that along 
with them there are not-so-good practices, is a very telling consequence of 
conceiving the right to protest as a positive right: its need for detailing. Charts 
normally assert rights in general and vague terms that invite their regulation, 
either to expand their force (not the most frequent scenario) or to limit their 
extension (the practice that many governments, such as the Quebec legislature and 
more recently Spain, mainly followed after the wave of protests that started in 
2010). As I explain below, the State and its institutions are both a friend and foe of 
rights.56 
                                                        
55 See, Tabatha Abu El-Haj, All Assemble: Order and Disorder in Law, Politics, and Culture, 16 J. CONST. 
L. 949, 953-63 (2014). 
56 MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 285-6 (2010). 
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Chapter 4 invites to build on the traditional doctrinal approach—as presented in 
Chapter 3—and consider other rights that are relevant in framing the right to 
protests. This importance can be seen as twofold. First, these rights show 
foundational freedoms (such as the freedoms of expression and of assembly) are 
relevant but not conclusive in constitutionally rooting the right to protest. Second, 
this approach is also relevant because it sheds some light on certain regulations 
(micromanagement)57 that, precisely because we usually stop short of considering 
other rights, may be useful in further shielding the right to protest. By resorting to 
urban studies, this chapter questions the current utility—in terms of being able to 
expand popular participation—of the so-called public forum doctrine. Taking into 
consideration that almost every important political space has now been privatized, 
the first section of this chapter calls to look at these developments with suspicion 
and caution. If cities are, as experience shows they are, places where the locus of 
political power displays, then the kind of city we have (particularly its spatial 
regulations) “cannot be divorced from the question of what kind of people we want 
to be …”.58  
The second section of this chapter examines the right to privacy. It delineates its 
understanding in public spaces and explores its utility for protests. Although the 
right to privacy is usually understood to be limited to private spaces, this chapter 
presents a more ample conception and prefers to ask what harms this right should 
                                                        
57 Abu El-Haj, All Assemble, supra note 55, at 1029-30. 
58 DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY TO THE URBAN REVOLUTION 4 (2012). 
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protect us from.59 This approach to privacy better addresses situations of 
surveillance and prohibitions of anonymity in public spaces, which eventually may 
lead to shrinking public participation, thus (sometimes directly, sometimes 
indirectly) affecting the foundations of the right to protest. 
Chapter 5 approaches the relation between constitutions and protests from the 
other perspective, the side of the people. It inquires whether constitutional theory, 
despite its emphasis on forms and institutions, courts and robes, and judicial 
opinions and dissents, is ready to accept a popular involvement in constitutional 
exposition. The affirmative answer to this question is found in what is called 
popular constitutionalism. In a nutshell, popular constitutionalism—in its many 
variants—aims to rescue the crucial role the people should play when it comes 
time to define the boundaries of constitutional commitments. At the same time, it 
defies the comprehension of constitutions as a form of law—and nothing more 
than a law. As one of its main expositors has put it, popular constitutionalism 
contends the understanding of constitutions as a species of law and thus set aside 
from the people.60 Rather than a document reserved to be exclusively read by a 
certain elite trained, if not domesticated, in law, that is, lawyers and judges, 
popular constitutionalism claims constitutions to be a layman’s document.61 
Constitutions, therefore, are to be taken back to the people themselves.62 
                                                        
59 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008). 
60 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004). 
61 Id. at 207. 
62 Id. at 247-8. 
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That fact that popular constitutionalism claims a key role for the people as final 
arbiters of constitutional understanding does not mean that institutions should be 
disregarded. Indeed, as I show in this chapter, every variant of popular 
constitutionalism admits the need of having an institutional avenue where these 
popular readings can be directed to. One trend of popular constitutionalism, in 
fact, believes it is possible to reconcile judicial supremacy with the people as final 
constitutional authorities. Another denies such a central place for courts (the very 
principle popular constitutionalism reacted against), thus proposing to look at 
representative branches, either the parliament or the executive. There are of 
course those who believe none of the representative branches should have a 
paramount position when it comes to defining constitutional boundaries and thus 
prefer a sort of horizontality between all branches. At any rate, as I claimed before, 
constitutional interpretation, even under the auspices of popular 
constitutionalism, requires institutions. It insists that constitutional interpretation 
is to consider the “vertical constitutional relationships both among citizens 
themselves and between citizens and the system of representative democracy 
within which they live.”63 
There are mainly two reasons that merit attention in highlighting the relation 
between institutions and popular readings of constitutions: instrumental and 
normative reasons. I describe these reasons at the beginning of Chapter 6. 
                                                        
63 Stephen Tierney, Whose political Constitution? Citizens and referendums, 14 GERMAN L. J. 2185, 
2187 (2013). 
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Instrumental reasons to have popular readings of constitutions institutionalized 
range from considerations of publicity to conceiving authoritative decisions as a 
means to shield (provided the immanency of democratic decisions) changes once 
they have been non-institutionally achieved. However, there is a normative reason 
as well. As I argue in Chapter 6, constitutional interpretation is, just as 
representative democracy, a diarchy. It requires the interplay, tense and disputed 
at times, between non-institutional forms of constitutional interpretation and 
institutional avenues.64 These two avenues do not merge, they do not overlap one 
other, and no avenue gains priority over the other.65 Rather, they act in concert or 
in what Guinier and Torres have called dynamic equilibrium.66 
The value this interplay serves is democratic equality—as understood in the 
specific context of constitutional interpretation. If constitutions express common 
commitments, then we need to find a way to subject its readings and 
interpretations to fora accessible to all. Chapter 6 explains that this can be 
achieved by asking social protests to direct their popular understandings to 
institutions that are open to all to consider and deliberate around these 
interpretations; thereby, protests do not replace institutions and institutions do 
                                                        
64 NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED: OPINION, TRUTH, AND THE PEOPLE 1-5 (2014). 
65 When explaining the main features of current constitutional democratic orders, James Tully 
talked of the ‘equiprimordial’ balance between the principles of democratic freedom (popular 
sovereignty) and the Rule of Law. James Tully, The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their 
Ideals of Constitutional Democracy, 65 MOD. L. REV. 204, 207 (2002). 
66 Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and 
Social Movements, 123 YALE L. J. 2740, 2749 (2014). 
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not replace protests.67 It is only then, that is to say, only after protesters have 
subjected their readings to the consideration of the rest, we can talk of a genuine 
constitutional interpretation, an understanding that can be attributed to the 
people as a whole.68 
What institution should social protest direct its popular readings to? This is a fairly 
strategic choice. As the literature on social movements shows, mobilizations 
usually target (not always successfully) those institutions that are more likely to 
deliver the kinds of benefits a specific social movement pursues. However, when 
talking of constitutional interpretations that can be attributed to the people as a 
whole, I am thinking not in specific benefits, but in democratically contributing to 
define the proper understanding of constitutions. Social protest movements aimed 
at interpreting (either consciously or unconsciously) the constitution do not 
operate as what the literature calls interests groups,69 but rather as public-
oriented political movements whose readings they want all to accept. 
                                                        
67 As Schmitt put it, “[i]t is precisely in a democracy that the people cannot become the 
administrative apparatus and a mere state ‘organ’.” CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 271 
(Jeffrey Seitzer trans. Duke University Press 2008) (1928). And he continues: “Just as a party cannot 
transform itself into an official organ without losing its party character, so public opinion cannot 
permit its transformation into an official jurisdiction …” (at 275). 
68 In other words, I distance myself from the work of others who believe the people as a whole act 
only at certain specific moments of democratic life—which are singled out as ‘constitutional 
moments’ and ‘higher lawmaking’ instances. BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 
(1991). Whereas these readings suggest regular and institutional ‘political’ times cannot revisit 
decisions reached through constitutional moments (Ackerman talks of overturning the “considered 
judgments previously reached by the people”), I contend constituted institutions are—in this 
interaction I am talking about—suitable to permit the development and deepening of our initial 
(but inevitably left opened) constitutional commitments. Moreover, these developments can also be 
attributed to the people, and not just to a government or a constituted agency or power. However, 
what I also argue in Chapter 6 is that the legitimacy of these ‘regular’ decisions can also be 
evaluated. 
69 See, Guinier & Torres, Changing the Wind, supra note 66, at 2756-62 
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* * * 
Liberal constitutionalism affirms the constituent power of the people is exhausted 
once a new constitution is in place.70 It also teaches that constitutions are to be 
read and implemented considering their mixture of politics and law. However, this 
is a compound where law, and more specifically courts, ends up having the last 
word as to constitutional meaning. Furthermore, this is also a mix where politics is 
to be mainly defined by representative (formal and institutional) bodies. This is 
why this work focuses on protests, for social protests—compared to lobbyism, 
legal battles, citizen representatives, and forms of self-authorized representation 
other than protests—are the most tangible, visible and disruptive responses to the 
hegemony of liberal constitutionalism. Legal governmental reactions against 
recent waves of upheavals show this to be so. These reactions against social 
protests are of course part of a larger picture: liberal constitutionalism’s antipathy 
toward citizen participation,71 a form of constitutionalism incapable of dealing 
with disagreement72 and appreciating conflict73 and backlash as legitimate 
practices of norm contestation.74 This work proposes a different understanding of 
constitutions, one that is more political and less legal, and whose contours 
therefore cannot be hidden under what an elite claims to be professional expertise 
                                                        
70 Joel Colón-Ríos & Allan C. Hutchinson, Democracy and Revolution: An Enduring Relationship? 89 
DENVER U. L. REV. 593, 607 (2012). 
71 Allan C. Hutchinson & Joel Colón-Ríos, Democracy and Constitutional Change, 58 THEORIA 43 
(2011). See also, FÉLIX OVEJERO, ¿IDIOTAS O CIUDADANOS? EL 15-M Y LA TEORÍA DE LA DEMOCRACIA 47-56 
[IDIOTS OR CITIZENS? THE 15-M AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY] (2013). 
72 JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 154-5 (1999). 
73 Torres & Guinier, The Constitutional Imaginary, supra note 42, at 1054. 
74 Robert C. Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 373, 382 ff. (2007). 
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nor limited to institutional avenues. By opening constitutions to popular 
interpretations and accepting non-institutional means of participation as suitable 
to propose constitutional meanings, this work argues it is up to the people to 
constitute themselves as a genuine community of consent.75 A community that, 
when not considered, decisively affects the legitimacy of constitutional 
understandings thus achieved.76 
                                                        
75 Guinier & Torres, Changing the Wind, supra note 66, at 2744.  
76 Torres & Guinier, The Constitutional Imaginary, supra note 42, at 1054-5; Tully, The Unfreedom of 
the Moderns, supra note 65, at 208 (“The constitution or the principles justifying it cannot be seen 
as a permanent foundation or framework which underlies democratic debate and legislation. They 
must be reciprocally subject to legitimation through practices of the democratic exchange of 
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Social protest movements positing political issues on the streets have marked the 
second decade of the twenty-first century. From the Spanish indignados and Greek 
aganaktismenoi to Wall Street occupiers, from Chilean students to their Québécois 
fellows, from ‘Arab spring’ protesters to Israeli tent protesters, social movements 
have become, to quote Time Magazine, “the primer makers of history.”1 
                                                        
1 TIME, Dec. 26, 2011. 
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Despite this politically transcendent role social protest movements play, 
governmental authorities tend invariably to label protests as illegitimate and 
undemocratic interventions.2 Emphasizing formal and institutional avenues of 
participation (i.e. elections), authorities approach social protests as threats to the 
State and blame their (allegedly) poor deliberative capacity. Protests are thus 
presented as menace to democracy itself.  
Unsurprisingly, different liberal governments around the globe have chosen to 
propose, and in several cases to pass, legislation granting the police ample powers 
to confront protesters, thus diminishing the people’s resort to non-institutional 
means of participation. Eventually, repression (both symbolic and material) 
becomes the regular answer—as the U.N. Special Rapporteur has noticed.3  
This chapter starts from these contentions and seeks answers from the sociology 
of social movements. Sociologists, in fact, have already discussed the contribution 
social movements have made to democracy. The first section (I) will briefly discuss 
social movements. In spite of the fact the concept of social movements has proven 
to be much contested, there are nonetheless some main traits emerging from 
scholarly observation that I will sum up in this first part.4 I will do this in order to 
                                                        
2 See, COSTAS DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE IN THE CRISIS 9 (2013) (noting that although Arab, 
Greek and Spanish, as well as other mobilizations, have differences in scope and intensity, they all 
provoked similar systemic and political reactions). 
3 See, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/27, May 21, 2012, para. 63 
(remembering positive obligations for States include to refrain from violence in controlling 
protests) and 84 a) (calling States not to criminalize those who exercise their right to assembly and 
association).  
4 By placing the emphasis on the movements’ external face (protests) I will sidestep, except for a 
few comments, the debate on the internal conditions social movements must meet to succeed—an 
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underscore that non-institutional instances of participation have become regular 
forms of political participation—very much stimulated the more States 
democratize.5 This, as I will note, has contributed to expand both the concept of 
politics and that of representative democracy. Ignoring these contributions by 
exclusively highlighting the abstract violence involved—very much the strategy 
followed by liberal governments—“combines the defence of the status quo with 
historical ignorance.”6  
In the second part (II), I shall underscore an underlying agreement between 
sociological analyses on social movements, namely that social movements 
presuppose the State and its institutions—despite the fact they mean to contest 
and, when possible, shape them.7 Although I will leave revolutionary (social) 
movements—which of course exist—aside, I will consider certain qualifications 
that the new wave of social protest movements should force us to consider. These 
new movements, although not nihilistic, have decided not to address their 
demands to the State—and in fact not to pose any demand at all. 
I shall finalize (III) by stressing social movements’ most relevant features that need 
to be considered for a constitutional law assessment of protests. This means, I 
                                                                                                                                                                  
emphasis upon which ‘Resource Mobilization Theory’ has built up its approach. GRAEME CHESTERS & 
IAN WELSH, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THE KEY CONCEPTS 1-21 (2011). 
5 As will be noted below, social movements (including their large array of non-institutional 
strategies) tend to increase as democratic conditions improve. 
6 DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE, supra note 2, at 139.  
7 The fact social movements presuppose the State, and not a certain form of polity, as I will add 




insist, that I won’t provide a definition of social protest, but highlight its main 
characteristics as they prove useful for further constitutional assessment.  
   
I. Social movements and politics outside the institutions 
 
“You say you’ll change the Constitution, 
Well you know,  
We’d all love to change your head.” 
“But when you talk about destruction, 
Don’t you know that you can count me out” 
REVOLUTION (Lennon-McCartney, 1968). 
 
What a social movement is has proved to be an elusive and much contested 
question.8 Rather than suggesting narrow and insufficient concepts, observers 
have focused on its distinctive reasons, notes and characteristics—giving place to 
different scholarly approaches.9 In fact, there are several branches of research 
depending on what observers consider to be social movements’ distinctive causes 
and features.10 However prolific this literature has been, the main questions that 
                                                        
8 CHESTERS & WELSH, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 4, at 1. 
9 But see, Mario Diani, The Concept of Social Movements, 40 SOC. REV. 1 (1992) (arguing there is 
sufficient common ground among different approaches to suggest a workable conceptualization).  
10 As authors of one the most complete companions on social movements have noted, “no single 
volume [] provides in-depth, synthetic examinations of a comprehensive set of movement-related 
topics and issues in fashion that reflects and embodies the growing internationalization of social 
movement scholarship.” David A. Snow et al., Mapping the Terrain, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO 
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have driven these inquiries have been turning around the why and the how of 
mobilizations—also denoting different theoretical backgrounds (emphasis on 
agency or structural conditions) and frames of analysis (theoretical or empirical, 
both being local, national and international) of intellectual traditions.11 Though 
history and experience have shown no sharp distinction exists between these two 
approaches, mobilizations seem to in fact respond to a mixture of reasons and 
overlapping factors.12 Differences remain in both the analytical and scholarly 
approach that will often emphasize one over the other. 
Some studies have paid more attention to the how of social movements. This 
approach has been predominantly dominated by the Resource Mobilization Theory 
(RMT), which put the focus “mainly on the organizational resources and the 
rational orientation of political actors.”13 Charles Tilly, for instance, has argued that 
a look at history will allow us to appreciate the characteristics social movements 
have deployed to become relevant political actors.14 The main characteristics—
Tilly contends—that transform a “mere” form collective action into a social 
movement are precisely those related to their internal organization. In fact, social 
movements are, and have been, characterized—at least since 1750—by three main 
features: (a) a “sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on 
                                                                                                                                                                  
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 3, 5 (David A. Snow et. al. eds. 2007). I certainly do not intend to do so here, but 
merely to highlight some main features that will allow a better constitutional comprehension of 
them. 
11 Id. at 3. 
12 Id. at 4 
13 CHESTERS & WELSH, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra 4, at 7.  
14 CHARLES TILLY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 1768-2004 (2004). 
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target authorities” transcending one-time petitions;15 (b) an employment of a large 
array of methods of political incidence;16 and (c) a public display that shows the 
addressees (whoever they may be) the worthiness, unity, numbers, and 
commitment of those taking part in the mobilizations.17 The effective transmission 
of this message, as Tilly argued, is the payoff of those mobilizing but also one of the 
most difficult obstacles to overcome: 
The actual work of organizers consists recurrently of patching together 
provisional coalitions, negotiating which of the multiple agendas participants 
bring with them will find public voice in their collective action, suppressing 
risky tactics, and above all hiding backstage struggle from public view.18  
Therefore, the fact of being a collectivity does not exhaust the main features of 
social movements, for their main difference with other forms of collective behavior 
is precisely their organized character—“the fact that the existence of social 
movement activity implies some degree of organization.”19 As Tilly himself 
elaborated in the early 1990s, “[a] social movement is not a group, a quasi-group, 
or a group-like composite, but a complex form of social interaction.”20 On the 
currency of recent mobilizations it is important to highlight the special role new 
technologies have played. For as Manuel Castells has noted, social movements have 
                                                        
15 Id. at 3. 
16 Id. at 4. 
17 Id. 
18 Charles Tilly, Social movements and (all sorts of) other political interactions – local, national, and 
international – including identities, 27 THEORY & SOC’Y 453, 468 (1998).  
19 David A. Snow et al., Mapping the Terrain, supra note 10, at 10. 
20 Charles Tilly, Social Movements as Historically Specific Clusters of Political Performances, 38 
BERKELEY J. SOC. 1, 5 (1993-1994). 
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found in the Internet new and fascinating tools to overcome the costs of collective 
action.21 Although physical presence in the urban space can certainly not be 
replaced, cyberspace has opened new (radically autonomous, independent and 
uncoerced) avenues for mobilizing emotions towards a common cause,22 
deliberating,23 exchanging information, and building common meanings.24 What 
recent mobilizations have shown—Castells argues—is that today we witness a 
hybrid public place, both digital and urban.25 
To sum up, the approach chosen by RMT led them to ask (a) why people join social 
movements, (b) how those social movements are organized—and how a given 
form of organization may either promote or impede their success26—, and, finally, 
(c) what are the conditions that, with all facts considered, present the most 
favorable scenario to a certain form of collective action.27 Detailing this last 
condition, RMT developed the concept of Political Opportunity Structure, the 
political and institutional environments—the argument goes—that influence the 
way people mobilizing define their organization, strategies and objectives to be 
                                                        
21 MANUEL CASTELLS, NETWORKS OF OUTRAGE AND HOPE: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE INTERNET AGE (2012). 
22 As the example of Tunisia and Egypt showed, protesters used the Internet to air, and in this way 
communicate, the brutal repression with which the challenged regime first responded. Id. at 22-4. 
23 For its great significance Castells mentions the case of Iceland, where a new Constitution 
(eventually blocked by traditional political parties) was drafted. As he argues, the Constitutional 
Assembly Council “received online and offline 16,000 suggestions and comments that were debated 
on the social networks … the final constitutional bill was literally produce through crowdsourcing.” 
Id. at 38-42.    
24 Id. 1-3, 9-12. 
25 Id. at 45. 
26 This is what the literature has called Social Movement Organizations. Andrew G. Walder, Political 
Sociology and Social Movements, 35 ANN. REV. SOC. 393, 404-5 (2009). 
27 CHESTERS & WELSH, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra 4, at 9. I will return later to this third stance on 
political context to suggest it is a transversal factor, that is, not that it is an overlap between the 
both approaches, but that it influences both the how and the why of social movements.   
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pursued—that is, a rational choice as to when mobilize.28 RMT centered its 
attention on the institutional channels modern States open for the people’s 
involvement; the more open these channels are, the more likely grievances will be 
manifested—and vice versa.29 
A second set of studies has put the emphasis on the why, allegedly the kind of 
reasons RMT did not consider in its scheme. In fact, as Chesters and Welsh 
summarize, RMT had been criticized for being indifferent to the political demands 
social movements advanced, overemphasizing the individual’s rational and 
economic calculations, and placing too much attention on the politico-institutional 
arena, thus reducing the terrain in which social movements act.30 New Social 
Movements (NSM) scholars instead contend “modern social movements provide 
avenues for the development of new values and identities, as well as novel 
interpretations of social life, revitalizing a decaying public sphere,”31 thus 
pluralizing the actors that intervene, the realm where they participate, and the 
objectives they seek.32  In this sense they are new movements.33 
                                                        
28 Sidney Tarrow, States and Opportunities: The political structuring of social movements, in 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND 
CULTURAL FRAMINGS 41 (Doug McAdam et al., eds 1996). 
29 CHESTERS & WELSH, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra 4, at 136. See also, Edwin Amenta & Michael Young, 
Democratic States and Social movements: Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses, 46 SOC. PROBS. 153 
(1999) (arguing States influence social movements, and that democratic States tend to open larger 
avenues to public contestation, thus encouraging social movements as they see the State answering 
their demands).  
30 CHESTERS & WELSH, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra 4, at 10. 
31 Kenneth H. Tucker, How New are the New Social Movements? 8 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 75 (1991). 
32 CHESTERS & WELSH, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra 4, at 12-3. 
33 Craig Calhoun, “New Social Movements” of the Early Nineteenth Century, 17 SOC. SCI. HIST. 385 
(1993) (contending these movements began in late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). 
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In stark opposition to the all-too-centered-in-the-State approach taken by RMT 
scholars, NSM advocates focus their attention in non-institutional avenues and in 
movements aimed at identity-formation,34 some of them operating under a 
completely different rationale (non-hierarchical and contesting of existing 
authorities) compared to the cost-benefit analysis that pervades RMT.35  
In his seminal piece on NSM, Claus Offe underscored the fact citizens taking part in 
NSM were eager to have a more direct control on policies, a path they start 
traveling by resorting to “means that are seen frequently to be incompatible with 
the maintenance of the institutional order of the polity.”36 New issues, claims and 
areas NSM politicize(d) go hand in hand with these new forms of participation, 
which are “not constrained by the channels of representative-bureaucratic political 
institutions”37 and which are defined by a new form of understanding politics. This 
‘new paradigm’ of participation, Offe argues, cannot be framed within the liberal 
tradition that emphasizes a strict distinction between private and public spheres, 
this latter to be shaped exclusively through representative instances (politics). For 
as NSM scholars note, the line dividing these spheres begins to blur as politics is 
                                                        
34 Nella Van Dyke et al., The Target of social Movements: Beyond a focus on the State, in RESEARCH IN 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE VOL. 25, 27 (Daniel J. Myers and Daniel M. Cress eds. 2004) 
(“public protest is also used to shape public opinion, identities, and cultural practices and to 
pressure authorities in institutional arenas not directly linked to the state.”). As I will note below, 
these contentions may also have an impact in the way the State finally receives demands posed by 
social groups before not considered legitimate interlocutors, or not noticed at all.  
35 Jean L. Cohen, Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social 
Movements, 52 SOC. RES. 663, 675-89 (1985). But see, Diani, The Concept of Social Movements, supra 
note 9 (arguing non-institutional politics should not be considered as one of the basic components 
of social movements). 
36 Claus Offe, New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics, 52 SOC. RES. 
817, 817-8 (1985). 
37 Id. at 820. 
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extended to new matters previously thought to be private.38 Thus, Offe contends, 
NSM create a third sphere—one that is neither private nor public—but 
which consists in collectively “relevant” results and side effects of either 
private or institutional-political actors for which these actors, however, 
cannot be held responsible or made responsive by available legal [stricto 
sensu] or institutional means.39 
This new space where social movements intervene is a space of non-institutional 
politics that appears as a need rather than as an option.40 Others have concurred in 
this reading; Kenneth Tucker, for instance, also noted NSM occur in a sphere far 
from (though, as Offe noted, connected with) traditional political landscapes. 
Therefore, collective communication occurring in a non-institutional fashion is the 
key to understanding citizens’ direct engagement with other citizens and 
authorities.41 Organizations engaged in this form of political participation privilege 
“direct action, popular initiative and self-actualization over bureaucratic 
                                                        
38 Habermas has also noted how under the NSM paradigm politics reaches new spheres before seen 
as private (i.e. the family), a process facilitated by recourse to direct means of participation. This, he 
suggested, generates a dialectical phenomenon of reduction/extension of the State. The State and 
its institutions, on the one hand, are reduced as NSM resort to forms of political participation other 
than those formally defined from above; however, at the same time, the State and its institutions 
begin to have a greater influence by starting to intervene, both legally and bureaucratically, in those 
very same spheres as they become politicized. Jürgen Habermas, New Social Movements, 21 TELOS 
33, 35-6 (1981). Rancière, from a more radical perspective, has called this very process the 
democratic process. The process—he argues—of enlarging the public sphere by politicizing areas 
before seen as part of the private realm, the very process by which individuals become political. 
JACQUES RANCIÈRE, HATRED OF DEMOCRACY 55-9 (Steve Corcoran trans., Verso 2014).  
39 Offe, New Social Movements, supra note 36, at 826. 
40 Id. Not surprisingly, as Offe noted years ago, the neoconservative strategy has insisted in 
‘reprivatizing’ those spheres, both reducing State interference and, at the same time, stretching 
political participation “down” to institutional channels. (818-20). 
41 Tucker, How New are the New Social Movements? supra note 31, at 78. See also, Cohen, Strategy or 
Identity, supra note 35, at 667. 
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representation.”42 It is a “new form of citizen politics,” as Handler put it, “based on 
direct action, participatory decisionmaking, decentralized structures, and 
opposition to bureaucracy.”43 As Jean Cohen sums up, NSM resort to a form of 
politics that, as these groups themselves claimed, place their efforts beyond 
traditional party politics: 
Instead of forming unions or political parties of the socialist, social 
democratic, or communist type, they focus on grass-roots politics and 
create horizontal, directly democratic associations that are loosely 
federated on national levels.44 
A quick survey on how recent protesters and observers saw the 2011 wave of 
mobilizations further confirms scholarly views on the use of direct action—this 
time merged with high levels of distrust toward formal politics and representative 
instances. Douzinas, accounting for the Greek case, emphasizes distrust towards 
representative democracy and the inattention to the interests of those 
marginalized and excluded as the main thrusts behind protests.45 This was also the 
case of the Occupy movements across North America; these movements expressly 
contended their representatives have agreed to promote multinationals’ interests 
rather than those of their people, and, as such, the movements called to advance 
                                                        
42 Tucker, How New are the New Social Movements? supra note 31, at 80. 
43 Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, And the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 697, 
719 (1992); Cohen, Strategy or Identity, supra note 35, at 692-3 (arguing the new paradigm notes 
actors taking part in NSM interact in a non-hierarchical fashion); Offe, New Social Movements, supra 
note 36, at 829 (noting NSM “do not rely in traditional political forms, neither internally, where 
they privilege non-hierarchical and collective relations, nor externally, where, as seen, they act in 
through informal means”). 
44 Cohen, Strategy or Identity, supra note 35, at 667. 
45 DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE, supra note 2, at 12-3, 147-8, 150-52. 
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“participatory democracy … not through elected representatives.”46 In Iceland, 
protesters held representatives were simply unable to confront the power of 
financial elites.47 Castells, for one, argues that the Spanish indignados went beyond 
in seeking direct action to move beyond formal politics, but also away from other 
cultural and media intermediaries.48 Even social protest movements which 
deliberately sought to engage in formal political dialogue, as was the case of 
Chilean students, began manifesting their criticisms as to the way representatives 
were carrying out their duties.49 
Not only has the concept of politics been transformed by direct action, but also the 
conceptual extension of representative democracy. By shaking models based 
exclusively on a juridico-legal representative fashion—despite claims contending 
the erosion of authority50—NSM have contributed to shape democracy’s current 
understanding. As Urbinati and Warren have shown, the concept of representation 
has been expanded (in a clear display of its historical contingency) to encompass 
forms of participation and political decision-making that include non-electoral 
                                                        
46 James Miller, Is Democracy Still in the Streets?, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK 173 (Janet Byrne ed., 
2012), at 174. 
47 Lilja Mósesdóttir, Iceland, 14 EUR. SOC’Y 141, 142 (2012). 
48 CASTELLS, NETWORKS OF OUTRAGE, supra note 21, at 121. 
49 Nora Lustig et al., ¡Basta ya! Chilean Students say ‘enough’, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK 223, supra 
note 46, at 227-30. 
50 Offe, New Social Movements, supra note 36, at 817-8 (underscoring that conservative analysts 
saw NSM as disruptive of the established legal order, “highly vicious and dangerous … of political 
authority and even [of] the capacity to govern.”). But see, Tucker, How New are the New Social 
Movements? supra note 31, at 79 (arguing NSM do not take authority for granted but, instead, they 
build and test traditional instances from below); David A. Snow, Social Movements as Challenges to 
Authority: Resistance to emerging Conceptual Hegemony, in RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS 
AND CHANGE VOL. 25, supra note 34, 3 (contending too much focus on “contentious politics” falls 
short of appreciating a whole array of NSM who contend authority beyond the government). 
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venues, including instances of self-authorized representation.51 While Urbinati and 
Warren show these new instances of self-authorization appear as a reaction 
against the failure of institutional politics in representing citizens,52 they also 
acknowledge—closer to the literature on NSM—that these forms of direct 
participation are “not necessarily a precursor to formal, electoral inclusion but 
rather a representative phenomenon in its own right.”53 
The same might be said about discursive representation. According to Dryzek and 
Niemeyer, discursive representation permits more of a comprehensive 
representation of individuals and groups in contexts where the demos has not 
been totally defined, admittedly the current situation in modern communities and 
by necessity situations where NSM contest dominant patterns.54 In making the 
case for representing discourses as an integral part of democracy, Dryzek and 
Niemeyer argue it opens spaces up for bringing new discourses into the 
democratic agenda. Groups normally marginalized from formal politics would see 
their chances of influencing public opinion increased—thus enhancing the 
legitimacy of public decisions.55 While Dryzek and Niemeyer are more concerned 
with suggesting formal avenues to implement discursive representation, they also 
note informal avenues for discursive representation serve the purpose of 
                                                        
51 Nadia Urbinati & Mark E. Warren, The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic 
Theory, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 387, 403-05 (2008) (mentioning also citizen representatives—citizens 
non-elected but who take part in “formally designed venues into which citizens” participate).  
52 Id. at 403. 
53 Id. at 404. 
54 John S. Dryzek & Simon Niemeyer, Discursive Representation, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 481, 481-8 
(2008) (arguing individuals feel represented by various levels of discourses, “each of which 
resonates with a particular aspect of the ‘self’”). 
55 Id. at 488-90. 
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providing a space of critical oversight of discourses recognized at the formal level 
as well as influencing the terms of political debates and understandings of those 
discourses.56 Once again, discursive representation neither replaces nor claims to 
be better than formal avenues of representation, rather different and 
complementary.57 
The emphasis on how the concept of political representation has been expanded to 
include forms of self-authorization and discursive representation, to name a few, is 
precisely the outcome NSM have sought and are still seeking: that of contending 
institutions and a certain form of politics, as well as cultural, social, and other 
kinds of normative values and principles that we usually take for granted. A large 
array of scholarly literature has agreed NSM have contributed to democratize, 
rather than to diminish, our comprehensions of democracy58 at institutional (by 
bringing in new forms of participation), political (by opening public opinion, 
shaping new discourses and thus broadening democratic legitimacy), and social 
(by contending “the structures of domination involved” in societal norms) levels.59  
                                                        
56 Id. at 490-1. 
57 Id. at 481, 489. 
58 CHESTERS & WELSH, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra 4, at 2 (noting social movements have triggered 
changes—as did the Civil Rights movement—, few would now claim to have diminished 
democracies); TILLY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 14, at 1 (“by the turn of the twenty-first century, 
people all over the world recognized the term ‘social movement’ as a trumpet call, as a 
counterweight to oppressive power, as a summons to popular action against a wide range of 
scourges.”); Offe, New Social Movements, supra note 36, at 828 (arguing social movements’ goal is 
that of being recognized as legitimate “political actors by the wider community”); Cohen, Strategy 
or Identity, supra note 35, at 668-9 (underscoring democratizing trends social movements have 
imposed do also impact beyond the State reaching social institutions).  
59 Cohen, Strategy or Identity, supra note 35, at 694.  
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Their biggest success has been that of making it empirically and politically evident 
that representative democracy is a contingent (essentially contested) concept.60 As 
John Markoff once wrote when introducing his sociological history of democracy’s 
changes, “[d]emocracy has been continually defined and redefined by the people 
challenging government in the streets and fields …”.61 
For my purposes here it is enough to note, along with Chantal Mouffe, that at the 
conceptual level democracy opens, rather than closes, spaces for contestation.62 
Mouffe’s normative stance also has its empirical face, for as political opportunity 
structure studies—a variant of RMT—have shown, the more democratic the States, 
the more likely social movements (together with their non-institutional means of 
intervention) will sprout.63 In fact, as Jack Goldstone has suggested, so regular are 
these non-institutional forms of participation that they are already contained in 
any shape which representative democracy might take in the future.64 Eventually, 
the level of tolerance, acceptance, and responsiveness a State shows toward non-
                                                        
60 Where the degree to which a “continuous active participation of all citizens in political life” 
stands among democracy’s (already an essentially contested concept) most contested features. W. 
B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 167, 184-6 (1956).  
61 JOHN MARKOFF, WAVES OF DEMOCRACY: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL CHANGE xvi (1996). 
62 In fact, as Mouffe argues, democracy opens the possibility of nevertheless sharing a common 
symbolic sphere, advancing different forms as to how to organize that common ground. In this, she 
notes—and I will argue below—rights play a key role in permitting that contestation to 
continuously flow, thus preventing, rather than promoting, radical redefinitions. CHANTAL MOUFFE, 
THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 13-6, 44-5 (2000 repr. 2009). CHANTAL MOUFFE, ON THE POLITICAL (2005) 
(arguing the dangers of denying political antagonism and its manifestation within a shared 
common ground). 
63 Amenta & Young, Democratic States and Social movements, supra note 29. But see, Jack A. 
Goldstone, More social movements of fewer? Beyond political opportunity structures to relational 
fields, 33 THEORY & SOC’Y 333 (2004) (arguing social movements are part of normal politics and not 
only a matter “of repressed forces fighting states” and acting according to given opportunities).  
64 Goldstone, More social movements of fewer? supra note 63, at 336-7. 
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institutional forms of participation becomes a democratic touchstone.65 The 
downside is for governments reluctant to (politically rather than formally) include 
non-institutional mechanisms of participation, for they artificially hinder 
disagreement and conflict likely to erupt at some further time in a more radical 
and evil face. 
 
II. Who are the addressees? Presupposing the State 
 
Hitherto I have been considering two of the most relevant approaches to social 
movements, namely RMT and NSM schools. Despite main disagreements on their 
approximations, they both coincide in highlighting the non-institutional means 
social movements resort to, on the one hand, and in admitting them as part of 
regular politics, on the other. Besides explanatory coincidences there is another 
common ground both schools admit to at a more conceptual level: that protests, as 
part of the repertory of actions social movements resort to—and in spite of 
revolutionary goals bawled—, presuppose the State and its institutions, at least 
when they are aimed at reading the Constitution.66 Although the literature on 
                                                        
65 Amenta & Young, Democratic States and Social movements, supra note 29, at 154 (“states whose 
leaders, forms, and policies are decided with key participation and input from everyday people.”). 
66 When I say that social protest movements (aimed at reading the Constitution) presuppose the 
State I mean they actually accept the State and its institutions as they have been erected, despite 
the fact they also aim to shape, transform, influence, etc. that very same State and its institutions. 
Therefore, they presuppose a certain form of State—most of the times it has been a decision from a 
governmental agent what has took them to mobilize—and not just a certain form of polity. 
Revolutionary movements, on the other hand, are aimed precisely at changing “the type of political 
organization, e.g. from monarchy to oligarchy, from oligarchy to democracy, and so on … a sharp, 
sudden change in the social location of political power, expressing itself in the radical 
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social movements shows this is the case, it is also worth noticing that recent social 
movements have made explicit their intentions not to present any demands before 
institutional avenues, totally disregarding the State.  
A. States, institutions and social movements 
Let me begin by pointing out the relevance of the State and its institutions on social 
movements (and of the movements over the State and its institutions). As I ended 
up noting in the previous section, social movements have played their part, in fact 
a very important one, in democratizing States. However, at the same time, 
empirical analyses show their intervention has been possible due to the fact States 
have also become more democratic—States, as Amenta and Young put it, “whose 
leaders, forms, and policies are decided with key participation and input from 
everyday people.”67 I do not want to engage in a kind of what came first, the 
chicken or the egg, debate, rather suggest these facts exhibit an (almost 
unavoidable) interdependency between States and social movements—a relation 
further encouraged as social movements do not completely dispense with 
institutional avenues, but quite the contrary.68 
According to Offe, institutional and non-institutional means run parallel as those 
engaging in “unconventional forms of political action do so in addition to the fact 
                                                                                                                                                                  
transformation of the process of government, of the official foundations of sovereignty ….” Eugene 
Kamenka, The Concept of a Political Revolution, in VIII NOMOS 122, 124 (Carl J. Friedrich ed. 1966).  
67 Id. 
68 In fact, and pushing things a little bit forward, even revolutionary social movements presuppose 
the State, whose institutions they seek drastically to alter and replace—not in vain nationalism has 
been the main driving force behind revolutionary social movements. JAMES DEFRONZO, REVOLUTIONS 
& REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS 8 (1991). 
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that they also are likely to have engaged in ‘orthodox’ political behavior.”69 Or as 
Cohen has put it, NSM are fairly characterized as self-limiting movements whose 
main focus is that of furthering the democratic project together with its 
institutions, rather than abolishing the State.70 In fact, they do not act in an isolated 
fashion, but in relation with other political actors.71 Non-institutional instances of 
participation as well as institutional venues become part of social movements’ 
repertoire, intertwined up to a point where no radical line can be drawn.72  
Unsurprisingly, Tucker thus noted actors of NSM accept democratic States, the 
very same condition that legitimizes their demands and means.73 Offe also 
underscored (new) social movements do not disregard the State; actually, their 
demands, which are neither purely private nor exclusively public, pose new issues 
likely to be affected both by private actors and State policy. What they insist on, 
however, is the unavailability of legal or institutional means suited, let alone 
designed, to hold involved actors accountable—which explains their insistence on 
(new spheres of political action filled up with) non-institutional means.74 
Moreover, as Habermas more practically put it,  
                                                        
69 Offe, New Social Movements, supra note 36, at 840 (his emphasis). 
70 Cohen, Strategy or Identity, supra note 35, at 664-70. See also, Elim Papadakis, Social Movements, 
Self-limiting Radicalism and the Green Party in West Germany, 22 SOCIOLOGY 433 (1988). 
71 Offe, New Social Movements, supra note 36, at 830 (“Social movements relate to other political 
actors and opponents not in terms of negotiations, compromise, reform, improvement, or gradual 
progress to be brought about by organized pressure and tactics, but, rather, in terms of sharp 
antinomies such as yes/no, them/us ….”). 
72 Goldstone, More social movements of fewer? supra note 63, at 342. 
73 Tucker, How New are the New Social Movements? supra note 31, at 78. 
74 Offe, New Social Movements, supra note 36, at 826. 
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these challenges [NSM pose] are largely abstract and require technical and 
economic solutions that must, in turn, be planned globally and implemented 
by administrative means.75 
Charles Tilly, on the currency of RMT, has also disputed that, from a historical 
viewpoint, social movements as political actors regularly involve “governments of 
one sort or another [that] figure somehow in the claim making, whether as 
claimants, objects of claims, allies of the objects, or monitors of the contention.”76 
Amenta and Young argue in a similar vein when affirming social movements 
necessarily involve the State—which would also be the case of identity 
movements.77 It is true that RMT fell short in their analyses by not considering that 
social movements act in spheres other than those of the State and its institutions.78 
Even in these situations, however, the State may play an important role. Van Dyke 
et. al have argued that social movements also target instances other than the State, 
such as when they look to influence public opinion by directing their actions 
“toward the realms of culture, identity, and everyday life, as well as direct 
                                                        
75 Habermas, New Social Movements, supra note 38, at 35. He would later insist that civil society 
functions by “signaling” problems the political system should process and solve. As this is an 
ongoing dialogue, once a solution has been implemented, civil society “oversee[s] further treatment 
of problems that takes place inside the political system.” JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND 
NORMS. CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 359 (William Rehg trans., MIT 
Press 1998).  
76 TILLY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 14, at 3. 
77 Amenta & Young, Democratic States and Social movements, supra note 29, at 153 (arguing that, 
though some contend not all movements are State-oriented, even those movements resort to State 
action “as leverage against their opponents”). 
78 Van Dyke et al., Beyond a focus on the State, supra note 34, 28 (arguing not all movements focus 
on the State, but a large array of them “target other entities, such as religious, medical, and 
educational organizations, professional associations, and private employers”). 
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engagement with the state.”79 But if States are catalogued as—allow me to put it 
this way—more democratic as they become more responsive to their citizenry, 
these changes and challenges at cultural, everyday life and social norms levels also 
impact the new realm of institutional politics, and, most importantly, they might 
also impact the very same conditions that legitimate social movements’ direct 
action.80 In line with András Sajó, dominant trends in social organization and 
norms receive a privileged legal treatment when it comes time to legally regulate 
certain forms of collective behavior, even when all forms of expression, hegemonic 
(i.e. religious manifestations) and counter-hegemonic, involve passions and 
emotions.81  
Experience shows, therefore, that RMT and NSM approaches are not such 
incompatible enterprises, but rather that they are complementary.82 Moreover, 
this overlapping relation between institutional and non-institutional forms of 
political participation, far from a pure casual empirical confluence, might be the 
result of the same driving principle working beneath both forms of intervention in 
                                                        
79 Id. at 29. 
80 A form of impact that has proven crucial for displaced and marginalized social groups as their 
struggle also concentrates on shaping both institutional as well as non-institutional patterns of 
hegemony. As Nancy Fraser explains, social groups resort to a cluster of strategies aimed at 
“redressing misrecognition … replacing institutionalized value patterns that impede parity of 
participation with ones that enable or foster it.” Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, 3 NEW LEFT 
REV. 107, 114-5 (2000). 
81 ANDRÁS SAJÓ, CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS 246-7 (2011). This, as I will argue below, also impacts 
the formation of the public opinion according to which the State responds. If certain forms of 
participation, particularly those regarded as uncommon, unconventional or non-institutional, are 
enfolded with legal, constitutional, social, and cultural restrictions, then part of the people will be 
placed in subordination to those whose forms of participation are considered more acceptable. 
They will be not, as they normally are not—to quote Fraser again—“full partner[s] in social life.” 
Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, supra note 80, at 113-4. 
82 Cohen, Strategy or Identity, supra note 35, at 705-08. 
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politics. Goldstone put it as follows: “that ordinary people are politically worthy of 
consultation.”83  
This relation, however empirically-credited, has also proved to be contingent and 
tense. Social movements that find States responsive to their demands84 are more 
willing to continue engaging in informal collective action.85 Moreover, even when 
previously marginalized groups have been progressively integrated into regular 
and institutional channels of political participation, this inclusion did not come “at 
the expense of other forms of participation.”86  
Others have called the attention of inclusive States as governmental officers are 
keen on using inclusion in formal avenues as an argument to call protesters to 
abandon informal means of participation (you have been invited to have a say—
the governmental argument goes) or to weaken non-institutional movements. For 
one thing, institutional venues have proven ill-suited to encourage actual 
deliberation between States and challengers.87 For another, by including 
challengers into formal avenues governments might succeed in disarticulating 
social movements or causing friction among them. After all, as Dryzek has argued, 
when groups leave the “oppositional sphere to enter the state then dominant 
                                                        
83 Goldstone, More social movements of fewer? supra note 63, at 342.  
84 Moreover, some authors have suggested governmental responsiveness is an index of democracy’s 
quality. See, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., The Chain of Responsiveness, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 91 (2004). 
85 Amenta & Young, Democratic States and Social movements, supra note 29, at 155. 
86 Goldstone, More social movements of fewer? supra note 63, at 337-8. 
87 Lucio Baccaro and Konstantinos Papadakis, The downside of participatory-deliberative public 
administration, 7 SOC.-ECON. REV. 245 (2009). 
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classes and public officials have less to fear in the way of public protest.”88 
Therefore, incentives actually point to maintaining the autonomy and 
independence that an informal civil society provides.89  
One possible way of solving this puzzle is by noticing that challengers, despite 
joining certain institutional avenues, maintain their rights to resort to direct means 
of action whenever they decide to do so—constitutionally granted rights, in other 
words, do not expire.90 In fact, it has been frustration with available conventional 
forms of participation what has brought many movements to seek alternatives in 
the non-conventional realm.91 A second non-exclusive alternative is not to 
succumb too quickly before the temptation of getting into formal avenues. It might 
be sensible to first analyze whether the avenues offered and issues contested 
provide any actual opportunity for change at the institutional level. Dryzek, for 
instance, argues social movements might first consider whether their claims fall 
(or can be redressed) to what he calls State imperatives, “any function that 
governmental structures must perform if those structures are to secure longevity 
and stability.”92 If this is the case, then it might be strategically sensible to join 
formal conversations. However, when this is not the case (i.e. challengers’ claims 
touch upon issues irrelevant for the State) inclusion might well be 
                                                        
88 JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS 89 (2002). 
89 Id., at 81-5 (arguing conditions for meaningful inclusion are quite demanding).  
90 This, however, opens the door for strategic criticism from the State, which will likely resort to 
mainstream media to highlight the fact that challengers, having been offered the opportunity to 
seek their demands at governmental level, have preferred to quit and continue rioting.  
91 Offe, New Social Movements, supra note 36, at 855. 
92 DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 88, at 83-5. 
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counterproductive.93 Context is also important; opening institutional avenues 
might not be enough where social patterns of misrecognition and, as in most 
countries, structural material inequality are maintained.  
There is an important caveat in this analysis that recent mobilizations force us to 
consider: the case of movements whose aim is addressing neither the State nor its 
institutions, but to promote the process itself.94 This is one of the key features the 
Occupy and the indignados movements have resorted to: not to present any single 
demand before the State and to reject representative politics.  
The first principle OWA [Occupy Wall Street] shares with anarchists is the 
refusal to recognize the legitimacy of existing political institutions. A reason 
for the much-discussed refusal to issue demands is that issuing demands 
means recognizing the legitimacy—or at least the power—of those of whom 
the demands are made.95 
By the same token, Douzinas, addressing the Greek protests in 2008, affirms the 
people did not pose any demand. These were “people whose interests are never 
heard, accounted or represented. They did not demand anything special. They 
                                                        
93 Id. at 110-1. However, it should be pointed out that State imperatives could vary over time—
something Dryzek recognizes (at 93)—and actually the large array of rights constitutionally 
enshrined have helped to open up States’ duties. In any case, what rights entail is often the subject 
of strong disagreement (there is key disagreement as to what rights we have and what they do 
command, forbid, and permit), and this is precisely Dryzek’s warning: social movements should 
only seriously consider joining the State when “the defining interest of the entering group can be 
connected quite directly to an existing or emerging state imperative” (at 88).  
94 CASTELLS, NETWORKS OF OUTRAGE, supra note 21, at 185.  




simply said, ‘enough is enough’, ‘here we stand against’.”96 It was a process through 
which those who were invisible became visible.97 
Refusal to posit demands has opened some flanks to criticism. Alain Badiou, for 
example, has argued riots unaccompanied with political truth become a sign (the 
unrest) with no judgment.98 While Badiou is not suggesting that political meaning 
is to be achieved only by addressing the State, he certainly believes movements 
become political as they also develop an idea, “a kind of historical projection of 
what the historical becoming of a politics is going to be …”.99 This is the moment 
when  
you decide what the state must do and find the means of forcing it to, while 
always keeping your distance from the state and without ever submitting 
your convictions to its authority, or responding to its summonses, especially 
electoral ones.100  
Žižek has also raised his voice to warn challengers not to fetichize the movement 
by “fall[ing] in love with themselves, with the fun they are having in the ‘occupied’ 
zones.”101 While he admits the movements might be in a latent state where no 
quick and adjusted-to-liberal-still-not-contested-hegemony is needed (challengers 
must resist the temptation of translating their energy in “a set of concrete 
                                                        
96 DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE, supra note 2, at 151. 
97 Id. 
98 ALAIN BADIOU, THE REBIRTH OF HISTORY: TIMES OF RIOTS AND UPRISINGS 21-6 (Gregory Elliott trans., 
Verso 2012).  
99 Id. at 63-4 (his emphasis). 
100 Id. at 81-2. 
101 SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE YEAR OF DREAMING DANGEROUSLY 77 (2012). 
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demands”—he concedes),102 he also argues “they express an authentic rage that 
remains unable to transform itself into even a minimal positive program for socio-
political change … the fatal weakness of the current protests.”103 By relying on the 
Spanish indignados manifesto, he asks: who are those being addressed by the 
demands?104  
To be clear, neither Badiou nor Žižek is suggesting challengers should exclusively 
address the State and its institutions, but to go further in radical change. The 
question that remains open is whether movements such as Occupy and European 
indignados are aimed at achieving that radical a change.105 Some say they do. 
Douzinas, for instance, claims that these mobilizations carry the germ of political 
comprehensive changes. They amount to a “political baptism,” as he puts it, which 
prepares resisting subjectivities despite posing no demands before formal 
powers.106 Castells makes a similar claim; to him, instead of assessing the 
movements by considering actual politico-formal outcomes, they have to be seen 
under broader political changes they might, and some are sure to, bring about: “its 
impact on people’s consciousness …”.107 In the worst scenario, lack of specific 
demands is the movements’ strength and weakness.108  
                                                        
102 Id. at 82-3. 
103 Id. at 78. 
104 Id. at 79. 
105 A latent condition Badiou reserves for ‘Arab Spring’ mobilizations. BADIOU, THE REBIRTH OF 
HISTORY, supra note 98, at 26 ff. 
106 DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE, supra note 2, at 141-4 (arguing against Badiou that these 
movements are not anti-political but collectively insurrectional or political despite their lack of 
direct demands). 
107 CASTELLS, NETWORKS OF OUTRAGE, supra note 21, at 185-97. 
108 Id. at 188. 
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This is one possible reading. On the one hand, it suggests the sociological 
approaches described thus far fall short in not considering the force of movements 
targeting not the State, but society itself. On the other, it might be seen as a call for 
reconceptualizing what presupposing the State means. Under this reading one 
could argue that these movements, even if not directly addressing the State (and 
its institutions), define themselves precisely in relation/opposition to it. In order 
to define the new frontiers of the possible, which is no longer in the sole hands of 
the State, movements take the State into consideration to demarcate 
boundaries.109 
A second reading will be to suggest that, no matter how antagonist of formal 
institutions a movement declares to be, it needs the State (and its institutions) to 
meet its goals. I’m here only sketching some possible forms this argument may 
take. First—I show some examples below—, challengers have claimed the 
protection of rights embedded in liberal constitutions to shield their actions. This 
signals, as I see it, respect and resort to the State and its institutions, certainly not 
to have their demands realized through them,110 but they confirm the legitimacy of 
certain key regulations (i.e. constitutional rights) that movements do not contend 
(call it procedural safeguards to advance a movement’s substantive goals).111 
                                                        
109 BADIOU, THE REBIRTH OF HISTORY, supra note 98, at 94-5. 
110 But see, Pam Martens, Occupy Movement files lawsuit against every federal regulator of Wall 
Street, WALL STREET ON PARADE (February 28, 2013), available at: wallstreetonparade.com 
111 In fact, many occupiers have resorted to these very same rights to shield their means of protest. 
Just to name a few examples: Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135646 (D. Minn. 2011) (where Occupy Minneapolis asked a court to enforce a 
bundle of constitutional rights—to free speech, assembly and others—against a resolution of the 
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Second, either willfully or not, these movements have triggered changes (or at 
least had those possible changes in sight) in the formal field of politics. Some of 
these changes have actually been seen as a success. In Iceland, the country where 
one of the most salient cases that actually inspired other European movements 
took place, demands were institutionally channeled through the Icelandic 
Althingi112—where they eventually failed. Douzinas, who described Greek 
mobilizations as latent historical movements that open prospects for future radical 
change, talks precisely about politics whose “terrain had changed, through the 
appearance of new politicized subjects.”113 In other cases, resorting to formal 
politics has been seen as an unavoidable path. In Israel, for instance, the movement 
acknowledged that for “changing the entire order … [they] will have to await the 
results of future elections.”114 In other words, formal politics, the State and its 
institutions are at least, a reference point not blurred by not posing demands. 
B. Political context 
                                                                                                                                                                  
county restricting meetings at Plazas); Order, In the Matter of Application of Jennifer Waller et. al. v. 
City of New York 112957/2011, November 15, 2011, available at: 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/press/OWS111511.pdf (where occupiers claimed the city’s order to 
ban tents in Zuccotti Park); Garcia v. Bloomberg, F. Supp. 2d, 2012 WL 2045756 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(where protesters marching across the Brooklyn Bridge complained they were not given fair 
warrant by police officers before being arrested); Occupy Eugene v. United States General Services 
Administration (GSA) 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170700 (D. Or. Dec. 3, 2013) (where occupiers asked a 
court to grant them permission to protests on public dependencies); Felarca v. Birgeneau, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6812 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 17, 2014) (where California occupiers complained against police 
brutality).  
112 See, Á. TH. Árnason, A Review of the New Icelandic Constitution – popular sovereignty or political 
confusion, 2011 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR CONSTITUTIONEEL RECHT 342 (2011).  
113 DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE, supra note 2, at 144. 
114 Neri Zilber, Occupying the Israeli Street: The tents protest movement and Social justice in the Holy 
Land, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK 232, supra note 46, at 238. 
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Now I turn briefly to the second point before announced, namely the political 
context where social movements display their (social) power. The political context 
that I will consider here is different from what is known as the political 
opportunity structures (POS) approach, despite being developed from this 
approach.115 POS paid too much, if not all, of its attention to the impact that the 
State (formally understood) has on movements, overlooking some crucial features 
highlighted above.116 As noted, mobilizations are related to, although not 
absolutely conditioned by, the State and its institutions. However, the fact that 
social movements influence the State as well was also underscored. In fact, social 
movements interact in a dialectic relation with the institutional channels of 
participation, sometimes accepting their invitation to engage in dialogue, 
sometimes not, but in any case shaping through action (and omission) formal 
                                                        
115 There might be as many definitions of what POS is as texts written on it. However, as Koopmans 
explains, the core of POS is the idea that “opportunities are the most important determinant of 
variations in levels and forms of protest behavior ….” Although rarely defined, opportunity, 
Koopmans argues, refers to “constraints, possibilities, and threats that originate outside the 
mobilizing group, but affect[s] its chances of mobilizing and/or realizing its collective interests.” 
Ruud Koopmans, Political. Opportunity. Structure. Some Splitting to Balance the Lumping, 14 SOC. 
FORUM 93, 96 (1999). 
116 CHESTERS & WELSH, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 4, at 136. On the political opportunity approach 
see, Tarrow, States and Opportunities, supra note 28. However, the political opportunity structure 
approach has found notable ground to accommodate itself to new empirical data and normative 
arguments, a process facilitated, in a sense, because of the very fact some of its critics underscore: 
its conceptual broadness “that soaks virtually every aspect of the social movement environment.” 
CHESTERS & WELSH, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 4, at 137. See also, Goldstone, More social 
movements of fewer?, supra note 63, at 347 (suggesting political opportunity structure does not 
distinguish between social movement formation and its possible success). David S. Meyer & Debra 
C. Minkoff, Conceptualizing Political Opportunity, 82 SOC. F. 1457 (2003-2004) (noting political 
opportunity theories have neglected a more robust theoretical conceptualization and suggesting 
ways to fill that gap by distinguishing approaches to different causal mechanisms that are more 
sensitive to some groups and less relevant to others). 
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avenues of participation (the democratization process).117 Furthermore, it should 
also be noted—as the NSM school insisted—that social movements interact in 
spheres before considered private or apolitical, therefore targeting issues different 
from governmental avenues of decision-making. Changes at the governmental 
level, therefore, do not necessarily impact these new spheres of politics.  
A political context approach acknowledges this reciprocal relation between States 
and social movements, and also takes note of its broader scope of action to suggest 
a more accurate, but at the same time comprehensive, view when compared to 
POS.118 If, as I have been noting thus far, non-institutional forms of participation 
are regular forms of political intervention in democratic States, social 
movements—and, among them, social protests movements—are not outside 
actors carefully and rationally assessing opportunities which the formal political 
landscape offers to advance their demands (the RMT approach), but one of the 
players who helps to form those spaces. As Goldstone put it, they are one of the 
“elements in a complex field of players in politics and society that are seeking 
advantages by using a variety of tactics.”119 According to this view, social 
movements may be affected (either hindered or encouraged) by the spaces 
governmental institutional spheres offer and also by many other factors with 
                                                        
117 The fact that here democratization stands for the deepening of already democratic States should 
be stressed. This does not mean social movements cannot trigger democratization in its more 
literal sense: when authoritarian States are overcome to adopt (some sort of) democratic ruling.  
See, DONATELLA DELLA PORTA, CAN DEMOCRACY BE SAVED: PARTICIPATION, DELIBERATION AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 124 ff. (2013). 
118 Hanspeter Kriesi, Political Context and Opportunity, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 67, supra note 10, at 68-69. 
119 Goldstone, More social movements of fewer? supra note 63, at 358. 
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which they relate (and vice versa), including several levels of political authorities, 
elites groups, other movements and counter-movements, various publics, and—
most neglected by RMT—“symbolic and value orientations available in society that 
condition the reception and response to movement claims and actions.”120  
Bearing these precautions in mind, I can now turn to mark, relying on Kriesi, the 
aspects of the political context that should be considered. The first aspect is 
political structure, which, as Kriesi puts it, is the hard core of the political process 
framework.121 This core is made up of formal political institutions, which admit a 
variety of classifications, as well as by cultural-symbolic frames.122 The second 
aspect is the configurations of actors, an ongoing process where protagonists, 
antagonists, and bystanders take shape by mutually interacting. These actors are 
also influenced by the structures of the political context—which, in turn, they also 
                                                        
120 Id. at. 357. See also, Meyer & Minkoff, Conceptualizing Political Opportunity, supra note 116 
(arguing issue-specific openness is more important than general openness). 
121 Kriesi, Political Context and Opportunity, supra note 118, at 69. 
122 Open/closed, strong/weak, exclusive/integrative, centralized/decentralized. Id. at 70-3. How 
these structures influence the formation and outcomes of social movements remains a contested 
matter of both theory and experience. Kriesi, for instance, suggests that “[t]he greater the degree of 
decentralization, the wider is the formal access and the smaller the capacity of any one part of the 
system to act.” Id. at 70. Amenta and Young take this analysis further, distinguishing between 
impacts on the form and level of mobilizations. In this light, they suggest the impact of separation of 
powers varies. While decentralized polities “encourage a wider variety of challengers to form [and] 
different types of collective action tailored to influence the various parts of the central state,” 
centralization in the central government “dampens the overall level of social mobilization”. Amenta 
& Young, Democratic States and Social movements, supra note 29, at 155-8. Meyer & Minkoff affirm 
structural openness might be an important factor to consider regarding social movements’ 
outcomes, yet social movement formation seems to be more decisively influenced by signals: the 
way activists perceive the political environment for mobilizing. Meyer & Minkoff, Conceptualizing 
Political Opportunity, supra note 116, at 1464-84. In a similar sense Kriesi, Political Context and 
Opportunity, supra note 118, at 77-8 (recognizing that subjective meanings that the people attach to 
situations mediate between political opportunity and action). 
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happen to impact.123 As political context is conscious that not all social movements 
target the State, not all social movements “are equally focused on the political 
process and, therefore, dependent to the same degree on political opportunities for 
their mobilization.”124 The third, and last, aspect is the place where structures, 
both political and social, link actors: the interaction context where “contentious 
interaction” occurs, that is, where actors influence one another and also shape and 
modify that very same political context.125  
This is the space Habermas termed the public sphere. More than a physical place, 
this sphere is a social phenomenon “best described as a network for 
communicating information and points of view.”126 Precisely to single out the 
dynamics between non-institutional and institutional actors, Habermas notes 
there are two public spheres: the public sphere and the political public sphere. The 
former is where civil society (“the real periphery”) strives in public opinion 
formation; the latter is comprised of those formal institutions (“parliamentary 
bodies, administrative agencies, and courts”) where will-formation occurs.127 This 
depiction of the common place of politics, broadly understood as comprising both 
institutional and non-institutional politics, will prove critical in addressing the role 
social protests might play as a legitimate constitutional form of interpretation. In 
fact, as Habermas pointed out,  
                                                        
123 Kriesi, Political Context and Opportunity, supra note 118, at 73-7, 79.  
124 Id. at 77. 
125 Id. at 79. On the broad comprehension of this political context as comprehending both political 
and new political matters, Cohen, Strategy or Identity, supra note 35, at 694-6. 
126 HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS supra note 75, at 360. 
127 Id. at 354-59. 
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binding [governmental] decisions, to be legitimate, must be steered by 
communication flows that start at the periphery and pass through the 
sluices of democratic and constitutional procedures situated at the entrance 
to the parliamentary complex or the courts (and, if necessary, at the exit of 
the implementing administration as well).128 
 
III. Social movements and social protests: some constitutional notes 
 
There is a lot we can learn from the sociology of social movements. I will close this 
chapter underscoring certain characteristics of social movements that are relevant 
in pursuing a constitutional analysis of social protests. This will help me in coming 
up with a set of relevant characteristics, certainly not a static definition, which 
social protests entail. In order to do so I (i) recall—as I said in the beginning—that 
social protests are, among the available resources social movements resort to, the 
most disruptive strategy when contrasted with prevailing liberal 
constitutionalism, and (ii) assume that social protests, although legally 
regulated,129 are constitutionally covered and protected.130 
                                                        
128 Id. at 356. 
129 Offe, New Social Movements, supra note 36, at 821-23 (arguing the contradiction of the liberal 
constitutional scheme stems from the fact that rights were recognized but were not expected to be 
claimed by the people they thought would be absorbed by “privatistic” matters). 
130 See, ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 268 ff. (2nd ed. 2005) (describing how protests find 
protection in constitutional rights such as freedom of expression and the right to assembly). 
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Protests are but one of the means social movements resort to.131 Their sociological 
comprehension has developed from being considered “irrational responses to 
[specific] crisis” to “‘normal’ part[s] of the functioning of developed societies.”132 In 
fact, protests have also been deemed a rational form of behavior that social groups 
utilize to advance their political goals.133 Precisely because social protests are but 
one of the means, among a myriad of strategies, that social movements resort to, 
they share some of social movements’ critical features—albeit, as I will note, with 
some proper characteristics. 
Just as I did when approaching social movements literature, I will not provide or 
attempt any definition, for definitions run the risk of proving too elusive or too 
broad; they quite obscure our comprehension and may not even be able to build 
sensible limits as to what they encompass. Consider, for instance, what Taylor and 
Van Dyke suggest. To them, protest is  
[the] collective use of unconventional methods of political participation to 
try to persuade or coerce authorities to support a challenging group’s aim … 
encompass[ing] a wide variety of actions, ranging from conventional 
strategies of political persuasion to such as lobbying, voting, and petition; 
confrontational tactics such as marches, strikes, and demonstrations that 
                                                        
131 But see, KARL-DIETER OPP, THEORIES OF POLITICAL PROTEST AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION, CRITIQUE, AND SYNTHESIS 39-41 (2009) (arguing social movements are 
but one of the specific forms social protest embody); Verta Taylor & Nella Van Dyke, “Get up, Stand 
up”: Tactical Repertoires of Social Movements, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
262, supra note 10, at 263 (arguing protests are compounded by a variety of actions, including 
lobbying, voting and petitioning). 
132 CHESTERS & WELSH, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra 4, at 143-5. 
133 KARL-DIETER OPP, THE RATIONALITY OF POLITICAL PROTEST: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY (1989).  
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disrupt the day-to-day life of a community: violent acts that inflict material 
and economic damage and loss of life; and cultural forms of political 
expression such as rituals, spectacles, music, art, poetry, film, literature, and 
cultural practices of everyday life. 134 
Before, they had stated that protests are precisely the “fundamental feature that 
distinguishes social movements from routine political actors.”135 However, the 
truth is that actions such as lobbying, petitioning and voting are far from being 
unconventional in nature. Moreover, the range of actions they include in their 
definition practically includes every kind of opposition to, or prevention of, change. 
Or take the definition Jenkins and Klandermans attempted when introducing a 
compendium on social protests, which they define as follows: 
The collective action of social movements that are attempting to alter the 
representation system, public policies, or the general relationships between 
citizens and the state.136 
In this definition the reader should imply that because social movements are 
mainly non-institutional then social protests are to have the same character, 
although its vagueness actually opens more doubts precisely by inviting 
speculation,137 for attempting to alter the representation system may be achieved 
                                                        
134 Taylor & Van Dyke, “Get up, Stand up”, supra note 131, at 263. 
135 Id. 
136 J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, The Politics of Social Protest, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL 
PROTEST: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON STATES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 2, 3 (J. Craig Jenkins and Bert 
Klandermans eds., 1995). 
137 As I will say below, it is precisely this mainly what denotes one of the main differences between 
social movements and social protests. 
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through innumerable ways of collective action without leaving institutional 
channels—an aspect this definition overlooks. Therefore, as I said, I would rather 
concentrate on some relevant features of social movements a constitutional 
approach to protests should consider. 
A. Outside institutional channels 
First, social movements are forms of collective action that take place mainly 
outside institutional channels.138 I highlight that they mainly occur at the non-
institutional level.139 For one thing, as I have noted, movements are not totally 
independent from institutional politics, which movements (most times) address 
with their utterances. For another, not all of the strategies that movements resort 
to are non-institutional (i.e. lobbying, bringing cases before courts). This is not the 
case of social protests, which are non-institutional displays of social power140—yet 
are aimed at being transformed into political power.141 The fact that protests are 
per se non-institutional forms of participation does not deprive them from 
constitutional protection. On the other hand, arguing that this constitutional 
protection confers on protests’ institutional carapace would be pushing things too 
                                                        
138 David A. Snow et al., Mapping the Terrain, supra note 10, at 6. 
139 Snow et al. say social movements “are defined in part by their use of non-institutionalized means 
of action …”. Id. at 7. 
140 Michael Lipsky, Protest as a Political Resource, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1144, 1145 (1968) (defining 
protests as a “political action … characterized by showmanship or display of an unconventional 
nature….”) But see, OPP, RATIONALITY OF PROTEST supra note 133, at 39 (arguing the concept of 
protests should be understood broadly enough as to encompass also institutional and conventional 
means of political participation). 
141 HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS supra note 75, at 362-64. 
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far.142 The same might be said about the legal regulations that protests are 
subjected to; although these regulations order protest activity, they do not specify 
either the form they might take143 or its continuity.144 This is not the case of other 
means which social movements utilize. Consider lobbying regulations, to take one 
example, which stipulate, among several other restrictions, that a lobbyist must be 
included in a public register, restrictions as to who can be a lobbyist, and even a 
code of conduct.145 Or take the case of social movements that push their agenda by 
filling lawsuits; this is a highly regulated arena where the range (kind, opportunity 
and form) of arguments to be considered is formally limited.146  
The fact social movements mainly occur outside political channels of participation 
highlights a second, allegedly contingent,147 aspect worthy of attention: 
                                                        
142 Many of our acts, or omissions, as citizens are constitutionally protected. As we act under 
constitutional protection, we remain citizens acting as members of the civil society. 
143 It is true that these regulations normally punish violence, therefore constraining a certain form 
which a protest movement must take, but this is also the case of every other means social 
movements may resort to and also a “burden” erected upon every other civil society activity. In 
other words, regulated violence is not a “legal burden” posed solely on social protests, but on all 
actions and omissions taking place within the law’s, however contested, realm—the very realm 
whose maintenance depends on (institutional) violence. See, Austin Sarat, Situating Law Between 
the Realities of Violence and the Claims of Justice, in Law, VIOLENCE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3 
(Austin Sarat ed., 2001). 
144 OPP, THEORIES OF POLITICAL PROTEST supra note 131, at 34 (arguing that an “action may be 
‘unconventional’ or ‘irregular’ if there are not institutional rules prescribing that it is repeated over 
time”). 
145 I took this example from Nancy Holmes & Dara Lithwick, The Federal Lobbying System: The 
Lobbying Act and the Lobbyist’ Code of Conduct (Background Papers - Ottawa, Library of Parliament, 
Publication No. 2011-73-E, 2011), available at: 
http://www.gordonforpendle.com/files/article/403/Lobbying%20(Canada).pdf (last visited Sep. 
25, 2012).  
146 See, Jeremy Waldron, Judges as moral reasoners, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 2 (2009) (arguing courts’ 
chambers may not be the best suited place to address, discuss and define both moral and political 
issues). 
147 Allegedly contingent as the fact protesters are regularly seen as illegitimate actors does not 
steam from any structural conditions of social protests, but rather from the way in which 
governments (helped out by mainstream media) see them. 
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challengers are usually not seen as legitimate political actors. Hegemonic 
legitimacy is reserved to those acting exclusively through institutional means, 
legitimacy reinforced through the successive imposition of cultural (societies who 
conceive only certain forms of communication as viable), discursive (authorities 
questioning resort to mobilizations), and legal (laws criminalizing protests) 
patterns. Recent protesters, for instance, have argued that it is this exclusion from 
the political public sphere, among other reasons such as distrust in 
representatives, which takes them to non-institutional means.148 Collective non-
institutional action, as Weldon has argued, works for oppressed groups as an 
effective way to overcome formal ties.149  
This different political standing is not be obscured by the fact substantive claims 
usually overlap with those brought up by legitimized actors.150 Dryzek and 
Niemeyer have argued, for instance, that current institutional instances feature 
crucial limits in providing sensitive and sensible representation.151 Even when 
members of marginalized groups are included in institutional avenues the problem 
of how a single member of that group can account for the whole still persists.152 
                                                        
148 In some readings it is precisely this political and economic marginalization of challengers what 
defines a protest and leads challengers to protest. See, Susan Eckstein, Power and Popular Protest in 
Latin America, in POWER AND POPULAR PROTEST: LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1, 9 (Susan 
Eckstein ed., 2001). 
149 S. LAUREL WELDON, WHEN PROTEST MAKES POLICY: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS REPRESENT DISADVANTAGED 
GROUPS (2011) (focusing on how social protest movements, particularly that of women, have 
resorted to informal means of participation seeking both new forms of representation and 
overcoming formal democracy’s procedural ties). 
150 David A. Snow et al., Mapping the Terrain, supra note 10, at 7-8.   
151 Dryzek & Simon Niemeyer, Discursive Representation, supra note 54. 
152 As Weldon has pointed out, the idea that individuals can represent a whole group “is based on a 
problematic understanding of the relationship between individual experience and group 
62 
 
Finally, some of the claims that movements will pose might arguably be exclusive 
to them—what NSM termed identity claims.  
From a constitutional viewpoint we should thus consider the legal limits imposed 
on social protests with a strengthened scrutiny,153 for those resorting to social 
protest aim to take part in shaping collective public decisions from a double 
condition of marginalization. In this double condition they resort to non-
institutional means, and, due to the very fact they are part of those groups, they are 
either deliberately or consequently displaced from formal politics. It is true that 
social displays of power have often been met with facially neutral regulations—
however difficult it is to draw such a sharp distinction between content-based and 
content-neutral regulations.154 But it is also true these very same regulations, 
however text-neutral, have an uneven impact on different groups. Reva Siegel has 
shown how this is true in the fields of racial and gender law, fields where the law 
has shown a non–combustible capacity to accommodate status–enforcement 
through what appear to be neutral regulations.155 In such fields—as in probably 
any other—“the state may enforce ‘facially neutral’ policies and practices with a 
disparate impact on minorities or women so long as such policies or practices are 
                                                                                                                                                                  
perspective.” She has insisted both institutional structures as well as social movements “can be 
more or less representative of marginalized groups” by studying the spaces some administrative 
agencies open for effective expression, even when compared to reserved legislative spots. Laurel S. 
Weldon. Beyond Bodies: Institutional Sources of Representation for Women in Democratic 
Policymaking, 64 J. POL. 1153, 1153-4 (2002). 
153 I deal with this, and other aspects here briefly mentioned, in Chapters 3 and 4. 
154 Wilson Huhn, Assessing the constitutionality of laws that are both content-based and content-
neutral: the emerging constitutional calculus, 79 IND. L. J. 801 (2004). 
155 See, Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protections No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Actions, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1996-1997) (arguing how the law has managed to 
maintain status-enforcement despite its evolution into racially and gender-neutral regulations). 
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not enacted for discriminatory purposes,”156 a standard too difficult, if even 
possible, to satisfy.157  
The same occurs with legal regulations for protests. Legal regulations of expressive 
conduct must be narrowly tailored in order to suppress as little speech as 
possible.158 This is why a total ban on certain forms of speech would not pass 
constitutional scrutiny: 
Prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or 
viewpoint discrimination, [but] the danger they pose to the freedom of 
speech is readily apparent—by eliminating a common means of speaking, 
such measures can suppress too much speech.159 
However, even when legal regulations satisfy these standards, that is, even when 
legal regulations are facially neutral and narrowly tailored, they still might be felt 
stronger over the shoulders of those who, sometimes forced by circumstances, find 
in protests the exclusive means to influence public opinion. To them, where no 
adequate substitute channel exists, the application of these regulations amount to 
the total elimination of effective channels of communication.160 The case is even 
more pressing on those movements that resort to protest to pose identity claims, 
for they will be struggling against more subtle forms of subordination that might 
                                                        
156 Id. at 1130. 
157 Id. at 1134-42. 
158 Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 
(1988). 
159 City of Ladue et al. v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994), at 55. 
160 Id. at 56-7 (arguing that for some people—those with “modest means or limited mobility”—
certain forms of communication are to be left unrestricted). See, Donatella della Porta & Olivier 
Fillieule, Policing Social Protest, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 217, supra note 
10, at 220-7. 
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be further dissembled by providing formal and neutral open access. In other 
words, as Nancy Fraser has argued, the total openness of the public sphere cannot 
be guaranteed with formal exclusions (i.e. a total ban of certain forms of speech) 
nor secured by relying exclusively on formal inclusiveness.161 Here, concerns for 
freedom of expression become entangled with equality worries.162 
B. Challenging nature 
A second feature Snow et al. underscore is that social movements have a 
challenging nature. Social movements are challengers aimed at either promoting 
or resisting change. As I noted before, their activity of contention occurs either (or 
both) in the political arena—“contentious politics”—or (and) at the cultural level. 
As the authors put it, “movements [can] be considered as challengers to or 
defenders of existing institutional authority … or patterns of cultural authority, 
such as systems of beliefs or practices reflective of those beliefs.”163 Social protests 
are not only non-institutional in character, but also challenging of prevailing 
(political and cultural) agreements in character,164 what Taylor and Van Dyke 
termed their raison d’être: contestation.165  
                                                        
161 Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy, 25-26 SOC. TEXT 56, 63-9 (1990). 
162 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law on 
the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2053 (2002) (arguing “no theory of constitutional 
law can be adequate or successful which does not centrally involve IBSMs and their 
jurisprudence”).  
163 David A. Snow et al., Mapping the Terrain, supra note 10, at 9.  
164 OPP, RATIONALITY OF PROTEST, supra note 133, at 38 (defining political participation as “behavior 
that has political relevance in the sense of attempting to influence governmental structure, 
personnel, or policy”). 
165 Taylor & Van Dyke, “Get up, Stand up”, supra note 131, at 268-9 (arguing social protest 
movements are essentially aimed at pursuing or preventing change). 
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In the case of the social protest movements that I am considering, their challenging 
nature points toward questioning political power relations as grounded in the 
Constitution. Acts of protests are here directed at contesting common normative 
grounds by advancing new constitutional readings and interpretations. Seen under 
this light, protest becomes a means through which the political power capable of 
implementing and developing the Constitution is shaped.166 As Habermas put it, it 
is by mobilizing the public opinion, which protests help to shape, that the political 
power is taken to formally consider issues brought about by ordinary people in 
contestation of current assumptions.167 In other words, social protest serves some 
groups as a means, and to some groups as the means, to take part in collective self-
government: defining and shaping the meaning of our common founding 
principles. It is this engagement in politics that should grant protests special 
protection.168 The long-settled freedom of expression doctrine grants dissenting 
speech heightened protection. As Justice Holmes wrote in his concurring opinion 
in Schwimmer more than eight decades ago,  
Some of her answers might excite popular prejudice, but if there is any 
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment 
                                                        
166 In Habermas, this political power institutionally capable of will formation includes both 
democratically elected assemblies as well as courts “that decide political relevant cases.” HABERMAS, 
FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 75, at 371-2.   
167 Id. at 372-3, 380.  
168 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 130, at 154 ff; Edward Heck & Albert C. Ringelstein, The 
Burger Court and the Primacy of Political Expression, 40 W. POL. Q. 413, 415-16, 420 (1987). 
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than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those 
who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.169 
There are also complementary reasons to strengthen social protests’ freedom of 
expression protection. Social protests possess a twofold nature: they are, as I have 
argued above, direct means of political participation and thus expressive conduct 
itself to be protected,170 but they also are indirect means of political resource 
building.171 Following Michael Lipsky, it is to be noticed that many times 
challengers who resort to social protests do not directly target the State, but 
develop political bargaining power they lack. They do this by addressing and 
activating target audiences whom the government considers worthy of paying 
attention to. Communication becomes essential to protests that, seen under this 
light, operate in a “highly indirect” fashion.172 Protection of these informal 
channels of communication proves critical for politically oppressed groups. For 
them, recourse to social protest appears not just as one strategy among others, but 
sometimes the only available communicative resource they have to posit their 
political claims.173 
                                                        
169 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), at 654-5. Freedom of expression also extends 
its protection to false statements. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), at 339 (“Under 
the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.”). 
170 See, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). On the behavioral character of protests, OPP, THEORIES 
OF POLITICAL PROTEST supra note 131, at 33-4 (arguing from a sociological viewpoint, protest is a 
behavior, although noting there is disagreement as to what kind of behavior contributes to the 
concept’s ambiguity).  
171 HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 75, at 383. 
172 Lipsky, Protest as a Political Resource, supra note 140, at 1145-46; OPP, THEORIES OF POLITICAL 
PROTEST supra note 131, at 34; HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 75, at 364; Taylor & Van 
Dyke, “Get up, Stand up”, supra note 131, at 267, 269. 
173 Id.; WELDON, WHEN PROTEST MAKES POLICY, supra note 149. E.g., Organization of American States 
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While social protests are expressive actions aimed at politically contending 
dominant patterns, they are not to be conceptually merged with civil 
disobedience.174 Civil disobedience, Jürgen Habermas explains, is “[t]he last means 
for obtaining more of a hearing” from political power.175 It is true that civil 
disobedience might serve, as it has served, as acts of protest. A disobedient 
contends acts of authority and power relations—using the breach of law to gain 
“greater media influence for oppositional arguments.”176 Moreover, by reviewing 
the list of characteristics normally attributed to civil disobedience they seem to 
share all the attributes of social protests—most crucially the fact they are both 
non-revolutionary means177—except for one critical feature: civil disobedience 
exhibits illegality as one of its key characteristics.178  
                                                                                                                                                                  
[OAS], Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Vol. III: Report of the 
Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.124 Doc.7 (Feb. 27, 
2006), at 121-22 (“The most impoverished sectors of our hemisphere face discriminatory policies 
and actions; their access to information on the planning and execution of measures that affect their 
daily lives is incipient and, in general, traditional channels to make their complaints known are 
frequently inaccessible. Confronting these prospects, in many of the hemisphere’s countries, social 
protest and mobilization have become tools to petition the public authorities, as well as channels 
for public complaints regarding abuses or human rights violations.”). 
174 I am of course considering here cases of civil disobedience taken out to the streets. In fact, 
disobedience does not need to be done in public or in a concert with others. It can actually be 
silently and individually practiced (i.e. refusing to enlist). 
175 HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 75, at 382-3. 
176 Id. 
177 RAFFAELE LAUDANI, DISOBEDIENCE IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT. A GENEALOGY 112-5 (Jason Francis 
McGimsey trans., 2013) (arguing that it is this very acceptance of legal sanctions what signals 
disobedients’ fidelity to the system); DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE, supra note 2, at 84-5; 91-
3 (“Disobedience … with its emphasis on civility, seeks its justification in the constitution, the law 
or other institutional sources.”) See also, RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 105 (1985) 
(distinguishing civil disobedience from mere criminality, as the former “do[es] not challenge 
authority in so fundamental a way … [it] accepts the fundamental legitimacy of both government 
and community.”). 
178 Id. at 383; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 320-21 (revised ed. 1999) (arguing that whether 
courts declare acts of civil disobedience as legally justified or not should not respectively encourage 
or deter dissenters’ action). 
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As Quill argues, legal protection of civil disobedience might even be rejected for it 
“entails the acceptance of punishment and guilt and the personal suffering 
incurred from a non-linguistic form of persuasion.”179 This is not the case of social 
protests, for social protests are prima facie lawful acts. Acts of social protests are, 
in principle, covered by a cluster of constitutional rights (most notably, although 
not exclusively, as I will tell below, freedom of expression). Furthermore, 
democracy could be understood as actually promoting forms of protest and 
dissent. As an author put it some years ago, “genuine democracy demands dissent, 
thrives on protest.”180 Whereas there is a general constitutional entitlement to 
critically engage in political self-government, there is no general principle granting 
the faculty to disobey laws—but quite the opposite.181 
It is true that challengers who resort to social protest often breach public order 
laws, but that is an unintended (in the best case) or a by-product (in most cases) of 
mass demonstrations.182 Protesters’ main aim is not to breach the laws they 
                                                        
179 LAWRENCE QUILL, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: (UN)COMMON SENSE IN MASS DEMOCRACIES 8-9 (2009); PETER E. 
QUINT, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE GERMAN COURTS: THE PERSHING MISSILE PROTESTS IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 40-1 (2008) (noticing that, though civil disobedience involves illegal action, it 
“demonstrates their adherence to the legal system in general by breaking the law in public and by 
being manifestly willing to accept the corresponding punishment”). But see, DWORKIN, A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE, supra note 177, at 114-5 (1985) (arguing civil disobedience is not incomplete without 
punishment). 
180 CARL COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TACTICS, AND THE LAW 13 (1971). 
181 As Professor Ronald Dworkin put it, “the moral permissibility of disobedience … is an exception 
to a more general principle that requires obedience even to laws they disapprove but do not think 
wicked.” RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 318 (2011). 
182 In the Brokdorf decision, cited below, the German Constitutional Court precisely considered 
public order disturbances as a by-product of mass demonstrations, whereas a year later, in the 
Großengstingen and Mutlangen cases, it upheld criminal convictions precisely because their very 
purpose was to violate blockades statutes. See also, QUINT, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, supra note 179, at 
164-5. But see, Batty et al. v. The City of Toronto, 2011 ONSC 6862, at para 15, where the court 
considered the breach of TPM regulations as a form of civil disobedience (“The Charter does not 
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contend, but to express their disagreement with authority and power relations; in 
order to shield both the content of their claims and the form to utter them, they 
invoke freedom of expression and the right to assembly.183 Civil disobedients also 
contend authority decisions, but the very means they resort to in order to express 
their contention is precisely by breaking the very laws they dispute.184  
In spite of the fact civil disobedience seems to be rather incompatible with liberal 
democracy (after all it entails defiance of law’s authority),185 it is usually accepted 
by liberal constitutionalism. In fact, liberal constitutionalism has found ways to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
permit the Protesters to take over public space without asking, exclude the rest of the public from 
enjoying their traditional use of that space and then contend that they are under no obligation to 
leave. By taking that position and by occupying the Park, the Protesters are breaking the law. Such 
civil disobedience attracts consequences. In this case, the civic authority which represents the 
Toronto community now seeks to enforce the law.”). 
183 This is why I disagree with Cohen when he argues these breaches of municipal regulations or 
traffic regulations amount to what he calls indirect disobedience. Disobedience is one thing while 
civil disobedience quite another, the latter being defined precisely by the breach of laws that are 
disputed and not, as Cohen claims according to what he considers to constitute indirect 
disobedience, as the breach of laws “other than the object of protest.” In fact, just as acts of protests 
are constitutionally protected, under some circumstances these indirect breaches are also justified 
as protests’ side effects. COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, supra note 180, at 14-5, 52. A distinction Joseph 
Raz has suggested is of help here; he distinguishes between what he calls ‘cases of occasional 
disobedience,’ “breaches of law which the agent thinks, given the character of the law involved and 
of the particular circumstances in which he acted, were morally permissible,” from civil 
disobedience, breaches of law that are politically or morally motivated. Whereas for the former 
kind of breaches “moral considerations merely render [them] permissible,” in the latter the moral 
and political reasons are the motivations for the breach. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON 
LAW AND MORALITY 263-4 (2009). 
184 Harrop A. Freeman, The Right to Protest and Civil Disobedience, 41 IND. L. J. 228 (1966) (“The 
protest action is often not civil disobedience but in fact ‘obedience’ (the leader of the second 
Oakland march called it ‘massive civil obedience’). The total pattern is in the democratic tradition 
rather than anarchic or totalitarian (it claims to be an expression of free speech). The theory is not 
anti-law but within the law.”). See also, Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public forum: Cox v. 
Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CR. REV. 1, 10-1 (1965) (arguing civil disobedience is a deliberate violation of 
law whereas protests’ “essential feature is appeal to public opinion.”). 
185 David Lyons has argued that there is not a moral/political obligation to obey the law when 
certain conditions are not met. The political obligation to obey the law, Lyons claims, should itself 
be based on moral grounds which are normally absent in the concrete historical/paradigmatic 
situations that have taken us to consider civil disobedience and its justification. In these cases, 
Lyons insists, there is no need to justify civil disobedience as there is no previous obligation to obey 
the law. David Lyons, Moral Judgment, Historical Reality, and Civil Disobedience, 27 PHILOSOPHY & 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 31 (1998). 
70 
 
admit acts of civil disobedience as a regular part of the political landscape. Their 
pacifist whiff may have contributed in considering conscientious objection as a 
legal excuse to prevent sanctions.186 As Laudani has noted—while criticizing 
Rawls—, disobedients show self-restraint that presents them as resorting to 
disobedience only when other means of redress, including legal means, have 
proved useless.187 Thus, liberal constitutionalism has found a way of turning what 
first seemed illegal into an action covered and protected by law.188  
Besides social acceptance, neoconstitutionalism has also helped to legally protect 
(meaning not punishing or reducing the sanctions of) civil disobedience. As Ronald 
Dworkin noted some time ago, constitutions that recognize constitutional political 
rights as legal rights create a certain ambiguity when it comes time to determine 
whether the law has actually been breached. The law, therefore, is no longer 
exclusively the single (breached) statute invoked, but interpreted and checked 
against the constitutional rights that redefine what the law is.189  
This alternative merits a little detour. If acts in breach of a law are not sanctioned 
under this model, it is exclusively because the statute itself is found to be 
                                                        
186 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 178, at 320 (defining civil disobedience as “a public, 
nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing 
about change in the law or policies of the government”). 
187 LAUDANI, DISOBEDIENCE IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 177, at 114-5. 
188 As Quill notes, when reviewing Rawls, while liberal tradition emphasizes a natural duty to obey 
the law, justifications of civil disobedience call to temper that duty with “the duty to opposed 
injustice.” QUILL, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, supra note 179, at 14-5. It is worth noticing, as Raz has done, 
that it is one thing to justify civil disobedience (or even to hold that, under certain conditions, there 
is also a duty to disobey the law), but quite another to suggest there is a general right to disobey the 
law. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 183, at 266. 
189 DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 177, at 115. 
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unconstitutional.190 We are thus dealing with cases where there was actually no 
disobedience to punish. Disobedience, in this way, becomes obedience.191 
However, it becomes obedience at a high cost: from a political perspective—for 
instance the one Laudani takes—this form of understanding civil disobedience 
deprives it of it rebellious significance.192 As Justice MacPherson put it, 
“practitioners of civil disobedience target governments in their hope to change 
certain laws. They do not expect the courts to change the laws …”.193 Well, this is 
not quite so. 
Social protests and demonstrations have not received the same benevolent 
treatment. Liberal constitutionalism has for the most part depicted protests as 
providing ample room for passions to flourish and thus as incompatible to the 
reason(s) of law. This view on protest obeys hegemonic considerations rather than 
a fair understanding of rights involved. As Sajó argues, every day we can witness 
an “ambivalent constitutional treatment of collective public display of emotions 
and passions,”194 for certain forms of collective behavior that also imply emotion 
display get privileged constitutional/legal reception, whereas others are 
                                                        
190 James MacPherson, Civil Disobedience and the Law: The Role of Legal Professionals 41 OSGOODE 
HALL LAW JOURNAL 371, 380 (2003) (“Provided the laws are constitutional … courts are sworn to 
uphold the rule of law.”). 
191 This was notably, although not exclusively, the case of Martin Luther King Jr.’s civil rights 
movement. Though involving acts of illegality, the movement was justified mainly on the grounds of 
“constitutional obedience.” LAUDANI, DISOBEDIENCE IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 177, at 
107-12. 
192 Id. at 115-6. 
193 MacPherson, Civil Disobedience and the Law, supra note 190, at 380. 
194 SAJÓ, CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 81, at 246. 
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mistreated.195 It is this ambivalent treatment, and a much-extended idea of civil 
disobedience as essentially non-violent but still willing to accept punishment, what 
accords them a deferential treatment. 
C. Joint action 
Third, social movements involve joint action, which roughly means a collective 
effort. The very fact social movements are collective enterprises signals some 
degree of internal organization is needed;196 in fact, this is the question RMT is 
concerned with. However, the fact social movements are collectivities might be 
somewhat obscured by some of their external manifestations. One single actor, say 
a lobbyist, appears before an administrative agency and the public as a single 
agent. This is not the case of social protests, which are always joint/collective 
actions197 that might or might not be preceded by some sort of internal 
organization.198 
Therefore, from a constitutional viewpoint, social protests are essentially 
collective bodies whose very comprehension has to be, both politically and legally, 
collective. Politically, on the one hand, social protests show a joint attempt to 
                                                        
195 Id. at 247. 
196 Although there is some disagreement as to the level, kind and necessity of organization needed. 
David A. Snow et al., Mapping the Terrain, supra note 10, at 9-10.   
197 OPP, THEORIES OF POLITICAL PROTEST supra note 131, at 34. 
198 In other words, a protest might be a tactic deployed by a social movement that decides to act in 
that way and where internal organization will be required, but social protests might also arise 
spontaneously, where internal organization may, but also may not, be present. This distinction has 
proven of relative importance regarding protests’ legal regulations. The Constitutional Court of 
Germany, for one, has held that while organized demonstrations might be subjected to 
administrative regulations of manner, place, and time, this is not the case of impromptu protests 




collectively take part in shaping the republic’s fate. This is a (constitutionally) 
legitimate way of engaging in politics, particularly for those who see themselves as 
something other than pure individual numbers whose votes are aggregated199 and 
for those groups often marginalized from regular channels—as argued before.  
Legally, on the other hand, this means that the rights involved are not just to be 
assessed on an individual basis, but as collective exercises. Reading an exercise of 
political citizenry in light of individual entitlements might prove misleading. This 
emphasis has practical consequences, for if we are talking about a collective action, 
particularly of social protest, legal decisions about protesters are to consider them 
as a whole. Admittedly, this is a standard too difficult for the law to meet, which 
normally focuses on the individual. What is interesting, however, is that it also 
highlights the limited answer the legal order may offer in face of social protests. 
Take three quick examples. In the Brokdorf case, the Constitutional Court of 
Germany assessed the constitutionality of a total ban on public demonstrations 
which was issued by the local police in light of the announcement of massive 
protests against a soon-to-be-built atomic power plant. Accepting demonstrations 
could be subject to regulations, the Court analyzed whether the fact that some of 
the protesters were prone to violence could be a valid constitutional reason to 
                                                        
199 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 206-15 (1986) (discussing three possible models of 
understanding what a community is). See also, HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 75, at 362 
(“Public opinion is not representative in the statistical sense. It is not an aggregate of individually 
gathered, privately expressed opinions held by isolated persons. Hence it must not be confused 
with survey polls.”). While an emphasis on institutional means of participation often entails, 
although not necessarily, an aggregative version of democracy, emphasis on avenues other than 
governmental institutions recall a wider understanding of political deliberation. I have taken these 
two models of democracy from CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, 
Chapter 4 (1996). 
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impede the others from freely exercising their constitutional rights. Considering 
the protesters as a whole, it argued the fact that a small number of demonstrators 
may resort to violence is not enough to “hold down the size of a demonstration or 
to dampen the desire to demonstrate.”200 In words of the Court: 
If there is no fear of collective strife, it is not necessary to take into account 
the possibility that a demonstration as a whole will take a violent or 
rebellious course or that the organiser or his following will strive for such 
an outcome or at least approve of it. In such circumstances, for peaceful 
participants the protection guaranteed by the Constitution to every citizen 
of freedom to meet must remain preserved even if other individual 
demonstrators or a minority commit riots. If behaviour of individuals which 
is not peaceful were to lead to discontinuance of the basic right protection 
for the whole event and not only for the perpetrators, these persons would 
have it in their hands to ‘turn round’ a demonstration and make it become 
unlawful, contrary to the intention of other participants [references 
omitted].201 
                                                        
200 DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 396 
(1997, 2nd ed.). 
201 The standard here proposed by the German Constitutional Court does not run counter to my 
previous assertion that social protest are to be considered as a whole, for what the Court is here 
implying is that those who engage in riots have put themselves outside the peaceful, nevertheless 
disruptive, protesters. Should this latter group collectively resort to violence, authorities will be 
entitled to intervene. I have taken this translation from the Institute for Transnational Law, the 
University of Texas School of Law, Translated Decisions, BVerfGE 69, 315 - Brokdorf Decision of the 
First Senate, available at: 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=6
56 (last visited, Oct. 14, 2012). 
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In Chicago, hundreds of people were detained and accused of having violated a 
curfew in Grant Park.202 A group of 92 of those detained (who amounted to 233) 
asked the Circuit Court of Cook County to dismiss charges as the curfew was 
facially unconstitutional. The Court found the curfew to be unconstitutional—as 
“the burden imposed on First Amendment activity is greater than necessary to 
serve the important government interest.”203 In order to reach that conclusion, 
which also benefited the rest of the detained not contending the ban, it considered 
not only the group appearing before the Court, but also “whether other groups [of 
protesters] … would have ample alternative channels for late-night assemblies 
…”.204 Finally, in Chile, and in the midst of student mobilizations, a school board 
decided to expel a student who took part in the occupation of the school. Chile’s 
Supreme Court reasoned not on the grounds of freedoms of expression, but held 
that the student sanctioned was not the only one participating in protests, thus 
revoking the board’s decision as arbitrary.205  
The collective character of social protests is also important when drawing 
differences with civil disobedience. While both are acts of political and collective 
display of contestation, only the former is constitutionally protected in the same 
                                                        
202 The curfew prohibits remaining inside the Park after 11:00 pm. As read in City of Chicago vs. Tieg 
Alexander et al., Memorandum Opinion and Order, No 11 MC1-237718, et seq. (2012), at 1. 
203 Id. at 23. 
204 Admittedly, as the Court itself explains, this is the standard with which a facial challenge must be 
assessed. However, my emphasis here is on the fact those “other groups not appearing before the 
court” (Id., at 20) are actual members of the same movement. Moreover, the fact that protests are 
collective in nature might also clarify the reason why the curfew was also found to be 
unconstitutional on an as-applied basis, for the curfew, the Court argued, has not been always 
enforced against all other demonstrators who had remained in Grant Park after 11:00 pm—thus 
considering people taking part in protests as a block. Id., at 28 ff.   
205 Corte Suprema [Supreme Court], Rol No 10.692-2011, 24 January 2012 (Chile). 
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fashion: collectively. It is true, as Rawls claimed, “civil disobedience is a political 
act.”206 However, while a single subject may perform civil disobedience—
something the very collective nature of protests makes impossible—, their 
constitutional justification (conscientious objection) is always individual and even, 
as some have claimed, an apolitical act.207 In fact, it has been precisely civil 
disobedience’s attachment to individual values and basic individual rights (along 
with its historical link to the defense of free market principles) what, Douzinas 
argues, has granted them liberal justification.208 Moreover, it has been this 
attachment to individual rights what impedes civil disobedience from having a 
truly political, in this sense collective, meaning.209 
In order to overcome individual rights’ intrinsic limitation, as isolating carapaces 
upon which an apolitical individual dichotomized from the State is configured, 
plural membership must be embraced.210 The true meaning of disobedience, one 
betrayed with too much emphasis on individual rights, rests—Laudani, citing 
Walzer, argues—“on a ‘shared moral knowledge,’ on a series of obligations toward 
a handful of principles that are, at the same time, ‘commitments to other men, from 
whom the principles have been learned and by whom they are enforced’.”211  
To be effective, it must join the ideal discourse of the principles that govern 
a political community to the concrete living conditions of those who 
                                                        
206 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 178, at 321. 
207 QUILL, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, supra note 179, at 13-4. 
208 DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE, supra note 2 at 89-92. 
209 LAUDANI, DISOBEDIENCE IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 177, at 116. 
210 Id. at 117.  
211 Id. at 116. 
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practice it, to the ‘mutual engagements’ of responsibility by the participants 
and to the sharing of a ‘community of laws and values’ that could be in 
conflict with those of the state.212  
Here, challengers are presented in a dialectic relation with the State, without, 
however, contesting its legitimacy. Claims against the State thus, as Laudani puts it, 
are partial.213 
Is social protest suited to better capture this collective (in the sense of politically 
engaging) face? I think it is. In light of the critique against civil disobedience, let me 
insist on what I briefly mentioned before: the inescapable collective nature of the 
rights involved in social protest. As it is well known, Karl Marx was highly critical 
of the rights of the man. Rights of the man, he contended, are the rights “of egoistic 
man, of man separated from other men and from the community.”214 Men and 
women, under this view, are isolated one from another, ‘withdrawn into 
themselves.’215 Liberty, in this sense—and as Marx clearly explains—“is not 
founded upon the relations between man and man, but rather upon the separation 
of man from man. It is the right of such separation, the right of the circumscribed 
individual, withdrawn into himself.”216 In support of his view, Marx cited the 
individualizing character of the right to property—not totally out of the place 
                                                        
212 Id. at 117. 
213 Id. at 117-8. 
214 Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26, 42 (Robert C. Tucker ed. 
Norton 1978 2nd ed.) (1844). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 43. 
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when it comes to civil disobedience217—to exemplify how the rights of the man are 
in private interest.218 It is not only that the rights of the man further private 
interests, but also that they are opposed to man’s social ties. Society, ‘mutual 
engagements’ of responsibility—to take the words used earlier by Laudani—
“appears as a system which is external to the individuals and as a limitation of his 
original independence,”219 said Marx.  
How can a political community be formed where rights facilitate isolation and 
foster egoism? It cannot, unless we resort to common engagement. Rights of the 
citizen, the other rights upon which Marx passed judgment, permit this communal 
existence, for these rights are of a different nature: collective. They presuppose a 
joint intervention on defining the fate of the political community—which is also 
presupposed.220 These rights permit—although Marx put it negatively as he 
criticized their subjugation to the rights of the man—the establishment of the 
political State and the composition of civil society into related individuals: a 
political man and a political woman.221 
                                                        
217 See, Leo Martinez, Taxes, Moral, and Legitimacy 1994 BYU L. REV. 521 (1994) (arguing some 
citizens may find the duty to pay taxes unjust and therefore disobey on the grounds of private 
property). Henry David Thoreau’s decisive essay, Civil Disobedience, was also about taxes, but 
founded on totally different grounds: his contention was that citizens should not contribute to 
finance what he considered to be an unjust war. Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience (Nancy L. 
Rosenblum ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 repr.) (1849) (“If a thousand men 
were not to pay their tax bills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would 
be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent blood. This is, in fact, the 
definition of a peaceable revolution, if any such is possible.”). 
218 Marx, On the Jewish Question, supra note 214, at 42-3. 
219 Id. at 43. 
220 See the introductory text of Jeremy Waldron to Marx’s On the Jewish Question in his edited 
volume ‘NONSENSE UPON STILTS’: BENTHAM, BURKE, AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 131-32 (Jeremy 
Waldron ed.,1987). 
221 Marx, On the Jewish Question, supra note 214, at 46.  
79 
 
Social protest is an exercise of the rights of the citizen.222 Social protest is collective 
at its roots and protected by rights that cannot be properly understood but in a 
collective fashion.223 Indeed the relevance, and actual manifestation, of these rights 
cannot be fully grasped if considered as exercised by individuals that are 
aggregated to one another; however, they can be fully grasped if they are 
considered a political, and therefore collective, exercise in itself.224 Consider, for 
instance, Garcia v. Bloomberg, which involved a claim filed by occupiers who were 
arrested when crossing the Brooklyn Bridge in support of Occupy Wall Street. One 
of the claims stated that they had not been given a fair warning by the police that 
they were not permitted to walk onto the bridge’s vehicular roadway. While the 
NYPD submitted video footage showing that they did in fact notify protesters of 
imminent arrest—before proceeding to arrest some 700 protesters—, the Court 
reasoned on the grounds of the collective body protesting: while some of the 
protesters—those walking closer to the officers carrying bull horns—may have 
                                                        
222
 I accept here that, under conditions of modern constitutional States, the difference between the 
rights of the man and the rights of the citizen is not so much a matter of ontology of the rules (yet 
the right to assembly cannot be exercised but in communion with others) involved, but on the 
conditions of their definition, appropriation and exercise. See, Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 
TEX. L. REV. 1417, 1422-3 (1983-4) (The first is that rights do not come neatly divided into 
inherently individual and inherently communal rights. Most rights are sufficiently ambiguous that 
they can be pushed in different directions by political and intellectual struggles). See also, RICHARD 
BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM. A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY 
30-1 (2007) (discussing freedom of speech as a public good rather than as an individual right). 
223 Lynd, for instance, mentioned the “right[s] to engage in concerted activity” as a clear 
manifestation of what he called ‘communal rights.’ Lynd, Communal Rights, supra note 222, at 1423. 
Although politically motivated, civil disobedience is precisely justified on exclusion from politics, 
namely on individual rights where those taking part are individually considered. 
224 Id. 1424. 
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heard the warning, some of them certainly did not hear it.225 In other words, 
protesters become, by the very same act of protests, a we.226 
D. Continuity 
Fourth, displays of joint action operating through non-institutional means and 
aimed at contending political and cultural authority become a social movement as 
they show some “degree of temporal continuity.”227 Admittedly, more than an 
intrinsic feature, continuity becomes a necessity if social movements want to 
succeed in achieving “the kinds of changes movements pursue.”228 The same holds 
for those who want to succeed in advancing new constitutional understandings. In 
any case, continuity is not required in social protests. In fact, their connection with 
social movements might be purely contingent. This signals that not only are they 
but one of the means social movements resort to, but also social protests’ 
autonomy from them. For one thing, what defines social movements is not their 
public salience, but their shared identity. Many protests sustained in time do not 
necessarily signal there is a social movement behind them, and, by the same token, 
one single sporadic act of protest might be a manifestation of a solid social 
                                                        
225 Garcia v. Bloomberg, at 488-9 (“While the demonstrators might have inferred otherwise if they 
had heard the bull-horn message, no reasonable officer could imagine, in these circumstances, that 
this warning was heard by more than a small fraction of the gathered multitude.”). 
226 Lynd, Communal Rights, supra note 222, at 1427 (arguing we engage in concerted action because 
a group is experienced as a reality in itself; “I do not scratch your back only because one day I may 
need you to scratch mine. Labor solidarity is more than an updated version of the social contract 
through which each individual undertakes to assist others for the advancement of his or her own 
interest.”).  
227 David A. Snow et al., Mapping the Terrain, supra note 10, at 10-11.    
228 Id. at 11. 
81 
 
organization.229 For another, we should also notice, as I did above, the 
phenomenon of spontaneous protests. These acts of unbidden grievances lack 
continuous machineries upon which they are maintained. 
Of course, from a constitutional viewpoint, social protests are granted 
constitutional protection no matter their continuity. One single (sporadic) act of 
protest will (or should) be granted constitutional protection, as much as more 
sustained displays. Constitutions do not provide protection, nor even strengthen 
protection, depending on how much an individual exhibits sustained exercise of 
his or her rights. In fact, recent experience suggests that ‘prolonged’ exercise of 
rights might actually have counterproductive results, thus diminishing 
protection.230 
Of course, the success of the political grievances expressed through protest, as 
noted above, depend on a large extent to being sustained efforts. Constitutional 
readings will seduce the public (creating social power) and the avenues of political 
will-making (turning that social power into political power) as long as they are 
able to convince them of their rationality, necessity, goodness, and so forth. 
However, from a constitutional rights viewpoint, even single acts of protests are 
covered and protected.  
 
                                                        
229 Diani, The Concept of Social Movements, supra note 9, at 16.  
230 It was, in fact, a prolonged exercise of assembly rights what proved critical to deny 
constitutional protection to occupiers in Toronto. Batty, 2011 ONSC 6862, at paras. 64, 92-6, 104 
(where a Toronto court told protesters that the trespass notice the City issued would only restrict 





This chapter has been devoted to the introductory analysis of social movements. 
As I noted at the beginning, my interest was primarily to enquire about social 
movements: about their place in, and the role they have played in the 
comprehension of, our democracies. In answering these questions I turned to 
sociology. For one, the treatment social movements have received in sociology has 
been more extensive than the treatment accorded by their legal counterpart. For 
another, terminology in sociology, mostly drawn from empirical research, is richer 
and clearer—despite the absence of any canonical definition.  
As noted, social movements are mostly defined as non-institutional in character, a 
feature that has not prevented them from relating to, and being influenced by, the 
State’s institutional avenues. Their place mainly outside the institutional channels 
of participation also explains why it is often said they have played a key role in 
expanding democracy’s understanding, for democracy’s meaning has been pushed 
to transcend the pure institutional arena to also encompass these new forms of 
representation (self-representation, self-authorization and discursive 
representation) and participation. Their impact has also been felt at the 
institutional level. Some of the achievements attained by social movements have 
been precisely to open governmental channels—to include larger participation—
and to help eliminate undemocratic obstacles we now consider evil—as was the 
case of the civil rights movements. However, I also noted institutional exclusion 
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might also bring important benefits in keeping a flourishing civil society 
unconstrained. 
In the end, I finalize by narrowing my analysis down from social movements to one 
of its manifestations, namely social protests. I focused on social protests because, 
contrary to other means social challengers may resort to, social protests seem to 
face higher opposition. They are noisy, they cause disruption, they take place on 
the streets, and, contrary to the legacies of constitutional liberalism regularly 
endorsed, they seem to give tumults, rather than reason and paused reflection, a 
say in politics. Unsurprisingly, answers to social protests have usually been 
accompanied with the State’s strongest tool: criminal law. A tool that, as Sajó 
argues, is used against certain forms of collective display, arguably those which 
stand against hegemonic relations of power—as noted, the very thrust behind a 
mobilization. 
Despite this current state of affairs, I finalized by suggesting that social protests 
exhibit some proper characteristics that should take constitutional analysis to 
pause and reflect before restrictions on protests, for protests have not only 
contributed to enhance democratic governments (to produce “good laws”), but 
also to show with their own action that constitutions are unfinished projects 
whose very understanding, included that of rights involved, is to be defined 
politically.231 The notion that constitutions are unfinished projects means to 
                                                        
231 HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 75, at 369-70, 383-4 (arguing one of the key features of 
social movements is the self-referential capacity to make use of rights and, at the same time, 
“interpret, defend, and radicalize their normative content”). 
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conceive constitutions as an activity,232 that is, as open-ended projects where basic 
commitments are recognized, yet inevitably left open.233 If politics plays a critical 
role in defining that unfinished project, politics, as shown above, should include 
non-institutional interventions to prevent selective (if not discriminatory) 
readings of what are, allegedly, common commitments. 
                                                        
232 GRÉGOIRE C. N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION. ON THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 13 (2009). 




RESIST AND PROTEST 
 
I. Common threads 
 II. Constitutional facts  




“The liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent 
revolution but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power …” 
V. I. Lenin∗ 
 
Constitutional law relates to social protests in at least two different, although 
complementary, ways. First, it provides a right-based framework under which acts 
of protests are constitutionally protected. Second, it is substantively influenced by 
the very same acts of protests it protects. This work deals with both relations. In so 
doing, it considers social protests main traits to be (a) a form of collective action 
(b) that manifest through street non-institutional means of participation which, (c) 
regardless of its temporal (dis)continuity, (d) is aimed at challenging both social 
                                                        
∗ THE STATE AND THE REVOLUTION (Penguin Classics 1992) (1918). 
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and legal/constitutional norms. These traits, instead of a static definition, provide 
the base upon which a right-based framework is erected and according to which I 
analyze protests.1 I will mainly consider the rights that are usually invoked to 
constitutionally protect social protests.2 While rights certainly provide 
constitutional protection, imposing duties on the State, they also regulate and 
limit—the unavoidable consequence of installing political claims under the 
umbrella of liberal jurisprudence3—the time, place and manner of protests. 
Besides case-by-case (legal) limitations, there is another, admittedly more 
fundamental, political contour the talk of rights configures, for talking about 
constitutional/legal rights presupposes the State, a constitution, and its norm-
creating, norm-applying (most notably, although certainly not limited to, courts) 
and norm-enforcing institutions.4 This means that rights need the State to which 
the rights are directed and therefore a constitutional order upon which a legal, and 
consequently bureaucratic, system is founded.5 In other words, its institutional 
form characterizes law. As an institutional system, law “consist[s] of rules which 
are subject to adjudication before official bodies,”6 where both those norms and 
                                                        
1 This is particularly relevant in the case of rules related to social protests—and social movements 
at large. As I will show below, the influence social protest movements exert on law is not confined 
to substantive understandings (meanings), but it also extends to the rules (rights) 
protecting/regulating protests. 
2 I will do this in Chapters 3 and 4. 
3 WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 6-7 (1995). 
4 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 105 (1979). 
5 NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 49 (2007) (“The 
institutionalization of legal order in a state or other polity depends on the evolution or adoption of 
a constitution that establishes the essential agencies of government and assigns powers to them.”); 
Joseph Raz, Legal Rights, 4 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 1, 2-5 (1984). 
6 Raz, Legal Rights, supra note 5, at 3. 
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those public bodies have been established (constituted) by other norms. As Neil 
MacCormick put it, “nothing comes out of nothing.”7 Precisely because law is not 
the general model for all other kinds of rights (or of every other time we claim to 
be acting pursuant to a right) its scope is limited and cannot account for, let alone 
protect, all actions claimed to be in exercise of rights (other than 
legal/constitutional rights).8 
This formal distinction, formal as law happens to be, is needed to clarify certain 
constitutional confusion (or what I see as constitutional confusion) that the 
excitement of the recent waves of protests has provoked. Many demonstrators in 
Europe, such as the indignados in Spain, and in North America, such as those of the 
‘Occupy’ movement, to name a few, saw themselves in a continuum with the 
protests of the ‘Arab Spring.’9 Thus, to some, Occupy Wall Street was drawing on 
                                                        
7 MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW, supra note 5. 
8 I emphasize the notion of law as an institutional system in order to highlight the need for a State, 
not with the intention of arguing moral (or other sorts of) rights or values cannot engender positive 
(legal/constitutional) rights, although this inference is not necessarily always the case. See, JEREMY 
WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 19-21 (2012) (“The Covenant gives us the legal ground of the 
rights set out in the body of its text, but it is a further question whether this is supposed to be the 
legal representation of a moral conception. Maybe every legal idea has a moral underpinning of 
some sort; but it would be a mistake to think that the moral underpinning has to have the same 
shape or content as the legal ground.”); Jeremy Waldron, A Right-based Critique of Constitutional 
Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 18, 23-8 (1993). See also, RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 4, 
at 115 (“Law has limits and this is why we can refer to legal systems and to legal rights and duties 
which are not necessarily moral rights and duties, etc.”). Even authors who hold law is part of a 
political morality, and therefore assume law is inevitably connected to some kind of moral 
standard, acknowledge political rights (those that arise only once a State has been established) are 
not necessarily translated into legal or constitutional rights. See, RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR 
HEDGEHOGS 331-2, 405-6 (2011). 
9 I am not arguing against those protesters who saw themselves as inspired by the ‘Arab Spring.’ 
That the ‘Arab spring’ served as inspiration to many protests in the rest of the world is something 
that, although open to criticism, is acknowledged by commentators. See, Sarah van Gelder, How 
Occupy Wall Street Changes Everything, in THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING 1 (Sarah van Gelder ed., 2011-2). 
My concern, however, is directed at those who see all these different movements as belonging to 
the very same wave of mobilizations.  
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the “successful model of revolt in Egypt,”10 whereas others in Madison even 
chanted, “From Egypt / to Wisconsin / power to the people.”11 The Adbusters—a 
cultural critique journal that posted one of the first calls to occupy—asked, “Are 
you ready for a Tahrir moment?”12 Hardt and Negri contended these protests, 
although with differences, were part of an “emerging cycle of struggles … against 
the lack—or failure—of political representation.”13 While many of these accounts, 
and others I shall note below, have traced similarities acknowledging regional 
differences, it is also true they still hold to the continuum narrative. 
Precisely because the first part of this work seeks to show what rights are usually 
invoked to protect protests—hence why I talk of the (positive) right to protest—it 
is worth distinguishing those who seek to dispute, and finally change, the locus of 
political power from those who do not contend the current constitutional scheme, 
although they aim at influencing it.14 Whereas those uprising against the State 
claiming to embody the constituent power will normally assert they have a right to 
do so, they are certainly not thinking in, neither exercising, a sort of right (both 
                                                        
10 Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Against Political Capture: Occupiers, Muckrakers and James 
A. Robinson, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK 100, 110 (Janet Byrne ed. 2012). See also, Marlies Glasius & 
Geoffrey Pleyers, The Global Movement of 2011: Democracy, Social Justice and Dignity, 44 
DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 547, 551 (2013) (“The Indignados we interviewed in Barcelona, Paris and 
Brussels reported being inspired by the example of what was happening in Tahrir Square, including 
the symbolic value of ‘square’ politics. In turn, Occupy Wall Street was inspired by both Tahrir and 
the Indignados.”). 
11 PAUL MASON, WHY IT’S STILL KICKING OFF EVERYWHERE: THE NEW GLOBAL REVOLUTIONS 184 (2013). 
12 MANUEL CASTELLS, NETWORKS OF OUTRAGE AND HOPE: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE INTERNET AGE 159 
(2012). 
13 Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, The Fight for ‘Real Democracy’ at the Heart of Occupy Wall Street, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136399/michael-hardt-
and-antonio-negri/the-fight-for-real-democracy-at-the-heart-of-occupy-wall-street. 
14 Constitutional influence, what I term a form of popular constitutional interpretation carried out 
through protests, is the subject matter of Chapters 5 and 6. 
89 
 
constitutional and legal) to be adjudicated by an official body, but a 
natural/political right previous or superior to those the civil State guarantees.15 
The aim of this chapter is to distinguish between protests as a means of revolution 
aimed at acting as constituent power, on the one hand, and protests as a (positive) 
right and therefore a constituted entitlement to be adjudicated before official 
powers likewise constituted.16 I shall do this by revisiting what I call the 
constitutional facts the ‘Arab Spring’ provide us with: namely the fact that many of 
the Arab protests and revolts ended with new constitutions in place. I begin by (I) 
briefly resuming the common threads some commentators of the recent wave of 
protests have found. I will argue that, although all recent experiences appear to 
share the main characteristics of social protest movements—most notably their 
non-institutional character—, these similarities are largely factual or external. In 
order to hold this claim I will (II) highlight the constitutional facts of some ‘Arab 
Spring’ protests, where revolutions led, either consciously or unconsciously, to 
new constitution-drafting and (III) introduce the very well-known distinction 
between constituent power and constituted powers. While this distinction will 
                                                        
15 I want to stress the limiting (without axiological charge) character of law. In fact, one of the most 
salient features of the Rule of Law is precisely that it limits the range of actions (and omissions, if 
you will) that political power can pursue. Aimed at preventing abuses of political power, the Rule of 
Law “insist[s] on a particular mode of the exercise of political power: governance through law.” 
Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2008-2009). See also, MARTIN 
LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 225 (2010) (“While government is the product of positive law, 
the nation owes its existence to natural law alone.”). 
16 This work assumes there is a conceptual distinction between the rights to resist, revolution, and 
rebellion, on the one hand, and the constituent power, on the other. However, for the sake of space 
and in order not to deviate the attention, it will treat the first cluster of terms as one and normally 




help in distinguishing two large groups of protesters: those who acted embodying 
the constituent power (i.e. Egypt) and those who did not contend the 
constitutional scheme under which they acted (i.e. ‘Occupy’), my main interest is to 
show that talking about a (positive) right to protest and of protests as popular 
constitutional interpretation—the two kinds of relations aforementioned—only 
make sense in the latter case. 
 
I. Common threads 
 
There has been a tendency to situate all waves of protests as one single group 
pertaining to a sort of global uprising,17 a tendency certainly not shared by all 
commentators.18 Thus, some see protesters as different as Egyptian 
revolutionaries and North American occupiers as members of a single global 
subject, namely the multitude.19 The multitude would thus bring different agendas 
to convergence in the struggle against the “dominance of global capital [that] is 
                                                        
17 WRITERS FOR THE 99%, OCCUPYING WALL STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF AN ACTION THAT CHANGED AMERICA 
11 (2012) (“Occupy Wall Street is part of a global movement that has reached nearly every 
continent in the last year [2010]. Although the protests in disparate nations have taken place under 
different forms of government … all have expressed a similar outrage with the inequities of 
unfettered global capitalism.”). 
18 See, ALAIN BADIOU, TIMES OF RIOTS AND UPRISINGS (arguing the historical conditions to bring 
revolutionary changes are only present in the Arab mobilizations); SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE YEAR OF 
DREAMING DANGEROUSLY (2012) (suggesting that the lack of real alternatives in the ‘Occupy’ 
movements may bring protesters to fall in love with the movement itself rather than triggering 
actual changes). See also, Magid Shihade et al., The season of revolution: the Arab Spring and 
European mobilizations, 4 INTERFACE 1 (2012) (although noticing the influence the ‘Arab Spring’ 
caused in other movements, calling the attention on the eurocentrism with which many 
approached the Arab revolutions). 
19 Mervat F. Hatem, The Arab Spring Meets the Occupy Wall Street Movement: Examples of Changing 
Definitions of Citizenship in a Global World, 8 JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY 401 (2012). 
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currently shaping the societies of the North and the South.”20 Others have argued 
that the ‘Occupy’ movement, including its tactical and political decisions, was 
originally envisaged in light of the “emancipatory possibilities of a new political 
subjectivity [they saw] in Egypt.”21 Therefore, ‘Occupy,’ here depicted as a global 
protest, was not only initiated in light of the ‘Arab Spring’—inspired specifically by 
its Egyptian chapter—but also crucially shaped by it.22 Still others have claimed 
that both the ‘Arab Spring’ protests and the occupiers in North America represent 
examples of pre-figurative politics, “a process in which the objective continuously 
changes.”23 Therefore, both groups of movements reject being categorized in terms 
of success/failure according to some standard abstractly defined and externally 
imposed; on the contrary, they share a common ground where their “outcomes, 
initial intentions … [and] ends … mutually evolve, interplay, change and cohere 
during or within the [political] practice.”24 Finally, there are those who contend the 
occupiers and ‘Arab Spring’ mobilizations belong to contemporary disobedient 
movements that “express their opposition to their government’s decisions and 
policies” by neither institutional means nor “rallies, mass demonstrations, and 
                                                        
20 Id. at 402. 
21 Sarah Kerton, Tahrir, here? The influence of the Arab Uprisings on the Emergence of Occupy, 11 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDIES 302 (2012).  
22 Kerton, indeed, talks about how the political subjectivity Tahrir’s occupation gave birth to, 
proliferated to, rather than simply called the attention of, North American occupiers (Id.). While she 
is totally aware of the limited fashion in which this subjectivity was (literally) translated into North 
America (305), she also insists that the “emancipatory possibilities of the Egyptian revolution  … 
has already been seen in the making possible of a new, or certainly modified, form of dissent in the 
Western world” (307). In fact, ‘Occupy Wall Street’ is presented as an emulator of Tahrir Square “in 
a symbiotic exchange between the two sites of resistance” (Id.). 
23 Mathijs van de Sande, The Prefigurative Politics of Tahrir Square-An Alternative Perspective on the 
2011 Revolutions, 19 RES PUBLICA 223, 231-2 (2013). 
24 Id. at 237. 
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strikes,” but “by consciously refusing to carry out the constituted laws and even 
the law-constituting authority of those who hold formal political power.”25 This 
would clearly be neither coincidence nor simply iteration. There is also a 
substantive similitude as both movements represent forms of a radical alternative 
to current societies where there is a “real-time realization in practice” of that very 
alternative. “[R]adical change,” as van de Sande writes, “is at once envisioned and 
actualised.”26 Finally, there are also those who, being aware that there are two 
identifiable threads in the current wave of protests (those seeking “political 
reforms,” such as the ‘Arab Spring’ protesters, and those manifesting their political 
discontent “regarding the political mismanagement of the socioeconomic crisis and 
the erosion of the welfare state,” such as in North America and Europe 
respectively), find a common ground in their causes.27 In fact, this reading suggests 
that, despite differences in tactics, contexts, and antecedents, this recent wave of 
protests shares its thrust towards more egalitarian and democratic societies as 
well as its roots “in the political economy in which globalization, financialization, 
and neoliberalism had produced vast wealth for the elites, but increasing levels of 
social and economic inequality.”28 Movements as different as those revolutionary 
waves in North Africa and public occupations across the United States and Canada 
would be “diverse manifestations of an international cycle of contention fighting 
                                                        
25 Adam Sitze, Foreword, in RAFFAELE LAUDINI, DISOBEDIENCE IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT. A 
GENEALOGY vii (Jason Francis McGimsey trans., 2013). 
26 Id. at 231. 
27 Benjamín Tejerina et al., From indignation to occupation: A new wave of global mobilization, 61 
CURRENT SOCIOLOGY MONOGRAPH 377, 380 (2013). 
28 Id. at 385. 
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against socioeconomic injustice whose primary goals and visions include a 
transformation of the economic system to provide greater opportunities, equality, 
and personal fulfillment.”29  
Corollary of this understanding was Time magazine’s decision to choose ‘The 
Protester’ as the person of the year in 2011.30 According to Time, 2011 was 
marked by protests that started in Tunisia with the fight against the dictatorship, 
continued in Egypt with the revolution against Hosni Mubarak, and later spread to 
Madrid, Athens, London, North America, Mexico, and Chile—to name a few. 
Although it recognized their “stakes were very different in different places,”31 the 
magazine considered all these protests as part of a global step, where the global is 
no longer solely reduced to “a fluid worldwide economy managed by important 
people;”32 rather, there is a common new citizenry worthy of a same label: ‘The 
Protester’ as the person of the year. 
There are undoubtedly some common traits empirical accounts have insisted 
upon. First of all, and most important, these mobilizations exhibit a 
phenomenological similarity that shows people on the streets, occupying public 
spaces (or turning spaces that were privately owned into public ones), and who, 
depending on the political conditions, exert different degrees of violence. In other 
words, this is a wave of protests. Second, it is not only that the people occupy 
                                                        
29 Id. at 386. But see, Stavros Stavrides, Squares in Movement, 11 SOUTH ATLANTIC QUARTERLY 585 
587-8 (2012) (emphasizing the similarity—caused by the public staged of the Arab world—in 
tactics that spread from Tahrir Square to Europe).  





public spaces, but that they do so politically; their intention is to participate in the 
definition of decisions common to all and they resort to protests as the non-
institutional means to present their positions. Third, on average, protesters around 
the world were young, educated and belonged to the middle class—in fact, many of 
them claimed, perhaps contradictorily with their so depicted fight against 
capitalism, that their future was curtailed as power remains unresponsive to their 
efforts and merits.33 Fourth, there is also a convergence in the significant use 
organizers have made of social media—a large use that admits no single 
characterization that can encompass the “diversity of communicative practices” 
deployed.34 Finally, there is no doubt all these waves of protests were, and are, 
challenging in their nature. A conditio sine qua non of the new social movements to 
some, their challenges have ranged from attempts to bring dictatorial regimes 
down to question Western democracies’ marriage with large multinationals.35 
 
II. Constitutional facts 
 
                                                        
33 This contradiction was noticed by ŽIŽEK, THE YEAR OF DREAMING DANGEROUSLY, supra note 18, at 10-
2 (2012). But see, Tejerina et al., From indignation to occupation, supra note 27, at 384 (arguing that, 
although the mobilizations started with the call from “young, often college-educated … citizens,” it 
rapidly spread and attracted “many other groups, classes, and age cohorts”) and Zeinab Abul-Magd, 
Occupying Tahrir Square: The Myths and Realities of the Egyptian Revolution, 111 SOUTH ATLANTIC 
QUARTERLY 565 (2012) (“Those who tweeted about Tahrir were not the ones who occupied it, 
fought bloody battles against state thugs on its frontiers, died in it, and made the revolution 
happen.”). 
34 PAOLO GERBAUDO, TWEETS AND THE STREETS: SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONTEMPORARY ACTIVISM (2012). 
35 Magid Shihade et al., The Season of revolution, supra note 18, at 11 (arguing waves of protests 
were directed at different crisis of hegemony). 
95 
 
My intention is not to question the specificities of each of these accounts, many of 
which I cannot but learn from, but ask whether these diverse movements can be 
located on a common constitutional ground. I wonder whether these different 
waves of protests, despite some factual similarities, are expressions of the same 
political power. Can we, from a constitutional law perspective, throw all these 
protest movements into the same basket? 
While protesters can find themselves with, or trigger with their actions, the task of 
drafting a new Constitution either consciously or unconsciously—as Hanna Arendt 
has argued was the case of 1968 student mobilizations36—, it is a constitutional 
fact that some of the ‘Arab Springs’ uprisings were able to contend the locus of 
constitutional sovereignty from previous autocratic rulers.37 Whereas some 
accounts have emphasized the democratic turn (or the failure to do so) of these 
revolts, I limit my analysis to what I shall call the constitutional fact of constitution-
making.38 In other words, I limit my analysis only to suggest some of the ‘Arab 
                                                        
36 HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 49-50 (1970). 
37 Some authors have argued these revolts are better conceptualized as political, rather than social 
revolutions: the former characterized by affecting the operation (even if redefining it) of the State 
and the latter by radically transforming relationships of power in society. Ricardo René Larémont, 
Revolution, revolt, and reform in North Africa, in REVOLUTION, REVOLT AND, REFORM IN NORTH AFRICA. 
THE ARAB SPRING AND BEYOND 1, 2-3 (Ricardo René Larémont ed., 2013). 
38 It is not my intention to determine whether those processes of constitution-making were, or have 
been, either democratic in character or pacifically concluded, if concluded at all. Some authors have 
suggested there are serious doubts as to whether the recent waves of uprisings brought actual 
democracy to the region or permitted authoritarian adaption, a debate I notice but do not engage 
with here. See, Garth le Pere, The Middle East, North Africa, and the ‘Arab Spring.’ Towards 
revolutionary change or authoritarian adaption? 43 AFRICA INSIGHT 1 (2013). But see, Noureddine 
Jebnoun, Introduction: Rethinking the Paradigm of “Durable” and “Stable” Authoritarianism in the 
Middle East, in MODERN MIDDLE EAST AUTHORITARIANISM: ROOTS, RAMIFICATIONS, AND CRISIS 1, 5ff. 
(Noureddine Jebnoun et al., eds. 2013) (arguing the recent Arab uprisings call to reconsider and 
reexamine the Western approach to the region that tends to emphasize cultural variables, assumed 
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Spring’ protesters were successful in bringing about comprehensive constitutional 
changes, changes that were not imposed from abroad.39 
As noted above, many commentators agree on the political (repressive and corrupt 
regimes responsible for gross violations of individual rights) and socio-economic 
(large financial crises accompanied with pervasive economic inequality) causes of 
the Arab revolts.40 Some scholars also argue that these uprisings were, in part, 
facilitated by political openness these States strategically implemented.41 Both 
Egypt and Tunisia, George Joffé notices, have transited from authoritarian rule to 
what he and others call ‘liberalised autocracies:’ a model signaled by “partial 
political liberalisation” that included the recognition of certain individual rights 
and toleration for political dissonance.42 Eventually this liberalization contributed 
to the formation of autonomous (“not formally controlled by the State”) social 
                                                                                                                                                                  
ethnic resilience, and religious exceptionalism, and even incompatibility with democracy, as ever 
present factors that explain enduring authoritarianism). 
39 Zachary Elkins et al., Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul …: Constitution Making in Occupied States, 49 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1139, 1140 (2007-8) (exploring what they call ‘occupation constitutions,’ 
“constitutions drafted or adopted in the extreme condition of one state having explicit sovereign 
power over another”); Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 858 (2004-5) 
(noticing how in countries such as former Yugoslavia or Iraq constitutions are being “drafted and 
adopted in the shadow of the gun”); but see, Hans Agné, Democratic Founding: We the people and the 
others, 10 INT’L. J. CONSTIT. L. 836 (2012) (arguing the founding of a State is democratic when agreed 
to by as many persons as possible within and beyond the boundaries of the State to be founded.). 
40 Kamal Eldin Osman Salih, The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings, 35 ARAB STUDIES 
QUARTERLY 184 (2013); Ibrahim G. Aoudé, Egypt: Revolutionary Process and Global Capitalist Crisis, 
35 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY 241 (2013); Chibli Mallat, The Philosophy of the Middle East Revolution, 
Take One: Nonviolence, 3 Middle East Law and Governance 136, 139 (2011). 
41 Joffé, for instance, and in line with ‘political opportunity’ analyses, argues that the cases of Egypt 
and Tunisia were more successful in part due to the same political openness, limited as it was, that 
those very same States tolerated. In an attempt to legitimize their own autocracies, authoritarian 
Tunisian and Egyptian rulers open the constitutional/legal field (thus becoming liberalized 
autocracies) to the formation of social movements that eventually proved to be relevant in the 
‘Arab Spring’ protests. See, George Joffé, The Arab Spring in North Africa: origins and prospects, 16 
THE JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES 507 (2011). 
42 Id. at 511-14. 
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movements, which, through their independent agency, were able to challenge 
regime hegemony.43 As Joffé puts it, 
liberalized autocracies, ironically enough, set up the conditions for their 
own demise by creating space for the evolution of autonomous precursor 
movements—ostensibly under regime control—which, in the right 
conditions, could evolve into movements of political contention.44 
Despite this partial openness, it is also true that a political regime—together with 
its Constitution—which offers little, if any, possibilities of redemption for such 
structural shortcomings has few chances of surviving. Constitutional regimes 
appeal to obedience in light of political faith and trust, not of false idolatry where 
empty forms of alleged participation are used to put democratic make-up on 
autocratic regimes.45 And faith, Balkin writes, is a matter of constant and ongoing 
appreciation that runs in a backward-looking and forward-looking fashion 
necessarily tied to present events.46 
This has long been held to be true of liberal constitutional regimes.47 John Locke, 
for one, argued governmental power is held in fiduciary capacity, which is to say 
that the people entrust their institutions with the power to achieve certain ends.48 
                                                        
43 Id. at 514-7. 
44 Id. at 517 
45 JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD  (2011). 
46 Id. at 73-4. 
47 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 367 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 
2005) (1698) (“For all Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, 
whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and 
the Power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall 
think best for their safety and security.”). 
48 Id. at 366-7. 
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Limited as those ends appear under the liberal rubric, what is important is to 
notice is that that trust is always under evaluation. By whom? Let John Locke  
answer: 
To this I reply, The People shall be Judge; for who shall be Judge whether his 
Trustee or Deputy acts well, and according to the Trust reposed in him, but 
he who deputes him, and must, by having deputed him have still a Power to 
discard him, when he fails in his Trust?49 
Ronald Dworkin, for another, has made a similar claim. Dworkin wrote that the 
legitimacy of a State, legitmacy which he saw certainly as a matter of degree, 
“depends on both how a purported government has acquired power and how it 
uses that power.”50  Even when States are not fully just to their citizens legitimacy 
can be contained only if there are “political processes of correction … available 
…”.51  
Not only liberals have emphasized the role active vigilant people and political 
processes open to the people’s decisive intervention.52 This has also certainly been 
the case of republicanism, where the government is always under the vigilant eye 
of the citizens. As Pettit has argued, in a republican perspective governmental 
                                                        
49 Id. at 426-7. See also, Benjamin Constant, On the Liberty of the Ancients compared with that of the 
moderns, in CONSTANT POLITICAL WRITINGS 307, 326 (Biancamaria Fontana ed., Cambridge University 
Press 2003, 9th print.) (“[T]he people who, in order to enjoy liberty which suits them, resort to the 
representative system, must exercise an active and constant surveillance over their representatives 
….”). 
50 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 8, at 321. 
51 Id. at 323.  
52 See, RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF DEMOCRACY (2007) (emphasizing the procedural openness democracies should show to permit 
citizen authorship of collective decisions). 
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legitimacy is evaluated according to how a (politically deemed acceptable) social 
order is imposed by a State.53 Thus, interference is generated and is only 
acceptable as long as freedom from domination is secured.54 
Of course, to secure individual liberty citizens must remain vigilant of their 
government—the very same precondition to secure the commonwealth’s 
freedom.55 This is why a variant of republicanism hails processes open to popular 
intervention; processes open to political contestation, rather than static rights 
defined in a depoliticized fashion, are the ways to secure and recognize equal 
status, respect, and concern for citizens.56 Republican emphasis on “enabl[ing] 
each individual citizen to exercise an equal right of participation in the making of 
the laws”57 also justifies the people’s capacity to exert democratic influence and, in 
the long haul, imposition of a popular direction on government. As Pettit puts it, 
democratic and popular control over government “enables us to explain why and 
how government should be forced … to operate on the people’s terms.”58 
                                                        
53 Philip Pettit, Legitimacy and Justice in Republican Perspective, 65 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 59 
(2012) (“The justice question is whether the coercively imposed order is acceptable or justifiable or 
desirable; the legitimacy question is whether the coercive imposition of the order is acceptable or 
justifiable or desirable.”). 
54 PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (2002 rep.) 51 (arguing 
liberty as non-domination to be the distinctive of republican thought, where liberty is understood 
not as the absence of interference, but “against interference on an arbitrary basis”). 
55 QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM 26 (2006 9th prin.) (“A free state is a community in 
which the actions of the body politic are determined by the will of the members as a whole.”); 
MAURIZIO VIROLI, REPUBLICANISM 49-50 (Anthony Shugaar trans., 2002) (arguing that classical 
republicans considered self-government a condition of liberty). 
56 BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 52, at 156 (arguing republicanism pushes for a 
form of governmental control “in terms of popular controls rather than a priori restrictions on 
certain kinds of governmental intervention”).  
57 SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM, supra note 55, at 30. 
58 PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 3 (2012). 
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While some scholars have affirmed the existence of an Arab resilience to live under 
authoritarian ruling, which is not the same as considering the difficulties to be 
found when freed from autocratic governments,59 apparently some Arab 
revolutions have also endorsed a fuller comprehension of political citizenship 
assuming a (now we know, crucial) say in their political fate.60 Seyla Benhabib, for 
instance, claimed that the ‘Arab Spring’ movements were revolutionaries seeking 
to establish a “new order of freedom.”61 By practicing what Benhabib sees as a 
“modern understanding of politics … they aim[ed] at constitutional reform.”62 Joel 
Colon-Rios and Allan Hutchinson make an even more concrete claim: “with warts 
and all,” they argue, ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions show “an undeniable embodiment 
and manifestation of constituent power at its most insistent and immediate.”63 
Constitutional facts accompany their assessment. 
First of all, the constitutional facts of Libya support the aforementioned 
affirmations that some African revolutions were a manifestation of the exercise of 
constituent power. There is little I want to add to what commentators have already 
noticed: namely that the Libyan case has proved more difficult as it is the State 
                                                        
59 “How difficult it is for a people accustomed to live under a prince to preserve their liberty, should 
they by some accident acquire it as Rome did after the expulsion of the Tarquins, is shown by 
numerous examples …”. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 153 (Penguin Classics 2003) (1531). 
60 I am not suggesting that Arab uprisings show their protesters have endorsed neither liberal nor 
republican ideals. What I am trying to do, however, is to understand how these revolutionaries 
embody vigilant communities concerned about their political fate and decided to exercise that 
right. 
61 Seyla Benhabib, The Arab Spring: Religion, revolution and the public sphere, Eurozine, (May. 5, 
2011), http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-05-10-benhabib-en.html. 
62 Id. 
63 Joel Colon-Rios & Allan Hutchinson, Democracy and Revolution: An Enduring Relationship?, 89 
DENVER U. L. REV. 593, 600 (2012). 
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itself, besides a new Constitution, what is to be built.64 The extremely personalist 
and stateless regime al-Qadhafi promoted was both the problem and part of the 
solution, for once the revolution succeeded in bringing him down the whole State 
(here used in a rhetorical sense) fell with him. Unsurprisingly, drafting a new 
Constitution is part of the tasks ahead.65 As I write this work reports show that the 
constituent process, although still facing a large number of substantial obstacles, is 
under way.66  
Although an authoritarian regime, Egypt instead exhibited some political openness 
that—according to Joffé—allowed autonomous social movements to flourish.67 
This would explain the relative success social mobilization had in Egypt, at least 
when compared with those monarchical regimes where incipient protests 
countered, and finally appeased, top-down constitutional reforms.68 As soon as the 
uprisings started to calm down, the Armed Forces—a prominent actor in Egypt’s 
political and economic life69—took power and decided to supervise the political 
future. Moreover, once the uprising started to come to an end, groups that had 
                                                        
64 Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski & Duncan Pickard, Libya starts from scratch, 24 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 
86 (2013) (arguing al-Qadhafi pursued a policy of “statelessness” which has conspired against the 
“development of effective governing institutions”). 
65 Alia Brahimi, Libya’s Revolution, 16 THE JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES 605 (2011). 
66 Rhiannon Smith, Libya’s Constituent Assembly: Light at the end of the tunnel?, OPENDEMOCRACY.NET, 
(Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/rhiannon-smith/libyas-
constituent-assembly-light-at-end-of-tunnel 
67 Joffé, The Arab Spring in North Africa, supra note 41, at 511-7. 
68 Imen Gallala-Arndt, Constitutional Reforms in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan: A Comparative 
Assessment, IEMED2012 141, 142 (2012), available at: http://www.iemed.org/observatori-
en/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/med.2012/gallala_en.pdf 
69 See, MASON, WHY IT’S STILL KICKING OFF EVERYWHERE, supra note 11, 5 ff. (insightfully explaining the 




been previously united against Mubarak diverged as to the constitutional agenda. 
The more conservative groups in the Muslim Brotherhood (a political coalition and 
movement proscribed under Mubarak and which eventually won the first 
parliamentary elections post-Tahrir) stood for constitutional reforms whereas the 
most liberal wing of protesters decidedly supported a plan for a new 
Constitution.70 Although at the beginning the Army established an informal 
alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, a society that originally rendered little 
changes to the Constitution,71 the Egyptian process is still open.72 In fact, 
Constitutional facts show that there was an exercise, however dramatically 
disputed, of constituent power.73 On January 19, 2014, 98.1% of Egyptians said yes 
to a new Constitution.74 
Finally, Tunisia—which many signal as the place where the ‘Arab Spring’ began—
also supports the notion of African revolutions exercising constituent power. 
Tunisia has also been depicted as a liberalized autocracy.75 That said, the most 
striking difference when compared with Egypt stems from the minor role the army 
                                                        
70 H.A. Hellyer, Revolution in the Arab World: Egypt and its Challenges, 3 MIDDLE EAST LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE 118, 121-2 (2011). 
71 Some authors suggest this pact proved to be a counter-revolution with the Army exercising a 
kind of “Caesarist role.” Brecht De Smet, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt, 78 SCIENCE & 
SOCIETY 11 (2014). 
72 Joffé, The Arab Spring in North Africa, supra note 41, at 521 (arguing this agreement thwarted the 
objectives more liberal revolutionaries sought).  
73 After the first parliamentary and presidential elections held after the revolution, where the 
Muslim Brotherhood succeeded and Mohamed Morsi was elected president, a constituent council 
was appointed. This council was declared unconstitutional, triggering new disputes and uprisings 
that concluded with Morsi’s ousting—‘enforced’ again by the same Armed Forces—and a newly 
instituted government. That has recently consulted a new Constitution. See, Oliver Housden, Egypt: 
Coup d’ Etat or a Revolution Protected?, 158 THE RUSI JOURNAL 72 (2013). 
74 Egypt referendum: ‘98% back new constitution’, BBC NEWS MIDDLE EAST, Jan. 19, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25796110. 
75 Joffé, The Arab Spring in North Africa, supra note 41, at 511-7, 518-9. 
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played in the pre-revolutionary political life and during the revolts.76 That 
marginal role, along with partial political openness—as Joffé argues—, created 
autonomous spheres that social movements were able to capitalize during the 
upheavals that started in 2010. It is true that as soon as former ruler Ben Ali fled to 
Saudi Arabia differences arose among the opposition.77 Nonetheless, a commission 
with members from civil society and political parties was established to set the 
bases for a new constituent assembly.78 Its work was not easy; difficulties building 
up political coalitions within the constituent assembly were coupled with new 
street demonstrations that signaled protesters’ impatience for changes. 
Nevertheless, Tunisia elected its second constituent assembly on October 2011, 
the very same form of constituent power that defined Tunisia’s political form since 
its independence from France in 1956.79 The process proved to be as turbulent as 
the Egyptian chapter—the process took a year longer than supposed and was 
buffeted by two assassinations and rising terrorism, as well as increasing popular 
protests.80 However, Tunisia inaugurated 2014 with a new Constitution that has 
                                                        
76 Id. at 519; Lisa Anderson, Demystifying the Arab Spring. Parsing the differences between Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2, 3 (2011) (“Tunisia’s military also played a less significant 
role in the country’s revolt than the armed forces in other nations experiencing unrest. Unlike 
militaries elsewhere … [the Army] does not dominate domestic economy.”). 
77 Anderson, Demystifying the Arab Spring, supra note 76, at 4 (arguing the old opposition tried to 
take advantage of the political vacuum, a move that proved fiercely contested by the young 
dissidence). 
78 Gallala-Arndt, Constitutional Reforms, supra note 68, at 143. 
79 Alaya Allani, The post-revolution Tunisian Constituent Assembly: controversy over powers and 
prerogatives, 18 THE JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES 131, 131-2 (2013).  





been praised because of its equilibrium between Muslim heritage (most of the time 
unduly associated to an undemocratic whiff)81 and individual liberties.82 
 
III. A constitutional distinction 
 
Do revolutions necessarily come with new constitutions? Paul Kahn has suggested 
something along these lines. According to Kahn, “[a] successful revolution 
establishes its own value by creating its own truth.”83 This is why revolutions are 
both negative and positive: they negate the status quo in order to replace it with a 
new order.84 Moreover, constitutions, says Kahn, are not only the product of 
revolutions, but “the inner truth of revolution[s].”85 At any rate, drafting a new 
constitution might be a good sign that a political revolution is beginning to end,86 a 
sound “measure of its durable success”87 and an adequate way to concretize 
“revolutionary aspirations … while also providing functional elements and 
institutions to reinforce these aspirations …”.88 As Landau puts it, accounting for 
                                                        
81 Consider, for instance, the preamble of the new Tunisian Constitution, which states, “Tunisia is a 
state of civil character, based on citizenship, the will of the people and the primacy of law.” Id. 
82 Id. 
83 PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 47 (2012). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Colon-Rios & Hutchinson, Democracy and Revolution, supra note 63; David Landau, The 
Importance of Constitution-Making, 89 DENVER U. L. REV. 611, 611-2 (2012) (arguing revolutions are 
sequential events where revolutions occur first and constitution-making later). 
87 Mallat, The Philosophy of the Middle East Revolution, supra note 40, at 147; Gallala-Arndt, 
Constitutional Reforms, supra note 68, at 141 (“The upheavals and revolts for more economic justice 
and political participation in the Arab world will not bear fruit if they are not consolidated with 
constitutional reforms.”).  
88 John Liolos, Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The problems and promise of constitutionalism 
post-Arab Spring, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 219 (2013).  
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revolutions cannot “end at the moment in which the old regime dies. In fact the 
new regime needs to organize itself in some fashion, by establishing fundamental 
rules.”89 Failure to exercise constituent power following a revolution may turn its 
aspirations elusive.90 This is further emphasized by authors such as Hans Kelsen, 
for whom revolutions were identified by the replacement of the entire legal 
order,91 or more tellingly by Negri, who asserted “[c]onstituent power as all-
embracing power is in fact the revolution itself.”92 
What I want to stress here is that, when that constituent power acts, it does so 
unbound by existing rules. Positive rights thus become irrelevant—in the sense 
they do not, as they cannot, justify neither the uprising nor the attribution of 
constituent power.93 Whereas you can speak of a positive right to protest, you 
cannot talk of a positive right to revolution—in the sense I argued before, that is, of 
being rights enforceable before an official body. Take Locke once again. According 
to Locke, it is for the people to decide whether the prince or the legislative power 
                                                        
89 Landau, The Importance of Constitution-Making, supra note 86, at 614. 
90 Liolos, Erecting New Constitutional Cultures, supra note 88, at 231. 
91 Id. 
92 ANTONIO NEGRI, INSURGENCIES: CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE MODERN STATE 1 (Maurizia Boscagli 
trans., 1999). 
93 While rights cannot legally justify neither revolutions nor the exercise of constituent power, 
rights (i.e. the right to be prosecuted under a due process of law, the right not to be tortured) might 
certainly become relevant once a revolutionary movement has been defeated. As Laudani put it 
when reviewing Fichte, a revolution is a way of escaping what revolutionaries see as inhuman 
conditions (“an audacious shot for humanity”), but when  “unsuccessful, precipitates society into 
‘worse and worse misery.’” RAFFAELE LAUDANI, DISOBEDIENCE IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 74-5 
(2013). Although talking about a different context—the 9/11 terrorists attacks and the U.S. 
response—Jeremy Waldron has argued States (where there is one) must respect certain legal, as 
well as moral, limits when responding to challengers. JEREMY WALDRON, TORTURE, TERROR, AND TRADE-
OFFS: PHILOSOPHY FOR THE WHITE HOUSE (2010).  
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has acted against their trust.94 The language he resorts to here is very telling, for it 
shows the people pass this judgment not resorting to established rules, but 
appealing to heaven:  
But farther, this Question, (Who shall be Judge?) cannot mean, that there is 
no Judge at all. For where there is no Judicature on Earth, to decide 
Controversies, amongst Men, God in Heaven is Judge: He alone, 'tis true, is 
Judge of the Right. But every Man is Judge for himself, as in all other Cases, 
so in this, whether another hath put himself into a State of War with him, 
and whether he should appeal to the Supreme Judge, as Jephtha did.95 
Although Locke is addressing the people’s prerogative to resist and not setting 
forth a theory of constituent power, once the people have resisted the illegitimate 
government and returned to a state of nature they constitute new forms of 
government in a legal and institutional vacuum.96 
The republican tradition holds a similar argument when considering how a 
corrupted city, a city not oriented to the common good, could get rid of their rulers, 
for once corruption has become so widespread in a city neither amending laws nor 
fixing institutions would be enough.97 Rather, new laws and institutions must be 
                                                        
94 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 47, at 426-7. 
95 Id. See also, JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN LOCKE’S POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 225 ff (2002). 
96 JOEL COLÓN-RÍOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT 
POWER 8 (2012) (arguing a truly democratic interpretation of the constituent power should take us 
not to confine it solely to resistance moments, but “at any moment in the life of a constitutional 
regime …”). 
97 MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES, supra note 59, at 160-2. See also, ISEULT HONOHAN, CIVIC REPUBLICANISM 
102-3 (2002) (explaining the North American independence along the lines of revolution as the 
means “to restore virtue” of Americans in light of what they saw as a corrupted crown). 
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introduced all at once.98 To do this, Machiavelli warned, “normal methods will not 
suffice now that normal methods are bad.”99 
Hence it is necessary to resort to extraordinary methods, such as the use of 
force and appeal to arms, and, before doing anything, to become a prince in 
the state, so that one can dispose it as one thinks fit.100 
In a similar vein, although in a positive sense, Pettit has argued that accepting the 
legitimacy of a regime implies “that attempts to change unjust laws should be 
restricted to measures that are consistent with the regime’s remaining in place.”101 
Contrario sensu, illegitimacy of the government triggers recourse to means outside 
the system.102 In republican thought, Pettit had previously argued, “the people are 
entitled to challenge the government about how far and how well it is discharging 
that [political] trust [that the rules were required to discharge on behalf of the 
people].”103 This continuous assessment, where sovereignty actually resides, 
                                                        
98 MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES, supra note 59, at 163. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Pettit, Legitimacy and Justice, supra note 53, at 62. Ronald Dworkin made a similar argument 
when discussing the kind of political obligations our living together under, and acting through, a 
State engenders. He called this a political, not a constitutional (less a legal), right. In fact, he 
distinguishes between regular means available to correct unjust or unsound policies, on the one 
hand, and revolution, on the other,  when “the stain is dark and very widespread … and if it is 
protected from cleansing through politics …”. DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 8, at 320-
3. 
102 This is an argument I intend here to be rhetorical. In fact, Pettit is quite clear about the 
impossibility of returning to a state of nature as “we are born into a political world.” Pettit, 
Legitimacy and Justice, supra note 53, at 75-6. However, by the same token is important to notice 
the exercise of constituent power is exactly that: recognition of the necessity of shaping our 
political community. What is crucial, though, is that by exercising constituent power we shape our 
political and public arrangement in a different fashion than it was established in the previous 
(illegitimate) regime. 
103 PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 54, at 202. 
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includes the people’s “right to resist and overthrow” the government “that fails to 
do its job.”104 
Unusual means, therefore, are precisely those means that take place—to 
paraphrase Pettit—once the regime does not remain in place. And once a regime 
does not remain in place, its institutions and regulations wither away with it. As 
Landau notes quoting Kelsen, in a revolution “the constitution is altered or 
replaced by some process other than the one contemplated in the text.”105 Antonio 
Negri makes a similar claim: from a juridical viewpoint the constituent power 
shows the paradox of being “a power rising from nowhere organiz[ing] law.”106  
It could hardly be in a different fashion. Carl Schmitt explained that the political 
subject who decides the political and juridical form of the community exercises the 
constitution-making power.107 This power is unbound, unlimited and ever present, 
which signals a political break with the anterior political form (a previous 
constitution).108 Hence, this power of political decisiveness and violence (in the 
sense of the breaking with the past and giving place to a new order) needs not  be 
regulated—although a certain procedure will be necessary to channel its political 
                                                        
104 Id. 
105 Landau, The Importance of Constitution-Making, supra note 86, at 616.  
106 NEGRI, INSURGENCIES, supra note 92, at 1.  
107 CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 125 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans. & ed., 2008). 
108 Id. at 125-8. 
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creativity.109 It is a power that positively constitutes but is not constituted, let 
alone constrained, channeled, or limited by previous rules.110 
Could it be that constitutions contain provisions recognizing the constituent 
power? Could State constitutions contain and protect the right of those who seek 
to fund the very same constitutional scheme anew? Experience shows this is 
hardly the case.111 Immanuel Kant, for one, rejected such a possibility. Kant 
thought that would imply a contradiction in its own terms.112 “There cannot be a 
law which permits lawlessness”—Beck wrote reviewing Kant’s ideas on the 
matter.113 In fact, he noticed such constitutions would confess their own 
precariousness, namely that constitutions depend on the will of the people and, to 
a certain extent, on their political and social practices.114 Antonio Negri, although 
with a different emphasis, has also noted that the constituent power “resists being 
constitutionalized.”115 Schmitt also rejected the idea: 
The constitution-making will of the people is an unmediated will. It exists 
prior to and above every constitutional procedure. No constitutional law, 
                                                        
109 Id. at 127-8, 130-2. 
110 Id. at 136-42, 145-6. See also, KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 110, at 52-3 (arguing 
constituting will contains the rule which it institutes, but it is not subject to any rule). 
111 Landau, The Importance of Constitution-Making, supra note 86, at 616. 
112 See, Lewis W. Beck, Kant and the Right of Revolution, 32 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 411, 413-
5 (1971). Cass Sunstein made a similar argument, although related to the right to secede. Though 
secession “might be justified as a matter of politics or morality,” he argued, “constitutions ought not 
to include a right to secede.” Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 633, 
633-4 (1991). 
113 Id. at 413-4. 
114 Id. at 414 (“Revolution abrogates positive law; therefore positive law and its system condemn 
revolution. Revolution means return to nature, which the contract establishing positive law 
renounces.”). See also JEREMY WALDRON, THE LAW 63-8 (1990) (arguing constitutions, either written 
or not, depend on social practices, deference and acceptance from those who are bound by them).  
115 NEGRI, INSURGENCIES, supra note 92, at 1. 
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not even a constitution, can confer a constitution-making power and 
prescribe the form of its initiation.116 
Others have suggested the opposite. Landau, for instance, discusses the possibility 
of constraining the exercise of constituent power. Why should we, Landau asks, 
consider “constitution-making as a kind of legal black hole” open to majoritarian 
taking?117 Colon-Rios and Hutchinson argue constitutions themselves could 
channel the exercise of constituent power, although they have suggested this in 
order to radicalize democracy by permitting the permanent actualization of the 
people’s fundamental will.118 Though they recognize constituent power is hard to 
handle, they also highlight Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory passages where he 
argues some form organization or procedure would be needed to implement the 
people’s will. From here they go on to suggest that “constitutions should approach 
revolutions and constituent power as offering opportunities for correcting existing 
injustice through radical and participatory change.”119  
A recent research by Tom Ginsburg et al. shows constitutions that recognize the 
‘right to overthrow your government.’ They conclude that mostly all constitutions 
                                                        
116 SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 107, at 132.  
117 Landau, The Importance of Constitution-Making, supra note 86, at 612. But see, Carl J. Friedrich, 
The Political Theory of the New Democratic Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II 13, 23-4 (Arnold J. Zurcher ed., 1955 2nd ed.) (showing constitutions 
might also seek to place “enemies of the constitution beyond its protective frame,” in clear 
reference to “Hitler’s  seizure of power ‘from within’”).  
118 Colon-Rios & Hutchinson, Democracy and Revolution, supra note 63, at 605-9.  
119 Id. at 606. But see, Emilios Christodoulidis, Against Substitution: The Constitutional Thinking of 
Disensus, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 189, 
204 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2008) (arguing processes of constitutional actualization 
of the constituent will are open to ‘involution,’ where “modalities of responsiveness and 
questionability renewal may remain bound to the pathways of the constituted …”). 
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that include a provision of the kind I’m discussing here do it either as a “forward-
looking tool that constrains future government abuse, empowers national 
citizenry, and acts as an insurance policy against undemocratic backsliding,” or as 
a “backward-looking justification for coup-makers who seek retroactive legitimacy 
for whatever political crimes placed them in a position to be making a new 
constitution in the first place.”120 
Even if constitutionally included, are these provisions to be adjudicated by an 
official body? These provisions seem largely unnecessary or at best merely 
rhetorical, as many of them put their enforcement in the hands of the citizens 
themselves and, as experience has shown, they cut both ways.121 It is true that 
under some circumstances official bodies may be caught up in resistance,122 but 
this is far from being a form of adjudication or enforcement. Moreover, official 
bodies might actually act in an opposite fashion by sending confusing political 
signals.123 There is also the risk, as the recent events in Egypt124 and Turkey125 
                                                        
120 Tom Ginsburg et al., When to Overthrow your Government: The Right to Resist in the World’s 
Constitutions, 60 UCLA L. REV.1184 (2013). At any rate, they also note the right to resist operates as 
a second-rate right, namely “one by which other substantive rights are made secure.” This is why 
“the constitutional text cannot really be considered the source of the right per se” (at 1193-4). 
121 Id. at 1124-5. 
122 Say in the case a branch or agency is unwilling to enforce governmental decisions they regard as 
illegitimate. 
123 This is what occurs when official bodies continue fulfilling their duties, despite a parallel 
initiation of constituent power. Amid Quebec’s attempts to secede, the Supreme Court held that, 
although it “would have no basis to deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession 
should a clear majority of the people of Quebec choose that goal,” Quebec was bound to “respect[] 
the rights of others,” including those Québécois who reject the idea and the majority of Canada as a 
whole. It is true that the Court rejected supervising political conversations between Quebec and the 
rest of the provinces; however, it made clear the legal implications these conversations may have in 
terms of the rights of those citizens involved (“Where there are legal rights there are remedies”). 
Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, paras. 77-105. 
124 Landau, The Importance of Constitution-Making, supra note 86, at 615.  
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have shown, that bringing official bodies to adjudicate the constitutional contours 
on the constituent power might open ways to subvert popular opinion or prolong 
the undecisive moment. Although there are some experiences that show courts’ 
willingness to pass decisions concerning the legality of constituent power 
exercise,126 constituent power politically proceeds in face of, in the sense that it 
needs not, these judicial decisions.127 
Finally, it is true, as I mentioned before, that some scholars have argued autocratic 
regimes, by liberalizing their politics, planted the seed of their own future 
destruction. However, this does not contradict my claims here, for that 
liberalization, which included the recognition of certain rights and a partially 
opened public sphere, permitted the spread of a political, rather than judicially 
enforceable, sense of injustice. In fact, the contradiction here was permitting 
movements to flourish independently from the State and its official (norm-
producing, adjudicative and law-enforcing) institutions. 
The aim behind this section has not been to question that different waves of 
protests in the West and in the North African and Middle East regions are not 
based on similar (both political and political economic) claims. My only intention 
here has been that of drawing a constitutional distinction to show that (i) some of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
125 Asli Bâli, Courts and constitutional transition: Lessons from the Turkish case, 11 INT’L J. CONSTIT. L. 
666 (2013) (showing how courts can act as bodies helping to shield elitist regimes from democratic 
change). 
126 Joel Colón-Ríos, Carl Schmitt and Constituent Power in Latin American Courts: The Cases of 
Venezuela and Colombia, 18 CONSTELLATIONS 365 (2011) (showing cases where courts have decided 
on the exercise of constituent power both “to defend the idea of an unlimited popular will, but also 
to limit political [constituted] power in profound ways”). 
127 Landau, The Importance of Constitution-Making, supra note 86, at 617 (“the public always has a 
residual power to call a constituent assembly to replace the existing political order.”).  
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them decided to push the exercise of constituent power as a way to overcome 
those political difficulties, (ii) whereas others have engaged in actions that leave 
regimes in place—although turning their backs on them. 
As some authors have argued, these waves of protests, despite their global 
dimensions, exhibit regional expressions.128 From a constitutional viewpoint—
which I have been trying to stress here— these differences show some of these 
movements “have mainly demanded political reforms to initiate or deepen ongoing 
processes of democratization”—the cases of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya—while 
others show a “massive display of discontent regarding the political 
mismanagement of the socioeconomic crisis and the erosion of the welfare 
state”129—admittedly, as the facts show, the cases of European and other Western 
mobilizations.130 Contrary to their Arab counterparts, protests in the West were 
not revolutionary in character, at least not in the sense of triggering new processes 
of constitution-making—with the sole exception of Iceland, a process which 
eventually failed.131 However, a hasty impulse to put all recent waves of protests in 
                                                        
128 Benjamín Tejerina et al., From indignation to occupation, supra note 27, at 380.  
129 Id. 
130 But see, Raúl Sánchez, 15M: Something Constituent This Way Comes, 11 SOUTH ATLANTIC QUARTERLY 
573, 575 (2012) (arguing the 15M movement in Spain embodies a “prototype of constituent power 
… a work in progress, a radical invention, and an open, intermittent—and in large measure only 
incipient—process”). 
131 I am totally aware that many of the European protesters and their North American counterparts 
have actually pushed a different strategy. Instead of targeting the State and its institutions, they 
have rather decided not to pose any specific demands, let alone interact with political 
representatives (which protesters claim represent none of them). However, in the best 
constitutional light these movements have only become tolerated and politically marginalized (at 
least so far). 
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the same basket has contributed to obscure this constitutional distinction—and, as 




In an interesting interview held in 2012, Noam Chomsky was asked whether he 
saw the Occupy movement as a precursor to a revolution. As he favored the 
movement and addressed occupiers many times throughout the duration of the 
occupations, it is important to highlight his answer: 
To have a revolution—a meaningful one—you need a substantial majority 
of the population who recognize or believe that further reform is not 
possible within the institutional framework that exists. And there is nothing 
like that here, not even remotely.132  
Let’s assume, as I explained before in this chapter, it might be the case that all 
protest movements that started in 2010 have a common grievance: they all 
manifest their discontent with gross economic inequality. Even if this is true— and 
I think it is one of the main reasons that explains the connection among recent acts 
of resistance—, a distinction must be drawn from a constitutional law viewpoint. 
Simply put, I have aimed at showing that from a constitutional viewpoint 
challengers have chosen (either consciously or unconsciously) different means to 
advance their discontent. 
                                                        
132 NOAM CHOMSKY, OCCUPY! 48 (2012). 
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On the one hand, protesters have pursued a more radical path by overthrowing 
governments and exercising their constituent power in order to fund their States’ 
political shapes anew. This, I argued, has been the case of Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. 
On the other, protesters have not defied the locus of constitutional legitimacy, 
although they certainly aimed at influencing its comprehension. Furthermore, 
these protesters not only have acted assuming the regime would remain in place, 
but have also sought protection for their actions of dissent from it. This is a 
sensible path since it only makes sense to talk of a positive right to protest 
assuming the State remains in place—with all its advantages and disadvantages 
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“Aturem el Parlament, no deixarem que aprovin retallades.”∗ 
 
                                                        
∗ “Stop the Parliament. We won’t permit further cuts,” stated a banner opened before the 
provincial Parlament in Catalonia, where protesters of the 15M movement intended to impede 
members of the Congress from entering the building. They did so by throwing objects at the 
Congressmen, circling and shaking authorities, and blocking the entrance. Protesters were 
accused of attacking the institutions of the State and assaulting Parlament members. La fiscal 
pide penas de cinco años y medio de cárcel para los 20 acusados de asediar el Parlament [The 
prosecutor asks for 5.5 years in prison for 20 accused of besieging the Parliament], 





To talk of the positive right to protest assumes the existence of the State and 
that the regime remains in place. Seen in this light, the right to protest is a 
constituted right, a right whose existence and protected exercise largely 
depends on the State. This is what (legally and constitutionally) distinguishes 
the protests that occurred in North Africa, on the one hand, from the protests 
that Western countries witnessed, on the other. Whereas the former were 
aimed—and up to a certain point successful—in bringing the regimes down to 
be replaced by new constitutional decisions, the latter have largely operated 
within a constitutional scheme protesters have not crucially contested.  
This chapter deals with this latter form of protests. It deals with the positive 
right to protest. It starts (I) insisting on its constituted character. This means 
the right to protest is sympathetic to the regime remaining in place, which 
brings both advantages and limits. In any case, it is a (A) positive right different 
from the right to resist, which does not need the civil state. (B) Avoiding a static 
definition of rights and stressing their institutional implications, it then 
proceeds (II) to describe the (positive) rights normally invoked to 
constitutionally shield protest. Although largely descriptive, this section also 
advocates for a certain interpretation (certainly based on experience) of these 
rights as the most consistent with a constitutional theory sensitive to protests 
as means of political participation.1 
 
I. ‘A deteriorated right’ 
                                                        
1 This might be a largely unavoidable path, which follows from the intrinsically aspirational, as 




Professor Costas Douzinas argues that the right to protest is a deteriorated 
version of the right to resistance. According to him, liberal constitutionalism 
diluted the right to revolution by excluding its wording from constitutions2 and 
providing a surrogate instead: “[a] modest right to protest against laws and 
policies without challenging the social order … included in constitutions and 
human rights documents.”3 Therefore, the right to protest, rather than being 
what once was the right to question the founding principles of a resisted order, 
has become “an example of ‘Speakers’ corner’ mentality: a place for people to 
‘let off steam’ and for the political order to claim a variable degree of tolerance 
and broadmindedness.”4 While resistance cannot be prevented from (ever) 
returning when there is a mismatch between the written laws (constitutions, 
etc.) and the popular sense of (in)justice,5 the right to protest would at best 
signal only its beginning. 
Professor Douzinas is right in the sense I have been arguing here: that the right 
to protest is a positive (and therefore constitutionally protected) right, whereas 
the right to resist (as well as to rebellion and/or to revolution) need not to be 
adjudicated by an official body. While the former presupposes the State as its 
condition of efficacy, the latter is natural6 in the very limited sense that the civil 
                                                        
2 COSTAS DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE IN THE CRISIS 82-3 (2013). 
3 Id. at 83. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 77-81, 83-4. I cannot stop noticing certain ambivalence here, for if resistance can never 
be wished away, that is to say, if constitutional provisions denying (or at least not explicitly 
recognizing) the right to resist will not stop resistance from returning, then what need is there 
to recognize it in a constitutional provision? I discuss some alternatives below.  
6 RAFFAELE LAUDANI, DISOBEDIENCE IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT. A GENEALOGY 56 (Jason Francis 
McGimsey trans., 2013). 
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State is not needed to secure that right.7 In other words, it is also directed at the 
State, but to ask its positive intervention. This is, in fact, something Douzinas 
also acknowledges. The right to resistance—he argues—is both a fact and a 
right, although a right that “does not derive from positive law, domestic state or 
international.”8 It derives from a “‘higher law’ … both immanent and 
transcendent.”9 
As argued above, none of the references to the right to resistance (and to the 
consequent exercise of constituent power) are understood in the sense of 
positive rights conferred or ratified by institutions resorting to pre-existing 
norms that, as it is the case of law, limit the scope of their decisions.10 Quite the 
contrary, the people exercising the right to resist and, as one of the 
manifestations of their sovereign power, their constituent power are neither 
bound nor limited by pre-existing norms.  
In other words—to insist with Pettit—, the right to protest is a right the people 
can resort to in order to oppose the laws “consistent with the regime’s 
remaining in place.”11 As Pettit argues, directed influence over one’s 
government can be carried out through institutional means (i.e. voting, public 
audiences, and so on) and also non-institutional avenues (i.e. protests on the 
                                                        
7 As Margaret Macdonald wrote, “[t]hough the Roman lawyers conceded that man might be 
entitled by natural law to that which he was denied by every positive law, they do not seem to 
have related this to any particular doctrine of legal and political authority.” Margaret 
Macdonald, Natural Rights, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 21, 26-7 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1995 6th prin.). 
8 DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE, supra note 2, at 95-6. 
9 Id.  
10 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 109-10 (2009). 




streets).12 In any case, accepting the regime’s remaining in place brings both 
advantages and limits. Just as the discourse of rights emphasizes, rights are to 
be respected and protected by the regime itself. The regime, however, will also 
place limits as to how that exercise is to be conducted. Most ironically, those 
limits will appear as the State regulates in order to protect the rights in 
question.13 
Nonetheless, both advantages and limits are rather dynamic than static. This 
means that rights content is in constant development and, moreover, that it is 
the very action of protesters what influences them.14 This is true both in legal 
theory as well as in the sociology of social movements. Legal systems are 
successive dynamic legal orders whose content varies without ceasing to be the 
very same legal orders. Individuals, and groups as well, feel more comfortable 
with the legal order that best fits their expectations—“which is valid hic et 
nunc.”15 Something similar occurs when one sees the interaction between social 
movements and the laws protecting/regulating their actions, for, as Habermas 
has argued, social movements entail a dialectic relation with these rules. While 
there are legal and administrative rules regulating the actions social 
                                                        
12 Id. at 62, 80. 
13 I need not insist by now on the crucial political limit that acting with the regime’s remaining 
in place implies, namely not being able to overthrown the government.  
14 To some, this is a crucial demand under conditions of democratic governance. See, ALLAN C. 
HUTCHINSON, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATIZED (2009). I reserve Chapters 5 and 6 to 
discuss how social protests influence constitutional understandings. 
15 See, ANDRZEJ GRABOWSKI, JURISTIC CONCEPT OF THE VALIDITY OF STATUTORY LAW: A CRITIQUE OF 
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL NONPOSITIVISM 258-9 (2009). I would like to thank Raúl Letelier for having 
brought this argument to my attention. 
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movements are permitted to perform, at the same time social movements 
influence that very same framework by pushing and influencing its limits.16 
A. Rights 
Any attempt to comprehensively conceptualize rights is doomed to fail. In light 
of pervasive theoretical disagreement about the concept of rights, and 
considering my aim in this work—distinguishing the so-called right to 
revolution and the consequent appeal to the exercise of constitution-making 
power from the (positive) right to protest—, it is enough to stress a general 
institutional implication of rights,17 namely that rights need (in order to be 
authoritatively created, identified, and secured) the regime to remain in place.18 
As MacCormick explains, the term ‘law’ seems inappropriate to identify those 
rules that wouldn’t be recognized nor applied by courts and tribunals19—and 
that would not have any significance to institutional arrangements such as 
parliaments. Here constitutions are relevant for they are assigned the role of 
                                                        
16 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY 369-70 (William Rehg trans., 1998) (“Thus, the institutions and legal guarantees of 
free and open opinion-formation rest on the unsteady ground of the political communication of 
actors who, in making use of them, at the same time interpret, defend, and radicalize their 
normative content.”). 
17 See, Jeremy Waldron, A Right-based Critique of constitutional rights, 13 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 1, 18 (1993). Habermas, for whom the legal order and morality are rather 
complementary as they emerged simultaneously, has noticed that the distinctive feature of law 
is precisely its institutionalized character. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, 
at 106-7. See generally, NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 49-58 
(2007) (describing the institutions of public law and noticing their necessity in enforcing law). 
18 Not surprisingly, these are the kinds of rules that Hart argued to be characteristic of a 
modern state and legal system; “the centralized official ‘sanctions’ of the system.” H.L.A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79, 98 (1997). See also, MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 286 
(2010) (“such rights claims—human rights claims—… have effect only when institutionalized 
within an existing governmental regime …”.). 
19 MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW, supra note 17, at 56. 
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providing coherence as to what is going to be deemed a system of law—a 
“unitary ultimate law for a state’s legal system as such.”20  
Therefore, rights as institutionalized law are directed at the State.21 It only 
makes sense to talk of a positive right to protest once we acknowledge the 
State’s twofold agency as an ally (it is there to secure and protect our rights) 
and as a foe (it limits our rights).22 One of the legal theorists who has explored 
this topic is Robert Alexy. Alexy notes that there are a variety of subjective 
rights that he divides into rights to something, liberties, and powers.23 In the 
case of the rights to something, Alexy has shown that they are better explained 
in a three-point structure (relational character), a relation which includes the 
State as the addressee of rights.24 While here the State is required to refrain 
from affecting rights (defensive rights), to provide factual acts, or to create legal 
                                                        
20 Id. at 57. 
21 Id. at 202 (arguing institutionalized law “provides means [adjudication and legislative] to 
make authoritative rulings about practical issues that arouse disagreement”). I’m not here 
exploring, neither suggesting, whether rights have any more specific institutional implications. 
What are these more specific institutional implications? For instance, one who assumes 
constitutional rights place limits as to what legislatures can do will normally allocate reviewing 
powers on a branch other than the legislature in order to decide when such limits have been 
violated. However, it is equally possible to argue that constitutional rights are rather political. 
In such a case constitutions would be inviting, rather than precluding, legislatures to develop 
rights. Furthermore, we can still draw a distinction, and not necessarily a correlation, between 
legal rights and constitutional rights. See generally, See Waldron, A Right-based Critique, supra 
note 17, at 18-28.  
22 This is so because this coercive power is put in motion both to constrain as well as to protect 
individual acts (freedom, entitlements, etc.). Most strikingly, this also holds true for the State, 
for the State and its institutions act validly (legally) where the Rule of Law—“a particular mode 
of the exercise of political power”—allows them to do so. Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the 
Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2008-2009). HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, at 87 and H.L.A. Hart, 
Postscript, in THE CONCEPT OF LAW 269 (Penelope Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 1997) (“[L]egal 
rights and duties are the point at which the law with its coercive resources respectively 
protects individual freedom and restricts it or confers on individuals or denies to them the 
power to avail themselves of the law’s coercive machinery”). 
23 ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 120 (Julian Rivers trans., 2010). 
24 Id. at 121-2.  
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positions to satisfy rights (positive acts), the relevant fact is that the State is 
there to secure the exercise of rights.25  
Something similar occurs with legal liberties, for they are also better 
understood as three-point relations with the State becoming relevant every 
time it is necessary remove obstacles—thus enforcing the liberty 
constitutionally granted. This is why constitutional permissive provisions are 
relevant and, according to Alexy, far from futile norms. He explains this by 
distinguishing unprotected liberties from protected liberties. Unprotected 
liberties “exist[] when both an act and its omission are permitted.”26 This may 
occur either when there is “an explicitly enacted permissive norm” or “in the 
absence within the legal system of any commanding or prohibiting norms 
covering the act, or its omission …”.27 In the case of constitutional permissive 
norms, those of lower hierarchy that contradict the permission (either by 
ordering the conduct or imposing a prohibition on the permitted conduct) are 
unconstitutional, so the State must sanction its violation.28 State action before 
protected liberties is still more obvious, for such liberties are combined with “a 
bundle of rights to something and other objective norms which together secure 
to the constitutional right-holder the possibility of carrying out the act 
permitted.”29 Moreover, as Alexy puts it, “[e]very constitutional liberty is a 
                                                        
25 Id. at 122-7. 
26 Id. at 146. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 146-7. 
29 Id. at 148. 
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liberty at least in relation to the state.”30 The State should at least “not prevent 
the liberty-holder from doing what he is constitutionally free to do.”31  
Finally, Alexy describes powers where State action is more straightforward. 
Powers are characterized for their capacity to alter the legal state of affairs by 
acts of the power-holder.32 An institutional act is what confers that legal 
capacity.33  
Institutional acts are those which cannot be performed merely on the 
basis of natural abilities, but which presuppose constitutive rules.34  
This does not mean that the very same act cannot be performed alegally. In fact 
it could. The people could, as a matter of fact, go out to the streets in order to 
(say) suggest change in governmental policies, but that action would become an 
act of legal significance only by means of the constitutive rules (say the 
constitutionally enshrined freedom of expression and right to assembly).35 The 
legal significance here can be seen once one understands, as Alexy suggests, 
that rights encompass a bundle of constitutional rights positions—rights to 
something, liberties, and powers.36 For instance, constitutional provisions 
would permit protests and, at the very same time, impose obligations on the 
State which, at the least, should not arbitrarily interfere with protests and/or 
                                                        
30 Id., at 149. 
31 Id. As Alexy notes, this is not the only case. What is important to stress here, however, is that 
constitutional rights are normally compounded of a cluster of different rights, liberties and 
powers. Thus, in the case mentioned above, we can see liberty (to act or refrain from acting) 
combined with a right to the non-obstruction of the act (the state should refrain), along with 
the power to claim before the courts the infringement of such a right. 
32 Id. at 150. 
33 Id. at 152. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 152-3 (explaining that one could move the chess figures any direction around the 
board, but that those movements would only become chess moves, i.e. a checkmate, in the 
presence of constitutive rules of the game).  
36 Id. at 159. 
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also remove obstacles to its exercise.37 Alexy says it explicitly: to appreciate the 
role of powers of constitutional positions, “they need to be related to rights to 
something and to liberties.”38 
I think the need for an institutional framework is still clearer through the 
international human rights optic. There, rights are obligations undertaken by 
the States, which consequently assume a cluster of negative and positive duties: 
to respect, protect and fulfill.39 Rights enforcement is linked to the State, and, 
although States are normally taken to enforce these rights by international 
courts, it is still up to the States to respect, protect and fulfill their duties. In 
other words, enforcement of rights—which to be properly understood in the 
international context cannot simply be compared with domestic enforcement—
is a multifaceted process which still sees the State and its institutions (state-
driven and state-owned) at its core, despite the help and contributions from 
other actors such as individuals and NGOs.40 
B. A (positivistic) right 
My intention in this section is to offer a brief review of rights normally invoked 
to cover and protect protests, but also to show, based on some comparative 
experience, what is the best understanding of those rights if we are to keep 
                                                        
37 Here, once again, Alexy notes the importance of understanding constitutional rights in 
relation with the State’s capacities. “At this point,” Alexy argues, “constitutional rights norms as 
negative competences … limits a positive competence norm.” Id. at 158. 
38 Id. at 156. There are, in fact, others who have, although relaying on Hohfeld, suggested a 
similar analysis of the right to protest. See, Simon Bronitt & George Williams, Political Freedom 
as an outlaw: republican theory and political protest, 16 ADELAIDE L. REV. 289, 304-5 (1996) 
(criticizing the Australian High Court for having conceptualized the freedom of political 
discussion as an ‘immunity’ and not as a higher level ‘claim-right.’). 
39 Asbjørn Eide, Economic and Social Rights as Human Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 9, 27-31 (Asbjørn Eide et al., eds. 2001 2nd ed.). 
40 Gerd Oberleitner, Does enforcement matter?, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 249 (Conor Gearty & Costas Douzinas eds., 2012). 
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open the channels of political contestation.41 Understanding the right to protest 
as a participatory (citizen) right is particularly pressing under current 
governmental practices that, by restricting protests, have privileged political 
stability—defined as broadly as you can conceive it.42 This concern with 
illegitimate limitations of rights,43 largely due to liberal constitutionalism 
uneasiness with non-institutional means of participation, has been one of the 
main preoccupations for the international law of human rights.44 The Special 
                                                        
41 I have taken this phrase from JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 105 (1980). 
42 In fact, one of the main unwanted consequences of the recent waves of protests has been that 
many governments passed or proposed to pass legislation and/or administrative by-laws 
limiting the right to protest, up to the point of turning it impracticable. Ministro Hinzpeter: “Ley 
antiencapuchados busca proteger el derecho a manifestarse, pero en paz y sin vandalismo” 
[Minister Hinzpeter: “The anti-mask bill seeks to protect the right to demonstrate, but peacefully 
and without vandalism], LA TERCERA, Jul. 20, 2012, available at 
http://www.latercera.com/noticia/politica/2012/07/674-473308-9-ministro-hinzpeter-ley-
antiencapuchados-busca-proteger-el-derecho-a-manifestarse.shtml ; Anti-protest legislation 
passes Quebec, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, May 18, 2012, available at 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/anti-protest-legislation-passes-in-
quebec/article4186770/; Jeanine Molloff, HR 347 ‘Trespass Bill’ Criminalizes Protest, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeanine-molloff/trespass-
bill_b_1328205.html; Spanish Government approves draft law cracking down on demonstrations, 
THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2013, available at www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/01/spanish-
government-approves-law-demonstrations; Gregg Caristrom, Egypt passes law restricting 
public protests, ALJAZEERA, Nov.25, 2013, available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/egypt-passes-law-restricting-public-
protests-2013112413847867334.html; Richard Seymour, From Quebec to Spain, anti-protest 
laws are threatening true democracy, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 25, 2013, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/25/quebec-spain-anti-protest-laws-
democracy; Oficialismo impulsa proyecto para regular protestas callejeras en Argentina 
[Government promotes a bill to regulate street protests], LA NACIÓN, Apr. 16, 2014, available at 
http://www.nacion.com/mundo/Bloque-oficialista-Argentina-protestas-
callejeras_0_1408859313.html. In Brazil, following demonstrations that questioned the large 
amounts of money spent on the 2014 World Cup, authorities submitted a bill containing vague 
definitions of ‘disorder’ and ‘terrorism.’ Amnesty International UK, Right to Protest under threat 
as Brazil pushes ‘terrorism’ law ahead of World Cup, (May. 12, 2014): 
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/right-protest-under-threat-brazil-pushes-
terrorism-law-ahead-world-cup#.U3C2TeM4ONA.twitter 
43 Illegitimate limitations are those that conspire against the (political) right of the people—of 
every single citizen—to hold ‘a suitable civic status,’ particularly when it comes to influencing 
and directing the State. As Pettit explains, this is the kind of control needed to control that the 
“coercive laws of government are not dominating—not the imposition of an alien will …”. Pettit, 
Legitimacy and Justice, supra note 11, at 79. 
44 I will show below that the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has been the most 
active court when it comes time to decide cases. 
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Rapporteurship on Freedom of Expression45 (‘the Rapporteurship’), for 
instance, has manifested its concern with the way in which governments in the 
region have dealt with pacific demonstrations.46 Thus, reviewing the limitations 
imposed to the right to protest in Canada, Chile and Ecuador, among others, it 
reminded States that “any restriction on them must be justified by imperative 
social interest.”47 Additionally, the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and of association (‘SR’), of the UN Human Rights Council, 
has expressed a similar concern.48 By stressing the importance of the right to 
peaceful assembly as a “cornerstone in any democracy,”49 it encouraged 
governments to avoid criminalizing its exercise.50 
                                                        
45 The Special Rapporteurship is not a member of the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights (IACHR), but reports before it.   
46 There has been no case decided on these grounds by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR). There is, however, one case pending against Chile. Although mainly related to 
the arbitrary application of the antiterrorist law against indigenous peoples in Chile, applicants 
have also claimed violation of their right to social protest—based on Article 13 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (freedom of expression). It should be noted that social protest is 
one of the new developments of the Inter-American System of Human Rights, which before was 
largely devoted to violations committed under authoritarian regimes in the region. Judith 
Schönsteiner et al., Reflections on the Human Rights Challenges of Consolidating Democracies: 
Recent Developments in the Inter-American System of Human Rights, 11 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
REVIEW 362, 367-8 (2011). 
47 IACHR-Office of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Annual Report of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.69 Vol II. December 30, 
2011, at 52; IACHR-Office of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Annual Report 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2012, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.147 Doc.1 Vol II. 
March 5, 2013. The IACHR also held a thematic hearing on State and police violence against 
Chilean student demonstrators in 2011. See IACHR, Press Release 87/11, IACHR Expresses 
Concern for Violence Against Student Protests in Chile, (Aug. 6, 2011), 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Comunicados/English/2011/87- 11eng.htm. 
48 See, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and of association (Maina Kiai), A/HRC/20/27. May 21, 2012. 
49 Id. at para. 82. 
50 Id. at para. 84 (c). 
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The (positive) right to protest is compounded by a cluster of rights (and each of 
these rights by a bundle of legal positions),51 most notably freedom of 
expression and the right to peaceful assembly, but also privacy and some 
variances of the rights already mentioned. Its multifarious sources and contents 
should be regarded as a strength rather than a limitation, for each specific right 
has its own conditions which (at least in theory) should render its limitation 
more (both politically and legally) costly.52 
 
II. Freedom of expression 
 
Why should we protect freedom of expression? Political philosophical enquiries 
have provided different justifications for its protection, ranging from 
considering freedom of expression as a tool for discovering the truth53 to 
                                                        
51 Needless to say, this is already clear from a viewpoint different than the legal perspective. 
See, JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE. AN INQUIRY INTO A 
CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 222-35 (Thomas Burger trans. The MIT Press, 1991).  
52 But see, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur 2012, para. 4 (showing that, 
in practice, cases are governed by, at least, two different types of legislation therefore rendering 
difficult to determine which governs the cases’ outcomes). 
53 The most famous exposition of this argument is to be found in John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in 
J.S. MILL: ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 1 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge University Press 1989) 
(1859). Mill summarized the “need” of freedom of opinion in order to not silence opinions that 
can be true, not restrict opinions that may contain a portion of the truth, and not censor 
opinions that permit contesting commonly assumed truths—whose “doctrine itself will be in 
danger of lost, or enfeebled and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the 
dogma becoming a mere formal profession …” (at 53-4). This argument can also be traced back 
to John Milton, for whom truth—which “hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces”—is 
susceptible of being known. Arguing against the Licensing Act, Milton claimed freedom of the 
press was required so as to always keep truth in motion, for “[t]ruth is comprar’d in Scripture 
to a streaming fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetual progression, they fick’n into a 
muddy pool of conformity and tradition.” JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, 43 (with a commentary by 
Sir Richard C. Jebb, Cambridge University Press 1918) (1644). This argument was legally 
popularized by Justice Holmes’ famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1919) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can 
be carried out.”). 
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conceiving it as a manifestation of personal autonomy.54 Although all these 
justifications can work in a complementary fashion,55 none of them is strictly 
related to the supervisory role (in the liberal tradition) and to the duty to 
participate (in the republican tradition) that is expected of citizens when 
dealing with common matters.  
While freedom of expression may certainly be important in personal self-
realization, it is its crucial contribution to self-government what better explains 
its democratic relevance.56 Democracy, as some have argued, is not achieved 
there where a popular element is merely present, but where that popular 
element is determining.57 This is why public opinion becomes the final 
touchstone of democratic governments. Opinions, Nadia Urbinati observes, 
“work as a force of legitimacy by connecting and uniting people inside and 
outside the institutions.”58 Opinions, she insists, permit establishing links, 
although contingent and in tension,59 between citizens and bridging the 
                                                        
54 This is a non-consequentialist justification that—as Dworkin put it—is regarded to pay due 
consideration to each individual’s moral personality in order to decide for ourselves what is 
good or bad in life and politics, and to express these convictions to others. RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 200 (2005 repr.). This 
distinction between consequentialist and non-consequentialist is also found in Kent 
Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUMBIA L. REV. 119, 127-30 (1989). 
55 Id. at 201. 
56 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM. A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR 
THE MODERN STATE 1-25 (2012) (arguing that the political core of the freedom of expression is 
better explained by its capacity to facilitate “the communicative process necessary for 
successful democratic self-governance”).  
57 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 235 (1999) (“The demand is not merely that there 
should be a popular element in government, but that the popular element should be decisive. 
The demand is for democracy, not just the inclusion of a democratic element in a mixed 
regime.”). 
58 NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED. OPINION, TRUTH, AND THE PEOPLE 27 (2014). 
59 William A. Gamson, Bystanders, Public Opinion, and the Media, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 242, 244 (David A. Snow et al., eds. 2007) (noting the term public has a 
“quasi-collective” condition with different people interested and divided). 
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institutions of the State with the people.60 Opinions authorize representation 
and check that representation. As professor Urbinati explains, citing Hume, 
public opinion operates as a “force that makes the many easily governed by the 
few and the few unable to escape the control of the many.”61 This also explains 
why freedom of expression occupies such a significant place in current 
democracies: it safeguards “the communicative process by which public 
opinion is formed.”62 In other words, freedom of expression protects the 
different forms of communication the people resort to, forms of communication 
which contribute to shaping public opinion. Finally, public opinion controls 
governmental decisions (and omissions). 
A. Protests as expressions 
Why should we protect social protests? First, social protests are forms of 
expression and therefore (should be) protected under constitutional 
provisions. In light of the political relevance of the freedom of expression, an 
important part of the constitutional debate revolves around the forms of 
expressions “we deem necessary for the free formation of public opinion.”63 
Today few, if any, voices would contend protected expressions are restricted 
only to language. As Post put it, public opinion formation sometimes occurs 
“through language, and sometimes, as with picketing and flag burning, it does 
not.”64 This does not render the distinction between speech and conduct 
constitutionally irrelevant, but shows that “courts are prepared to hold forms 
                                                        
60 URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED, supra note 58, at 27. 
61 Id. 
62 POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 56, at 14. 
63 Id. at 15. 
64 Id.  
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of conduct, intended by the actors to communicate opinions and so understood 
by others,” as protected by freedom of expression provisions.65 The language of 
Western constitutional provisions helps in this regard as they recognize ample 
means for expression.  
By the same token, and precisely because we deem public opinion an important 
component of democratic life, we are to avoid imposing a certain fashion in 
which public discourse is to be held. András Sajó, for instance, argues that 
liberal constitutionalism has had a large influence in modeling the kind of 
interactions we consider appropriate of protection, which ends up being the 
hegemonic imposition of patterns of dialogue and public engagement ‘which 
large part of the community does not entertain.’66 According to Sajó, the liberal 
‘rationality paradigm’ has conspired against other forms of political interaction, 
such as protests, that bring (sometimes heavy) emotions to the public forum.67 
Concealing its own emotions, liberalism has been ready to recognize emotions 
in the eyes of those who advocate majoritarian politics, but denied those 
sentiments when it comes time to justify prevailing social, economic, cultural, 
and legal regimes.68 
Public discourse, however, presupposes exactly the opposite. If, as Robert Post 
has argued, public discourse is to “enable the formation of a genuine and 
uncoerced public opinion in a culturally heterogeneous society,”69 then we 
                                                        
65 ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 78 (2007 2nd ed.). 
66 This is of course a paraphrase of Justice Holmes’ famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905). 
67 ANDRÁS SAJÓ, CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS 213 (2011). 
68 Id. at 206, 247. 
69 Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic 
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 601, 639 (1990). 
132 
 
should expand the means through which the people take part in the political 
process of public opinion formation. In light of public involvement on matters 
of common concern—the understanding of the constitution, for one—we 
should follow Richard Parker and “adjust[] the image of the sort of person who 
exercises—that is, whom we like to think of as exercising—freedom of 
speech,”70 and avoid a privileged status to some forms of collective behavior 
that receive better treatment.71  
Second, social protests also merit protection because, as forms of expression, 
they are part of the public discourse and therefore help shape public opinion. 
Protests, in other words, are one of the means the people resort to in order to 
participate. This was what the German Constitutional Court held in 1985 when 
it reasoned that the right to demonstrate “is derivative of the right to shape 
public opinion by means of speech and assembly.”72 This criterion should be 
given utmost relevance when protests are the sole means of participation some 
groups may resort to. According to Lipsky, relatively weak challengers who 
resort to social protests do so not to directly call governmental attention as 
they lack that power, but to develop political bargaining power they lack by 
addressing, and activating, target audiences whom the government pays 
attention to. Communication, seen under this light, operates in a highly indirect 
fashion and, to these disempowered groups, becomes central in order to have a 
                                                        
70 Richard D. Parker, “Here the People rule”: A constitutional populist manifesto, 27 VALPARAISO 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 531, 576 (1993). 
71 SAJÓ, CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS supra note 67, at 247.  
72 DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
396 (Duke University Press: 1997, 2nd ed.). 
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say in public opinion.73 At any rate, the same reasons for protection hold where 
protests directly target the State and also where protesters, like those of the 
‘Occupy’ movement, target no institutional avenue.74 
Considerations that stress the role of social protests in forming public opinion 
are thus strengthened with reference to equality commitments—which are also 
constitutionally enshrined.75 This is not so much a matter of impact76 as one of 
opportunity and capacity to influence.77 A constitutional theory of freedom of 
expression that (from a normative viewpoint) cannot dispense from (but rather 
has the duty to exalt) commitments to equality cannot rule out forms of 
expression that are considered disruptive or disturbing of institutional 
politics.78 As Barendt has argued, “the state is not free to determine the 
                                                        
73 Michael Lipsky, Protest as a Political Resource, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1144, 1146-8 (1968). 
74 However, this might well end up being a circular argument. If they wish to be accommodated 
under a constitutional scheme they don’t contend, but want to, say, be left alone (“we have no 
petitions for you”), they probably would try to influence the meaning of constitutional 
provisions or governmental policies. 
75 The equality references being made here, and subsequent references to them, are procedural 
rather than substantive; that is, they focus on how equality can enhance and deepen channels of 
political participation. This does not mean that other equality considerations are irrelevant to 
protests. Roberto Gargarella, for instance, has argued that in the context of social protests 
equality assumes different forms. Many of those who protest, in fact, utilize these expressive 
means to manifest “grave violations of other fundamental rights.” Were procedural equality 
considerations the only moment when equality becomes relevant, we would certainly run the 
risk of overlooking the substantive claims related to social justice that protesters are posing. 
Roberto Gargarella, Law and Social Protests, 6 CRIM. LAW & PHILOSOPHY 131, 142-4 (2012). 
76 Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1987-1988).  
77 URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED, supra note 58, at 50-8 (explaining what she calls the 
democratic-influence maxim, an egalitarian approach to political communication between 
citizens and institutions). This capacity of influence, Pettit has argued, is exercised with, and 
among, other citizens. Therefore, republican democratic control—the one he is interested in 
explaining—is a form of “civic or popular control in which you participate with others …”. 
Pettit, Legitimacy and Justice, supra note 11, at 77-8.  
78 In fact, it could be further argued that freedom of expression is meant precisely to protect the 
interactions between institutional and non-institutional politics. In representative democracy, 
Urbinati observes, the meaning of the public is enriched “as both state-based (what pertains to 
the legal and institutional order) and what is open to all under public scrutiny …”. URBINATI, 
DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED, supra note 58, at 40-3.   
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boundaries of public discourse.”79 Imposing such a restriction upon the public 
sphere will risk silencing certain voices that can only be expressed in this way, 
thus preventing the public opinion from having their input. In fact, equality 
preoccupations that permeate freedom of expression are important in 
noticing—as argued before—that in some instances protests are the only 
available means social groups resort to in order to influence public opinion. As 
the Rapporteurship put it not long ago,   
The most impoverished sectors of our hemisphere face discriminatory 
policies and actions; their access to information on the planning and 
execution of measures that affect their daily lives is incipient and, in 
general, traditional channels to make their complaints known are 
frequently inaccessible. Confronting these prospects, in many of the 
hemisphere’s countries, social protest and mobilization have become 
tools to petition the public authorities, as well as channels for public 
complaints regarding abuses or human rights violations.80 
By depriving them the right to resort to protests, we are limiting the voices that 
shape politics, thus restricting the voices representatives consider.81 However, 
                                                        
79 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 20. Robert Post has made a similar claim noting 
what he calls the ‘paradox of public discourse:’ within public discourse freedom of expression 
“aspires to suspend legal enforcement” of community values of civility and toleration. Post, The 
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse, supra note 69, at 638-46, 681-2. 
80 IACHR-Office of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Annual Report of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 2005, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.124 Doc. Vol III. February 27, 
2006, at 121. 
81 The Audiencia Nacional of Spain has recently passed a decision which has served to remind 
that many social groups resort to public demonstrations because such demonstrations are “the 
only means they have to express and spread their thoughts and opinions.” However, it also 
linked this egalitarian emphasis on protests with pluralism, for by opening different means of 
political participation “the State guarantees the visibility of different opinions present in 
society, especially those voices silenced before those other voices overrepresented.” Judgment 
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it is not only that we are limiting the scope of voices that shape public opinion; 
we are actually excluding a ‘certain kinds of peoples,’ thus “privileg[ing] those 
modes and styles of expression associated with the ‘better’ sort of people—
relatively ‘reasonable,’ ‘orderly,’ ‘articulate’ speech having ‘social 
importance’.”82 Those who are excluded are rendered not self-governing, but 
subjects of external power.83 
Freedom of expression, therefore, has to be understood as embracing the public 
and non-institutional displays of grievances not only because its constitutional 
understanding permeated by equality considerations is essentially non-
hegemonic,84 but also because public opinion is influenced in a myriad of 
ways.85 This is why public opinion is not only attached to those kinds of 
discourses that appear as political prima facie.86 While this restrictive approach 
would certainly leave unprotected what we now consider core areas of the 
freedom of expression,87 it also overlooks the political-moral agency of citizens 
                                                                                                                                                            
of Jul. 7th, 2014, Audiencia Nacional, Sentencia No 31/2014, at 57 (my translations). I would like 
to thank José Luis Ugarte for having brought this decision to my attention.   
82 Parker, “Here the People rule”, supra note 70, at 577. 
83 Pettit, Legitimacy and Justice, supra note 11, at 79 (“If the demos or people are to participate 
in exercising kratos or control over government, and if the control they share is to ensure that 
the coercive laws of government are not dominating—not the imposition of an alien will—then 
what they exercise must involve both influence and direction.”).   
84 Robert Post, Law and cultural conflict, 78 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 485, 503 (2003). 
85 POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 56, at 19. 
86 As it is well known, some have advocated this position. Meiklejohn argued that the First 
Amendment does not protect a ‘freedom to speak.’ It protects the freedom of those activities of 
thought and communication by which we ‘govern.’ It is concerned with a public power—a 
governmental responsibility—, and not with a private right. Freedom of expression, he held, 
should only grant its “unqualified protection” to acts directed at understanding “the issues 
which … face the nation” and to pass judgment upon the decisions our representatives make on 
those matters. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 
245, 255 (1961). 
87 This inconsistency is noticed in DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 54, at 203. 
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to—as I argued before—freely determine how to and according to what means 
influence public opinion.88  
It is this political face which better explains freedom of expression’s central 
place in the current configuration of the right to protest. There is no doubt that 
protests might have a value in truth seeking and that some citizens do not feel 
that they are expressing their unique individual identities when protesting 
(“People are citizens but they are much more,” Greenawalt wrote).89 What the 
political comprehension emphasizes is that the individual character of freedom 
of expression remains safe but is insufficient.90  
That protests are better understood in this political light is almost an 
inescapable fact once we notice the collective exercise of rights. Social protests 
are, in fact, collective contestations that resort to the streets in order to 
influence and direct the government.91 The political meaning of protests lies 
not so much on the ontology of the rights involved, but on, as Lynd put it, being 
rights that are collectively exercised and understood.92 Social protests 
presuppose the exercise of “rights that are only exercised in community with 
other men.”93 They are a shared activity, an activity influencing and 
(eventually) controlling the government, where one is not alone.94 
B. Expression as a right 
                                                        
88 POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 56, at 23-5. 
89 KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS. INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 131 
(1995). 
90 URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED, supra note 58, at 65-6. 
91 Pettit, Legitimacy and Justice, supra note 11, at 80.   
92 Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1417, 1429-30 (1984) (arguing we are 
talking here of rights that gain their political meaning by being exercised in communion, but 
that can also be individually exercised and protected). 
93 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 57, at 232. 
94 Id. at 235-6; Pettit, Legitimacy and Justice, supra note 11, at 77. 
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This political understanding of freedom of expression impacts the duties 
associated with it. As I argued above, taking on Alexy’s argument, constitutional 
rights of the kind Western constitutions exhibit are better understood as 
encompassing a bundle of rights: rights to something, liberties, and powers. 
Nevertheless, I also take some distance from Alexy as I regard the fulfillment of 
rights—in the broadest meaning of this expression—depends on the (joint) 
work of all the three branches of government, and not solely on courts. We can 
still stick to the language of constitutional rights and stress their political 
significance even if there is no judicial enforcement mechanism.95 As Tushnet 
contends, constitutional rights limit governments not simply because they are 
presented in a text under the name of rights, but because they are publicly 
fought.96 
It is of course difficult to tell what this bundle of rights includes without 
considering specific contexts including social, cultural, political, legal, and 
constitutional variables. However, examples may shed some light in 
understanding the positive right to protest. There is no doubt freedom of 
expression imposes negative duties. States have the duty to neither censor nor 
impede dissemination of speech. As Barendt explains, this is largely a 
consequence of the equal political agency each of us is embedded with,97 an 
equal agency that results in prohibitions against viewpoint discrimination. 
“[A]ll persons within public discourse,” Post argues, “should be equally free to 
                                                        
95 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM COURTS 167-8 (1999). 
96 Id. at 167. 
97 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 20. 
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say or not to say what they choose.”98 If governments were permitted to 
restrain protests on the basis of the content of their claims, it would amount to 
having States modeling public discourse at will.99 Were governments allowed to 
authorize certain demonstrations while prohibiting others, the moral agency of 
some groups would be seriously diminished.100  
Prohibition of censorship and viewpoint discrimination proves crucial for 
protests. Protests, in fact, are defined by their dissenting nature: they challenge 
legal and cultural understandings, on the one hand, but also conventional 
means of participation, on the other. Because we are dealing with a positive, 
rather than a natural, right, regulations are unavoidable.101 Here is where 
governments find spaces to assess what protesters will be (substantively) 
mobilizing for. Indeed most governments, typically local governments, have 
issued regulations (i.e. ordinances) for public meetings that demand protesters 
submit notifications in advance before administrative authorities.  
However, States are not free to regulate protests. Freedom of expression 
regulations are primarily assessed on the basis of whether they leave 
alternative channels of participation open. This is a reason why a total ban of 
                                                        
98 POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 56, at 22. 
99 The international human rights law is helpful in this regard. The American Convention on 
Human Rights states in its Article 13.2 that freedom of thought and expression “shall not be 
subject to prior censorship.” The American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
reprinted in COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY - CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 25+ HUMAN RIGHTS 
DOCUMENTS 130, 133 (2005). Although the European Convention does not have a similar 
prohibition, the European Court of Human Rights case-law has maintained that prior restraints 
are subject to a more stringent assessment. BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 117. 
100 As Post puts it, those prevented from shaping public discourse “will not experience 
participation in public discourse as a means of making government responsive to their own 
personal views.” POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 56, at 21.  
101 This should not lead us to overlook how these regulations have, or could have, rendered the 
right to protests symbolic performances, rather than rendering them in a substantive way to 
secure governments’ responsiveness. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 543, 587-8 (2009). 
139 
 
protests is to be considered unconstitutional.102 Other regulations, provided 
they are not total bans, usually receive a strict review as well. Whereas in the 
United States free speech regulations are constitutionally acceptable as long as 
they are narrowly tailored,103 in Canada regulations designed with the purpose 
of restricting expressions “will be found to violate section 2(b) 
‘automatically’.”104 In the international human rights law the standard—which 
is also a substantive—asks whether regulations are proportional.105 
                                                        
102 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 83. See also, City of Ladue et al. v. Gilleo, 512 
U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (“Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of 
content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily 
apparent—by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much 
speech.”). It is the people’s decision to express themselves by resorting to the streets. See, Kent 
Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, 55 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 5, 
30 (1992).  
103 Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 
474 (1988). According to the Supreme Court of the United States, regulations are constitutional 
only if they (i) do not target content, (ii) are narrowly tailored, and (iii) are to serve a 
compelling State interest. In Clark, for instance, the Court upheld regulations forbidding 
camping activities outside the designated areas in Lafayatte Park and the Mall, no matter if they 
were intended to serve as protests. In reaching its conclusion the Court reasoned 
The regulation is neutral with regard to the message presented, and leaves open ample 
alternative methods of communicating the intended message concerning the plight of 
the homeless (Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. at 288). 
In Frisby, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld an ordinance making unlawful “for any 
person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual.” The 
Court reasoned in the following manner: 
The ordinance leaves open ample alternative channels of communication … Viewed in 
the light of the narrowing construction, the ordinance allows protesters to enter 
residential neighborhoods, either alone or marching in groups; to go door to door to 
proselytize their views or distribute literature; and to contact residents through the 
mails or by telephone, short of harassment. As is evidenced by its text, the ordinance 
serves the significant government interest of protecting residential privacy (Frisby, 487 
U.S. 474, 475-6).  
104 RICHARD MOON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 34-5 (2000). The 
Canadian Chart states,  
Everyone has the following freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and 
expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication.” 
Can Const (Constitution Act, 1982) §2(b). Section 1 of the Chart allows the imposition of 
reasonable limits on rights and freedoms only if they are (i) prescribed by law and (ii) can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. No doubt this is also a substantive 
standard that, under Canadian case-law, has taken courts to assess whether (i) “the restriction 
advances a substantial purpose,” (ii) that purpose is advanced rationally, (iii) it is 
proportionate, and (iv) it “impairs the freedom no more than is necessary” (MOON, at 35). The 
standard of assessment was established in Oakes (R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103), a standard 
that, as I shall show below, has had significance in determining the constitutional luck of some 
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States may engage in viewpoint discrimination when regulating protests. 
Although rare, viewpoint discrimination could occur. In 1972, the Supreme 
Court of the United States decided a case involving a Chicago city ordinance. 
The ordinance prohibited all picketing activities within 150 feet of a school, 
unless it was “peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.”106 
The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional on the grounds of the Equal 
Protection clause—“here intertwined with First Amendment interests.”107 
The central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes 
permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picketing 
on the subject of a school's labor-management dispute is permitted, but 
all other peaceful picketing is prohibited. The operative distinction is the 
message on a picket sign. But, above all else, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.108 
The same criterion should be applied when administrative authorities are 
conferred unfettered discretion to restrict public demonstrations, for “wide 
                                                                                                                                                            
Canadian occupiers. I follow the description available in Leon E. Trakman, R. v. Oakes 1986-
1997: Back to the Drawing Board, 36 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 83, 90-108 (1998). Finally, it 
should be noted that in cases involving freedom of expression the Canadian Supreme Court has 
also resorted to assessing regulations in light of their overbroadness, such as in RJR-Macdonald 
(RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 SCR 199). There the Supreme Court 
reasoned that,   
As the second step in the proportionality analysis, the government must show that the 
measures at issue impair the right of free expression as little as reasonably possible in 
order to achieve the legislative objective. The impairment must be “minimal”, that is, 
the law must be carefully tailored so that rights are impaired no more than necessary. 
The tailoring process seldom admits of perfection and the courts must accord some 
leeway to the legislator (RJR-Macdonald, at para. 160). 
105 OLIVER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 313-4 (2011 repr.) (arguing the 
condition of proportionality includes assessing the appropriateness of the measure as well as 
its necessity). 
106 Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).  




discretion would allow officials to engage in viewpoint discrimination.”109 This 
could particularly affect demonstrations against governments, whose 
administrative officials vested with ample powers are incumbents.110 
What about notification procedures? One way in which prior restraint could be 
prevented is by understanding—as some standard in the international human 
rights law suggests—that these notifications are required only to permit 
governments to organize whatever they need to organize (i.e. traffic) but 
should not be deemed as preventive authorizations.111 Notification procedures 
also are not applicable, for obvious reasons, to spontaneous protests. The 
German Constitutional Court, for instance, has held this,112 while the ECtHR has 
called States to facilitate, rather than place unbearable burdens, on impromptu 
                                                        
109 Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, supra note 102, at 30.  
110 In this sense, and related to the notification procedures below, the Rapporteurship noted 
that, although notification procedures are not per se against the Convention, administrative 
officials granted that ample discretional authority could be questioned. IACHR-Office of the 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights 2005, supra note 80, at 142 (“However, the requirement of prior notification 
should not become a demand that permission be granted beforehand by an officer with 
unlimited discretional authority.”). 
111 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur 2012, supra note 48, at para. 28 
(considering these notifications per se as not incompatible with human rights obligations, as 
long as they are not transformed into forms of permission); see also, IACHR-Office of the Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights 2005, supra note 80, at 141-2. 
112 Notice the reasonableness with which the Constitutional Court of Germany addressed this 
issue in 1985: 
According to the substantially prevailing view, the duty to notify at the right time does 
not apply to spontaneous demonstrations which form instantaneously from some 
cause at that moment. 
The fact that a violation of the duty to notify does not automatically lead to a ban or to 
the dispersal of an event coincides with this. It is true that any person who as organiser 
or leader "conducts" a meeting which has not been notified commits an offence (§ 26 
Meetings Act). But the Meetings Act merely provides in § 15 para. 2 that the competent 
authority "can" disperse meetings in the open air and processions if they are not 
notified. 
The case in question was Brokdorf. I have taken this translation from Institute for Transnational 
Law, The University of Texas School of Law, Translated Decisions, BVerfGE 69, 315 - Brokdorf 





protests.113 However, a form of censorship may still occur. Although this will 
not happen in advance, it will happen if the authority decides to dissolve a 
manifestation that is against its interest/policies. 
At any rate, determining when a government hinders the right to protests on 
the basis of its content proves certainly difficult. First, it is not always easy to 
define what the primary purpose of a governmental regulation is.114 Second, in 
protests freedom of expression considerations get merged with the right to 
assembly regulations.115 Governments normally claim they are not restricting 
specific contents through these regulations, rather furthering permissible 
constitutional objectives (i.e. public tranquility). Third, a categorical distinction 
between content-based and content-neutral regulations is flawed as “most laws 
contain both content-based and content-neutral-elements.”116 Whether as 
content-based or as content-neutral regulations, there will be a degree to which 
public debate gets distorted.117 
These cautions demand a more careful approach, for it is also true that by 
resorting to general and content-neutral regulations governments also conceal 
                                                        
113 Case of Bukta and others v. Hungary, HUM. RTS. CASE DIG. 1175 (2006-2007) (“In the Court’s 
view, in special circumstances when an immediate response, in the form of a demonstration, to 
a political event might be justified, a decision to disband the ensuing, peaceful assembly solely 
because of the absence of the requisite prior notice, without any illegal conduct by the 
participants, amounts to a disproportionate restriction on freedom of peaceful assembly.”). 
114 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 83. 
115 In fact, some have suggested that cases of protests and demonstrations began to be decided 
in light, and seen as an appendix, of freedom of speech—that is, these were cases “resolved 
without reference to assembly.” John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TULANE L. 
REV. 565, 610-11 (2010). 
116 Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the constitutionality of laws that are both content-based and 
content-neutral: the emerging constitutional calculus, 79 INDIANA L. J. 801, 814 (2004).  
117 Id. at 821; Mary M. Cheh, Demonstrations, security zones, and first amendment protection of 
special places, 8 D.C. L. REV. 53, 67-70 (2004) (noting that in protests there is a continuum 
between forms and substance, which also applies to State regulations). 
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their actual purposes.118 The basis of content-neutral regulations is the 
imposition of restrictions or regulations, regardless of the viewpoints being 
expressed. However, there are good reasons not to exempt these general 
regulations from freedom of expression scrutiny; laws that appear as facially 
content- or speech-neutral may become content- or speech-based as applied.119 
Many protest regulations are of this kind, namely content-neutral statutes that 
were enacted to further permissible and non-speech-related objectives such as 
preventing breach of the peace, but that are applied in a content-based 
fashion.120 As Volokh notes citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, a 1940 case,  
The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of 
conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes 
not only violent acts but acts and words likely to produce violence in 
others.121 
Political equality also becomes relevant here. In fact, facially neutral regulations 
should trouble us more when those being affected by them are always (in a 
political, but not in a statistical sense) the same.122 General laws, we know, have 
                                                        
118 Chemerinsky, for instance, has argued that the Supreme Court of the United States has 
maintained a very vague and ambiguous definition of content-neutrality. He also argued that 
the Court has upheld the validity of various clearly content-based regulations, deemed 
constitutional only because they have been motivated by content-neutral purposes. Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Content neutrality as a central problem of freedom of speech: problems in the 
Supreme Court’s application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 56-61 (2000). See also, Huhn, Assessing the 
constitutionality of laws that are both content-based and content-neutral, supra note 116, at 815-
6 (arguing that the standard of assessment for free speech regulations has been relaxed as to 
permit inquiry into legislative intent to determine a statute’s constitutionality). 
119 See, Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: generally applicable laws, illegal courses of conduct, 
“situation-altering utterances”, and the uncharted zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1286-9 (2005). 
120 Id. at 1292. 
121 Id. n. 69. 
122 Owen Fiss, for instance, has argued that when the Supreme Court protected the protests of 
the civil rights movement, States also claimed to be simply enforcing public order laws. The 
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uneven impact depending on one’s (political, social, cultural, etc.) side.123 
Context might also be of help here. For instance, as noted before, most current 
anti-protests bills and regulations have been submitted and passed in very 
specific contexts of protests and with very specific consequences, which might 
be very telling of the State’s purpose.124 Whereas governments claim these are 
content-neutral regulations aimed at protecting (say) public order, political 
contexts advise taking two steps back to assess those regulations in their 
proper light: their effects on suppressing certain forms of dissenting speech.125  
According to professor Greenawalt, “[s]treet demonstrations are a unique and 
important form of communication.”126 As I just noted above, the fact that 
protests are forms of communication (or of expression) brings important 
consequences, for States are not free to regulate them at will. Protests, to 
                                                                                                                                                            
problem, Fiss argues, was that “[o]rder did not just mean order, but order that preserves 
segregation.” OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 7 (1996). 
123 Kevin F. O’Neill, Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 LOYOLA L. REV. 411, 436-7 (1999) 
(showing that upheld content-neutral regulations limited speech of very specific groups); Helen 
Fenwick, The Right to Protest, the Human Rights Act and the Margin of Appreciation, THE MODERN 
LAW REVIEW 492, 493-4 (1999) (arguing that denial of public forum rights “bears unequally on 
different groups” as it is actually a denial of free speech rights for certain minorities). 
124 See, Mohamed Abdelaal, Egypt's Public Protest Law 2013: A Boost to Freedom or a Further 
Restriction? 11 US-CHINA L. REV. 1114 (2014). 
125 Cheh, Demonstrations and special places protection, supra note 117, at 69. I don’t want to add 
more, but a caveat is necessary here. The approach I’m here suggesting should take us, and 
courts, to consider the effects of content-neutral regulations. Are courts reluctant to do so? 
Moon has argued that courts in Canada have been reluctant to strike down legislation that, 
although not aimed at suppressing speech, ends up limiting expression, unless—Moon 
continues—challengers are able to show “that the restricted expression advances the values 
that underlie freedom of expression … the realization of truth, participation in social and 
political decision making, and diversity in the forms of individual self-fulfillment and human 
flourishing.” MOON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 104, at 
34-5. The same is true in the United States where governments are given ample room to 
present the intentions of their regulations—which takes precedence over expressive effects. 
Huhn, Assessing the constitutionality of laws that are both content-based and content-neutral, 
supra note 116, at 817-9 (explaining the intent test). Recently the United States Supreme Court 
ratified the broad scope authorities have in trumping judicial assessment. McCullen v. Coakley, 
573 U.S. ___ (2014) (“Second, even if a facially neutral law disproportionately affects speech on 
certain topics, it remains content neutral so long as it is “‘justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech’.”). 
126 Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, supra note 102, at 31.  
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continue with Greenawalt, “cannot be closed off completely, and regulation that 
sharply limits them should be carefully reviewed.”127 Freedom of expression, 
and through it the right to protest, relates to States in the friend-foe relation I 
mentioned at the beginning, with all the pros and cons this dialectic relation 
brings with it. As Fiss wrote,  
The state, like any other institution, can act either as a friend or enemy 
of speech and, without falling back to the libertarian presumption, we 
must learn to recognize when it is acting in one capacity rather than 
another.128  
Noticing the political purposes freedom of expression serves, as I have argued 
in this section, could helps us to determine when the State it is acting in which 
capacity and, consequently, demand tighter scrutiny of its regulations. 
 
III. Freedom of assembly 
 
Owen Fiss noted some time ago that large chains of newspapers and television 
dominate the current public sphere.129 The market, he argued, constrains what 
matters occupy the front page of the public sphere in two main ways: by 
privileging “certain select groups, by making programs, journals, and 
newspapers especially responsive to their needs and desires,”130 on the one 
hand, and by privately determining what news they will air (or print). These 
                                                        
127 Id. 
128 Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARVARD L. REV. 781, 787 (1987). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 788. 
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latter decisions, Fiss regretted, “have a great deal to do with profitability or 
allocative efficiency … but little to do with the democratic needs of the 
electorate.”131 
This is not a matter of market failure, but of market reach—Fiss insisted.132 
This is why the State is asked to create spaces that supplement, rather than 
replace, the market. Nevertheless, this is also why social groups strive to 
overcome the limitations they face due to the current configuration of the 
public sphere. Assembling themselves is a form of effectively influencing politics 
where traditional channels appear to be closed.133 Engaging in concerted 
activity is actually both a matter of mutual aid and protection,134 given the 
realization that certain objectives are most effectively achieved (or the 
achievement at least appears feasible) through joint action.135 The very source 
of the body politic is, as Rousseau put it: “This sum of forces [that] can only 
arise only from the cooperation of many.”136 This sum of forces is also the 
condition for the exercise of other rights, such a freedom of speech: “If the 
people could not assemble, many of their rights would be rendered 
nugatory.”137 
                                                        
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 See Lynd, Communal Rights, supra note 92, at 1424. 
134 Id. at 1423. 
135 Id. at 1424. 
136 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 39, 49 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003 repr.) (1762).  
137 James M. Jarrett & Vernon A. Mund, The Right to Assembly, 9 N.Y.U. L. QUARTERLY REV. 1, 4-5 
(1931). At any rate, it is worth emphasizing that the values normally attributed to assemblies 
and associations are not solely instrumental. Associations, however transitory (assemblies), 
have value in themselves as they promote “camaraderie, dialogue, deliberation, negotiation, 
competition, creativity, and the kinds of self-expression and self-sacrifice that are only possible 
in association with others.” Amy Gutman, Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay, in 
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Certainly, once a body politic has been erected people may come together with 
different purposes—for example, to overthrow the regime itself. As I have been 
stressing here, I am concerned with forms of political participation and 
contestation that presuppose the regime remaining in place. Here, freedom of 
assembly occupies a central place. Not surprisingly, John Rawls listed this 
freedom as one of the basic liberties citizens enjoy. Freedom of assembly, 
among other liberties—Rawls also mentions freedom of expression—, is key to 
“secure the free and informed application of the principles of justice.”138 In fact, 
in A Theory of Justice Rawls had also mentioned freedom of assembly as not 
only required by the first principle of justice (an equal right to the most 
extensive scheme of basic rights and liberties), but also to secure a public 
forum free and open to all citizens where they can assess and “add alternative 
proposals to the agenda for political discussion.”139 
On the currency of the republican tradition, at least as Pettit has expounded it, 
assembly also ranks as a prominent place. Numbers (meaning citizens 
contesting State action in concerted action) are in fact a matter which is 
necessary to secure liberty. Indeed, the only way in which a government is 
conducted in republican terms is when that government is controlled by a 
                                                                                                                                                            
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 3, 3-4 (Amy Gutman ed. 1998); Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of 
Assembly, supra note 115, 567-70 (2010) (arguing the fact of gathering is a form of expression 
related to, but certainly different from, freedom of speech). 
138 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 334 (1996). 
139 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 197-8 (1999 rev. ed.). In obvious connection with the 
references to Owen Fiss with which I open this section, Rawls also added, 
The liberties protected by the principle of participation lose much of their value 
whenever those who have greater private means are permitted to use their advantages 
to control the course of public debate (at 198). 
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system equally accessible to all.140 As freedom in republican terms is more 
demanding than its liberal counterpart, control of government here is not to be 
based solely on the will of the State, but—as Pettit explains—on unconditioned 
grounds.141 How is that correlation between popular influence and government 
to be maintained beyond simple contingency? One key component to keep that 
influence binding, and thus not dependent on the discretionary will of the 
government, is a resistive community: 
a community in which, as a matter of fact and/or common belief, people 
are disposed to resist government, should it ignore popular influence, 
and government is disposed to avoid triggering resistance.142 
Numbers are determining to this purpose. “It is only in the presence of 
concerted, sustained oversight of government activity,” Pettit argues, that 
governments will be brought, rather than simply expected, to be responsive to 
popular inputs.143  
A. Freedom of assembly as an independent right 
Freedom of assembly is the second right that concurs in configuring the right to 
protest. It is under the understanding sketched above that concerted actions 
become politically significant and, to some, the only available channel. It is 
under this political understanding that I read this right. As a right, it is also 
better understood as encompassing a bundle of legal positions including both 
negative and positive obligations. 
                                                        
140 PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 208-9 
(2012).  
141 Id. at 218. 
142 Id. at 219. 
143 Id. at 226. 
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One way to start understanding the bundle of rights freedom of assembly 
encompasses is by distinguishing it from freedom of expression.144 Is freedom 
of assembly independent of freedom of speech or is it always speech-related?145 
In A. V. Dicey’s historical account of the common law of manifestations, he 
denied there was such a thing as an independent right to assembly. In his 
words,  
The right of assembly is nothing more than the result of the view taken 
by the Courts as to individual liberty of person and individual liberty of 
speech.146  
Schauer, for another, argued demonstrations, parades and picketing activities 
were important not much because of their communicative value,147 but because 
of their effectiveness as means to call others’ attention.148 
Nowadays, a conceptual distinction seems more appropriate—although, as I’m 
claiming here, both rights concur in configuring the right to protest. Barendt, 
                                                        
144 And also by distinguishing freedom of assembly from freedom of association. See, Inazu, The 
Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, supra note 115, at 567 (“something is lost when assembly is 
dichotomously construed as either a moment of expression (when it is viewed as speech) or an 
expressionless group (when it is viewed as association).”). 
145 Notice that this is a related, although different, discussion as to whether the concurrence of 
different liberties strengthens the right to protest (as discussed supra note 53). 
146 Cited in Jarrett & Mund, The Right to Assembly, supra note 137, at 9. But see, Helen Fenwick & 
Gavin Phillipson, Public Protest. The Human Rights Act and Judicial Responses to Political 
Expression, 2000 PUBLIC LAW 627 (2000) (arguing that since the ratification of the Human 
Rights Act in 1998 the right to protest transformed from being conceived as an unprotected 
liberty to a positive right). 
147 In fact, he was very dismissive as to the communicative character of protests. Arguing 
protests are more emotional than intellectual, he contended there would be little, if any, 
communicative loss if we were to prohibit protests since “statements of the positions involved 
are available in books, newspapers, magazines and other less obstructive communicative 
formats.” These channels, he insisted, are “more conductive to a rational argument and 
deliberation …”. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 201-2 (1982). 
148 Id., at 202. The Constitutional Court of Spain embraced this approach when stating that the 
freedom of assembly (“derecho de reunión”) entails “a collective manifestation of free speech 
by means of an instrumental and transitory association of persons put in service of the 
exchange and exposition of ideas.” Judgment of May 8, 1995, Constitutional Court, Second 
Chamber, STC 66/1995, para. II.3 (my translation). 
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for instance, has persuasively argued the advantages of considering the right to 
assembly as an independent right. In fact, as he notes, under the protection of 
the right to assembly there is no need to entertain the discussion whether there 
is speech involved or not.149 Accordingly, not every protest has a 
communicative purpose.150 What Barendt argues is that freedom of assembly 
has an “organizational dimension, enabling the convenors of meetings and 
street processions to choose, subject to limits and conditions, the time and 
place of their demonstration.”151 It is this organizational character what has 
permitted freedom of assembly, different from freedom of expression, to be 
more easily conciliated with positive duties.152 Finally, this conceptual 
distinction is needed to make sense of the fact that many Western constitutions 
explicitly recognize freedom of assembly as a right different from, although 
highly related to, freedom of speech.153 However, this conceptual distinction 
                                                        
149 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 271. More recently, Judith Butler has made a 
similar claim. JUDITH BUTLER, NOTES TOWARD A PERFORMATIVE THEORY OF ASSEMBLY 8 (2015) (“If we 
consider why freedom of assembly is separate from freedom of expression, it is precisely 
because the power that people have to gather together is itself an important political 
prerogative, quite distinct from the right to sat whatever they have to say once people have 
gathered.”).  
150 I cannot but think of the case of football fans in Latin America and Europe who gather some 
time before matches in public spaces surrounding stadiums, such as squares and parks. There 
they normally chant to support their teams, and authorities may regulate their activities in 
order to control the orderly entrance to the stadium. While these activities have an expressive 
purpose—to show fans’ commitment to their team—, their regulation would hardly be a matter 
of freedom of speech, but of freedom of assembly. In other words, a fans’ case against these 
regulations would not be made stronger if they were to show that chanting in favor of their 
team is a matter of freedom of expression. However, their case would be strengthened by 
showing they have peacefully gathered in public spaces where reunions are allowed or if chants 
themselves are politically loaded—a fact we should not dismiss out of hand considering the 
way in which many political actors have related to football teams. 
151 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 272. 
152 Id. at 271-2. 
153 In fact, it should be noted that many State constitutions in the United States subordinate the 
freedom of assembly to specific communicative purposes: “To consult the common good; to 
instruct their representatives; (and, or) to apply to the state governments.” Jarrett & Mund, The 
Right to Assembly, supra note 137, at 17.  
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should not obscure the relevant political purposes that freedom of assembly 
serves alongside, and shares with—as noted above—, freedom of expression.154 
B. TPM regulations and public order 
The most obvious negative duty the State is held to is that of not obstructing 
freedom of assembly. As noted before, notification procedures are likely to be 
used by States as instances to discriminate or censor because of viewpoints to 
be aired. This is why notification procedures are not permissions, but instances 
of communication flow between demonstrators and the State. At any rate, 
notification procedures are part of what the literature has called regulations of 
the time, place and manner of protests.155 I have already said that these TPM 
regulations should not be subtracted from freedom of expression scrutiny; 
under what appears to be neutral TPM regulations the purpose of suppressing 
certain dissident voices might be hidden. I briefly consider here TPM 
regulations in light of freedom of assembly alone. 
TPM regulations are regularly accepted as they permit the State to balance its 
interests (i.e. preserving public order and traffic flow) with those of the 
protesters. But is it actually a balance? There has been an interesting debate as 
to the State’s role in implementing these regulations. Some commentators, for 
instance, highlight the spaces of negotiation that TPM regulations open 
                                                        
154 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 272 (“the self-fulfilment of those participating 
in the meeting or other form of protest, and the dissemination of ideas and opinions essential to 
the working of an active democracy. Public meetings and demonstrations enable those ideas to 
be communicated more effectively.”). 
155 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 80.  
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between State authorities (mostly the police) and protesters,156 which some 
have deemed an actual institutionalization of protests.157  
Others, however, warn these regulations offer spaces of negotiation that 
include unequal bargaining power.158 They contend that these instances make 
protesters focus on procedural, rather than substantive matters,159 that this 
model has proven to offer ample discretion to authorities,160 and that these 
negotiations have not changed the face of a State that imposes these limits in a 
top-down fashion.161 Moreover, it has been argued that this negotiated 
management model has been withdrawn altogether and currently replaced by a 
‘command-and-control’ model.162 In the end, protests have been transformed in 
forced rituals rather than meaningful political instances,163 free speech rights 
                                                        
156 John D. McCarthy & Clarck McPhail, The Institutionalization of Protest in the United States, in 
THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SOCIETY: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS FOR A NEW CENTURY 83, 83-4 (David S. Meyer 
& Sidney Tarrow eds., 1998) (arguing that this public order management system, where citizen 
protests are a normal part of the political process, has improved practices when compared with 
protest policing in the 1960s). 
157 McCarthy & McPhail, The Institutionalization of Protest in the United States, supra note 80.  
158 Donatella Della Porta & Oliver Fillieule, Policing Social Protest, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION 
TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 59, at 219-20 (arguing this negotiated exchange between 
protesters and the police is based on unequal bargaining power). 
159 Trevor C. W. Farrow, Negotiation, Mediation, Globalization Protests and Police: Right 
Processes; Wrong System, Issues, Parties and Time, 28 QUEEN’S L. J. 665 (2002-2003) (arguing 
TPM processes put protesters in the difficult position of compromising their claims by focusing 
on procedural matters). 
160 Patrick Rafail, Asymmetry in Protest control? Comparing protest policing patters in Montreal, 
Toronto, and Vancouver 1998-2004, 15 MOBILIZATION 489 (2010) (contending whether 
negotiated management models are always the default rule and highlighting differences across 
cities). 
161 Citizens, Abu El-Haj has argued, are thus “rendered supplicant” of permissions to assemble. 
Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right to Assembly, supra note 101 at 546-7 (“we [have] 
replaced the notion that the state can only interfere with gatherings that actually disturb the 
peace or create a public nuisance with a legal regime in which the state regulates all public 
assemblies, including those that are anticipated to be both peaceful and not inconvenient, in 
advance through permits.”). 
162 PETER DAUVERGNE & GENEVIEVE LEBARON, PROTEST INC. THE CORPORATIZATION OF ACTIVISM 55-65 
(2014) (arguing this model is characterized by ample and vague powers granted to the police 
and its militarization, all this against a background and culture of impunity). 
163 Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right to Assembly, supra note 101, at 547.  
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have been turned into ‘permitted speech,’164 and many protesters have been 
taken, either consciously or unconsciously, to commune with the power (either 
public or private) of those they claim to fight against.165  
In any case, States are not free to restrict public meetings at will. These 
restrictions will, generally, be upheld as long as they are “no wider than 
necessary to prevent litter, noise, congestion, or other nuisance.”166 In the 
United States, TPM restrictions are subjected to a three-part test where courts 
control (a) whether regulations are content-neutral, (b) whether regulations 
are narrowly tailored, and (c) whether these regulations leave “sufficient 
alternative channels of communication.”167 This test precludes total, although 
content-neutral, prohibitions.168 Similar criteria is followed in Canada—where 
public protests can be restricted only if (a) regulations are content-neutral and 
(b) their limits are “narrowly drawn”169—and in the international human rights 
law.170 Of course, no matter how strict we are in constraining States’ regulatory 
                                                        
164 Don Mitchell & Lynn A. Staeheli, Permitting Protest: Parsing the Fine Geography of Dissent in 
America, 29 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH 796, 800-1 (2005) (arguing 
the system of regulations has become so accepted that the general rule has become limiting). 
165 DAUVERGNE & LEBARON, PROTEST INC., supra note 162, at 1-28. 
166 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 80. 
167 O’Neill, Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, supra note 123, at 435.  
168 See, for instance, City of Ladue et al. v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (“Although prohibitions 
foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the 
danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily apparent-by eliminating a common means 
of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech”). 
169 MOON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 104, at 148. 
170 IACHR-Office of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Annual Report of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2005, supra note 80, at 141 (“The Rapporteurship 
considers that for said limitations to respect the standards for the protection of freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly, they must not depend on the content of what is to be 
expressed in the demonstration, they must serve a public interest, and they must leave open 
alternative channels of communication.”). 
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powers, the fact is that today these regulations seem to be the rule rather than 
the exception.171 
Let me close references to TPM restrictions by mentioning two related, 
although open, debates: the resort to public order, on the one hand, and the 
displacement of dissenting voices, on the other. Public order is one of those 
vague and open-ended concepts authorities regularly resort to for restricting 
protests.172 Historically, the legal scope of protests has been tightly linked to 
their impact on bystanders. In fact, in the English common law of assemblies, 
public meetings were illegal if they meant to terrorize the people or had that 
consequence.173 As it has been noted, a protest might become unlawful because 
of its purpose, but also because of its manner.174  
These limits, however, have proven difficult to determine precisely because of 
their vagueness and generality. Furthermore, it is not clear at all what interests 
these restrictions protect, let alone whether there are any rights involved on 
the side of the government.175 The absence of rights, in any case, is not 
conclusive so as to deny the State regulatory powers. States may actually show 
                                                        
171 Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right to Assembly, supra note 101, at 579 (“we have replaced the 
notion that the state can only interfere with gatherings when they disturb the peace, with a 
legal regime in which the state is permitted to regulate in advance …”.). 
172 It is, in fact, one of the criteria upon which freedom of assembly can be restricted under the 
American Convention of Human Rights (Article 13.2.b). The European Convention on Human 
Rights uses similar terms. It states “[n]o restrictions shall be placed on the exercise” of freedom 
of assembly, other than those necessary “for the prevention of disorder or crime … or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Article 11.2). 
173 Jarrett & Mund, The Right to Assembly, supra note 137, at 6. 
174 Id. at 19-21 (explaining, meanwhile noticing the flexibility of, the “tumultuous manner” 
standard). 
175 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 290-1.  
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there are sensible public interests in preserving order,176 probably the very 
same social planning interests the law itself is aimed at serving.177 
The problem is, therefore, with the different conceptions of public order at 
hand. One canonical approach suggests that public order entails preserving 
order,178 “a matter of keeping the peace, avoiding brawls and so on.”179 That 
extremely ample approach makes unlawful any assembly concerted with the 
common intent of “produc[ing] danger to the tranquility and peace of the 
neighborhood,” as a New Jersey court held in 1928.180 Moreover, in the recent 
European context the definition of public order has also been linked to the 
security and free movement of goods.181 Nevertheless, public tranquility, to put 
it broadly (as broadly as the term has been used), shows only one side of the 
coin, for public order also has an egalitarian component. It might “comprise 
society’s interest in maintaining among us a proper sense of one another’s 
social or legal status.”182 This is to secure the standing of citizens as full 
                                                        
176 Id. at 291. 
177 SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 170-73 (2011) (arguing legal systems are “institutions of social 
planning and their fundamental aim is to compensate for the deficiencies of alternative forms of 
planning” in the context of highly pluralized communities). 
178 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 291.   
179 JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 46 (2012). 
180 Jarrett & Mund, The Right to Assembly, supra note 137, at 22. 
181 In Schmidberger v. Austria—the case I am thinking about here—the European Court of 
Justice (‘ECJ’) did not hold that protests are to be restricted in light of the fundamental freedom 
of movement of goods. In fact, the ECJ reasoned that sometimes freedom of assembly outweighs 
other considerations. Matthew Humphreys, Free movement and roadblocks: the right to protest 
in the single market, 6 ENVTL. L. REV. 190, 191-3 (2004). However, the freedom of movement of 
goods was certainly a standard with which protests (and other rights) are to be balanced, 
although in a more relaxed fashion. See, Andrea Biondi, Free Trade, a Mountain Road and the 
Right to Protests: European Economic Freedoms and Fundamental Individual Rights, 1 EUROPEAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 51, 58-9 (2004) (noticing that, according to the ECJ in Schmidberger, the 
fundamental rights defense is to be scrutinized in light of whether they are tolerable 
interferences with “obligations imposed by Community Law, even under a fundamental 
freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as the free movement of goods.”). 
182 WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 179, at 46. 
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members of a given society, that is, the status of citizenship.183 This egalitarian 
side of public order, a face seldom emphasized, leads us to consider the 
attribution and protection of rights, particularly the protection of rights that 
allow the people to become meaningful citizens (participatory rights), not the 
security that one’s daily life will be uneventful.184 
A similar reading can be found in the international human rights law where, 
aware of the open-ended character of public order, a more structural 
conception has been preferred. This structural conception of public order 
stresses the institutional conditions needed to secure the enjoyment of rights, 
being the respect for rights precisely one of these conditions.185 Thus, the 
                                                        
183 Id. 
184 In fact, Waldron argues this version of public order aspires to assure “members of a 
vulnerable group can live their lives gracefully and in a dignified manner, in routine 
interactions with other” WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 179, at 92. I have 
already emphasized above the importance of reading freedoms of expression and of assembly 
in an egalitarian manner, that is, paying attention to how the regulation of rights affects those 
who are worst-off. Stressing the egalitarian aspect of public order follows such an approach. 
The Rapporteurship has also highlighted the crucial role protests play in consolidating 
democracies. IACHR-Office of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Annual Report 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2005, supra note 80, at 140 (“the 
Rapporteurship emphasizes that societal participation through public demonstrations is 
important for the consolidation of democratic life of societies. In general, as an exercise of 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, it is of crucial social interest …”.). More 
recently, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and of association has emphasized restrictions on freedom of assembly are more burdensome 
to certain marginalized groups. The effect of freedom of assembly regulations, as well as 
hostility from other individuals, has the consequence of “reinforcing marginalization” and 
political participation in public matters. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (Maina Kiai), A/HRC/26/29. 
April 14, 2014, at paras. 7-15. 
185 The objective of these clauses is to allow States not to resort to legitimate interests 
recognized in international conventions with the aim of restricting rights and liberties 
recognized there as well. See, Article 29.a of the American Convention on Human Rights;  
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: 
a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of 
the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater 
extent than is provided for herein. 
And Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction 
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Rapporteurship noted in its 2009 Annual Report that public order cannot be 
invoked to suppress rights recognized in the Convention.186 In line with the 
structural notion here emphasized, it defined public order as “the conditions 
that assure the normal and harmonious functioning of institutions based on a 
coherent system of values and principles.”187 Pointing to the maintenance of 
democratic institutions,188 the Rapporteurship emphasized that the widest 
circulation of ideas was indeed required by public order.189 Exactly the same 
emphasis on the structural understanding of public order has been held in the 
international system of human rights.190 
There has been some debate as to the meaning of public order in the European 
context, where public order has been conceptualized in both a broad and a 
                                                                                                                                                            
of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater 
extent than is provided for in the Convention. 
186 IACHR-Office of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Annual Report of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.51. December 30, 
2009, at 251. See also, the Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
2005, supra note 80, at 140-41 (“the purpose of the regulation of the right to assembly cannot 
be that of establishing grounds for prohibiting meetings or demonstrations.”). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. (“any impairment of public order that is invoked as a justification to limit freedom of 
expression must be based on real and objectively verifiable causes that present the certain and 
credible threat of a potentially serious disturbance of the basic conditions for the functioning of 
democratic institutions.”). 
189 Id. Some have suggested that this means the IACtHR has understood the terms of the 
Convention to be sort of “an American democratic public order,” which explains why public 
order can only be interpreted with reference to the American Convention. ANNA-LENA SVENSSON-
MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATES OF EXCEPTION: WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES AND CASE-LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING ORGANS 
170-1 (1998). 
190 De Schutter cites the ‘Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,’ noticing that 
The expression ‘public order (ordre public)’ as used in the Covenant may be defined as 
the sum of rules which ensure the functioning of society or the set of fundamental 
principles on which society is founded. Respect for human rights is part of public order 
(ordre public).  
DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 105, at 306. 
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narrow sense.191 The broad sense is similar to the structural conception here 
identified: “‘the basic structure of a state governed by the rule of law, or in 
other words, a proper democratic republic’.”192 In a narrow sense, however, 
public order amounts to public policy, “that is, normal and undisturbed life in 
the public sphere.”193 While de Lange recognizes that it is this narrow sense 
what provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights accept when 
permitting limits on rights (the European Convention talks of public safety and 
the prevention of disorder,),194 it is also true that fundamental rights normally 
trump these public policy considerations.195 This is so because the interests 
that States regularly resort to in order to restrict rights might be very 
important, but “they would not include the basic structure of the republic, nor 
necessarily the fundamental rights of the citizen.”196 Furthermore, the ECtHR 
has also developed a more demanding standard whenever political speech is 
involved, therefore reducing the margin of appreciation granted to States for 
domestic regulations.197 Thus, in Schmidberger, as already noted, the ECJ 
                                                        
191 Here I follow Roel de Lange, The European Public Order, Constitutional Principles and 
Fundamental Rights, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 3, 7-9 (2007). 
192 Id. at 7-8. 
193 Id. at 8. 
194 Id. at 9. 
195 Id. at 8. See also, SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 
189, at 188 (“the international law of human rights provides a positive legal framework which 
strictly conditions the meaning of these notions [national security and public order] so as 
always to make their interpretation and application conducive to the effective protection of the 
rights concerned.”). 
196 Id. 
197 This is particularly the case of public meetings, whose protection has been routinely merged 
with that of freedom of speech. Every time this is the case—and as I said before relaying on the 
amplitude of means freedom of expression provides citizens with and public opinion openness, 
this is regularly the case—the Court sees that the essential foundations of democracy are 
involved. In any case, as van Dijk et al. recognize, freedom of peaceful assembly has not played 
such a relevant role in the jurisprudence of the Court. See, PIETER VAN DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 818-9, 821-3 (2006). I would like to 
thank Pablo Contreras for the discussion and reference on this issue.   
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reasoned the right to protest trumped the free movement of goods, for an 
isolated incident in question did not give rise to a general climate of 
insecurity.198  
There is no doubt that the structural understanding of the public order is more 
congenial with the right to protest, for public meetings will always involve 
some level of public nuisance that cannot be used as an excuse to sanction 
dissent.199 This was what the German Constitutional Court held in Brokdorf:  
a limitation of this freedom will definitely not be justified by just any 
interest; inconveniences which inevitably arise from the large scale on 
which the basic right is exercised, and cannot be avoided without 
disadvantages for the purpose of the event, will generally have to be 
born by third parties. It will be just as inappropriate to consider banning 
of meetings on the basis of mere technical traffic grounds, since 
juxtaposition of the use of the highway by demonstrators and moving 
traffic is as a rule attainable by conditions.200 
It should be noted that in the context of the ECtHR it has also been held that 
protests will inevitably cause some disruption—inherit in any demonstration—
                                                        
198 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria (Case C-112/00), 
[2003] ECR I-5659, 5722. 
199 It is a telling fact that in the preparatory works of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Covenants (on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights) narrower terms such as ‘public welfare’ and ‘prevention of disorders’ were 
dropped as limits on rights. This does not mean, as the international case law shows, that 
considerations of public tranquility cannot be invoked, but it does mean that those 
considerations alone do not exhaust the meaning of public order. At any rate, this openness 
calls for a balance of different interests in defining the scope of public order, fundamental rights 
included—as argued above. See, SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
supra note 189, at 149-61. 
200 Brokdorf, supra note 112. 
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, which is protected by freedom of assembly.201 This protection has also been 
extended to unlawful gatherings.202 How much disruption and disorder will 
authorities permit, however, is difficult to tell in advance. Authorities normally 
enjoy ample latitude to ‘accommodate’ exercise of (crucial) rights with disorder 
and risk of violence,203 but they are not free in determining so. 
Or are they? One of the main obstacles to a vigorous freedom of assembly is the 
vague nature of statutes granting governmental authorities, particularly the 
police, ample powers for policing protests.204 No wonder this is one of the 
reasons why authorities have preferred to stick with the erratic-vague-and-
open-to-as-many-interpretations-as-you-will notion of public order.205 
                                                        
201 Ezelin v. France, [1992] EHRR 362. 
202 Case of Akgöl and Göl v. Turkey, nos. 28495/06 and 28516/06, ECHR 2011, para. 41 (“the 
Court reiterates that any demonstration in a public place may cause a certain level of disruption 
to ordinary life and encounter hostility … it also points out that an unlawful situation does not 
justify an infringement of freedom of assembly and that regulations of this nature should not 
represent a hidden obstacle to freedom of peaceful assembly as protected by the Convention.”). 
However, the ECtHR has done so in the context of protests or assemblies limited in time, 
meaning protests that cause momentary, rather than extended, disruption. In Barraco, the 
Court, despite recognizing that “all demonstrations in a public place are likely to cause some 
disruption,” also noted that in this specific case protesters went “beyond the level of 
obstruction inherent in the demonstration itself.” Barraco v. France [2009] E.H.R.L.R. 580, 581-
2. 
203 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 291-2.  
204 I have noted above (supra note 42) that there is a current trend among governments facing 
different degrees of protests (Canada, Chile, Egypt, Greece, Russia, and Spain, to name a few) to 
submit bills and pass statutes and different by-laws curtailing the freedom of assembly. They do 
this by criminalizing ample and vague conducts which exact limits are hard, if impossible, to 
foresee by regular citizens (public order, of course, ranks among authorities’ preferred terms). 
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur 2014, supra note 184, at para. 7 (“In 
recent years many States have responded to people’s assertions of peaceful dissent by violently 
clamping down on peaceful protests and other forms of assembly, unduly restricting the ability 
of associations to form and operate, and physically assaulting civil society actors.”). In this 
regard, a case decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1965 is exemplary. In Cox, the 
Court held a statute of breach of peace was unconstitutionally vague and broad in scope as it 
permitted to “sweep[] within its broad scope activities that are constitutionally protected free 
speech and assembly.” Cox v. Louisiana (No. 24), 379 U.S. 536, 551-2 (1965). 
205 Helen Fenwick, for instance, has shown that in the United Kingdom the breach of peace 
doctrine of the common law is so ample and vague that it even fails to distinguish between riots 
and protests with freedom of expression significance. Fenwick, The Right to Protest, supra note 
123, at 508. See also, Helen Fenwick, Marginalising Human Rights: Breach of the Peace, 
“Kettling”, the Human Rights Act and Public Protest, 2009 PUBLIC LAW 737, 737-8 (2009) 
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Whereas empirical research has shown the police are keen on reading their 
own perceptions as to what public order involves within statues and bylaws,206 
the fact that these statutes contemplate mostly criminal sanctions transforms 
this into an urgent issue.207 However, while the police give orders, their orders, 
as Jarrett and Mund put it back in 1931, are not laws.208 
Many decisions and standards show that empty and conjectural references to 
disorders that may (but also may not) follow protests are not enough.209 As the 
Rapporteurship explained, every time public order is invoked to limit 
expressions and assemblies it “must be based on real and objectively verifiable 
causes that present the certain and credible threat of a potentially serious 
disturbance of the basic conditions for the functioning of democratic 
institutions.”210 In this very fashion the ECtHR has reasoned that authorities 
                                                                                                                                                            
(showing the police have preferred to resort to the common law of breach of peace which offers 
more discretion to curb and control protests, rather than to the statutes regulating public 
meetings—however vague as well). 
206 Della Porta & Fillieule, Policing Social Protest, supra note 158, at 222-27. 
207 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2009, supra note 186, at 
143 (criminalization could have an intimidating effect on this form of participatory expression 
among those sectors of society that lack access to other channels of complaint or petition.”); 
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur 2014, supra note 184, at para. 60 
(“Criminal procedure laws and penal sanctions are used in several States to deter the exercise 
of the right to freedom of association. Authorities who are hostile to critical voices resort to 
criminal prosecution for defamation or similar offences, thereby discouraging and interfering 
with legitimate activities by groups.”). See also, Gargarella, Law and Social Protests, supra note 
75 (calling attention on the inconvenience, and justificatory problems in the context of 
pervasive inequality, of answering protests with criminal law). 
208 Jarrett & Mund, The Right to Assembly, supra note 137, at 26. 
209 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 294-302. 
210 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2009, supra note 186, at 
251. The Rapporteurship has also held that protests “cannot be considered as synonymous with 
public disorder for the purpose of restricting it per se.” Therefore, “an officer cannot deny a 
permit because he or she believes it to be likely that a demonstration will endanger peace, 
security, or public order, without taking into consideration whether the danger to peace, 
security or public order can be avoided by modifying the original circumstances of the 
demonstration (place, time, and so on).” Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights 2005, supra note 80, at 141-3. 
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need to specify the reasons why an outbreak of violence is likely. Therefore, 
empty reference to legal norms is not enough. Indeed, in Ivanov it held that 
even assuming that the legitimate aims pursued were public safety and 
the prevention of disorder, it can hardly be concluded that the 
authorities gave relevant and sufficient reasons justifying the 
prohibitions of the rallies, substantiating their finding that there was a 
risk to public order, and that the bans were thus necessary in a 
democratic society. It should also be noted that in their observations the 
Government did not specify any particular reasons to justify the bans, 
but merely stated that the authorities had acted in conformity with 
national law and that their actions had not been arbitrary.211 
Other local jurisdictions have maintained similar criteria. Thus, in Edwards v 
South Carolina the Supreme Court of the United States held that the threat of 
breach of peace, there defined in a pretty narrow sense,212 has to be real and 
imminent213—a standard later to be picked up by the Colombian Constitutional 
Court under the wording of a “imminent and serious threat.”214 The 
Constitutional Court of Spain has also emphasized the burden on authorities to 
                                                        
211 Case of Ivanov and others v. Bulgaria, no. 46336/99, ECHR 2005, at para. 63. See also, VAN DIJK 
ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION, supra note 197, at 821-2. 
212 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 234 (1963) (“In general terms, a breach of the peace 
is a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility, by any act or conduct 
inciting to violence …, it includes any violation of any law enacted to preserve peace and good 
order. It may consist of an act of violence or an act likely to produce violence.”). 
213 Id., at 237-8 (“That is why freedom of speech … is … protected against censorship or 
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive 
evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. … There is no room under 
our Constitution for a more restrictive view.”). 
214 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 14, 1992, Sentencia T-456/92 (slip  
op. at a), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1992/T-456-92.htm. 
See also, Gargarella, Law and Social Protests, supra note 75, at 140 (noticing the closeness 
between the Colombian and the North American standards). 
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show that there are justified reasons to conclude an alteration of the public 
order is imminent215—recalling previous decisions where it has also held 
public assemblies will inevitably bring restrictions on the free circulation of 
bystanders, restrictions that are to be expected in a democracy.216 Something 
similar has been suggested in the admittedly more restricted context of the 
United Kingdom. There, the House of Lords has restricted the discretionary 
powers the police enjoyed before the Human Rights Act was passed.217 
Moreover, in determining whether disorder is likely to occur authorities are 
restricted from looking to previous disturbances. In other words, previous 
disorders are no guarantee they will occur again in the future.218 It should be 
mentioned that, in light of the freedom of peaceful assembly, direct advocacy of 
violence by organizers might well be a reason to restrict assemblies.219 
The second TPM-related issue is the displacement of dissent. TPM restrictions, 
particularly those of place and time, will normally have the effect of altering the 
plans of protesters. Protests are intended to call political attention; therefore, 
                                                        
215 Judgment of October 27, 2003, Constitutional Court, First Chamber, STC 195/2003, at para. 
II.4. 
216 Id., at para. II.9. In a similar sense the Constitutional Court of Peru has reasoned restriction 
of the freedom of assembly can only be deemed constitutional when based on probable causes, 
“objective and duly justified reasons.” Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 
diciembre 7, 2005, Sentencia EXP. No 46-77-2004-PA/TC, available at: 
http://www.tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2005/04677-2004-AA.html, at para. 9.2 (18) (my 
translation). 
217 According to Fenwick, this was the case of Laporta. There, the House of Lords reduced the 
amplitude of the concept of imminence in the common law of the breach of peace. However, as 
she herself shows, this is far from a consolidated jurisprudential trend. In fact, in Austin, the 
House granted the police ample deference in applying the breach of peace conditions. Fenwick, 
Marginalising Human Rights, supra note 205, at 742-54. 
218 So held the Supreme Court of the United States in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951) 
(“The court below has mistakenly derived support for its conclusion [criminal conviction of a 
religious preacher] from the evidence produced at the trial that appellant's religious meetings 
had, in the past, caused some disorder.”). 
219 VAN DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION, supra note 197, at 822 
(arguing the ECtHR considers relevant the “non-violent intentions of those involved in the 
assembly, and not those not involved”).  
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the specific place where, and time when, they are to happen is of utmost 
importance. I will say something else about this in the following chapter when 
dealing with the right to the city. 
There are also some positive duties different from access rights (which I also 
discuss in the following chapter), duties which stem from freedom of assembly. 
First, if States have the duty not to interfere with freedom of assembly, States 
also have the positive duty of removing legal obstacles to its exercise. Although 
a positive duty, this is one that is negatively fulfilled most of the time. Thus, 
whereas a court could find a regulation to be unconstitutional for unreasonably 
regulating freedom of assembly, courts are unlikely to impose positive duties 
on political branches to pass legislation/regulations in a certain fashion.220  
States also have positive duties regarding what could be called factual 
obstacles. The most obvious example is that of hostile audiences, which are 
normally seen as a threat to public order. Here the primary duty of the State, no 
doubt whatsoever a positive one, is that of safeguarding the opportunity of the 
speakers to speak.221 As the United States Supreme Court put it in Fainer, 
We are well aware that the ordinary murmurings and objections of a 
hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a speaker, and are also 
                                                        
220 This is not the place to entertain, but simply to notice, the debate regarding the fashion in 
which constitutional or supreme courts exercising judicial review function. Some have 
suggested judicial review of legislation is better seen as a dialogue between and among the 
different branches. I am not denying that, on certain occasions, judicial decisions might lead 
political branches to fill the vacuum left by a nullified regulation, and to sometimes even follow 
the guidelines set by a court to do so.   
221 Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1417 (1985-1986) 
(arguing that whereas TPM are often seen as limitations on the right to protests, it is also true 




mindful of the possible danger of giving overzealous police officials 
complete discretion to break up otherwise lawful public meetings.222 
This right to speak includes that of counter-demonstrators: 
A demonstration may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the 
ideas or claims that it is seeking to promote. The participants must, 
however, be able to hold the demonstration without having to fear that 
they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents.223 
The reason seems obvious: violence from counter-demonstrators would “deter 
associations or other groups supporting common ideas or interests from 
openly expressing their opinions on highly controversial issues affecting the 
community.”224 On the other hand, if the State (normally police authorities) 
were permitted to prohibit or dissolve demonstrations simply because they feel 
that counter-demonstrators may be present, thus causing a (also alleged) 
disruption of public order, then that would imply that the exercise of freedom 
of assembly would be subjected to a sort of de facto veto.225 Considerations on 
equality might be of importance here too, for it is one case if a protest is 
countered by those who oppose the purpose for which demonstrators are 
advocating, but quite another when the group mobilizing is also unpopular, 
marginal, and constantly excluded from regular channels of political 
                                                        
222 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951). 
223 Case of Plattform “Ärzte Für Das Leben” v. Austria, [1988] EHRR 204, para. 32.  
224 Id. But also because violence is not deemed a form of legitimate expression. BARENDT, 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 80-1. 
225 Considerations on public order sketched above are important here too, for everything I have 
said here about positive duties of the State does not mean that, under certain circumstances, 
there might not be sensible reasons to further regulate protests. Barendt calls for seeking 
“imaginative solutions.” BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 65, at 302-3 
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intervention.226 Whereas the duty of the State is not absolute, in the sense that 
its resources are limited in safeguarding the rights of the speaker(s),227 when 
groups involved are unpopular, marginalized, and constantly excluded from 
regular channels of political influence it seems reasonable to demand a more 
stringent scrutiny, for the group might be unpopular for State authorities as 
well—including the police.228 
The State can limit freedom of assembly—and the current state of affairs shows 
shameless governments invoking ample and vague concepts as amply and 
vaguely as they can be invoked—but also secure its enjoyment. Again, the State 
is both a foe and friend. Freedom of assembly, as noted above, triggers a bundle 
of rights (liberties and powers). Sometimes the State is required to step back, 
such as when we ask it to not obstruct protests, but other times the State is 
needed. By this I mean that we need the State to not only be a legal entelechy, 
such as when we demand the derogation—to name a case—of statutes or 
                                                        
226 I have taken this distinction from David G. Barnum, Freedom of Assembly and the Hostile 
Audience in Anglo-American Law, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 59 (1981). 
227 See, Plattform “Ärzte Für Das Leben,” supra note 223, at para. 34 (“While it is the duty of 
Contracting States to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful 
demonstrations to proceed peacefully, they cannot guarantee this absolutely and they have a 
wide discretion in the choice of the means to be used.”). 
228 See, for instance, the claims at issue in Edwards v. South Carolina (No 86). Edwards involved 
the criminal conviction of 187 African Americans who demonstrated against discriminatory 
laws in South Carolina in 1961. As the records of the case show, no member “of some 200 to 
300 onlookers … [did] any threatening remarks, hostile gestures, or offensive language on the 
part of any member of the crowd” (at 231). The police, however, proceeded to arrest them for 
breach of the peace. In Stankov, the ECtHR held also that  
If every probability of tension and heated exchange between opposing groups during a 
demonstration were to warrant its prohibition, society would be faced with being 
deprived of the opportunity of hearing differing views on any question which offends 
the sensitivity of the majority opinion. 
… The national authorities must display particular vigilance to ensure that national 
public opinion is not protected at the expense of the assertion of minority views, no 
matter how unpopular they may be. 
Case of Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, HUM. RTS. CASE DIG. 
739 (2001).  
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regulations too burdensome on citizens’ rights. We need it to be an actual State, 
that is, the State in its physical form, such as when we need the State to protect 
protesters from hostile audiences or, as I shall explain in the next chapter, 
when we require the State to own property open to the multifarious voices 




The positive right to protests assumes the regime remains in place. Seen in this 
light, the State is, as I have tried to show, both a friend and a foe. It is a friend 
for it is the State’s very existence what confers meaningful value—and probably 
a purpose—to the right to protest. It is a foe as it is its very regulatory powers 
what, not uncommonly, unduly restrain the scope of the right. I have argued 
that the right to protest, understood as a positive right, presents both these 
advantages and limitations. The most obvious advantage stems from the fact, 
probably an institutional and political fact, that States are not free to restrain 
the right to protests as they please. The disadvantages, on the other hand, are 
precisely within the regulatory powers of the State. Governmental regulations 
following the recent upheavals have led us to consider the disadvantages more.  
These disadvantages certainly exist. This is why in sections II and III I have 
suggested that a correct comprehension of the foundational rights involved in 
protests should lead States to opening avenues of political participation, even if 
they are non-institutional, such as in the case of protests, for this is the only 
path to secure that citizens will (i) continually engage in dialogue with the 
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State, (ii) remain loyal to their constitutional regimes, and (iii) be reluctant to 
resort to more radical, and evil to their fellow citizens, ways of manifesting 
dissent.  
Of course, all these constitutional democratic goals can be cynically read and, 
from the State viewpoint, cynically implemented. Because of this, some 
commentators show little, if any, hope in regular means of participation—
among which protests are but one means. Nonetheless, we should have more 
trust in the people themselves. As the examples from the ‘Arab Spring’ 
illustrate, the people are quite aware as to when a sensible constitutional faith 
in current regimes has been replaced by blind obedience to an imposed top-
down constitutional idolatry. Put differently, the State acting as a foe of the 
right to protests might turn out to be its own foe if it unduly and illegitimately 




THE RIGHT TO PROTEST: EXPANSIONS 
 
  I. Public forum / the right to the city 
 A. Public forum as a positive right 
  B. A positive right? 
II. Participating without a face 
A. From privacy to contextual integrity 
B. Harms to protests 
C. Surveillance 
D. Counter surveillance 




“It is clear that terror is not simply an emotional and psychological phenomenon 
but a physical one as well …” 
Paul Virilio∗ 
 
In the previous chapter I dealt with the rights that concur in giving the 
(positive) right to protests its basic form. The foundations of the rights to 
protests, namely freedom of expression and of assembly are so since these are 
                                                        
∗ THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEAR 21 (Ames Hodges trans., Semiotext(e) 2012). 
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the basic protections protesters claim to be on their side when taking the 
streets. Put differently, there is no (positive) right to protests without freedom 
of expression—which protects, among other things, the right to hold and shout 
dissenting views—and of assembly—the right we have to join others in public 
spaces. 
This chapter focuses on the expansions of the (positive) right to protest. It calls 
attention on matters that are not foundational to the right to protests, but 
certainly are of utmost importance for the constitutional protection of 
protesters. The matters this chapter deals with are expansions in a twofold 
sense. This is first because—as I argue below—they expand, in the sense that 
they strengthen, the constitutional protection of protests. Second, they are 
expansions in that they take us to consider situations that normally would go 
unnoticed—or at least are not necessarily related to the right to protest. In 
other words, this chapter argues to expand the view of the constitutional 
protection of protests and consider restrictions on the right to protest that are 
usually harder to identify and protect.  
The first section (I) goes (in a sense) back to foundations sketched in the 
previous chapter in order to question what many have called the positive face 
of the right to protests, that is, the public forum doctrine. While an important 
development in that it questions a State’s behavior as a private proprietor 
when regulating protests, it still falls short in actually procuring State’s positive 
obligations. I will take insights from what is known as the right to the city 
(mainly contributions from urban geography) to expand our views on matters 
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that seem irrelevant, but that end up being seriously inimical, to protests (i.e. 
privatization). 
In the following section (II), I analyze a socially vitalized form of privacy to 
justify the political right to participate without a face. The argument of this 
section is that protesters, even when in public, still hold a form of privacy. As I 
argue below, this is not oxymoron, for protests are still public, and therefore 
political, expressions whose arguments are presented in an open-to-all fashion. 
What this argument holds, however, is the right that individuals have—when 
they consider appropriate to do so—to prevent others, including the State, from 
knowing their actual identities or using the information States gather through 
different means in a way that affects the right to protest. This is a particularly 
pressing issue when we consider the general context in which protests take 
place. This is a context of concentrated violence in the hands of the State and its 
intelligence services, whose costs (like physical violence and unidirectional 
imposed restrictive regulations) are directly and indirectly placed on 
protesters. This is an even more urgent concern in regions, such as in Latin 
America, where institutions (like the police) have been inherited from recent 
dictatorships and that are still going under, sometimes stormy, democratic 
adjustment.1 
 
I. Public forum / the right to the city 
 
                                                        




“Whatever else a city may be,” Eric Hobsbawm wrote some years ago, “it is at 
the same time a place inhabited by a concentration of poor people and, in most 
cases, the locus of political power which affects their lives.”2 Urban spaces, in 
fact, cannot divorce the political, material and cultural conditions they have 
been erected upon, and—as Douzinas has pointed out—they “express[] the 
inequality of social relations and offer[] a site of conflict.”3 Urban spaces are the 
locations where political disagreements take physical existence and actually 
pervade every corner of urbanity—as I shall show now, they are spaces where 
different layers of conflict cohabit. 
Urban spaces, in fact, are an extension of ourselves, thus merging with the self.4 
What the city is defines, to a certain degree, what we are. As David Harvey put 
it, 
the question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from the 
question of what kind of people we want to be, what kind of social 
relations we seek, what relations to nature we cherish, what style of life 
we desire, what aesthetic values we hold.5 
The right to the city, following these definitions, is more than mere access 
rights or privileges to enjoy the city’s amenities (although these are certainly 
included), but a collective political right “to change and reinvent the city more 
                                                        
2 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Cities and Insurrections, in REVOLUTIONARIES. CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 220 
(1973). 
3 Costas Douzinas, Athens Rising, 20 EUROPEAN URBAN & REGIONAL STUDIES 134 (2012). 
4 This is brilliantly explained by Mustafa Dikeç, who shows public space performs a double, 
sometimes dialectic, function: it unites by bringing people together and, at the same time, 
separates as it permits individuals to display their own uniqueness—“as distinct from others,” 
although built and shaped in interaction with others. Mustafa Dikeç, Space as a mode of political 
thinking, 43 GEOFORUM 669, 672 (2012).  
5 DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY TO THE URBAN REVOLUTION 4 (2012). 
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after our heart’s desire.”6 We need not dig much to find conflict and 
disagreement as to the collective formation of this ‘cityness’—to use Saskia 
Sassen’s terminology.7  
This right, however, has been itself the subject of struggle and conflict as the 
notions of what public spaces are, who can access them, who is deemed as 
contributing to its definition, and who is seen as an inappropriate user have 
always been part of our political struggles and disagreements. As Don Mitchell 
argues, there are, indeed, many forms through which access to urban spaces is 
permitted/limited, including “environmental change, behavior modification, 
and stringent policing,” so as to maintain public spaces “‘public’ rather than 
hijacked by undesirable users.”8  
Experience shows, therefore, that the right to the city is also, and above all, 
exercise and practice. In fact, Mitchell contends that no matter how laws 
guarantee liberties and rights their actual protection is their practice. 
Constitutional liberties are thus always contested and “always proven in 
practice, never, that is, guaranteed in the abstract.”9 The very idea of public 
spaces and constitutional rights, in fact, “has never been guaranteed. It has only 
been won through concerted struggle, and then, after the fact, guaranteed (to 
                                                        
6 HARVEY, REBEL CITIES, supra note 5, at 4. 
7 Saskia Sassen, Does the City have a Speech?, 25 PUBLIC CULTURE 209, 214-5 (2013) (arguing 
‘cityness’ corresponds to collective and interdependent dynamics “making the public and 
making the political in urban space,” dynamics that take place beyond specific disagreements 
and conflicts). 
8 DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC SPACE 2 (2003). 
9 Id., at 4.  
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some extent) in law.”10 This is why, according to Sassen, the right to the city is 
something that is both established and always contested. This ‘cityness’ she 
talks about is conceived as 
a kind of public-making work that can disrupt established narratives and 
thereby make legible the local and the silenced even in visual orders that 
seek to cleanse urban space.11 
Of course, in this vision of the city, one where the people take an active, rather 
than a passive, role in shaping its understanding and political comprehension, 
some tolerance to danger, disorder and violence must exist.12 This city is no 
longer one where authorities summon their subjects—“an admiring and 
applauding audience,” as Hobsbawm put it13—to display the power of the State 
with big fanfare and eloquence, but one where citizens take quite an active role 
in shaping and defining publicity.  
This implies a third dimension of conflict and struggle, one that relates to the 
very definition of public space, for public places where the political is present 
are no longer those ceremonial sites previously determined by the authority 
(although these sites are certainly included).14 Rather, these public places have 
                                                        
10  Id. at 5. See also, MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM COURTS 168-9 (1999) 
(arguing that there is no need for a court vested with judicial review powers to “have a vibrant 
language of fundamental rights” that can be defended politically). 
11 Sassen, Does the City have a Speech?, supra note 7, at 214. 
12 MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY, supra note 8, at 5 (“Struggle—which is the only way that the 
right to public space can be maintained and the only way that social justice can be advanced—is 
never without danger of violence.”). 
13 HOBSBAWM, Cities and Insurrections, supra note 2, at 224. 
14 Id. at 230 (“No doubt why these sites, deemed by all as the places of power, are one of the 
preferred sites for rioting, protesting and occupying. Precisely because they express the locus 
of power they are places worth rioting against; popular protests, in fact, are aimed, at least 
transitorily, to blur the division rulers/ruled and the occupation of ceremonial sites and 
buildings shows thing are taking that turn.”). 
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expanded to encompass what Saskia Sassen calls the ‘global street.’15 What 
characterizes the global street is its difference from more European-style 
ritualized places. Whereas these latter places operate under the recognition of 
spaces where politics occurs through ritualized routines (i.e. an official parade 
where the public assumes, or is imposed, a passive mood), the global street sees 
urban public spaces as opened to political action. Thus, different from 
European piazzas and boulevards, the global street is conceived “as [any 
available open] space where new forms of the social and the political can be 
made, rather than a space for enacting ritualized routines.”16 Hence, that what 
signals the global street is neither ceremonies nor rituals, but action.17  
Finally, this action implies the coming together of people who strive to become 
political subjects, a struggle which is itself political. In this sense, public 
spaces—and spatialities in general—work as a catalyst for groups sometimes 
holding radically different views “to protest against, or wrest control from, 
those holding the reins of power.”18 By appearing publicly these groups become 
political subjects, even if they are not formally citizens;19 they become visible 
where they were previously ignored;20 they get a voice and speech where 
before they were considered pure noise;21 and they finally get the chance to 
                                                        
15 Saskia Sassen, The Global Street: Making the Political, 8 GLOBALIZATIONS 573 (2011). 
16 Id. at 574. 
17 Id. 
18 Walter Nicholls et al., Introduction: Conceptualizing the Spatialities of Social Movements, in 
SPACES OF CONTENTION. SPATIALITIES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1, 1 (Walter Nicholls et al., eds. 2013). 
19 Think, for instance, of protesting immigrants. 
20 Douzinas, Athens Rising, supra note 3, at 136-7. 
21 Dikeç, Space as a mode of political thinking, supra note 4, at 674. 
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make history.22 This is so because, as Dikeç has noted reading Arendt, the 
political space is the space of appearing.23 Or more concretely,  
the right to the city is a claim for the recognition of the urban as the 
(re)producer of social relations of power, and the right to participate in 
it.24 
In this fashion, the concept of citizenship is enhanced and pluralized. 
Citizenship is no longer univocally seen as a legal link (formal) that attaches 
one to a given territory (territorial), but a substantive and structural set of 
relations that take place in the city. It is a right that is “not inscribed on paper 
but cultivated through sharing space.”25 
A. Public forum as a positive right 
Urban spaces are political sites. They are places where our political 
disagreements take actual form and appear. As Costas Douzinas has remarked 
on recent popular uprisings, public appearances have contributed to concretize 
the public sphere from a sociological concept to a political time and space.26 
The city is political and therefore the locus of conflict.27 Public spaces are 
politically relevant since they represent the where of politics helping to 
                                                        
22 The ‘global street,’ Sassen argues, offers the powerless the space to “make history … 
[b]ecoming present, visible to each other [they] can alter the character of powerlessness.” 
Saskia Sassen, Does the City have a Speech?, supra note 7, at 213. 
23 Dikeç, Space as a mode of political thinking, supra note 4, at 671 (“The ‘who’ of the acting 
subject—her unique distinctness—is revealed to others through speech and action in a space of 
appearance—when acting, in other words, in the presence of others. This plurality, for Arendt, 
is ‘the condition sine qua non for that space of appearance which is the public realm’.”). 
24 Liette Gilbert & Mustafa Dikeç, Right to the City. Politics of citizenship, in SPACE DIFFERENCE, 
EVERYDAY LIFE: READING HENRI LEFEBVRE 250, 254 (Kanishka Goonewardena et al. eds. 2008). 
25 Id. at 258. 
26 COSTAS DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE IN THE CRISIS 165 (2013). 
27 We should not overlook that these conflicts are mediated by the very same processes that 
produce ‘civicness.’ The city, therefore, it is a space of conflict but also the place of dynamics 
that permit triaging that very same conflict in ways different from a militarized response. 
Sassen, The Global Street, supra note 15, at 575. 
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decisively, if not entirely, define which voices are heard and which voices are 
excluded.28 This is why it is so important to scrutinize who is accepted and who 
excluded, for, as the Constitutional Court of Spain notably held, in a “democratic 
society, urban spaces are not just a field to move, but also a space of 
participation.”29 
I noted above that freedom of expression is important in that it compels the 
State to refrain from encroaching on the people’s right to express themselves in 
a politically meaningful way. Freedom of assembly, I later suggested, is also 
relevant in that it strengthens the protection afforded to protests as States have 
the duty not to block public meetings. I also noted these freedoms involve 
certain positive duties such as removing legal obstacles and protecting 
protesters from hostile audiences. Are States also subject to more stringent 
positive duties implying opening spaces?  
To effectively protest, that is to politically appear having a voice on crucial 
political matters, the right to the city requires State. It actually requires the 
State to own property common to all and which is, as it has been the aspiration 
of many protesters, open to all voices and inputs. Because the right to the city 
mostly implies positive duties I will look at this issue in more detail. I will also 
now consider freedom of expression and of assembly in unison to see how they 
strengthen the right to protest.  
                                                        
28 Don Mitchell & Lynn Staeheli, Permitting Protest: Parsing the Fine Geography of Dissent in 
America, 29 INTL’ J. URBAN & REGIONAL RESEARCH 796, 798 (2005). 




Positive duties, roughly put, imply that the State must not only refrain from 
censoring or discriminating speech, but also that it is under the obligation of 
providing “opportunities or facilities for speech.”30 In the words of Robert 
Alexy, the State is under the duty of positive acts when it is asked to provide 
factual acts or to create legal positions to satisfy rights.31 It is little wonder that 
political theories interested in deepening democratic self-government have 
argued in favor of these enlarged governmental duties.32 But what happens 
from a legal viewpoint? 
The answer is debatable and depends to a large extent on the specific 
constitutional context. This does not prevent us from some initial 
considerations. Frederick Schauer, for instance, thinks freedom of expression 
only triggers negative duties.33 It is a ‘negative liberty’ established precisely 
against interference.34 Positive obligations, he claims, would cause differences 
in treatment by favoring the expressive activities of some groups to the 
prejudice of others—prejudices that include the interference with others’ 
rights.35 In “each instance the decision to enhance the actual ability of one 
individual or entity to communicate,” Schauer argues persuasively, “will at the 
                                                        
30 ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 101 (2007 2nd ed.).  
31 ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 126-7 (Julian Rivers trans., 2010).. It is 
worth noticing that constitutionally protected liberties, such as freedom of expression, can be 
positively protected by the State when combined with a right to a positive act (149). Once 
again, the proper understanding of constitutional rights arises once we consider a right as a 
bundle of constitutional rights positions. 
32 NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED. OPINION, TRUTH, AND THE PEOPLE 65 (2014); PHILIP 
PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 201-2 (2012). 
33 FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 129 (1982). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 125-8.  
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same time create a legal restriction” on others.36 The decision regarding whom 
to favor with positive rights involves “the government in the process of 
selecting and distinguishing.”37 
Eric Barendt, on the contrary, thinks freedom of speech cannot be considered in 
solitude, rather in context. Barendt argues that free speech must honor 
equality, particularly when dealing with the path our polity may take.  
In constitutional schemes that also recognize a right to equality, this is a 
somewhat unavoidable path. Positive obligations are particularly relevant 
where there is the risk of public discourse being captured by some voices (“the 
rich and powerful,” Barendt writes,38 and “television networks and a number of 
large newspapers and magazines,” Fiss warned some years ago),39 therefore 
disgracing the equal right to participate.40 Freedom of expression and the right 
to assembly which are understood as political rights, and thus as (part of) our 
equal share in the making of the laws, cannot be regarded as “merely ‘negative’ 
rights.”41 In fact, these political rights require, just as any other right,  
the institution and operation of administrative systems … involve 
manpower and resources … presuppose a relatively stable and well-
organized society; and … require governments and government officials 
                                                        
36 Id. at 128. But see, OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996). (arguing that the exercise of 
freedom of speech itself might imply silencing others). 
37 Id. 
38 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 30, at 106. 
39 Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARVARD L. REV. 781, 787 (1987). 
40 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 30, at 106. 
41 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 232-3 (1999). 
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to do certain things under certain conditions, not merely refrain from 
doing certain things.42 
This approach is also reconciled with that of the international human rights 
law, where the positive obligation to protect rights is not an absolute. This 
means that positive obligations are instead understood as an ‘obligation of 
means.’43 Authorities are bound to take reasonable and appropriate steps to 
ensure rights and are granted ample margin to choose the means they deem 
necessary in doing so.44 
The mandate is directed at authorities. This is why positive duties should not 
necessarily be seen as speaking exclusively to courts—which have been 
reluctant to uphold wide constitutional positive rights45—but to every 
governmental avenue. In other words, (constitutional) courts might at times 
interpret the constitution as requiring positive duties, and so may legislatures 
when passing access rights.46 “The legal form in which the right is satisfied,” 
Alexy has claimed, “is quite irrelevant.”47 
Positive obligations have proven particularly relevant for social protests. As 
Barendt argues, insisting on the need of taking an egalitarian approach, “the 
poor and oppressed can only express their opinions through demonstrations 
                                                        
42 Id. at 233-4. See also, STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999) (arguing the distinction between negative—as noninterference—and 
positive rights—as welfare rights—is futile as all rights are positive). 
43 OLIVER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 414 (2011 repr.) 
44 Id. 
45 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Expression, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 891, 897 (Michael Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds. 2012). 
46 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 30, at 103. 
47 ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 126. 
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on the streets, and in meetings held in premises they do not own.”48 In 
considering these positive obligations, just as Barendt does,49 it is useful to 
notice how freedom of speech merges with the right to assembly.50 The result is 
what has become to be known as the public forum doctrine. However, as the 
State is always a friend and foe, I want to show that the public forum doctrine is 
both a legal translation and (at the same time) a disfiguration of the right to the 
city. 
Do the people have a right to use government property, such as streets, as a 
forum and not as a passageway? Do the people have the right to gather in parks 
in order to present their political views, instead of doing so just for leisure?51 
The Supreme Court of the United States answered affirmatively. In Hague, it 
held the government cannot treat State-owned property as if it had a private 
owner; they must accept the burdens of democratic participation.52  
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of 
                                                        
48 BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 30, at 106. 
49 Id. at 270 
50 Recall that in the previous chapter I noted that the Human Rights Council showed its doubts 
as to whether different legislations related to different rights strengthen or diminish the 
protection of protests. I would tentatively say that if we consider that this merging of rights lays 
positive duties to the State, then there is no doubt the right to protest ends up being reinforced. 
However, as it is the case with every positive (as opposed to natural) regulation, there are 
limits as well (what above were described as TPM regulations). 
51 Harry Kalven, Jr., The concept of the public forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12 
(1965). 
52 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
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the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the 
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.53 
The State, in other words, is not like any individual proprietor, rather someone 
who holds property in trust from the people themselves.54 As the Supreme 
Court of Canada put it back in 1991, an absolutist approach to State-owned 
property would “fail[] to take into account that the freedom of expression cannot 
be exercised in a vacuum and that it necessarily implies the use of physical space 
in order to meet its underlying objectives.”55  
That access to public spaces is beneficial as expression should not be hard to 
understand. For one, protesters would be permitted to obtain access to a large 
array of people. This allows them to amplify their message by reaching audiences 
who may not be aware of the topics challengers are presenting. They may also 
succeed in changing the views of those in the audience who do know the issues at 
hand.56 For another, access to public spaces proves particularly crucial for certain 
specific claims; when protesters want the State to listen—as is the case in most 
protests—there are certain specific buildings that are worth targeting, either 
because of their symbolic value or because those are the places where public 
authorities actually operate (i.e. legislatures).57 
                                                        
53 Id. at 515. 
54 However, it should be noted that not all public property is deemed to be public forum and 
therefore subject to the very same constitutional standard. Accordingly, the government’s 
ability to regulate activities depends on the kind of property we are talking about. The 
government has more latitude to regulate activities taking place in public property not 
considered to be public forum. See, ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS. DEMOCRACY, 
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 199, 208-11 (1995). 
55 Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139, at 155.  
56 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 26 (2007). 
57 Id. at 26-7. 
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The right to use public property as a forum is, of course, not absolute. As soon as 
the Court in Hague held streets and public places could be used for 
“communicating thought between citizens and discussing public questions,” it 
qualified this right:  
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks 
for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in 
the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised 
in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in 
consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of 
regulation, be abridged or denied.58 
As Kalven put it some time ago, public forum requires accommodation of the 
conflicting interests,59 for streets are not only meeting places, but they “are also 
dedicated to other uses, such as travel.”60 This conflict of interests requires “to 
work out mutually satisfactory arrangements”61 that—as seen before—target 
not the content of speech, but the timing of the activity.62 
B. A positive right? 
The public forum doctrine is a pretty widespread concept,63 despite its limited 
benefit in some regions.64 It is also mainly a legal category. Perhaps this is the 
                                                        
58 Hague, at 515-6. 
59 Kalven, The concept of the public forum, supra note 51, at 26. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 27. 
62 Id. See also, BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 30, at 281. 
63 See, Barendt, Freedom of Expression, supra note 45, at 897-8 (giving a general account of the 
doctrine related to access to State-owned places); RICHARD MOON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 148-51 (2000) (explaining how Canada has given shape to 
its own version of the public forum doctrine). 
64 ¿ES LEGÍTIMA LA CRIMINALIZACIÓN DE LA PROTESTA SOCIAL? DERECHO PENAL Y LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN 
EN AMÉRICA LATINA [IS IT LEGITIMATE TO CRIMINALIZE SOCIAL PROTEST? CRIMINAL LAW AND FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION IN LATIN AMERICA] (Eduardo Bertoni comp. 2010) (reviewing the discretionary, 
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reason why it falls short in answering two crucial critiques. One shows the 
public forum doctrine itself has built in the concept of limitations by authority. 
The other shows the public forum doctrine is unable to deal with the effects of 
legal regulations on dissenting speech, the effects being the unavoidable 
restriction on dissenting speech, regardless if that restriction was not the 
purpose the authority sought. 
First, there are numerous voices that have warned about the pernicious effect 
of the public forum doctrine in terms of the doctrine itself.65 Whereas it 
accepted new forms of protected expressions such as picketing and protests, it 
is also true that this has come at the cost of granting the authority enormous 
powers to regulate dissenting speech. The trick, Mitchell has argued, is not 
targeting speech (the what), but where it is said.66 The public forum doctrine 
assumes that political speech is in fact to be subordinated to “the general 
comfort and convenience.”67 By tracing the history of the public forum doctrine 
in the United States, Don Mitchell argues access to public space has indeed 
always been subjected, if not directly constrained, by a certain understanding 
                                                                                                                                                            
selective and, at times, unlimited resort to criminal law in Latin American countries to deal with 
social protests). 
65 Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 585 (2009) (“while 
cases involving these related doctrines frequently rehearse the words of Justice Roberts in 
Hague v. CIO that streets from ‘time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions,’
 
substantively, they 
all take as undisputed the correctness of the view that permit requirements are constitutionally 
permissible within certain parameters.”).  
66 Don Mitchell, The Liberalization of Free Speech: Or, How Protest in Public Space is Silenced, in 
SPACES OF CONTENTION, supra note 18, at 47. See also, Mitchell & Staeheli, Permitting Protest, supra 
note 28, at 801 (noting public forum doctrine creates broad legal spaces for regulating, and 
even prohibiting, speech and assembly on public property). 
67 Mitchell, The Liberalization of Free Speech supra note 66, at 50-1. 
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of appropriate behavior.68 This is what he calls the ‘liberalization’ of speech: the 
assumption that there is only one way in which political speech can be put 
forward. As he puts it, public forum accepts dissenting ideas, but 
these ideas, however, have to stand or fall on their own merits as they 
enter into competition with other ideas; the better ideas win, but only by 
being tested against less worthy ideas. [If] … speech is forced into the 
public arena, or if violence accompanies that speech, it can and must be 
regulated.69 
Although rejection of violence as protected speech is a commonplace in 
freedom of expression doctrines, Mitchell warns about the very fashion in 
which violence has been determined over the years. In the early 1900s, for 
instance, merely picketing or assembling was automatically seen as an act of 
violence—or an act that would undoubtedly lead to violence.70 This is so, as 
András Sajó has argued in the context of constitutional understandings and 
institutions, because assumptions about what constitutes violence or what 
actions risk triggering violence are “culturally framed.”71 In fact, it is not hard to 
see that there are specific forms of collective behavior that receive privileged 
treatment by authority. Sajó mentions the behaviors of “[v]oting, organized 
manifestations of religion or other election-related activities,” which are 
“nearly unconditionally free, although an equal level of irrationality should 
                                                        
68 Don Mitchell, Political violence, order, and the legal construction of public space: power and the 
public forum doctrine, 17 URBAN GEOGRAPHY 152 (1996).  
69 Id. at 153. 
70 Id. 155-60.  
71 ANDRÁS SAJÓ, CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS 259 (2011). 
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have made them equally suspect.”72 The truth is that preoccupations arise not 
with gatherings and demonstrations themselves, but with a certain kind of 
gathering or demonstration (normally those seen as problematic in light of 
prevailing social, cultural, political, and thus legal constructions).73 
This sheds light on another built-in limitation of the public forum doctrine, for 
the very canonical formula according to which we are to determine what spaces 
are public forums shows a history of exclusion and hegemonic determination of 
what is permitted. Recall that in Hague public forums were defined as those 
places that “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, 
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”74 Although they 
are called public spaces, experience shows that many of these sites have been 
envisioned upon the basis of exclusion. In other words, experience shows that 
there are few spaces that have ‘always’ been used by citizens to gather and 
communicate political ideas.75 There are few public spaces that have not been 
built upon some form of exclusion,76 an exclusion of what authorities have 
deemed undesirable, thus shrinking the concept and content of rights.77 In 
other words, we are not talking here of spaces that have been immemorially 
used as political fora by all citizens, but—just as only certain displays of 
                                                        
72 Id. at 247. 
73 Id., at 247. 
74 Supra note 52. 
75 Don Mitchell, Introduction: Public Space and the City, 17 URBAN GEOGRAPHY 127, 127 (1996).  
76 Id. (pointing to feminist arguments, Mitchell argues that “idealized public spaces such as the 
agora … are not and never have been any truly open public spaces where all may freely 
gather.”). 
77 MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY, supra note 8, at 8-9 
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collective action were deemed permitted—of places where only some have 
been allowed to appear.  
The second critique of the public forum doctrine relates to the effects of legal 
regulations. The public forum doctrine has been praised as it prohibits 
governments from limiting dissenting speech based on content or viewpoints, 
and also as it invites dissenters to determine, along with their governmental 
counterparts, the conditions of protests. However, we should not overlook the 
limiting effect on speech, particularly on dissenting speech, that the public 
forum doctrine has not impeded—or, as Mitchell has put it, that it has 
concealed.78 Regulations of places, in other words, have a large and quite 
uneven impact on participatory rights by preventing certain speech from being 
disseminated.  
As noted before, TPM regulations leave ample room for States to justify 
limitations without having to disclose their actual intentions. As John H. Ely put 
it some time ago, “the state obviously can move, and often does, ‘simply’ to 
control the time, place, and manner of communication out of concern for the 
likely effect of the communication on its audience.”79 So the first question is as 
follows: who defines what the public forum is?  
Whereas the definition of public forum has been regularly seen as a 
governmental decision, a sort of a top-down decision protesters have no 
alternative but to abide, recent approaches stress the fact TPM regulations 
                                                        
78 Mitchell, Political violence, supra note 68, at 169-71 (arguing that, although courts have 
moved from targeting speech to target the places where it is said, the issue and effects remain 
the same: “exclusion in the name of social order”). 
79 John H. Ely, Flag Desecretation: A case study in the roles of categorization and balancing in 
First Amendment analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1498 (1975). 
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open the space to negotiate places and times of protests.80 This means that both 
the State and citizens engage in determining the scope of rights exercise 
(normally limiting rights). However, as some have argued, it is not at all 
obvious that these restrictions are in fact defined in a negotiated- or consent-
based manner. Moreover, security concerns (there will always be an excuse for 
this) have swung the pendulum back to top-down impositions of restrictions. In 
fact, as Tabatha Abu El-Haj has argued, the model of TPM regulations became 
accepted under the crucial (usually hidden, overlooked or simply ignored) 
assumption that it is the State who defines public forum at will, just like any 
other private proprietor.81 Places and times for dissent are thus exactly 
determined, perhaps with the intention of silencing dissent, perhaps not, but in 
any case incorporating dissent into “the liberal democratic state.”82 Therefore, 
political dissent, when not chilled,83 is strictly shaped and controlled.84  
Places of protests (public fora) are determined in a top-down fashion by a State 
that imposes the concept of order as the State sees it. There are further reasons 
that explain why TPM regulations have an uneven impact. First, not everyone 
resorts to social protests. As Mitchell has argued, there is a striking similarity 
                                                        
80 John D. McCarthy & Clarck McPhail, the Institutionalization of Protest in the United States, in 
THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SOCIETY: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS FOR A NEW CENTURY 83, 83-4 (David S. Meyer 
& Sidney Tarrow eds., 1998) 
81 “For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or 
public park,” Holmes wrote back in 1895, “is no more an infringement of the rights of a member 
of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When no 
proprietary rights interfere, the Legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the 
public place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the lesser step of 
limiting the public use to certain purposes.” This famous passage from Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
although seriously diminished by subsequent decisions, remains relevant, Abu El-Haj contends. 
Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, supra note 65, at 583-4. 
82 Mitchell & Staeheli, Permitting Protest, supra note 28, at 797. 
83 PETER DAUVERGNE & GENEVIEVE LEBARON, PROTEST INC. THE CORPORATIZATION OF ACTIVISM 65-74 
(2014) 
84 Mitchell & Staeheli, Permitting Protest, supra note 28, at 797. 
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between the economic metaphors utilized by the public forum doctrine 
(marketplace of ideas, free trade of ideas, and so on) and the very same 
abstraction that economic theories need to be sound, for, just as liberal 
formulations on free access to market and equal bargaining power—Mitchell 
insists—, here too power relations of society have been completely ignored.85 
Recalling Justice Brennan’s words, Mitchell adds, 
Those who can communicate through ordinary channels of modern 
discourse—because they controlled or could afford access to the 
media—have little need for popular demonstrations in the street.86 
Despite the uneven impact TPM regulations have, most constitutional systems 
see consequences on speech and mobilizations as accepted side effects of 
regulations. Consider the case of occupiers in Calgary against whom the city 
issued an injunction ordering them to remove all the tents and structures they 
had kept on the Olympic Plaza.87 The Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta 
reviewed whether there were any extraordinary circumstances (i.e. violation of 
Charter rights) which could prevent the city from pursuing its order. 
Interestingly enough, the city of Calgary acknowledged that the Occupy Calgary 
encampment and its different city occupations are “expressive activities.”88 
                                                        
85 Mitchell, Political violence, supra note 68, at 170.  
86 Id. A recent research conducted throughout Latin America in 2009-10, and promoted by the 
UNDP, shows that political social conflicts in the region happen against a background of 
pervading inequality. One of the main conclusions of the report is that the larger the social gaps 
are, the more, and more radicalized, protests occur. LA PROTESTA SOCIAL EN AMÉRICA LATINA 
[SOCIAL PROTEST IN LATIN AMERICA] 15-7; 23-4. (Fernando Calderón coord., 2012). The report also 
shows that a high percentage of those protesting are those excluded from regular politics—
either deliberately or simply because there is a lack of institutional channels of participation, 
therefore reproducing historical, cultural and social patterns of domination (Id. at 131-5). 
87 I am taking the issues from Calgary (City) v. Bullock (Occupy Calgary), 2011 ABQB 764, at para 
27. 
88 Id. at para 31. 
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Moreover, it actually “conceded that the effect of injunctive relief requiring the 
dismantling of the encampment will be to restrict the Respondent’s [occupiers] 
expression.”89 While this left little room for the court to maneuver, it did not 
prove to be conclusive. In fact, the court found restrictions on the uses of parks 
to be reasonable and proportional, and therefore constitutional.90  
This debate replicates the discussion concerning the way governments resort 
to neutral regulations—before reviewed. As long as these regulations are 
content-neutral, narrowly tailored and so on, restrictions of time, place and 
manner will be deemed constitutional no matter their unequal impact. The 
problem, as I am arguing here, is that this carapace of neutral regulations hides 
the displacement of dissent. Permit systems, covered under mutually-agreed 
conditions for protesting, in fact unleash outcomes similar to those of neutral-
based regulations, silencing dissent voices while at the same time “giving the 
appearance that public space is politically inclusive.”91 Put another way, as 
Mitchell has suggested, the public forum doctrine helps to guarantee “the right 
to speak” in public spaces but says little, if anything, on “the question of 
effective access to that forum by those who need to speak in the street.”92 The 
public forum doctrine, and its acceptance of allegedly neutral regulations, ends 
up being a law that treats everyone in the same fashion, thus “reinforc[ing] 
unjust social relations.”93  
                                                        
89 Id. 
90 Id. at paras 33-45 (reasoning restrictions were i. prescribed by law; ii. reasonable and 
demonstrably justified; iii. pursuant of an important governmental objective; and, iv. 
proportional). In a very similar sense see, Batty et al. v. City of Toronto, 2011 ONSC 6862. 
91 Mitchell & Staeheli, Permitting Protest, supra note 28, at 798. 
92 Mitchell, Political violence, supra note 68, at 171 (emphasis in the original). 
93 Id. Lenin magnificently emphasize this, although with a different purpose: 
191 
 
This is why, as I argued before with neutral regulations of speech, we should 
also consider contexts more carefully.94 This would allow us to determine 
whether those subject to TPM restrictions are always the same unpopular 
groups whose voices are also despised in institutional avenues. The specific 
political milieu in which these restrictions are being issued and applied, for 
instance, may be, despite formal neutrality, very telling of what the specific 
governmental targets are.  
It is public forum neutrality, that is, public forum doctrine’s refusal to consider 
the specific social and political conditions of those who protest, what also 
explains the doctrine’s shortcomings before subtler—although highly 
documented—forms of limiting dissenting speech such as privatizations. 
Limitations here work in a double fashion: first, by shrinking public forums 
and, second, by refusing to grant protest rights in those private spaces. 
It is not hard to see how privatization of what was before State-owned property 
limits political spaces.95 This privatization includes, among others, the 
reconstruction and fencing of parks and large urban areas, and the 
                                                                                                                                                            
If we look more closely to the mechanism of capitalist democracy, we shall see 
everywhere … in the real obstacles to the right of assembly (public buildings are not for 
beggars!) …  we shall see restriction after restriction. 
These restrictions, exclusions, exceptions, obstacles for the poor, seem petty, especially 
in the eyes of anyone who has never known want himself and never been in close 
contact with the oppressed classes in their mass life … but the sum total of these 
restrictions excludes and shoves out the poor from politics, from active participation in 
democracy. 
V. I. LENIN, THE STATE AND THE REVOLUTION 79 (Robert Service trans., Penguin Classics 1992) 
(1918). 
94 See, Timothy Zick, Property, Place, and Public Discourse, 21 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 173, 208-9 
(2006) (“Given the constitutional recognition of place, courts should far more carefully 
consider the impact that spatial regulations have on opportunities for public discourse.”). 
95 I am talking here of private property sensu stricto. Others have suggested that certain 
regulations upon public spaces create a form of privatization without altering property 
regimes. This may occur by securing permits which allow users (say those in a political rally) to 
expel the opposition. Kevin Francis O’Neill, Privatizing public forums to eliminate dissent, 5 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 201 (2006-2007). 
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privatization of services and security of those services, such as the installation 
of thousands of surveillance cameras in train stations. “Whole public spaces,” as 
Mitchell notes, are “closed off for much of the day, locked tight against 
unwanted users.”96 Downtowns, where people used to gather, have 
“increasingly become anomalies in a landscape cluttered with suburban 
shopping and strip malls,” tells McLeod,97 while the public spaces that remain 
“are often designed to facilitate commerce and recreation, rather than 
expression.”98 In fact, privatizations and urban planning trends are far from 
being unconscious of the effects sought on dissent.99 New property regimes, 
therefore, dictate where political speech is tolerated and who is welcomed in 
these new spaces.100  
If public forum is to operate properly as a positive right, then governments 
could be legally held accountable for the way they have contributed to reduce, 
or directly eliminate, public spaces. This requires, as Timothy Zick has claimed, 
to strongly argue for rights to a place decoupled from property, a truly 
independent constitutional concept.101 This means considering a place in 
regards to its impact and importance on public discourse, rather than to being a 
(physical) thing (res).102 Place, here, rather than a “background for expressive 
                                                        
96 MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY, supra note 8, at 2. 
97 KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION®: RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION IN THE AGE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 226 (2007). 
98 Zick, Property, Place, and Public Discourse, supra note 94, at 173 (2006). 
99 John Michael Roberts, Public Spaces of Dissent, 2 SOCIOLOGY COMPASS 654, 663-6 (2008) 
(explaining how urban developers ‘integrate’ citizens into new solutions in order to pre-empt 
dissent, but also how the ‘publicness’ of public spaces is altered “by either opening up or 
shutting down access to the public space in question.”). 
100 Mitchell, The Liberalization of Free Speech, supra note 66, at 63-4. 
101 Zick, Property, Place, and Public Discourse, supra note 94, at 204, 209. 
102 Id. at 210. 
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activity … is constitutionally bound to expression.”103 However, courts and the 
history of Western constitutional thought seem unprepared to displace 
property to such a ‘secondary’ position.104 
Another alternative to overcome the reduction of public space could be 
accepting the ‘sovereignty’ of the State to dispose of its property at will and 
having courts recognize the right to protest in these new public fora. In fact, the 
focus of the people—forced by circumstances—has also switched from the 
traditional public forum to these new, although privatized, city centers (such as 
malls, stadiums, concert halls, etc.) It is in these places that attention can be 
called. However, courts have not gone as far as to recognize rights to protest in 
these forums—which illustrates the second limitation aforementioned.  
According to McCarthy and McPhail, vague public forum standards have 
become an open invitation to narrow the protection of the right to protest.105 
These standards have also proven futile before the privatization of traditional 
places of public gathering which are now in the hands of private corporations 
or individuals, thus falling within a fourth category where free public transit is 
discretionarily restricted (it is restricted at the owner’s will).106 This has been 
                                                        
103 Id. 
104 Where secondary here stands for a value/right as important as that it has to be balanced 
against. See, JEREMY WALDRON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE MEASURE OF PROPERTY (2012) (arguing 
property rights, although relevant and foundational of liberal autonomy, are but one of the 
interests a proper constitutional analysis should consider). 
105 John McCarthy & Clark McPhail, Places of protest: the public forum in principle and practice, 
11 MOBILIZATION: AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY 229, 229-30 (2006). 
106 As of today, this is how the scheme of forums looks: 
Traditional public fora: where, as noted, content-neutral restrictions might be imposed 
if they “aim at the noncommunicative impact of speech … [and are] justified only under 
the strictest scrutiny;” 
Limited public fora: public property that the government has opened for expressive 




reflected in the jurisprudence of “the [United States Supreme] court [that] has 
tended to place these newer ‘limited public spaces’ further away from the 
traditional public fora, hence allowing greater restrictions to be placed upon 
protest in the newer places.”107 As noted above, property regimes have 
outbalanced political participation. 
When considering its limitations public forum becomes, despite what is usually 
stated, a doctrine of negative rights. A doctrine that, echoing liberal economic 
metaphors, is aimed at regulating State intervention but not so much—if at 
all—a doctrine of positive rights seeking to “assur[e] that marginalized groups 
can be heard …”.108  Although the public forum doctrine has proven relevant in 
securing the right to protest, it has to be taken cautiously and, in the end, 
contended from within. 
To prevent assemblies and protests from becoming ritualized events under 
current conditions,109 where spaces of political participation are determined by 
authorities, “dissent can only be effective when it is illegal.”110 On the one hand, 
it is important to acknowledge that keeping public spaces open up for 
contestation allows to have and bring different voices in in order to shape and 
                                                                                                                                                            
Nonpublic fora: where restrictions only need to be reasonable; 
Private property: excluded from right to protest. 
Id. at 230-1. Others have shown that the impact of privatization reaches even individual acts of 
expression, including wearing t-shirts with messages that the owners of these ‘new public 
places’ consider inappropriate—including the unauthorized distribution of First Amendment 
fliers. MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION®, supra note 97, at 227-8. 
107 Id. at 231. 
108 Mitchell, Political violence, supra note 68, at 170. 
109 Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right to Assembly, supra note 65, at 546-7. 
110 Mitchell, The Liberalization of Free Speech supra note 66, at 47. See also, but labeling it as 
civil disobedience, McCarthy & McPhail, Places of protest, supra note 105, at 230 (“The evolution 
of the public forum doctrine, then, while conceived in theory to protect the rights of dissidents 
to effectively voice their views, has, in practice begun to nudge them toward more civilly 
disobedient tactics simply to be heard.”). 
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define our constitutional commitments.111 This is what transforms 
constitutions into actual commitments instead of being pure forceful 
impositions ready to fall into pieces at the very first actual challenge. On the 
other hand, it is also important to notice that protests are not only to be 
understood narrowly in the sense that the only permitted protests are those 
which police orders allow, but also those that transcend those limits in order to 
actualize equality in the public space.112  
Some court has taken a step forward in this light. The Audiencia Nacional of 
Spain has recently passed a decision on protests held before the doors of the 
Catalonia Parlament. While it insisted on the importance of linking protests to 
the political speech of silenced and displaced voices (something I highlighted in 
the previous chapter), it also reasoned—in light of Mitchell’s ideas—that in a 
context of limited expression and access to public space, “mostly controlled by 
the private media corporations,” 
it cannot be concluded but accepting a certain excess in the exercise of 
freedoms of expression and assembly to grant protests any minimum 
effectiveness and critique character.113 
This is the sense of illegality and excess Mitchell is talking about: a sense of 
illegality, although of constitutionality; a sense in which these very acts of 
                                                        
111 As lawyers, Timothy Zick has argued, we should not entertain in urban, environmental or 
city planning, but we “must ask whether our legal doctrines of place can accommodate public 
discourse given the spatial environment, the places, that we actually have. And if they cannot,” 
which seems to be the case, as shown above, “we must consider what changes might be made to 
preserve the exercise of fundamental public speech rights.” Zick, Property, Place and Public 
Discourse, supra note 94, at 176.  
112 Dikeç, Space as a mode of political thinking, supra note 4, at 674.  
113 Judgment of Jul. 7th, 2014, Audiencia Nacional, Sentencia No 31/2014, at 57-8 (my 
translations). The Tribunal Supremo would later revoke this decision (Judgment of Mar. 17th, 
2015, Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal, Sentencia No 161/2015). 
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dissidence can take law-making institutions to rethink and reconceptualize the 
way constitutional rights are to be understood in order to include novel forms 
of protests.114 This is, in fact, the history of law itself—the very act of protest 
once was illegal.115 Furthermore, this is not an illegality or unruly behavior 
aimed at destabilizing the State, rather behavior meant to contest and 
(re)shape the fashion in which political liberties are to be understood. As 
Mitchell claimed, rights can only be secured through exercise.116 
 
II. Participating without a face117 
 
Social protests take place in the public sphere. In its physical sense—and 
certainly in a wider understanding as well—this is a place States watch 24/7. 
Surveillance, however, meets with resistance. The image of protesters covering 
their faces, whether with a hood, a scarf, a balaclava or, more recently, with 
zombie or Guy Fawkes masks the ‘Occupy’ movement popularized, is common 
in protests. While this practice might be justified on the grounds that masks 
themselves are expressive means that help protesters to portray their claims—
as I shall show below, an argument which may or may not seduce courts—or 
                                                        
114 This is possible, as Zick argues, because public expressive places are not objective 
immutable governmental allocations, but are contingent, dynamic and depending, in the last 
instance, on the meaning speakers and listeners—a mixture of layperson, authorities, legal 
regulations, and contestation of those regulations—impress on them. Zick, Property, Place, and 
Public Discourse, supra note 94, at 
115 Mitchell, Political violence, supra note 68, at 157. 
116 MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY, supra note 8, at 4-5. 
117 I would like to thank my colleague Rodolfo Figueroa who provided insightful critiques—by 
posing the right questions—to a previous draft of this section. 
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simply out of some specific circumstances,118 I want to insist on a different, yet 
complementary, path. This path requires considering a socially vitalized form of 
privacy. 
According to the view I will explain, there is a political right to participate in 
public without a face; citizens have the prerogative to demand the State refrain 
from interfering—in ways subtler than, say, prohibiting assemblies—with the 
right to protest. This argument has its basis in privacy protection, but it also 
requires us to move forward to consider the social and political dimension of 
informational privacy. Informational privacy alludes to portions of information 
citizens deem sensible to share in certain contexts (their face when working) 
but not in others (their face when protesting). In other words, this view 
requires us to move from considering privacy, along with its implications, an 
individual right to a societal value. 
I explain this argument in more detail in the first section (A) and consider how 
it bears specific consequences in helping us to expand our understanding of 
protests in the second (B). I then analyze the impact and possible effects this 
revitalized conception of privacy has on three practices that usually affect the 
right to protest: governmental surveillance, counter surveillance, and the 
prohibition of using masks when in public. I will argue that, considering the 
social dimensions of informational privacy, States (C) should be restricted in 
                                                        
118 For instance, when members of the Russian music band Pussy Riot were arrested under 
charges of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred, protesters who complained about their 
persecution gathered in front of the Russian Consulate in New York. They wore “colored 
balaclavas” (as The New York Times reported) to resemble those worn by the members of the 
band. In any case, they were arrested and charged with a law dating from 1845 that prohibits 
“three or more people to wear masks in public.” Colin Moynihan, Law Banning Masks at Protests 
is to be Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2012, at A18. 
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using information gathered through surveillance; (D) are to accept counter 
surveillance as a means citizens have to scrutinize their actions and enforce 
their right to participate; and (E) must refrain from banning challengers from 
wearing masks during protests. 
A. From privacy to contextual integrity 
In their very much-quoted piece Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued 
privacy was better understood (and legally protected) as “a more general right 
of the individual to be left alone … of an inviolate personality.”119 This is a right, 
they argued, “as against the world.”120 For this reason the right ceased as soon 
as the individual publicized the facts or consented to their publication.121 The 
very acts of the person also speak for the person. Whereas there are those—to 
insist with Warren and Brandeis—who have “in varying degrees … renounced 
the right to live their lives screened from public observation,”122 there are 
others who live exactly in the opposite way. 
Is it not then an oxymoron to claim privacy in public spaces? Not really. Privacy 
has long ceased to be a right attached to space; rather, it has become a matter of 
control of information and expectations.123 Privacy, therefore, is no longer 
confined to the intimate and personal spheres, but also encompasses 
                                                        
119 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890-1891). 
120 Id. at 213. 
121 Id. at 218. 
122 Id. at 215. 
123 In fact, it has been argued that the opposite is true; public space is no longer attached to the 
State (in the formal sense) and therefore is not spatialized. Quite the contrary, public space is 
spatially undifferentiated today. Neil Smith & Setha Low, Introduction: The Imperative of Public 
Space, in THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPACE 1, 5 (Setha Low & Neil Smith eds., 2006). 
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information (available about us) in the public realm.124 This is so because 
“privacy norms are not necessarily derivable from setting but can come 
prior.”125 As Julie Cohen has convincingly argued against what she calls the 
liberal approach to privacy, the self is culturally and socially situated, and 
therefore communally and communicatively shaped.126 While places are 
elements that help frame these contexts, they are not the only, nor even the 
most important, elements, as has been correctly suggested. This is so because 
our lives occur in and we do things in places, and our lives also take place 
within certain “politics, convention[s], and cultural expectation[s].”127 
Privacy, thus, cuts across a universe of overlapping realms where the (simple) 
private/public distinction cannot automatically account for what is 
private/public. According to Nissenbaum, 
We do not have a dichotomy of two realms but a panoply of realms; 
something considered public in relation to one realm may be private in 
relation to another …128 
In fact, the texture of people’s lives shows we “cross[] dichotomies … move[] 
about, into, and out of a plurality of distinct realms.”129 What best accounts for 
privacy therefore is this multiplicity of realms, relations, and norms governing 
roles, expectations, behaviors, and limits within.130 Precisely because privacy 
“enabl[es] individuals to maintain contextual integrity,” that is, distinct 
                                                        
124 Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of Information 
Technology, ETHICS & BEHAVIOR 207, 212 (1997). 
125 Id. at 214. 
126 Julie E. Cohen, What privacy is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905-08 (2013). 
127 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASHINGTON L. REV. 119, 137 (2004). 
128 Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public, supra note 124, at 215. 
129 Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 127, at 137. 
130 Id. at 138. 
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relationships with different people, information we deem “appropriate in the 
context of one relationship may not be appropriate in another.”131  
Contextual integrity (and not the spatial focus) better explains how privacy 
contributes to our identity and individuality132—and it also helps us 
understand why privacy is rooted in public relations rather than in solitude and 
against the world. Actually, privacy is the “relief from a range of kinds of social 
friction.”133 In fact, privacy permits the interplay between selfhood and social 
shaping—rendering these two concepts mutually reinforcing.134 This is 
possible thanks to privacy’s dynamism, for privacy is not a fixed concept that 
takes place in just one realm, but “an interest in breathing room to engage in 
socially situated processes of boundary management.”135 When we lack 
privacy, we lack this valve that allows the autonomous, although not totally 
isolated, definition of the self. Privacy, thus seen, ensures that “the development 
of subjectivity and the development of communal values do not proceed in 
lockstep.”136  
This approach allows to understand privacy beyond its individual right 
carapace and to highlight its other benefits. In other words, this permits 
comprehending the value of privacy as a right of the citizen. We care about 
protecting privacy not solely, if at all, because it is an individual right, but 
because harms on privacy “affect the nature of society and impede individual 
                                                        
131 Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public, supra note 124, at 216. 
132 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 34 (1967).  
133 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA L. REV. 477, 484 
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activities that contribute to the greater social good.”137 Seen in this way, privacy 
constitutes both, rather than tears apart, individuals and community.138 
This also holds true in a comparative constitutional perspective. In fact, the 
core of privacy has been conceptualized as going “beyond the idea of privacy as 
seclusion and as a shield from intrusion and unwanted gaze.”139 Whereas 
privacy still has a value for those wanting to be left alone, undisturbed both in 
their existence as well as in their personal details, it has also come to be 
understood as “a right to define and construct one’s own identity, not only in 
isolation but in social relations.”140 Privacy “protects people, not places.”141 
How could this socially infused version of privacy benefit protesters? Is privacy 
a concern for protesters at all? Amid massive student demonstrations in Chile 
between 2011 and 2013, where isolated misdemeanors had been committed 
against property and members of the police, then-President Sebastián Piñera 
claimed the need to grant police the power to conduct preemptive identity 
verifications against those taking part in protests.142 This, he argued, would 
prevent crimes and vandalism.143 What was is his reasoning? 
                                                        
137 Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 133, at 488. 
138 Id. at 488-9. 
139 Manuel Cepeda, Privacy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 966, 
supra note 45, at 969. 
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141 Id. at 971. As the Supreme Court of the United States stated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 351 (1967). 
142 Presidente Piñera firma proyecto de ley que permite control preventivo de identidad [President 






If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear. Only those aimed 
at committing crimes will feel offended by this legislation.144 
As professor Solove has observed, there is a false tradeoff involved when 
people—protesters included—are asked not to fear if they have done nothing 
wrong, for, as he points out, this argument attaches little value to privacy.145 
First, it is uncommon that no one has anything to hide.146 Second, it is 
absolutely wrong to suggest privacy is about hiding bad things.147 Most of the 
time privacy works to protect totally legal actions. Moreover, encroachment of 
privacy actually may prevent legal actions—such as joining a demonstration.148 
Third, it is also misleading to exclusively see privacy as secrecy. As noted above, 
privacy protects a myriad of situations, which include some forms of secrecy.149 
Governmental public observation, for instance, is problematic even when the 
information it collects is not something the people may have wanted to hide. 
The pernicious effect of these forms of privacy invasion, which include 
governmental public observation and citizen identity control, is the “suffocating 
powerlessness and vulnerability” the use of personal data creates.150  
                                                        
144 Id. Piñera’s Minister of Interior had previously justified a prohibition to attend protests with 
masks on the same grounds. His reasons? “In our … country you cannot mask yourself to 
commit vandalism, protests are to be attended with clean hands and to attend with clean hands 
is to attend with your face uncovered.” Gobierno anuncia reforma legal para prohibir 
encapuchados en manifestaciones [Government announces legal reform to prohibit masked 
protesters], NACION.CL, Aug. 13, 2011, available at http://www.lanacion.cl/gobierno-anuncia-
reforma-legal-para-prohibir-encapuchados-en-manifestaciones/noticias/2011-08-
13/132238.html (my translation). 
145 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 21 
(2011). 
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In other words, as it has been aptly observed, privacy protects forms of harm 
“involved beyond exposing one’s secrets to the government.”151 We value 
privacy not because it permits us to hide things, but because—as observed 
before—it enables us to move in a series of realms feeling empowered to do so. 
Therefore, for protesters the force of privacy stems precisely from the fact they 
have done nothing wrong, unless you consider it wrong (either constitutionally 
or legally) to publicly shout your grievances.  
B. Harms to protests 
From here it is possible to see further, more specific, implications for the right 
to protest. The harms a socially infused understanding of privacy should 
protect us against, as explained before, can only be aptly grasped when 
considering privacy to be a citizen right. Here the right is completely 
reconfigured. As Honneth has argued, these are rights whose structure invites 
and enables civil engagement. They allow the people to become authors 
(democratic citizens) of their political fate through the cooperative task of 
democratic will-formation.152 These rights, in other words, “enable subjects to 
do what they could not do alone and in a stance of individual retreat.”153 This is 
the case, for instance, of the right to vote. A “seemingly individualistic right to 
                                                        
151 Id. at 29. 
152 AXEL HONNETH, FREEDOM’S RIGHT. THE SOCIAL FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRATIC LIFE 79 (Joseph Ganahl 
trans. Columbia University Press 2014). Of course, it can also be a subjective right that enables 
individuals to retreat and conduct inner examination “in order to explore the meaning and aims 
of their individual lives” (Id. at 72). At any rate, Honneth insists that that very subjective space 
where individuals examine their own lives has been ethically shaped. In other words, the legal 
freedom individual rights permit depends on the content of these rights being defined from 
outside the rights. The same applies to privacy: “individuals can only exercise their legally 
guaranteed right to privacy if they can rely on the communicative background of a lifeworld 
that itself has not come as a result of legal processes” (Id. at 85-6). 
153 Id. at 259. 
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vote” cannot be properly understood unless we consider it a citizen’s 
prerogative, the citizen being a member of the democratic community.154 
Solove concurs. Instead of protecting individuals at the expense of society, 
privacy “should be justified by its social benefits.”155 It is the contribution to the 
greater social good, and certainly its contribution to citizenship, what should 
guide our understanding of privacy. “It is hard to imagine,” Solove writes, “how 
people could freely participate in public life without some degree of control 
over their reputation and private life.”156 
In the specific case of protests, therefore, what should trouble us are the harms 
that could affect the people’s willingness to join others and thus take an active 
part in political life. In fact, these are forms of harm that lead people to 
withdraw their intervention in public opinion shaping activities—such as 
protests. As a general matter, many privacy problems indeed involve the “risk 
that a person might be harmed in the future.”157 This risk includes direct 
attacks such as dignitary, monetary and physical harms.158 It also affects a 
person’s life by preventing him or her from engaging in activities that he or she 
would otherwise join.  
Solove, for instance, writes, “[p]eople’s behavior might be chilled, making them 
less likely to attend political rallies or criticize popular views.”159 Nissenbaum 
holds a similar notion. For her, privacy in public becomes relevant to secure 
both political autonomy and freedom. Where there is absolutely no restriction 
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in access to personal information critical reflection may shrink. Certain spaces, 
in fact, are crucial to provide the people with freedom to “experiment, act, and 
decide without giving account to others of being fearful of retribution.”160 When 
the people are freed from what others will judge, say or react, they obtain the 
necessary inhibition to think about, propose, discuss, hold, and revise “the 
reasons behind significant life choices, preferences, and commitments.”161 This 
is what Simmel called the phenomenon of the stranger, a sociological liberation 
that permits specific forms of interaction in liberty: 
the objective individual is bound by no commitments which could 
prejudice his perception, understanding, and evaluation of the given. (…) 
he is freer, practically and theoretically; he surveys conditions with less 
prejudice; his criteria for them are more general and more objective 
ideals; he is not tied down in his action by habit, piety, and precedent.162 
Still, Cohen argues that unconstrained and unchecked surveillance affects both 
an essential condition to define ourselves and our capacity of self-
government.163 Surveillance permits the burgeon of what Cohen terms 
‘modulated democracy,’ a form of democracy, if at all, where our decisions are 
molded from the outside.164 Citizenship, therefore, is crucially affected, for the 
scope of these practices, which include voting, public debates and other forms 
                                                        
160 Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 127, at 148-9. 
161 Id. at 149. 
162 Georg Simmel, The Stranger, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 402, 402-5 (Kurt H. Wolff 
trans. & ed. The Free Press, 1950) (1908). I have taken links between Simmel’s The Stranger 
and privacy from WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, supra note 132, at 31-2.  
163 Cohen, What privacy is for, supra note 126, at 1912. 
164 Id. at 1915 (defining modulated democracy as “a set of processes in which the quality and 
content of surveillant attention is continually modified according to the subject’s own behavior, 
sometimes in response to inputs from the subject but according to logics that ultimately are 
outside the subject’s control”). 
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of political participation, “will be defined in part by the practices that existing 
institutions encourage, permit, or foreclose.”165 Technology, particularly 
networked information technologies, helps to shape those practices by allowing 
some interventions and rejecting others, thus crucially determining our 
capacity for democratic self-government.166 
As Solove highlights, this more comprehensive approach to privacy is not only 
concerned with the harms the person may directly feel, but also with a larger 
harm—that sometimes occurs unnoticed—affecting society: 
Constitutive privacy understands privacy harms as extending beyond 
the “mental pain and distress” caused to particular individuals; privacy 
harms affect the nature of society and impede individual activities that 
contribute to the greater social good.167 
When someone is prevented, because of disturbances on his or her privacy, 
from sharing his or her voice so as to shape public opinion, it is not only he or 
she who is affected. All of us are affected—and along with us, our constitutive 
commitments whose contours are determined for an exclusive set of voices.  
Of course, as in the cases of other aforementioned rights, the State is both an 
ally and a foe to privacy.168 In fact, privacy’s constitutive aspects requires the 
State to refrain from impinging privacy (where privacy turns out to be largely a 
negative right) and to also take positive measures allowing the “autonomous 
                                                        
165 Id. at 1912. 
166 Id. at 1913. 
167 Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 133, at 488. 
168 Thus, regulation of both private and public realms responds to specific power relations in 
society which also happen to shape the State, just as “many of the state’s actions do indeed 
mold and frame what specific societies take to be the public” and, we should add, private. Smith 
& Low, The Imperative of Public Space, supra note 123, at 5. 
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shaping of individual identity.”169 Indeed, privacy “enables people to engage in 
worthwhile activities in ways that they would otherwise find difficult or 
impossible”170—activities which certainly include our right to participate in 
political matters without the fear of losing our job, being presented as violent, 
being criminally persecuted, “community shunning, and other social 
reprisals.”171  
I now turn the focus to three specific issues related to social protests: 
governmental surveillance; the natural counterpart of this surveillance, that is, 
citizens’ data collection of governmental, particularly police, behavior; and 
different means by which protesters seek to conceal their identity when 
protesting.172 
C. Surveillance  
“Power, whether in the form of elites, government policies, or innovations in 
built environments, can override the speech of the city,”173 Saskia Sassen has 
argued. She has also identified one such government policy: large-scale 
surveillance systems which have had the effect of turning everyone into 
                                                        
169 Id. at 970. 
170 Solove, Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 133, at 484. 
171 Daniel J. Solove, The virtues of knowing less: justifying privacy protections against disclosure, 
53 DUKE L. J. 967, 995 (2003). 
172 I am interested here in explaining the right to protest. This is why I will not stop at analyzing 
how the right to privacy can, at times, work as a limit on protests, as it has occurred for access 
to abortion clinics. Richard Albert, Protest, Proportionality, and the Politics of Privacy: Mediating 
the Tension between the Right of Access to Abortion Clinics and Free Religious Expression in 
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possible suspects,174 transforming a vibrant civil society into an uncivilized 
one.175 As I show here, this constant monitoring (due to a government’s 
suspicion of all people) should be observed as a serious disturbance on the 
right to protest. 
Why does surveillance affect protesters and their right to demonstrate? After 
all, as some have suggested, protests occur in the public realm; therefore, 
participants should assume they are to be observed. I have already argued that 
privacy extends to public areas such as streets and squares, and also that 
privacy covers legal, as well as regular, daily actions taking place is these areas. 
With these considerations in mind I now turn to show specifically how 
surveillance undermines the right to protest. 
Governmental surveillance of protests takes many forms, two of which I will 
name. For one, governments gather information by means of massive 
surveillance carried out by cameras located throughout cities. After all, we live 
in a ‘Cam era.’176 Governments also watch through policing. This latter form of 
surveillance is directly done by police agents who carry portable cameras as 
well as other devices. 
There are several reasons why surveillance is detrimental to protests. These 
reasons stem mainly from the enriched conception of privacy (in public) that 
was depicted above. First, surveillance can take citizens to self-censorship by 
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avoiding (public) places and practices where, for whatever reason, they don’t 
want to be seen.177 Second, surveillance limits freedom and autonomy by 
permitting the State to have a record of our past actions and omissions, which 
compromises our anonymity.178 This constraint on freedom, as Solove shows, is 
particularly potent for people engaging in political protests or dissent of 
accepted norms,179 for people captured on film in such activities might “face 
persecution, public sanction, and blacklisting for their unpopular political 
beliefs.”180 Moreover, these retributions regularly target disfavored groups and 
causes.181 Sadly, this is far from pure academic speculation. As recently 
reported, the Russian Federation makes “‘propaganda of non-traditional sexual 
relations’ … punishable by administrative fines,”182 propaganda which includes 
parades and other public gatherings. From a more historical perspective, some 
research has shown governmental surveillance has been directed precisely at 
exposing, disrupting, misdirecting, discrediting, and neutralizing social 
mobilizations seen as undesired.183 Finally, massive surveillance technologies 
allow the State to gather an amount of information absolutely disproportionate 
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with the objective originally sought (i.e. prevent crime).184 This permits the 
State to develop large repositories of information then used to target 
disfavored groups or dissident voices with whatever minor infraction they 
could pull from that gathered data.185 
In the end, these forms of protest surveillance have the effect of seriously 
constraining, if not directly eliminating, political dissent.186 By promoting 
anxiety and discomfort,187 massive surveillance takes, or may take, people to 
conform their behavior and views—including those views about how to better 
understand our constitutional commitments—to mainstream ideas.188 In fact, 
modulation, which surveillance facilitates, is a form of privacy that produces 
particular kinds of subjects whose consent is manufactured and directed both 
in markets and politics.189 Whereas democracy needs discomfort to have 
citizens constantly engaged in pursuing “political and social ideals,” 
surveillance and modulated democracy deprives citizens of the means, and 
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probably the desire, to practice this sort of contestation—“this sort of 
citizenship.”190 
Moreover, we have to consider that, although today it is a common knowledge 
that cameras are constantly watching us, one of the few unexplored 
components of surveillance is ‘unverifiability.’191 This means that citizens, 
despite having a general sense of being watched, do not know whether they are 
actually being observed. It is precisely that general sense of being under 
surveillance where governmental power resides, for whereas actual watching 
might be sporadic, “‘the threat of being watched never ceases’.”192 
A likely result of this internalization of control193 is that people are prevented 
from suggesting new visions. This is because experimentation requires a 
certain level of privacy, that is, the assurance there will be no retribution.194 
This chilling effect on dissent affects not only ideas, but also one of the most 
effective means, and to some the only available means, of political participation: 
popular reunions and assemblies. Constant surveillance may take people to 
avoid joining others, a burden particularly felt by disadvantaged or minority 
groups.195 As some empirical data shows, surveillance may take people to 
                                                        
190 Id. at 1918. 
191 Koskela, ‘Cam Era’, supra note 176, at 298. 
192 Id. (citing Matt Hannah). 
193 Id. at 299 (“People internalise the rules, regulate their own behaviour even when it is not 
necessary and, thus, exercise power over themselves. Power operates by creating ‘bad 
conscience’.”). See also, Cohen, What privacy is for, supra note 126, at 1916 (“In the modulated 
society, surveillance is not heavy-handed; it is ordinary, and its ordinariness lends it 
extraordinary power.”). 
194 Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 127, at 148-9. 
195 Solove, Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 133, at 499 (“Espousing radical beliefs and doing 
unconventional things takes tremendous courage; the attentive gaze, especially the 
government’s, can make these acts seen all the more daring and their potential risks all the 
more inhibitory.”).  
212 
 
withdraw from groups and seek more individualistic forms of participation;196 
it also impacts the organizational basis of movements197 and, in the end, the 
culture of protest itself.198  
This, however, remains a disputed territory in courts. Some of them, like the 
courts in the United States, have held citizens do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in public. Although in Katz the Court declared that 
privacy protects people rather than places,199 it has never really left the secrecy 
paradigm—as Solove has termed it.200 This paradigm consists of understanding 
privacy in very a narrow fashion: something is private, and is therefore granted 
constitutional protection, “only if it is completely secret.”201 In California v. 
Ciraolo, for instance, the Court held a person had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy, even when in his backyard, against a governmental “observation from 
a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the 
activities clearly visible.”202 This vantage point was possible thanks to a police 
helicopter flying over the claimant’s home. Therefore, to claim the protection of 
one’s privacy, people must act as reasonable paranoids, that is, take every 
imaginable step to prevent exposition to the public eye.203 
                                                        
196 Starr et al., The impacts of State Surveillance, supra note 183, at 255.  
197 Id. at 258-60 (showing surveillance generates reluctance to participate and thus “impacts 
donations to organizations, numbers of participants in events, willingness to sign petitions and 
public statements, volunteering, and receipt of newsletters and other educational materials 
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198 Id. at 261-3. 
199 Supra note 141. 
200 SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE, supra note 145, at 93-101. 
201 Id. at 94. 
202 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
203 See a description of how a reasonable paranoid would behave in Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, 
Privacy and the reasonable paranoid: the protection of privacy in public places, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 
305, 305-6 (2000). 
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In Canada, the Supreme Court previously held a property approach which it 
later abandoned to adopt its own version of reasonable expectations of 
privacy.204 In Hunter et al. v Southam Inc., it held, just as the United States 
Supreme Court did in Katz, that privacy protected persons, not places.205 
However, the standard has also proven futile in protecting privacy rights in 
what are normally seen as public spaces. Whereas some commentators have 
noted Canadian courts seem more willing—at least when compared with courts 
in the United States—to protect some forms of privacy in public,206 overall 
matters are more or less the same. In United Food and Commercial Workers, 
Local 401 v. Alberta, the Supreme Court of Canada decided whether a picketing 
union had the right to record individuals crossing the picket line. Individuals 
recorded by the union claimed their privacy rights were infringed. The 
Supreme Court dismissed these privacy concerns. It found the union to be 
exercising ‘journalistic’ powers as granted in the relevant legislation (Personal 
Information Protection Act, PIPA) and therefore considered the union had 
engaged in expressive activities. The Court also held the following: 
                                                        
204 Kate Murray, The ‘reasonable expectation of privacy test’ and the scope of protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure under Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 18 
OTTAWA L. REV. 25 (1986) (arguing the Canadian version of the test has several differences with 
the one adopted in the United States). 
205 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159. However, the Court was not so quick to admit the people lose 
their privacy rights once in public. See, Derek Lai, Public video surveillance by the State: Policy, 
Privacy legislation, and the Charter, 45 ALTA. L. REV. 43, 66 (2007) (distinguishing Katz, depicted 
as “an American rather than a Canadian viewpoint,” from Hunter). 
206 Paton-Simpson, Privacy and the reasonable paranoid, supra note 203, at 318 (analyzing the 
trend in the early 2000s and suggesting “there are signs that Canadian courts may be more 
open to the notion of public privacy.”); Lai, Public video surveillance by the State, supra note 205, 
at 67 (“current Charter jurisprudence does suggest that Canadians retain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in what they expose in public”), although the decisions Lai analyzes, as 
he acknowledges, deal with “surreptitious video surveillance in a private place” (Id.). 
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I agree that the complainants had no reasonable expectation of privacy. 
They were at not just a public place, but a public demonstration with 
important political and social implications. There is no rational 
connection between protecting privacy when the individuals in question 
are in public view. There is no right to “practical anonymity.”207 
It is true that the Court was dealing with private individuals and not with 
governmental officers, but it is important to highlight that it understood there 
is no such thing as a reasonable expectation of privacy when in public places.208 
In fact, as it has more recently been suggested, the series of cases regarding 
privacy matters which the Supreme Court has heard—besides being related to 
admissibility of evidence obtained without judicial warrants—have missed 
important differences between being seen, watched, recorded, and 
monitored.209 
In Australia, the Victoria Civil and Administrative Tribunal found the police had 
sensible reasons to film and take photographs of protesters, even when they 
                                                        
207 United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v. Alberta, [2011] 509 AR 150, at 187. 
208 In Ward, the Ontario Court of Appeals read the Supreme Court case law as securing a right to 
privacy even when in public. It held the following: 
I take the [Supreme] court to have held that in Canadian society people can reasonably 
expect that they can move about on public highways without being identified and 
continually monitored by the state. If the state chooses to engage in that kind of 
invasive conduct, it must be able to meet the constitutional requirements of s.8. Wise 
holds that while the public nature of the forum in which an activity occurs will affect 
the degree of privacy reasonably expected, the public nature of the forum does not 
eliminate all privacy claims. R. v Ward, [2012] 296 O.A.C. 298, at 313-4. 
However, it is worth noticing this standard has been built in the context of criminal 
investigations and evidence gathered without judicial warrants. See, Lai, Public video 
surveillance by the State, supra note 205, at 70 (arguing that, according to Wise, “any breach [of 
privacy] must flow from the subsequent monitoring and/or recording by those cameras,” but 
not from the mere fact of cameras being installed in public).  
209 Krista Boa, Privacy outside the castle: surveillance technologies and reasonable expectations of 
privacy in Canadian judicial reasoning, 4 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 329 (2007) (arguing that the 
Court has dismissed reasonable concerns of privacy by overlooking these distinctions). 
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were peacefully demonstrating.210 The court held the police can gather and 
retain information about protesters for intelligence purposes, no matter how 
broadly defined (“it may be useful in future”),211 and that there was no privacy 
violation. In order to do so, it held privacy remained unaltered as “no names 
were noted down.”212 Following the trend depicted above, it also noted that 
“very public activities did not engage (or infringe)” a right to privacy.213 
Not all courts have followed the same path. Spain’s Constitutional Court ruled 
on the action of police officers who took pictures and recorded images of a 
picket of workers who, while holding a strike, were also informing bystanders 
about the main causes of a general labor strike. The Court, although resting on 
the constitutional right to collective bargaining and strike, held the policed 
affected the workers’ labor rights.214 The Court reasoned that, while the police 
did not impede the strike,215 their actions were certainly aimed at intimidating 
and threatening workers taking part in the strike.216 
What should be done then? I argue this socially vitalized version of privacy 
should have States acting within more demanding limits as to the information 
they are allowed to gather and keep, and certainly controlling the uses the State 
can make of that information. The practical answer to State surveillance, 
therefore, is not that States should drop every form of public vigilance, but 
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maintain it within margins that do not unnecessarily threaten the right to 
protest.217 Roughly put, this means that for all purposes (even punishing 
crimes) the State should consider protesters joining a protest as first-time 
attendees, as if they had no protesting past. In fact, it is a common practice of 
the police to record and aggregate information of demonstrators, thus creating 
protester profiles later used to obstruct their right to protest—for instance, to 
conduct preemptive detentions. The means to achieve this objective, again, is 
not to drop public surveillance, but to subject a State’s means of gathering 
information to stringent standards, such as imposing penalties for abuses 
(leaks), the obligation to delete old data, the prevention of ‘mission creep,’ and 
judicial overview.218 In other words, governmental surveillance needs to 
undergo more effective accountability measures. Indeed, one of the problems of 
surveillance is that citizens do not know what information on them is available 
at governmental records. In addition, they do not know what pieces of 
information have been put together or who is doing that job.219 
D. Counter surveillance 
Technology cuts both ways. What happens when surveillance is turned against 
the watcher? This practice, favored by technology developments in devices 
(mostly mobiles) citizens carry, could be seen as a sort of accountability of 
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those in charge of watching us,220 but also as mechanisms of power 
contestation that disrupt State surveillance and contribute to identity building 
of political actors in the streets.221  
Slobogin, for one, has argued that ‘watching the watchers’ is a form—a popular 
form, for the situation I am concerned with here—of implementing privacy 
rights in public.222 It is, therefore, a form of accountability of what governments 
and their agents collect, catalogue and index that is rooted in privacy concerns. 
Notice that these citizen practices not only enhance governmental 
transparency, but also place the burden of surveillance on the government 
itself.223 By doing so, the State, and particularly the police, loses its ability to 
“patrol the facts” before public opinion.224 On the other hand, it is also possible 
to see these acts of counter-surveillance as forms of political contestation—
‘protests as news,’225 for publicly exposing the policing of protests also signals 
how the State reacts before specific demands. The legitimacy of the State is in 
this way doubly challenged.226 Technologies, whose uses are not 
predetermined, are thus given a social meaning of resistance.227 
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This ‘forced’ openness pretty much explains why States feel uneasy about these 
forms of popular accountability. The police rarely tremble before proceeding to 
arrest journalists covering protests228 and, of course, protesters photographing 
or recording them.229 This is not just a matter of police practice, but of legal 
entitlement as well. For instance, in the United Kingdom counter-terrorist 
legislation has been resorted to in order to legally justify detention of those 
taking images of the police,230 while in Spain, as well as in other latitudes, a 
recent bill is aimed to sanction those who capture images of the police force 
without their consent.231 
Nevertheless, it is easier here to find courts standing on the side of citizens (and 
journalists). Arguably this is because courts have focused on the vigilant role 
                                                                                                                                                            
(2011) (noting socio-technological practices have their own inner dynamics which cannot 
prevent ‘unintended effects’ such as counter-surveillance). 
228 Arbitrary detentions of journalists have been reported in Chile (Jason Suder, How to be 
arrested in Chile without breaking the law, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jun. 3, 2012, http:// 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-suder/chile-freedom-of-press_b_1324547.html), the 
United States (In Ferguson, Washington Post reporter Wesley Lowery gives account of his arrest, 
THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 14, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-ferguson-
washington-post-reporter-wesley-lowery-gives-account-of-his-arrest/2014/08/13/0fe25c0e-
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KEEPTALKINGGREECE.COM (Oct. 5, 2011), 
http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2011/10/05/athens-riot-police-beats-photo-reporters-
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protesters. Human Rights Council, Promotion and protection of all human rights in the context of 
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HUFFINGTON POST, Jul. 11, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.es/2014/07/11/ley-seguridad-
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citizens play vis-à-vis the State, on citizens’ freedom of expression rights 
allowing them to scrutinize public officials, or on the public office of those being 
photographed or recorded by citizens. Thus, the Constitutional Court of Spain 
held in 2007 that privacy encompasses the protection of an individual’s image 
from being captured by others without consent.232 However, it also held that it 
was not an absolute right.233 In fact—the Court went on—, the right to control 
whether an individual’s image is captured and divulgated cannot rest solely on 
the individual’s will, but also on the circumstances where the individual is 
placed.234 In certain cases those circumstances may require the individual’s will 
be yielded before other considerations, such as when other rights concur (i.e. 
freedom of expression) or when there is a public interest involved in capturing 
and publishing images.235 
Was there any public interest involved in this case? The court held there was. 
The case dealt with a newspaper article which, in covering an eviction process 
in Madrid, had published photos of police officers involved under the headline 
‘violent eviction.’236 To support its argument, the Court cited domestic 
legislation which protects image rights and prevents public officials from 
recovering damages if pictures are taken when they are performing official 
duties in public places.237 These exceptions were taken to constitutional status 
when the Court held there was no encroachment on privacy rights when the 
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photo captures images of (a) a public official (b) exercising his or her duties (c) 
in the context of public actions (d) taking place in a public place.238 
In Canada, a court in Ontario decided a case involving a police assault of a 
photographer who was shooting pictures of a fight between patrons and the 
police at a restaurant. The personal assault resulted from the excessive force 
the police used in detaining the photographer after having been ordered to stop 
shooting pictures. It held that, although police officers were in the middle of a 
“volatile situation, faced with a loud, hostile and aggressive crowd,”239 police 
have limits as to the use of force they can resort to.240 More crucially, the court 
enquired whether the order to stop taking pictures was within police powers. 
The court concluded that 
unless Mr. Farkas’s [the photographer] presence or actions were 
creating a danger to him or others, ordering him to stop photographing 
was not a lawful command …241 
The court noted the relation between the police, on the one hand, and citizens, 
on the other—whether they have or have not committed any offence—, is 
imbalanced. Sometimes some light is needed to expose the sensible concern as 
to how the police exercise their legal powers. “An officer who conducts himself 
reasonably has nothing to fear from an audio, video or photographic record of 
his interaction with the public.”242 Furthermore, the court saw the recording of 
an interaction with the police as a right to oversee the way in which public 
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powers are being put into practice, a citizen practice that, in the end, plays a 
significant role in the maintenance of the Rule of Law.243 “Interference by a 
police officer in the public’s exercise of that right,” the court concluded, “is a 
significant abuse of authority.”244 
In the United States, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals prevented the enforcement 
of Illinois’ eavesdropping statute.245 The statute considered it a felony to audio 
record conversations unless all parties involved in the conversation give their 
consent. While the government claimed to be protecting the privacy of 
conversations, the Court held “that interest is not implicated when police 
officers are performing their duties in public places ….”.246 It is worth noting 
that the case was presented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
which sought declaratory and injunctive relief so that the statute could not be 
enforced against their ‘police accountability program.’247 The ACLU argued the 
statute violated their free speech rights. The court agreed. First, it held public 
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recordings used as a means of expression to disseminate information were 
included within freedom of speech protection.248  
Audio and audiovisual recording are communication technologies, and 
as such, they enable speech. Criminalizing all nonconsensual audio 
recording necessarily limits the information that might later be 
published or broadcast—whether to the general public or to a single 
family member or friend—and thus burdens First Amendment rights.249 
It was the fact that the statute prevented citizens from freely discussing 
governmental affairs, namely the work of public officials in public places, what 
seriously compromised free speech rights.250 This fashion in which the court 
framed free speech rights can have no other outcome than to highlight the 
accountability role the citizenry plays in a democratic society.251 Accordingly, 
the statute was seen as restricting a medium of expression “and thus an 
integral step in the speech process … it interferes with the gathering and 
dissemination of information about government officials performing their 
duties in public.”252 
Although some of the Court’s paragraphs aforementioned make some 
references to public space, it would be completely wrong to suggest free speech 
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rights—as framed here—are to be upheld only in such a space,253 for the 
vigilant role the people play also reaches spaces that, while public, are not part 
of what the traditional doctrine regards as public fora. Thus, the same stringent 
scrutiny—as the one applied in Alvarez—would be applied if a statute 
criminalizes the use of mediums of expression in (say) the congress, a court, or 
the buildings of the administration.254 The Supreme Court has recently denied 
certiorari, leaving the 7th Circuit decision to stand.255 
More recently in Spain, a court in Madrid decided a case along the same 
matters. A citizen (who claimed to be a free press journalist) was recording two 
municipal police agents that were conducting an eviction when they requested 
he stop capturing their images. The agents ordered the man to pixel their faces 
if he published the material, hit his camera,256 and eventually charged him with 
a public order offense. The court dismissed the charge.257 In doing so the court 
noted there is no legal prohibition to record public officials in public spaces and 
recalled the Constitutional Court decision aforementioned (supra note 232): 
privacy and image rights of public officials, when exercising their legal duties in 
public places, are yielded in favor of other constitutionally protected rights, 
such as the public interest associated with scrutinizing public officials.258 
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The bottom line here is that these counter surveillance activities are to be 
permitted, if not promoted. Counter surveillance allows citizens to uphold their 
own privacy rights. As it has been argued, by unveiling questionable practices 
counter surveillance may help to moderate or even trigger a cessation of undue 
publications or uses of information. Information gathered through counter 
surveillance, in fact, could also be used to persecute governmental 
responsibilities of those involved, also causing the revision of surveillance 
practices.259 
E. Masks, hoods and anonymity for protesters 
Does informational privacy also play a role in protecting protesters from being 
identified? And if so, why would protesters want to remain anonymous? Many 
protesters use masks to cover their faces—thus hindering, if not directly 
impeding, their identification. This practice has found stringent reaction from 
governments. In fact, many governments have reacted by submitting bills or 
passing regulations—mostly criminal regulations—prohibiting protesters from 
hiding their faces at public demonstrations.260  
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Whereas preventing crime may be a sound reason for these regulations—
anonymity makes it hard to punish crimes by helping to conceal the identity of 
perpetrators261—, my concern is with protesters who are not committing 
crimes.262 In other words, I wonder whether this is not an overreaching 
response that affects the privacy of the rest of protesters who pacifically concur 
to protest (normally the vast majority of them) and still wish to remain 
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determine whether there is an alteration of public safety. Therefore, whereas my concern here 
is with protesters who concur pacifically to demonstrate, we should not overlook the fact that 
the determination of when a protester becomes an offender depends largely on police 
discretion and selective enforcement of its public order regulations—and hoods themselves 
may play a significant role in causing the police to enforce those regulations. I would also add 
that, even where there is judicial control over the acts of the police, it is the very act of the 
police that infringes both the right to protest and privacy of protesters. Finally, there might still 
be good reason to criticize the criminalization of masks, even when protesters, or anyone else, 
wearing masks do so in order to commit crimes. This depends largely on the distinction 
between ‘criminal laws’ and ‘general laws’ (which I address below). In the former case—where 
the government intervenes upon evidence that those masked have committed a crime or are 
intending to commit one—it could be possible to suggest that by preventing individuals from 
concealing their identity the State is forcing the perpetrator to self-incrimination. This, of 
course, would depend to a large extent on how the right to not self-incriminate is understood. 
In the United States, for instance, this right has been understood to protect only compelled 
testimony leading to (self) incrimination (Susan W. Brenner, The privacy privilege: law 
enforcement, technology, and the Constitution, 7 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 123, 182-90 (2002)). I would 
like to thank Ignacio Castillo and Juan Pablo Mañalich for a valuable exchange of opinions here. 
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anonymous. Despite obvious similitude with surveillance, a restriction on mask 
wearing at protests, I want to suggest here, is a complementary assault on 
privacy—which happens to have an undesirable impact on freedom of 
expression, in addition to causing other harms to individuals. 
Is anonymity alien to democracy? Not at all. We cast votes in privacy. This 
means that one of the most important rituals in current democracies, a crucial 
feature under the liberal view, takes place under anonymity. This also means 
that there might be good reasons available to demand anonymity when 
politically participating. Secret voting, for instance, was aimed not only at 
preventing bribery,263 but also at securing the liberty of voters (citizens) before 
political and economic power.264 By securing the secret of the ballot, citizens, 
particularly those worst-off who largely depend on governmental economic 
assistance, would not be the subject of threats and intimidation by political 
power.265 Their social and material inequality, to put it in other words, would 
not translate into political disparities.266 The anonymity citizens enjoy in the 
voting booth, seen in this light, amounts to “political privacy,”267 a 
constitutional guarantee that they would be able to participate by “vot[ing] 
                                                        
263 But see, Simeon Nichter, Vote buying or turnout buying? Machines politics and the secret 
ballot, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 19 (2008) (arguing bribery can still take, and actually takes, place 
in face of secret voting). 
264 This, however, has not always been an undisputed reason. In 1840s England, for instance, 
some saw secret voting—in an impressive resemblance with today’s critique of protesting with 
covered faces—as “a mask on an honest face.” NADIA URBINATI, MILL ON DEMOCRACY: FROM THE 
ATHENIAN POLIS TO REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 105 (2002).  
265 ANDREW REEVE & ALAN WARE, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: A THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 
111 (1992). 
266 Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1329-30 (2000). 
267 EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 152 (1978). 
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according to their best judgment, rather than to avoid political ostracism or 
penalty, or to seek approval of favors …”.268  
This is where the socially infused understanding of privacy calls us to look at 
the social goods which the protection of privacy seeks to further. Daniel Solove, 
who argues that privacy, rather than being defined in a single concept, is to be 
understood as a cluster of problems that create harms to individuals and 
society,269 notes there are many situations where privacy-as-anonymity is to be 
protected. This is particularly the case before relationship harms, vulnerability 
harms, power imbalances, and chilling effects.270 Continuous monitoring, for 
instance, can contribute to create, if not directly to provoke, anxiety and 
discomfort, causing individuals to alter their behavior and self-censorship.271 
The same may occur with identification—the very objective that mask bans are 
aimed at obstructing—which links actual individuals to a baggage of 
information.272 
As Solove argues, all these harms are better understood when we see them not 
as forms of injuries to particular individuals, but as forms of harm that 
contribute to generate what he terms ‘architectures of vulnerability.’273 These 
are “designs or structures for the processing of personal information that make 
people vulnerable to a host of dangers.”274 
                                                        
268 Id. 
269 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 155. 
270 Id. at 176-8. 
271 Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 133, at 493. 
272 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 155, at 122-4. 




Anonymity brings important benefits against these structures of vulnerability; 
anonymity allows individuals to be protected from bias, feeling free and safe to 
speak and associate without harm of (a large array of possible) reprisals.275  
This is quite a relevant concern once we realize these harms are particularly 
burdensome on unpopular and vulnerable groups. By prohibiting anonymity 
minorities feel their liberty is taken away and that they are forced to conform 
to mainstream ideas.276 A couple of years ago a Chilean media corporation 
warned its employers not to take part in labor protests that are held yearly to 
commemorate International Worker’s Day on May 1st. They were told that if 
they did, they would be fired. Many of them disregarded what they saw to be an 
arbitrary command and proceeded to demonstrate. As they were marching in 
front of the newspaper’s offices, they glanced at the human resources officer 
taking pictures of them. They filed an amparo laboral277 claiming their freedom 
of expression and assembly had been threatened.278 For them, covering their 
faces would not have been a matter of breaking the law, but a security measure 
to keep their jobs. The same is the case of various minorities in different 
jurisdictions that have been prevented from wearing masks and hoods when 
peacefully demonstrating. The U.N. Human Rights Council expressed its 
preoccupation with this situation, calling States to consider the condition of 
                                                        
275 Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 133, at 515. 
276 Slobogin, Public privacy, supra note 222, at 240-42. 
277 A judicial writ filed before Labor Tribunals to secure the exercise of constitutional rights. 
278 A labor court found workers had a right to demonstrate and to receive legal protection, 
particularly considering the protest in which they were taking part involved political speech. A 
Court of Appeals overturned the decision; it held it cannot appreciate how the mere fact of 
taking pictures could pose an actual and effective violation of the constitutional freedom of 
expression. Protesta social y derechos humanos [Social protest and human rights], in INFORME 




minorities for whom covering their faces is the means to prevent violence and 
escape retaliation.279 
Is it a contradiction to demonstrate and conceal one’s identity? After all, 
protests take place on the streets, before many eyes—including those of the 
very bystanders protesters seek to convince. Alan Westin argued that there is a 
specific shape the right to privacy takes when exercised among a larger group, 
that of becoming a condition of anonymity or reserve.280 Anonymity therefore 
takes place even when the individual “is in public places or performing public 
acts,” for there he or she may still want to seek, and multitudes normally 
permit, “freedom from identification and surveillance.”281 Of course this is not 
an absolute right; you cannot claim anonymity to prevent being prosecuted for 
a crime committed either in public places or at home. On the other hand, 
individuals are also (almost naturally) inclined to participate in society.282 At 
any rate, the decision to participate in society in an (un)anonymous fashion is 
an individual and autonomous one. It is the individual who is “continually 
engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for 
privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others 
…”.283  
                                                        
279 The Council convincingly noted that these prohibitions seem to target particular vulnerable 
groups. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur 2014, supra note 182, at paras. 
32-3. 
280 WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, supra note 132, at 7 (1967). 
281 Id. at 31. 
282 Id. at 7, 31 (“In this state the individual is able to merge into the ‘situational landscape.’ 
Knowledge or fear that one is under systematic observation in public places destroys the sense 
of relaxation and freedom that men seek in open spaces and public arenas.”). 
283 WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, supra note 132, at 7. 
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The autonomous character of this decision, however, is not only seriously 
affected by constant monitoring, as argued before, but also by prohibiting 
wearing masks or hoods or prohibiting whatever means someone may find 
suitable to keep her identity on reserve. As Slogobin put it, “[p]eople who 
engage in expressive conduct in public know they will be observed. But they 
may choose, like the pamphleteer or the petitioner, not to reveal their identity 
for all sorts of reasons.”284  
It would be wrong, in other words, to suggest that one withdraws privacy when 
entering the public arena. As I have been arguing here, privacy in fact often 
becomes a precondition for public engagement. Thus, even when in public we 
expect to remain “nameless-unremarked,”285 being in the middle of a crowd 
gives people the advantage of remaining “part of the undifferentiated crowd—
as far as the government is concerned.”286 It is precisely because protesters 
have done nothing wrong—let alone illegal287—that they want to remain free 
from identification, even when in public.288  
Could democracy require citizens to appear with uncovered faces? After all, 
publicity has been held to be—since Kant stated so in his essay on Perpetual 
Peace—a precondition for justice.289 This is, no doubt, a sensible claim that 
                                                        
284 Slobogin, Public privacy, supra note 222, at 256. 
285 Id., at 238. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. at 244-5 (arguing that we should not have trouble in understanding why we sometimes 
want actions, although totally legal and taking place in public locations, to be kept secret, such 
as attending an alcoholics anonymous meeting, going to a gay bar, a visit to the doctor, or a love 
affair, to name a few). 
288 Id. at 239. 
289 IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY 196 (M. Campbell Smith trans., G. 
Allen & Unwin Ltd. Macmillan Co. 1917) (1795) (“The possibility of this publicity, every legal 
title implies. For without it there could be no justice, which can only be thought as before the 
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demands clarification. The clarification is this: whereas it would be wrong to 
read privacy as anonymity as opposed to public participation, not every 
anonymous political intervention will be deemed democratically acceptable.  
First, it should be noted that publicity primarily applies to States and not to 
their citizens.290 This is so because citizens and governments perform different 
duties and functions, and this is the way we see each other.291 Differences in 
power and responsibility, for example the extremely limited power electors 
have over their representatives as compared with the considerable power the 
latter have on citizens, bring very different standards of publicity and 
accountability.292 Furthermore, imposing standards of publicity—or of 
informational flow—suited for the State on citizens would be an injustice, the 
injustice of allocating duties (publicity) according to the standards meant for 
other spheres (governmental).293 
Of course, functional differentiation, that is, the fact that States and citizens 
perform different functions each with its own norms of information flow, 
cannot be the exclusive criterion to judge when publicity is required, for this 
would leave without explanation many situations where citizen transparency is 
                                                                                                                                                            
eyes of men: and, without justice, there would be no right, for, from justice only, right can 
come”). 
290 Evan Darwin Winet, Face-veil bans and anti-masks laws: State interest and the right to cover 
the face, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 217 (2012) (arguing there is no such right “to see the 
bare face of another person.”). 
291 As Nissenbaum has convincingly argued, different contexts and functions require different 
flows of information. Unidirectional flows of information are not strange. In the context of 
healthcare, for instance, the flow of information is far from bidirectional—indeed it is a context 
where information flows from patient to physician. Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 
supra note 127, at 142. 
292 Annabelle Lever, Mill and the secret ballot: beyond coercion and corruption, 19 UTILITAS 354, 
359-61 (2007). 
293 Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 127, at 143-5. 
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also expected.294 In order to explain why this is so we must unveil the 
democratic principle behind governmental publicity. The reason why we want 
governments to be transparent is to promote what has been called 
independency through dependency to assure, to the extent possible, that 
governments remain responsive to the people and the rules framing their 
public duties and not to undue influences.295 The standard of independency 
through dependency, and not an unqualified duty of publicity applicable to all 
citizens, allows us to highlight differences between social protests—where 
privacy as anonymity could be constitutionally protected—and other means of 
political intervention—where transparency is sensibly required, such as 
lobbying or campaign financing.  
In fact, while protesters present their arguments in a public fashion—
regardless if they have concealed their faces—, lobbying and campaign 
financing do so secretly—regardless of having an uncovered face. This is the 
reason why it is sound to require lobbyists to (at the least) appear in public 
light. Because they have sought to conceal not so much their identity, but their 
arguments, interests, and motivations—precisely the aspects social protests 
publicly present—, they thus compromise the public good in order for private 
interests to benefit.296 Put differently, whereas in public protests we know, 
even when we do not see faces, what ideas might have affected a governmental 
                                                        
294 Recall that I have said that whereas it would be wrong to read privacy as anonymity as being 
opposed to public participation, not every anonymous political intervention will be deemed 
democratically acceptable. 
295 LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST. HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 130-1 
(2011). 
296 I took these ideas from Zephyr Teachout, The unenforceable corrupt contract: corruption and 
Nineteenth-Century law, in MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 135, 
138-46 (Monica Youn ed. 2011). 
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decision, secret lobbying and anonymous electoral financing prevent us from 
seeing what agenda and interests (decisively) influence the State’s march.297 
After all, when individuals protest anonymously they still remain in public, yet 
undifferentiated.298 
Finally, some have argued—as presented in a previous example—that open 
voting might encourage someone “to vote in a discursively defensible 
manner.”299 While this is an important argument, it does not affect my claim 
here. For one, in a social protest the message (say, the popular interpretation of 
the constitution) remains public, and the same happens with the reasons and 
arguments that protesters put forward. For another, I am not suggesting, as is 
the case with secret voting, that protesters must cover their faces when 
participating in protests, but that they may if they feel the need to do so (such 
as when they want to avoid reprisals). In the end, a protester who conceals his 
or her face neither ceases to be a public-minded citizen nor corrupts the 
government by bringing it down to answer private interests.300 In fact, it could 
be argued that actually the opposite is the case: a protester who conceals his or 
                                                        
297 See, DAVID SCHULTZ, ELECTION LAW AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 260 (2014) (“The argument for 
disclosure here is a structural democratic claim in favor of building up a wall that shields the 
polity from being influenced by money and economic market factors.”). 
298 Brown, Anonymity, faceprints, and the Constitution, supra note 219, at 413-4 (“Anonymity 
enables one to remain undifferentiated in public.”). 
299 Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit, Unveiling the vote, 20 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 311, 311 (2009). 
300 Zephy Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 241, 377-9 (2009) 
(arguing citizenship is a form of public office also malleable by corruption when oriented 
toward private interests). This is, in a similar sense, what Schmitt argued against secret voting. 
The fact that such secrecy transforms citizens, otherwise part of the people and bearers of 
public opinion, into private individuals who manifest their ‘private opinions.’ CARL SCHMITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 273-4 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans. Duke University Press 2008) (1928). 
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her face wants to bring attention exclusively to arguments, rather than to the 
faces that pronounce them.301 
Besides those practices that dishonor the independency through dependency 
principle, it is reasonable to consider a second set of practices that are not 
constitutionally covered by privacy: crimes. The problem here is how to strike 
the right balance between governmental interest in preventing crime, on the 
one hand, and those of the protesters in exercising constitutional rights, on the 
other. While this is a question that is hard to answer in the abstract, it is useful 
to consider some general ideas in the context of social protests.302 I want to 
argue that in order to strike the right balance we should start by paying 
attention to the harms that overreaching criminal legislation (may) pose on the 
exercise of rights.303 
Although freedom of expression can be invoked as an independent justification 
for anonymity, I think it has a stronger (constitutional) force when linked to 
privacy, for it is the harm on privacy what prevents people, particularly 
unpopular groups, from concurring to shape public opinion. After all, as the 
Supreme Court of the United States held in NAACP v. Alabama, political 
participation may require some form of anonymity.304 
                                                        
301 Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 133, at 515 (“Anonymity can enhance the 
persuasiveness of one's ideas, for identification can shade reception of ideas with readers' 
biases and prejudices. This is why, in many universities and schools, exams are graded 
anonymously.”). 
302 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 155, at 187-8 (arguing that, although the “balance 
might come out differently across various societies,” the taxonomy of harms he proposes have 
been recognized as problems “in nearly every industrialized information-age society”). 
303 This is, as you can see, a very modest claim. 
304 N.A.A.C.P v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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It is useful to begin distinguishing between ‘general anti-mask’ laws, where the 
mere fact of wearing a mask results in criminalization, from ‘criminal anti-
mask’ laws, where wearing a mask results in criminalization as long as 
authorities prove criminal intent from those wearing masks.305 From the 
constitutional viewpoint of the right to protest, the former laws end up being 
tremendously problematic, for they ban the use of any masks, including those 
being used for legitimate reasons. It does not matter what circumstances 
individuals argue. It also does not matter if protesters fear retribution or 
experience anxiety—such as a serious loss of autonomy—due to having their 
faces associated to specific groups. The use of masks, under this approach, is 
always illegal. The latter laws might also be problematic if, as I have noted 
above, the mere fact of wearing a mask is considered to be an indicator of 
criminal intent. As long as masks themselves are not seen in this light, there 
might be a way of conciliating these laws with the exercise of rights.306 I will 
assume this understanding for the second kind of laws, although the practice 
and governmental intent often proves the opposite, and will focus my attention 
on ‘general laws.’ 
Some have argued that when the State claims to be preventing crime it is not 
shielded from constitutional objections. I agree. Simoni, for one, argued 
constitutional objections could be drawn from constitutional freedom of 
expression. These objections, he suggests, are of two kinds: direct, when 
                                                        
305 Stephen J. Simoni, “Who goes there?”—Proposing a model anti-mask act, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 
241, 241-3 (1992). Simoni also mentions ‘narrow anti-mask laws,’ “which prohibit mask-
wearing only when the wearer actually seeks the resulting anonymity” (Id. at 243). 
306 This is, in fact, the claim Simoni made when proposing a model anti-mask act. In doing so, 




statutes prohibit the use of masks (which are themselves considered to be 
expressive conduct),307 or indirect, when the prohibition of masks prevents 
people from taking part in what would otherwise be lawful activities.308 Others 
have made a similar claim when noting that in Ghafari v. Municipal Court the 
Court held that a general law intended to be applied to masked student 
demonstrators outside the Iranian Consulate in San Francisco was “overbroad, 
vague, and denied equal protection.”309 
However, putting forth a defense exclusively based on freedom of expression is 
limited in that it requires protesters to show that masks themselves serve an 
expressive purpose—which could be, but is certainly not always, the case of 
masked protesters. In Aryan v. Mackey, Winet notes that a court prevented the 
enforcement of an anti-mask general law against Iranian students who wore 
masks while protesting.310 The court, Winet shows, reasoned the masks 
themselves constituted a form of symbolic speech that deserved constitutional 
protection. The problem with this argument is that the Iranian students 
succeeded in showing the masks themselves were a means of expression, but 
                                                        
307 That laws may end up directly affecting the exercise of freedom of expression can be easily 
seen, Simoni convincingly argued, when considering the kinds of exceptions regulations 
contain. For instance, the use of masks for purposes other than political matters (i.e. 
entertainment) are usually allowed as accepted exceptions. This shows these regulations are 
far from being totally neutral—the argument the State would make to justify regulations are not 
content-based but neutral general laws—and that these regulations therefore do depend on 
“the actor’s message.” Simoni, “Who goes there?”, supra note 305, at 250-1. Richard Parker 
made an argument in favor of anonymity when discussing Abrams v. United States (250 U.S. 
616, 1919). There, the elitist approach he criticized suggested all individuals should express 
themselves unmasked. This approach, Parker contended, contributed to discriminate “against 
expressions of ordinary energy, [that may contribute to further constitutional values such as 
an] ‘uninhibited, robust … wide-open’” debate. Richard D. Parker, “Here the People rule”: A 
constitutional populist manifesto, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 531, 577 (1993). 
308 Id. at 245.  




many others have failed in trying to prove the same.311 This was the case of the 
Klu Klux Klan in Kerik,312 where the court considered the masks worn by the 
Klan’s members were not symbolic speech, but instead “redundant with the 
Klan robes and other regalia;” the masks added “no expressive force to the 
message portrayed by the rest of the outfit.”313 Of course, the same criticism 
may be directed against protesters who, by going to the streets and 
demonstrating, are already expressing their viewpoints. Moreover, in Miller, 314 
the Georgia Supreme Court found that members of the Ku Klux Klan had not 
provided evidence that reprisals are likely to follow.315  
Does privacy protection need to satisfy this high standard? Not necessarily. For 
one, there are many forms of privacy protection that do not require 
uncontrovertibly showing some kind of reprisal will follow.316 Peeping Toms, 
for instance, are legally sanctioned for intruding on spheres of informational 
privacy—as Moore has put it—, and not because the information 
surreptitiously captured pose any specific, let alone uncontrovertibly proved, 
risk such as future threats, harassments, etc.317 In fact, as Moore argues, an 
                                                        
311 Id. at 235. 
312 Church of the American Knight of the Klu Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004). 
313 356 F.3d at 206. 
314 260 Ga. 669 (1990). 
315 Miller, 260 Ga. at 675.  
316 As the Supreme Court of the United States held in McIntyre, 
The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official 
retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as 
much of one's privacy as possible.  
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-2 (1995). It is true that Simoni argues that 
the standard the Court relied on deciding NAACP v. Alabama does not require protection to be 
afforded only before uncontroverted evidence, but only where a reasonable probability of 
threats, harassments and other harms exist. However, NAACP v. Alabama is precisely a case 
where anonymity (in that case of members of a political association) has no expressive purpose 
itself but to enable political participation. Simoni, Model Anti-Mask Act, supra 305, at 265 n.160.  
317 ADAM D. MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS. MORAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 82-7 (2010). 
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individual might not know that his or her privacy has been invaded or the 
specific and ‘uncontroverted’ risks associated with this. The person’s privacy 
would still be affected.318 For another, we are to consider that privacy concerns 
do not rule dignity out of the picture as a sound foundation for privacy 
protection. Many times dignity is actually the underlying value that justifies 
privacy protection. This is the case of continental privacy law which, as 
Whitman has argued,319 rests on personal dignity: 
rights to control your public image—rights to guarantee that people see 
you the way you want to be seen … rights to be shielded against 
unwanted public exposure—to be spared embarrassment or 
humiliation.320  
Could it be that excessively permissible legislation on mask wearing can 
incentivize crime? As Winet notes, ‘criminal anti-mask’ laws are perceived to be 
less effective from the law enforcement viewpoint, for in these situations the 
police should wait for those who are masked to “manifest[] clear intent to 
commit a crime …”.321 I think this depends to a large extent on how much 
anonymity is actually achievable. The fact that, even when we can 
                                                        
318 Id. at 96-7. 
319 James Q. Whitman, The two Western cultures of privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 
1151 (2004). See also, BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY, supra note 267, at 39-46. This 
does not mean that all privacy violations should be treated in exactly the same way nor that 
they all cause the same harms as if they were based on a same essential core. As Solove has 
persuasively argued, privacy is better understood as an umbrella concept encompassing 
several and disparate groups of things and situations. Privacy, in other words, is a “pluralistic 
concept … [that] does not have a uniform value. Its value varies across different contexts 
depending upon which form of privacy is involved and what range of activities are imperiled by 
a particular problem.” SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 155, at 173, 185-7 (arguing 
different countries recognize the same privacy problems). 
320 This distinction, Whitman notes, is certainly a matter of degree. Whitman, The two Western 
cultures of privacy, supra at 319, at 1161-4.  
321 Winet, Face-veil bans and anti-masks laws, supra note 290, at 232. 
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(constitutionally) hold a reasonable expectation of privacy in public, total 
anonymity is impossible to achieve—largely because of the means the State has 
at its disposition—should balance governmental anxiety regarding mask 
wearing at protests. Even when protesters mask their faces, they do so in 
public. They are thus able to keep their identities hidden, but not the fact that 
(when this is the case) they are (publicly) committing a crime.322  
Admittedly, calling authorities’ attention to the importance of these collective 
harms has proven difficult. Courts and legislators do not seem to consider 
harms other than specific injuries, very narrowly understood, to particular 
individuals.323 This narrow approach has prevented them from noticing the 
impact these overreaching regulations on the use of masks and other devices 
have had, and may have, on protesters. Whereas some have suggested tackling 
these harms by paying exclusive attention to individuals’ freedom of 
expression, I think—as I hopefully have showed—that it is better to see 
freedom of expression as another victim (harm) of the scant attention 
protesters’ privacy has received. Put differently, it is not privacy or freedom of 
expression, but two constitutional rights that are to be considered together in 
expanding the scope of the (positive) right to protest. 
Once again, a neglected approach might consider this form of privacy opposed 
to the public role of protests. After all, protesters appear in the public sphere to 
become, by that very act of self-assured visibility, political and recognized. 
However, as I have explained, this form of privacy is not considered as such. As 
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323 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 155, at 179-83. 
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I have been arguing, privacy may actually work as a condition to appear 
publicly. Privacy, here, is the right we have to determine our public image.324 
This is, as you may recall, what Nissenbaum called privacy as ‘contextual 
integrity,’325 that is, the right we have to hold distinct relationships with 
different people and to share different information depending on contexts.326 
Privacy is not a device to seclude us from the outer world, although it may 
operate as such. Rather, it is the power we have to determine “how we present 
ourselves before the world.”327 This right includes our decision to appear and 
pose political arguments (for instance, about how to better understand our 
constitutions) far from the government’s eyes or anonymously. 
 
Conclusions 
We know that rights are not simple entities but they embody a cluster of legal 
positions. This, I have claimed, is also the case of the right to protest. 
Traditional accounts of the right to protest mention both freedom of expression 
and the right to assembly as its foundations. This is what I explained in Chapter 
3. This present chapter, relying on those foundations, has advanced in 
expanding the legal basis of the right to protest. I have sought to show that 
there are other constitutional rights that may also concur in framing the right 
to protest. 
These rights, namely a reconceptualization of the public forum doctrine and the 
right to privacy, as I have argued, expand the force of the right to protest. The 
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325 Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public, supra note 124, at 216. 
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327 Whitman, The two Western cultures of privacy, supra at 319, at 1168 (quoting Rossinio).  
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expansion, as I have been trying to show, can be seen not only in the fact that 
these other rights come to play, thus extending the array of legal positions at 
hand, but also in the fact that it is only by considering these new rights that we 
can notice many situations that otherwise may appear as unrelated to the right 
to protest. This is the case, as I have contended, of privatizations—that one 
could see as simple policies related to the administration of resources—and the 
use of public vigilance—that one could see as simply related to public security 
policies. Instead, I have shown that a new conception of the public forum 
doctrine along with privacy rights can take us to dispute these decisions (such 
as privatizations and public vigilance) in light of how many restrictions they 





POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND SOCIAL PROTEST 
 
I. Popular constitutionalism  
A. Just multitudes?  
B. Foundations 
C. Avenues (to speak) 
II. Popular institutionalism 
A. The need for institutions (avenues to be heard) 




“Here lies the dilemma of the revolutionary within a society unripe for revolution.  
If he stands aside from the main currents of social change, he becomes purist, 
sectarian, without influence. If he swims with the current, he is swept downward by 
the flow of reformism and compromise.” 
E. P. Thompson∗ 
 
                                                      
∗ William Morris, in PERSONS AND POLEMICS, HISTORICAL ESSAYS (1994). I’d like to thank Pedro Lovera 
Parmo for having brought this reading to my attention. 
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Many current social protest movements deal with constitutional matters. This is 
not to say that protesters are themselves conscious about the fact they are reading 
the country’s constitution nor that they are citing specific constitutional provisions 
to the forum—although some of them have done so. However, it means that 
protesters are dealing with the issues they/we most care about.1 In some cases, in 
fact, they are dealing with the bases upon which politics is built. 
Here are some examples: 
In Iceland, massive social protest movements contended their political class was 
unable to cope with financial institutions. Rather than keep a vigilant eye on banks, 
politicians have allowed them to operate as sovereign institutions whose directors, 
different from ordinary citizens, have a direct line with the country’s most 
important political authorities.2 Consequently, and taking note of an old 
aspiration,3 they claimed (although eventually failed) a new constitutional order 
was to be discussed. In Greece, one of the nations where the economic crisis has 
become most tangible, protesters joined their Icelandic counterparts in their 
allegations against the political class—which they already considered gone.4 They 
also made more powerful demands. In struggling with the austerity measures 
imposed by the European Union (EU), protesters claimed Greece’s commitment to 
                                                      
1 MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS (2010). 
2 MANUEL CASTELLS, NETWORKS OF OUTRAGE AND HOPE: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE INTERNET AGE 38-9 
(2012). 
3 Á. TH. Árnason, A Review of the Icelandic Constitution – popular sovereignty or political confusion, 
2011 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR CONSTITUTIONEEL RECHT 342, 343-6 (2011) (arguing Iceland’s Constitution is 
mainly a set of old rules adapted from the old Danish monarchy in 1941). 
4 PAUL W. MASON, WHY IT’S STILL KICKING OFF EVERYWHERE: THE NEW GLOBAL REVOLUTIONS 88-93 (2013). 
244 
 
the EU is to be reviewed on the basis of popular decision-making.5 The indignados 
in Spain followed a similar path; they contended their political class was doomed 
to fail before the power of financial institutions.6 The ‘Occupy’ movements across 
North America were also involved in key political-constitutional matters; those 
camping in New York parks defied their authorities to confront massive financial 
frauds, and their mobilizations and sit-ins also included claims related to job cuts 
in the public sector7 and healthcare reform8. Chilean students and their fellows in 
Quebec also posed crucial matters in the spotlight; while the former argued the 
State should ensure free access to secondary and university education, the latter 
demonstrated against the raising of university fees. In both cases crucial public 
policies, including the definition of key sections of national budgets, were involved. 
Should we be troubled by a multitude of people marching onto the streets to 
influence the way in which the constitution is to be understood? The first part of 
this chapter (I) will discuss this question from a normative viewpoint. By 
presenting the mainstream assumptions liberal constitutionalism has been based 
upon, namely that constitutions are legal codes whose interpretation belongs 
exclusively to courts (and, eventually, lawyers), I shall contend there are new 
constitutional approaches that highlight the decisive role of the people in 
constitutional understanding. Here the role of the people is not only to influence 
                                                      
5 COSTAS DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE IN THE CRISIS 10-5 (2013). 
6 MASON, WHY IT’S STILL KICKING OFF EVERYWHERE, supra note 4, at 216-20. 
7 Id. at 184-7. 





constitutional interpretation, but also to contribute—as long as their claims are 
heard—to its legitimacy. 
The second part (II) will clear up some misunderstanding about popular 
constitutionalism. In fact, popular constitutionalism, although promising to give 
the people a say in constitutional understanding, proposes a mediated process 
where governmental institutions play a key role. The State and its institutions are 
actually the tools the people have to make their popular interpretations of 
constitutions effective. This will take me to consider recent waves of protest, such 
as the indignados or ‘Occupy,’ that have rejected engaging with the State. 
 
I. Popular constitutionalism 
 
This part aims at normatively building the legitimate relation that exists between 
social protest and constitutional law. To do this, I (A) explain the mainstream 
assumptions liberal constitutionalism has been based upon, namely that 
constitutions are legal codes whose interpretation belongs exclusively to courts 
(and, eventually, lawyers). In this landscape, the people themselves are pictured 
(at best) as incompetent to deal with constitutional matters. As I will show, (B) 
popular constitutionalism has rightly contended these assumptions by proposing 
an understanding of constitutions which is open to popular interpretations. While 
all popular constitutionalists share this principled understanding of constitutions, 
they place different emphasis on this openness depending on the governmental 
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branch they highlight as the proper forum for constitutional interpretation. I shall 
close the first section (C) arguing that popular constitutionalism is sympathetic to 
non-institutional means of constitutional exposition, social protests included. 
Thus, under the banner of popular constitutionalism, social protests—as one of the 
means the people resort to in order to advance their own (lay) readings of 
constitutions—are not disruptive of constitutional understanding, but a 
democratic input to its shaping. 
A. Just multitudes? 
Questions about the role of the people in constitutional interpretation are 
particularly pertinent in times of widespread demonstrations and pervasive liberal 
constitutionalism (or at least the most extended version of it).9 For liberalism has 
tended to despise all forms of passion outpouring in politics and claims itself to be 
the throne of reason,10 a view that has certainly impacted the way we see 
constitutions (and their interpretation). By way of equating regular politics to 
passion, conflict and disagreement, constitutions—our most important and 
constitutive commitments—have unsurprisingly been shielded from legislative 
intervention.11  
                                                      
9 I identify three core characteristics of liberal constitutionalism: (a) a written constitution, (b) 
provided with a set of basic constitutional rights and other open-ended provisions, (c) whose 
enforceability and definition depend, in the last judicial instance, on some high court. 
10 See, MICHAEL WALZER, PASSION AND POLITICS: TOWARD A MORE EGALITARIAN LIBERALISM 110 ff. (2006) 
(arguing liberalism itself is an expression of, and has roots in, passions); ANDRÁS SAJÓ, 
CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS (2011) (arguing emotions and sentiments have played a large role in 
shaping our current constitutional institutions). 
11 Of course, this argument normally begs the question regarding foundational moments, where 
politics (and thus passions and sentiments) also have their own way. See, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 20-1 (2012) (discussing that respect for the Constitution steams from 
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This politico-constitutional scenario offers little hope for those advocating a role, 
let alone a paramount one, for the people to directly intervene in constitutional 
politics. As Michael Walzer has argued, the rejection of passions in politics—or, as 
he puts it, of some passions that hegemonic views have catalogued as bad/wrong 
passions—has come at the cost of presenting dangerous sentiments as necessarily 
associated to the people (the plebe) while linking enlightened and considered 
judgment to elites.12 These dangerous sentiments (i.e. a rampant desire to oppress 
those who hold different views) can manifest either when the people are acting 
through their representatives as well as (and most notably) when acting by 
themselves. The key assumption here is, as Jeremy Waldron has argued, the 
rejection of assemblies (of people getting together to decide matters of common 
concern). Legislative assemblies are seen as instances particularly propitious to 
elicit passions and tumultuous disagreements, on the one hand, as well as 
raising—precisely because of the assemblies’ numbers—clear obstacles to rational 
lawmaking, on the other.13 James Madison addressed these alleged obstacles when 
he was dealing with the appropriate number for legislatures; “the number ought at 
most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the confusion and 
intemperance of a multitude.”14 
                                                                                                                                                           
a reasoned decision “to be preferred to decisions made in the heat of a particular political 
moment”). 
12 WALZER, PASSION AND POLITICS, supra note 10, at 121 ff. 
13 JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 28-35 (1999). 
14 THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 275 (James Madison) (Oxford University Press 2008). 
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If this is how legislatures are seen, the people themselves come up worst, for non-
institutional mechanisms of participation are not considered forms of dialogue at 
all. Crowds, gatherings and demonstrations—the argument goes—are per se the 
spaces where passions will flourish.15 
In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion 
never fails to wrest the scepter of reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a 
Socrates every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.16 
Indeed, men and women acting by themselves in constant dispute and 
disagreement are precisely the reasons that call for a civil organization to 
overcome the state of irrationality.17 
Courts, more than any other institutional arrangement, have been vindicated from 
this view. For as Jeremy Waldron has argued, the perverse imagery used to 
describe legislatures (“as deal-making, horse-trading, log-rolling, interest-
pandering, and pork-barreling—as anything, indeed, except principled political 
decision-making”) has been accompanied by an “idealized picture of judging”18 (as 
being “not directly political” and isolated “from the conditions of ordinary life”).19 
                                                      
15 See, SAJÓ, CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 10, at 246-7. 
16 THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 275 (James Madison) (Oxford University Press 2008). 
17 See, STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSION AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 75-8 (1995). 
18 WALDRON, DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 13, at 1-2. That judges are idealized is more than a 
simple exaggeration. See, J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE 
LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 21 (2012) (“The imperfections of democracy 
[intolerant, biased, venal …] are the imperfections of the human condition, which, by the way, have 
not passed the judicial branch by.”).  
19 Id. at 24-5, 31; Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (2004) (claiming that assuming popular constitutionalism postulates would 
mean that “[c]onstitutional interpretation would be transferred from an institution largely 
insulated from political pressure to one that is highly majoritarian”). 
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Their institutional settings—as some have argued20—would allegedly grant them 
the capacity to be shielded against politics (passions, conflicts and factious 
interests).21 In fact, many of liberalism’s most prominent expositors have accorded 
courts—the forum of principles22—the capacity to better articulate “the political 
ideal of a people to govern itself in a certain way” as expressed in the 
constitution.23  
Hence, constitutional law has began to be seen as a lawyers’ bastion and 
consequently (being a kind of law)24 as courts’ exclusive terrain, for courts have 
faced little opposition to setting themselves up as the final readers and expositors 
                                                      
20 See, RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 69-71 (1986) (arguing courts are institutionally 
designed to ensure rights issues will be properly and morally dealt with); Horacio Spector, Judicial 
Review, rights, and democracy, 22 L. & PHIL. 285, 292-3 (2003) (affirming “law ought to secure an 
institutional setting for people to exercise the discursive moral powers associated with moral 
rights,” which he suggests would be courts—“institutional arrangements enabling holders of such 
rights to express their claims and grievances in their own voice and ensuring them a deliberative 
and impartial response”). 
21 BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 9-10 (1991) (arguing the Supreme Court “serve[s] 
democracy by protecting the hard-won principles of a mobilized citizenry against erosion by 
political elites who have failed to gain broad and deep popular support for innovations”). 
22 DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 20, at 2-3, 10-1, 32 (“[S]ociety … promises a forum in 
which his claims about what he is entitled to have will be steadily and seriously considered at his 
demand.”). 
23 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 215-6 (1996) (arguing the Supreme Court has “to explain and 
justify” its decisions on the Constitution, something “the legislative and the executive need not”). He 
would later insist this presents the Supreme Court as an exemplar of public reason, “the only 
branch of government that is visibly on its face the creature of that reason and of that reason 
alone.” Id., at 231 ff. It should be stressed that, even if the argument of judicial settings is not 
convincing enough, there still might be reasons of outcome—as some have argued—to grant courts 
the power to veto legislative decisions. As professor Fallon, Jr. has argued, judicial review might 
“promote[] better outcomes than would exclusive legislative definitions of disputed rights …”. 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The core of an uneasy case for judicial review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (2008). 
But see, JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 56-60 (1980) (arguing we 
should question the “alleged incompatibility between popular input on moral questions and 
‘correct’ moral judgment”). 
24 See generally, STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION & THE PRIDE OR REASON 36-9 (1998) (arguing 
American framers decided to lay down a law-shaped document to institutionalize what they saw as 
‘self-evident’ truths); Larry Alexander, The Constitution as Law, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 103 (1989) 
(arguing stability, predictability, a theory of authority, the interpretation and settlement of conflicts 
all advise that the constitution should be considered the law). 
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of the constitution,25 triggering a shift in public attention from representative 
chambers to judicial halls.26 Constitutions have thus become ‘juricentric.’ This 
means, as Post and Siegel have put it, that judges consider constitutions “as a 
document” that speak only to them.27 It is no wonder judges have been declared 
the constitutions’ exclusive guardians and expositors of its moral, open-ended, and 
vague principles.28 Accordingly, judges—and with them society at large—assume 
that constitutions are legal codes rather than a layman’s document. 
If courts end up being vindicated vis-à-vis parliaments in general depictions of the 
work of politics, the same occurs under ‘juricentric constitutions,’ for here 
parliamentary interpretations of constitutions are seen—when contended—as 
merely transitory before courts. Courts’ decisions are actually expected to either 
                                                      
25 ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 1 (2000) (“‘new 
constitutionalism’ has it that legislation must conform to the dictates of the constitution—as 
interpreted by constitutional courts—or be invalid.”). See also, AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A 
DEMOCRACY 134 (2006) (affirming judges “must give expression to the constitution’s fundamental 
values … [that] act as a basis for judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes.”).  
26 On the relevance of the matters addressed through judicial decisions, see, RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS 
JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 169-99 (2004). 
27 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions 
on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L. J. 1, 2 (2003) (criticizing the role courts played as exclusive 
guardians of the Constitution in spite of popular forms of political engagement). 
28 We find Dworkin to be a fine expositor of this form of constitutional interpretation. RONALD 
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 72-81 (1996) (arguing 
the Constitution guarantees the rights required by the best conception of the political ideals laid 
down in the Constitution—even if those rights are unenumerated). The role of courts in finding 
rights not expressly enshrined in constitutions has been a major issue in the scholarly discussion in 
civil law countries—under the label of ‘neo-constitutionalism.’ Promoted by the introduction of 
constitutional courts, constitutional judges have had no reluctance in interpreting constitutions, 
guiding their decisions and even striking laws down based on the constitution’s broadest and most 
ample provisions. See generally, TEORÍA DEL NEOCONSTITUCIONALISMO [Neo-constitutional Theory] 
(Miguel Carbonell ed., 2007); Paolo Comanducci, Formas de (neo)constitucionalismo: un análisis 
metateórico [Forms of (neo)constitutionalism: a metatheoretical analysis], 16 ISONOMÍA 89, 100-1 
(2002) (emphazising authors like Dworkin endorse an ideology of neo-constitutionalism 




endorse or reject those parliamentary readings, only then conferring these 
decisions a seal of constitutionality. Moreover, a ‘juricentric constitution’ sees 
parliamentary constitutional interpretations as threats to the “Court’s role as the 
‘ultimate expositor of the constitutional text’,”29 and also downgrading politics as 
unable to grasp constitutions’ actual meaning. If the constitution is the superior 
law—the very fact that would grant courts the power to review other branches’ 
acts—, its interpretation becomes “emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department.”30 Courts, judges, lawyers, and precedents have become part 
                                                      
29 Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution, supra note 27, at 3. Also consider the following passages 
taken from ‘juricentric’ decisions: 
This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected 
by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our 
constitutional system. Aaron v. Cooper, 358 U.S. 1, at 18 (1958). 
The framers envision a new strategy for the effectiveness of rights, which consist in giving 
preference to the judge—and not to the executive or the legislator—the responsibility of 
the efficacy of rights. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], junio 5, 1992, 
Sentencia T-406/92 (slip op. at 12), available at 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1992/t-406-92.htm (my translation). 
The Court has been entrusted to finally and definitively interpret the Constitution … the 
court substitutes the will of those involved in the [constitutional] conflict, making its 
opinion prevail over those branches involved. Tribunal Constitucional de Chile, STC Rol No 
591, 11th Jan. 2011, par. 3, 9 (Chile) (my translation). 
This constitutional outlook has now changed. The Knesset is no longer all-powerful in 
exercising its legislative authority. In the area of human rights, the Knesset [parliament] 
has limited its legislative powers by exercising its constituent authority. 
It is the people that determines–according to the social philosophy developed over the 
course of its history–who exercises the highest authority of the State, and its rule of 
recognition. The Court gives expression to this social determination. The Court is the 
faithful interpreter of the people’s will as expressed in the constitution. The Court attempts 
to give the best possible interpretation of the totality of the national experience. Bank 
Mizrahi v. Migdal Cooperative Village, [1995] ISRLR 1, at 142, 188 (Israel). 
The Constitutional Court as the authorized interpreter of the Political Constitution and 
guardian of the integrity of its text, has already well settled the binding character of the 
ratio decidendi of its decisions. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 
22, 2011, Sentencia T-110/11 (slip op. at 8), available at 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2011/t-110-11.htm (my translation). 
30 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
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of our common language, which has resulted in the exaltation of legalistic prose 
when we argue and debate on matters as diverse as life31 and death,32 and war.33 
Arguably, the critique that sees courts as final constitutional expositors may be 
somewhat exaggerated. No matter whether courts see their decisions as final 
constitutional expositions, politics will continue around divisive issues (i.e. 
abortion and same-sex marriage, to name but two), and the constitutional 
amendment alternative—however difficult to meet—will always remain open as a 
valid challenge of judicial (although finally concessive of its supreme) authority.34 
Whereas some scholars have emphasized the fact that courts are but one of the 
participants in a broader and ongoing political dialogue related to constitutional 
meaning,35 others have pointed precisely to the force and circumstances of politics 
that prevent courts from monopolizing constitutional understanding,36 including 
                                                      
31 Kelly J. Hollowell, Defining a person under the Fourteenth Amendment: a constitutionally and 
scientifically based analysis, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 67 (2001-2) (referring to the “fourteenth 
amendment person”).   
32 Dworkin asked in Chapter 5 of his Freedom’s Law: “do now we have a right to die?” DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 28, at 130; Vacco et al. v. Quill et al., 521 U.S. 793, 793-4 (1997) (“The 
distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient die is important, logical, rational, 
and well established: It comports with fundamental legal principles of causation.”).  
33 William J. Ronan, English and American courts and the definition of war, 31 AM. J. INTL’ L. 642 
(1937) (noticing courts have had a say in the definition of ‘war’ and/or ‘state of war’ when dealing 
with domestic statutes). 
34 John N. Hostettler & Thomas W. Washburne, The Constitution’s Final Interpreter: We the People, 8 
REGENT U. L. REV. 13, 19-20 (1997) (arguing that if constitutional amendments are a check against 
judicial supremacy, it means that we have already affirmed the court’s supremacy). 
35 KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001). 
36 Carol Nackenoff, Is there a political tilt to “juristocracy”?, 65 MD. L. REV. 139, 147-8 (2006) 
(arguing that even if judicial decisions were final constitutional expositions, political deliberations 
teach that a single issue has several other related aspects at stake); see also, ROACH, THE SUPREME 
COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 35, at 31-2 (arguing that, despite certain exceptions—most notably in 
the American case—, legislatures almost always can respond to a court’s decisions with legislation). 
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strategies legislators display to walk (that is, legislate) around judicial 
constitutional interpretations.37 
Possible exaggerations aside, some constitutional theories have correctly reacted 
against too much emphasis on ‘juricentric’ interpretations of constitutions. These 
approaches have highlighted the role of the people, as I will specify, either directly 
or indirectly in reading the constitution. Under the rubric of popular 
constitutionalism, scholars have questioned the role of courts as exclusive 
constitutional expositors and, by suggesting different institutional arrangements, 
have vindicated the people’s involvement in having a (crucial) say in key 
constitutional issues.  
Highlighting popular involvement in constitutional understanding, popular 
constitutionalism seems promising before politico-constitutional demands posed 
by current social protest movements.38 The following sections explore the 
foundations of popular constitutionalism. They argue popular constitutionalism 
reacts against juricentric and jurispathic courts in order to stress the role of the 
people in constitutional interpretation. It ends noting social protests—the people 
                                                      
37 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 17-21 (1999).  
38 Although it may be claimed that this is not entirely so, for, as I shall suggest, popular 
constitutionalism assumes social movements always present their claims before institutional 
authorities. Hence, it is unprepared to answer those constitutional visions running parallel to 
formal avenues of political decision. In fact, what recent demonstrations have shown, as in the case 
of Greek aganaktismenoi, Spanish indignados, and worldwide occupiers, is that large sections of 
protesters are not interested in delivering any claims before their political authorities. As I said at 
the beginning, they see their authorities as co-opted by large financial institutions and unable to 
protect the people—let alone to channel democratic self-government. Bringing politico-
constitutional demands to the formal forum would amount, they claim, to (re) recognizing their 
political capacity and legitimacy, exactly what they are contesting. I will argue the (constitutional) 
advantage of engaging in institutional dialogue below, thus contending the withdrawal strategy 
indignados and occupiers resorted to. 
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on the streets—are one among many avenues to pose popular and cultural 
readings of constitutions. 
B. Foundations 
The whole constitution is not judicially enforced,39 nor the constitutional text 
exhausts what we understand as constitutional matters—the issues we care about 
the most.40 However, as experience shows, many of those sections of the 
constitution that reach court chambers are the ones that provoke large and heated 
disagreements.41 In fact, it is the political salience of these issues what brings both 
courts and the constitution into the spotlight. As noted above, courts—whether 
acting as supreme courts or constitutional tribunals—have found the way to erect 
themselves as the constitution’s final expositors. Therefore, the issues we most 
care about are, although primarily sketched by political branches, eventually 
judicially determined.  
It is not only that courts (non-elected bodies) have the final say, but also that they 
diminish society’s jurisgenerative capacity. Some thirty years ago Robert Cover 
called our attention to the jurisgenerative powers of society expressed through 
different cultural medium.42 Laywomen and laymen exercise jurisgenerative 
power—the capacity to create legal meaning—, through which they develop 
                                                      
39 LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 84-92 
(2004). 
40 TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS, supra note 1; ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 9 (2003) 
(“written constitutions are not complete codes capable of answering all constitutional questions. 
Indeed no written constitution could ever be.”). 
41 TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 37, at 10-1 
42 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term. Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 11 (1983-4). 
255 
 
“alternative stories [that] provide normative bases for the growth of distinct 
constitutional worlds.”43 They all look to the same authoritative constitutional text, 
where there is one, but suggest different narratives as to its meaning. This 
multifarious array of societal-constitutional meanings show—Cover believed—
that there is no “authoritative narrative regarding its significance.”44   
What is the role supreme or constitutional courts play here? According to Cover’s 
view, courts act in a ‘jurispathic’ fashion. Judges are people of violence whose job is 
not to “create law, but to kill it”—he wrote.45 This should not come as a surprise. 
Cover wrote this landmark piece when there was growing distrust toward the 
State and disenchantment with the possibilities of conceiving it in a fashion other 
than as the exercise of pure brute force.46 Therefore, the State, and courts 
accordingly, exercises force that destroys legal meaning(s) by imposing the official 
view. Indeed, they are here to solve the problem of the “fecundity of the 
jurisgenerative principle.”47 When they do so, claiming such hermeneutic 
superiority backed up by force, they shut down the “creative hermeneutic of 
principle that is spread throughout our communities.”48 
This is the scenario popular constitutionalism reacts against. It reacts against 
courts that are both juricentric—those that hold an interpretation that sees the 
                                                      
43 Id. at 19. 
44 Id. at 17. 
45 Id. at 53. 
46 Robert C. Post, Who’s Afraid of Jurispathic Courts?: Violence and Public Reason in Nomos and 
Narrative, 17 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 9 (2005).  
47 Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 42, at 40. 
48 Id. at 44. 
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constitution as speaking exclusively to them—and jurispathic—those that aim at 
killing non-judicial, but above all non-official, interpretations of the constitution. 
Popular constitutionalism disputes the role of judges as the exclusive readers of 
the constitution. It believes that our constitutional normative coordinates are 
generated from avenues other than the formal corridors of judicial chambers. In 
other words, they contend it is up to the people to have (at the least) a say 
(although some argue the final say) on the meaning and extension of the crucial 
matters principled constitutional provisions address. Popular constitutionalists 
also argue there are many ways through which the people can channel the legal 
meanings they envision; social protests are one among them.49 
The core of popular constitutionalism can be stated in the following way: the 
people should have a say on constitutional matters50—the final say, in fact. 
Accordingly, any institutional arrangement seeking to take constitutional decisions 
                                                      
49 Despite the argument he later develops, the example Larry Kramer cites in one of the many 
quotes he uses in opening one of the most important books published on the matter is remarkable: 
“Saturday, July 18, 1795. At least 5,000 people gathered in front of Federal Hall in New 
York to protest the Jay Treaty … Hamilton mounted the steps of a nearby building 
surrounded by supporters and began to speak … someone in the crowd allegedly threw a 
rock that hit Hamilton in the head. Similar scenes were repeated around the country.” 
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 4 (2004). 
50 Many popular constitutionalists claim to be accounting for U.S. history rather than posing a 
normative claim. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 49, at 7; Robert C. Post & Reva B. 
Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 25-6 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. 
Siegel eds., 2009); see also, Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICHIGAN LAW 
REVIEW 2596, 2598-9 (2002-2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court has always been responsive to 
public opinion, “albeit not in the precise from in which [popular constitutionalists] ask for it.”). 
Here I am extracting popular constitutionalism’s main traits in a rather normative fashion.  
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away from the people suffers from a key democratic deficit.51 Certainly the idea 
that popular opinion should set bounds on every democratic government (as the 
final touchstone of political and constitutional decisions) has taken many shapes in 
the minds of those who advocate public opinion’s crucial role. 
In his seminal piece on the matter Richard Parker advocated a majoritarian 
reading of constitutional law.52 He attacked elitist constitutionalism which—in his 
view—saw (as it currently sees) the political energy of ordinary people as a 
problem and normally attached to values that run against (what they consider to 
be) a good government: emotions, ignorance, short-sightedness, impulsiveness, 
and so on.53 By claiming to rescue a populist sensibility, Parker vindicated the 
participation of the people in constitutional matters, an approach also 
accompanied by a reconsideration of the role emotions play.54 
Parker did not claim the people’s voice to be infallible, but sovereign, or that the 
government should be responsive to it.55 This required, as he noted, to 
reconceptualize constitutional law as open, rather than essentially contrary, to 
majority rule. He brightly dismissed claims about the alleged tyranny of the 
                                                      
51 As will be clear below, the democratic deficit stems from depriving the people from having the 
final say and not—as it could not be in the context of representative democracies—from erecting 
institutions in charge of being responsive to public opinion. 
52 Richard D. Parker, “Here the People rule”: A constitutional populist manifesto, 27 VALPARAISO 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 531, 532 (1993). 
53 Id. at 553-4. To him our attitudes toward the people were crucial when determining the role they 
are to play in politics. Id., at 532 (arguing precisely that our attitudes to the energy of ordinary 
people define what we think “should be the mission of constitutional law … and the proper form of 
reasoning about their derivation, definition, and application.”). 
54 Id. at 557. 
55 Id. at 556. 
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majorities by arguing experience shows majorities seldom rule.56 In regards to 
apathy he argued this was a consequence of elitist constitutionalism that can be 
counteracted; it is the appropriation, and privatization, of constitutional law by 
lawyers and judges what has taken ordinary people not to participate, rather than 
a presumed lack of interest.57  
Accordingly, Parker reframed the role of constitutional law with a new mission: “to 
promote majority rule … the goal inspiring argument about ‘interpretation’ of the 
Constitution ought to be government of, for, and—to the extent it is feasible—by 
the majority of the people.”58 People can certainly not be forced to participate, but 
their intervention is to be encouraged by criticizing action or inaction “that tends 
to frustrate opportunity for the effective exertion of ordinary political energy”59 
and by reframing under this sensibility the exercise of much-praised political 
rights.60  
Parker certainly believed constitutional matters were of utmost importance, but he 
contended they were to be (exclusively) read in a legal fashion. This is why he 
called to deflate constitutional discourse, admitting at its heart lays “political 
controversy about democracy, and about what it can be and what it should be.”61 
                                                      
56 Id. at 558-61, 569-71. 
57 Id. at 561. 
58 Id. at 573. 
59 Id. at 574. 
60 Id. at 577-9. I will say something about this below. For the time being, it is enough to notice that 
current answers to popular challenges take the following form: political participation rights are 
open to all. However, as Parker argues, that is not enough to overcome the elitist approach, for 
rights are not exercised by the majority, on the one hand, and not every form of exercise is 
protected, on the other, as only certain (most of the time, judicially-) accepted fashions are covered. 
61 Id. at 580. 
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In fact, the terms of constitutional debate are “not so different from the terms of 
ordinary political argument.”62 Notwithstanding the fact judges wear robes, 
lawyers wear suits, and they talk in inflated terminology, “no fancy ‘theory,’ no 
obsessive ‘methodology,’ can hide the fact that, like any argument, constitutional 
argument appeals—at the bottom—to ordinary, competing sensibilities, 
competing emotions.”63 
As noted above, arguments favoring the role of courts in constitutional 
interpretation came at the expense of the role of the representative branches and 
ultimately of the people. Popular constitutionalism assault, as can be seen in 
Parker’s work, turned the equation around. Accordingly, this resulted in a 
vindicated role for legislatures in constitutional matters and a direct contention of 
judicial review—seen as the very artifact to impose final constitutional readings. 
Mark Tushnet, for example, called to take the constitution away from courts.64 
First, he rejects that courts can fix political rules through their rulings. Judicial 
decisions settle the particular dispute they are passed on, but cannot stand as 
general political rules binding representative branches.65 Vital questions affecting 
the whole people—Tushnet argues referring to Lincoln—are to be decided by the 
people themselves and their representatives.66  
                                                      
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 37. 




To determine what are the vital questions affecting the whole people, Tushnet has 
us consider what he labels the “thin Constitution:”67 ample and vague principles 
taken by the people to be a political, rather than judicial, rule. These principles are 
(also) to be found beyond the constitutional text.68 The (thin) constitution can be 
read in several ways as disagreement looms large on politico-constitutional 
matters. Judicial decisions seldom bring these disagreements to an end. This is true 
partly because political branches often find ways to circumvent the core of a 
judicial decision—a practical way out that does not challenge, and can actually 
exists together with, judicial supremacy.69 But above all it is true because of the 
normative stance populist constitutionalism takes: that the political constitution 
belongs to the people. These disagreements—Tushnet argues accordingly—are 
“best conducted by the people, in the ordinary venues for political discussion.”70 
Political disagreements, therefore, are best conducted by the people, but not in a 
vacuum. These discussions, where people should have a vital say, take place in the 
regular venues of political debate. This, Tushnet implies, shows the relevance of 
politics, politicians and institutional avenues, as long as these avenues are 
popularly informed. In Tushnet’s words: 
                                                      
67 Id. at 11. 
68 Id. at 12-3. 
69 Id. at 17-21, 23. 
70 Id. at 14. 
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Discussions among the people are not discussions by the people alone, 
however. Politics does not occur without politicians, and political leaders 
play an important role in the account of populist constitutional law ….71  
Giving the people a say in key constitutional matters not only makes them 
participants in the common government,72 it also makes them own the 
constitution73 and embrace it politically, thus shielding its content (though always 
open to contestation).74 In Tushnet’s words, what limits governments are not 
rights contained in texts, but those publicly and politically fought.75 As he puts it 
citing Madison, 
‘The political truths declared in that solemn manner [in a constitutional 
text] acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free 
Government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, 
counteract the impulses of interest and passion.’76 
                                                      
71 Id. An important part of Tushnet’s argument is devoted to showing the role of politicians and, 
among them, leaders who are able to conduct and canalize the views of the people (this is actually a 
two-sided dialogue) to identify when vital constitutional issues are at stake (id., at 23-5). Tushnet 
has recently insisted on this point; if rights and (vital) constitutional arrangements are better 
defended when politically embedded in the national sentiment, then the reason why the 
constitution matters is because it sets the frame for politics to happen and function.  
The Constitution matters because it provides a structure for our politics. It’s politics, not 
‘the Constitution,’ that is the ultimate—and sometimes the proximate—source of whatever 
protection we have for our fundamental rights. 
TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS, supra note 1, at 1. 
72 TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 37, at 182-5 (arguing the 
constitution set the terms of political discourse thus uniting us as a people). 
73 Id. at 180-2 
74 Id. at 185 (“populist constitutionalism does not dictate the position we must take on affirmative 
action. Instead, it sets the terms of discourse.”). 
75 Id. at 167. 
76 Id. at 167. 
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Jeremy Waldron has examined in greater depth constitutional disagreement and 
the adequate institutional avenue to democratically address, rather than to 
resolve, this disagreement. He offers a vindicated role for legislatures, along with 
arguments against judicial review of legislation.77 
Members of a political community need to make (as we make) decisions on 
matters of common concern.78 This is what he calls the ‘circumstances of politics,’ 
“the felt need among the members of a certain group for a common framework or 
decision or course of action on some matter …”.79 Of course, what decisions should 
be made will be subject to the burdens of pluralism and disagreement. People in 
modern communities disagree on crucial matters—we “disagree with one another 
every bit as much as strenuously about rights as [we] do about social justice and 
public policy.”80 The harder the issues we have to address (i.e. the treatment we 
should accord one another to respect a common, although unspecified, 
commitment to equality), the more difficult the decisions will be.81 
With this background of disagreement in mind Waldron argues that legislatures 
are avenues of collective decision that account for, rather than just hide or wish 
                                                      
77 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). Waldron has concentrated what he called “the 
core” (meaning a process-based analysis independent of historical considerations and specific 
manifestations) of the arguments against judicial review in his The Core of the Case against Judicial 
Review, 116 YALE L. J. 1346 (2006). 
78 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 77, at 15-6.  
79 Id. at 101-2. 
80 Id. at 11-2. 
81 Id. at 12. Waldron persuasively argues that “it is a mistake to think that the more important the 
question, the more straightforward or obvious the answer.” 
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away, those disaccords.82 Legislation, in fact, shows the possibilities of 
“achievement of concerted, co-operative, co-ordinated, or collective action,” even 
in the face of pluralism.83 More importantly, legislation permits the kind of 
achievements Waldron talks about in a democratic fashion. This is so as 
legislatures open spaces respectful of each individual’s moral (and democratic) 
agency. By recognizing politico-constitutional disagreement and pluralism 
(“differences of opinion about justice”), legislatures respect each individual’s moral 
responsibility to address matters of common concern by “embod[ying] a principle 
of respect for each person in the processes by which we settle on a view to be 
adopted as ours even in the face of disagreement.”84 
Proponents of judicial review of legislation, the faculty granted to courts to review 
legislative outcomes, normally point out the need to protect minorities from the 
predatory self-interests of those voting. However, Waldron argues this overlooks 
the moral autonomy accorded to individuals to have their own say about common 
matters.85 Likewise, it denies that voting can be public-spirited and based on good 
faith disagreement about common concerns.86 In fact, matters we care most about 
are routinely what Waldron terms partial conflicts; we need/want to address 
                                                      
82 Id. at 16, 99 (“Legislation is the product of a complex deliberative process that takes 
disagreement seriously and that claims its authority without attempting to conceal the contention 
and division that surrounds its enactment.”). 
83 This is already, Waldron notes, a reason to respect legislative outcomes: the fact that, even in the 
face of looming disagreements, we can still coordinate actions and reach decisions—however 
always open to contestation. Id. at 101-5. 
84 Id. at 109.  
85 Id. at 14 (arguing proponents of judicial review claim respect for the rights that will protect our 
autonomy as equal moral agents while at the same time majorities are described as “irresponsible 
Hobbesian predators”). 
86 Id. at 14-5. 
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matters of (say) social justice, but we (reasonably) differ as to the specific 
outcome.87 Finally, and most importantly, this alternative merely transfers 
disagreement from one chamber, popular and representative, to another, elitist 
and isolated.88 As he puts it, 
Judges disagree among themselves along exactly the same lines as the 
citizens and representatives do, and … make their decisions, too, in the 
courtroom by majority voting.89 
                                                      
87 Id. at 103-5. This reference to issues of common concern we all address opens room in Waldron 
(although in a fashion different from which he would hold) to accept judicial review—or any other 
form of review—when decisions involved exclusively affect (or address) the interests of a single 
(however difficult to define) group, even if the group is not formally excluded from participating in 
the legislative debates. Consider, for instance, Roemer, where the U.S. Supreme Court considered a 
California constitutional amendment passed against a political minority. As it is well known, the 
amendment stated that “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation” would be barred from being 
considered legal “basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority 
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). The Court held that this was a measure specially passed against a minority group. It stated, 
we doubt, homosexuals could find some safe harbor in laws of general application, we 
cannot accept the view that Amendment 2’s prohibition on specific legal protections does 
no more than deprive homosexuals of special rights. To the contrary, the amendment 
imposes a special disability upon those persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the 
safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint” (Romer, 517 U.S. at 631). 
Some authors have developed a theory of judicial review limited to these kinds of cases, situations 
in which courts, instead of focusing on discovering the fundamental values hidden in the 
constitution, should—as Ely put it—keep political processes open to all viewpoints “on something 
approaching an equal basis.” ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 23, at 79. 
This is a case different from the situation where groups whose interests are addressed (most of the 
case minority groups) are excluded from the discussion (something Waldron concedes, WALDRON, 
LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 77, at 297). This exclusion does not necessarily need to be 
formal; as we can imagine—as Ely did—, it can be in subtler forms of non-recognition as well. Cécil 
Fabre has argued in a similar vein, but with the purpose of opposing Waldron, that not every debate 
about rights is always about “rights all members have.” She also mentions the case where “the 
legislature decides whether homosexuals should be granted all the rights heterosexuals have,” a 
case where they are clearly addressing “rights for one group of the population, to wit homosexuals.” 
Cécile Fabre, The Dignity of Rights, 20 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 271, 277-8 (2000) (her emphasis). 
88 This is not just a transferring of a decision method from one chamber to another; “is a difference 
of constituency.” WALDRON, DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 13, at 128-9.  
89 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 77, at 15.  
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In a context where disagreement cannot be eliminated, granting judges judicial 
review faculties amounts to an elitist approach to constitutional matters where 
disagreements among citizens are seen not as politically relevant as disaccords 
among judges.90 In fact, Waldron correctly points out that “citizens may well feel 
that if disagreements on these matters are to be settled by counting heads, then it 
is their heads or those of their accountable representatives that should be 
counted.”91 In the end, a constitutional scheme where judges monitor (let alone 
make final) constitutional interpretations becomes politically arbitrary;92 
meanwhile, it also denigrates the people’s moral agency as equals to define the 
issues of principle affecting them.93 This, Waldron agues, ignores the central role 
the right to participation (‘the right of rights’) plays and represents as the means 
through which we, in concert, govern common affairs.94 It is up to “[t]he people 
whose rights are in question [to] have the right to participate on equal terms on 
that decision.”95 
A similar stance can be identified in Adam Tomkins’ work.96 According to Tomkins, 
granting judges the enormous power to overrule political decisions, as if this 
                                                      
90 Disagreement among citizens, as the argument favoring judicial review goes, is equated to 
passion, obscured reason and self-interest, whereas disaccord among judges is seen as debates 
regarding the terms of law, as a genuine disagreement about reason and justice. Fernando Atria, 
¿Qué desacuerdos valen? La respuesta legalista [What disagreements matter? The legalist answer], 8 
IUS ET PRAXIS 419 (2002). 
91 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 77, at 15. 
92 Id. at 168 (“In this democratic sense, ‘arbitrary’ means something like ‘without authority or 
legitimacy’.”). 
93 Id. at 249. 
94 Id. at 233.  
95 Id. at 244. 
96 TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW, supra note 40; ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2005). 
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would prevent discretionary decisions from being made, is pure wishful thinking. 
In the face of political disagreement, the kind of disagreement we face when 
determining the details of constitutions, the only thing that the legal 
constitutionalist model does is replace one avenue to make political decisions 
(legislatures) “with untrammeled judicial discretion.”97  
Worse still, by placing political decisions in the hands of judges, Tomkins argues 
we risk being dominated by decisions made in an undemocratic and unaccountable 
fashion.98 In fact, legal constitutionalism trusts crucial policy questions in the 
hands of judges whose decisions will impact citizens, while citizens will lack any 
power to affect these decisions. Indeed, “unlike those who in a democracy fold 
political office, judges are neither democratically elected, accountable, nor 
representative.”99 Besides the fact that access to courts is limited to those who can 
afford lawyers’ fees,100 it is the very nature of the judicial forum what critically 
alters the profile of decisions there made. Instead of producing public (common) 
oriented decisions,101 courts offer an environment where decisions are adjudicated 
between two parties, a setting which happens to ‘privatize’ what was (but now 
ceases to be) a common matter open “to any reason … at any time” before the 
political branches.102 
                                                      
97 TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, at 22. On the role Tomkins sees for courts, 
see Adam Tomkins, The Role of Courts in the Political Constitution, 60 U. TORONTO L. J. 1 (2010). 
98 TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, at 25. 
99 TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW, supra note 40, at 21. 
100 Id. at 19-20.  
101 Of course Tomkins is not suggesting judicial decisions lack any public impact. 
102 TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, at 27-30. 
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How should the democratic shortfalls of legal constitutionalism be addressed? It 
should do so by turning our attention to the political constitution. A political 
constitution—Tomkins contends while explaining public law in England—is one 
whose implementation depends on the actions and policy decisions of a 
“responsible government,”103 one that is responsible to the people. A political 
constitution creates a dynamic between citizens and public officials that courts do 
not. In this scenario, “governments will not do things which they cannot politically 
get away with,”104 for they will feel the people’s pressure; in other words, “they 
will lose power.”105  
How is it that a political constitution secures this control? By trusting decisions 
over political matters to fora which are open and accessible to all.106 Different from 
courts, which legally shield their decisions passed in chambers isolated from 
political pressure, a political constitution seeks to secure public decisions—
whether good decisions or bad decisions—will be the people’ own decisions. To 
claim control and authorship over political decisions, these decisions are to be 
made in a forum that citizens can control and have power over.107 Of course, this 
model demands an active role from citizens, who are to act in a public-spirit 
fashion and oriented toward the common good.108 Public contestation and active 
engagement are necessary conditions to create the dynamic and interaction that 
                                                      
103 Id. at 1. 
104 TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW, supra note 40, at 19. 
105 Id. 
106 TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, at 51-2. 
107 Id. at 57-61. 
108 Id. at 62-3. 
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permits popular control. To clarify, Tomkins does not argue there is any way to 
eliminate governmental discretion.109 Rather, Tomkins insists we should ask 
ourselves what forum we should trust with the power to regulate such discretion. 
His answer admits no waver: if a community wants to have control over its 
decisions, then the people should grant this regulatory power to the political 
branches they have better access to. 
Not all popular constitutionalists have taken the courts out of the picture. There 
are those who, like Larry Kramer, have argued courts play a role, however modest, 
in a larger constitutional deliberation that takes place among the different 
governmental branches all under the people’s supervision. More tellingly, Robert 
Post and Reva Siegel have affirmed that popular constitutionalism can actually be 
conciliated with judicial supremacy, as long as courts (or the superior court) are 
responsive to cultural and popular interpretations.110 
Larry Kramer published what has become one of the most important pieces on 
popular constitutionalism.111 According to Kramer, American history shows the 
people have had a relevant role in understanding, interpreting and enforcing the 
constitution. More importantly, this is a role the people have played for the most 
part outside courts.112 Kramer does not contend courts should not play a role at all. 
Instead, what he suggests, read in a normative fashion—and in what has become 
                                                      
109 See, TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, at 34-5. 
110 Both approaches, as I mentioned before, claim to be describing, rather than prescribing, how 
American constitutionalism has developed. Here I’m interested in proposing what would be the 
theoretical principles behind that positive account. 
111 KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 49. 
112 Id., at 7. 
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one of the most important variants of popular constitutionalism—, is that courts 
should not have a final say as to how the constitution is to be interpreted. His is an 
argument against judicial supremacy. 
What matters for this variant of popular constitutionalism is that the people be 
accorded the preponderant role in defining the constitution. Its paramount 
objective is to make it clear that “courts have no normative priority in the 
conversation” or in the constitutional dialogue among the different actors. As 
Tushnet—commenting on Kramer—has put it, “for popular constitutionalism, it 
simply does not matter whether, or when, or how, the courts come to accept the 
constitutional interpretation offered by the people themselves.”113 This is why 
Kramer highlights the people’s vigilant role. The constitution, he argues, 
“remained, fundamentally, an act of popular will … made by the people … who 
were responsible for seeing that it was properly interpreted and implemented.”114  
If the people are to perform such a paramount role, there is obviously something 
crucial we lose in terms of democratic self-government when the constitution is 
understood as a legal text. In that scenario, as the professionalization of law 
shows,115 the constitution becomes the terrain of lawyers and its reading their 
monopoly. Judicial supremacy, meaning that courts have the final authority in 
expounding the constitution, is therefore at odds with popular 
                                                      
113 Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991, 999 (2006). 
114 KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 49, at 6. 
115 Id., at 162-6. 
270 
 
constitutionalism,116 for in such a model the people are deprived from taking part 
in the republican process of shaping their constitution, while judges find a free 
means to erect themselves as the constitution’s final expositors. 
Interestingly, Kramer shows there is an important burden on the people. Judges 
will never relinquish the power they have acquired, nor should we expect the 
constitution itself to return to the people’s control. Rather, it is up to the people 
(“the choice is ours to make”)117 to claim the role they never should have been 
deprived of: that of being sovereign interpreters of the constitution. If a model of 
judicial supremacy rests upon a constitution legally understood, and thus to be 
exclusively read by judges, the first step is to claim the constitution back to the 
people.118 The people should make courts aware that they are “our servant[s] and 
not our master[s] … who [are] ultimately supposed to yield to our judgments about 
what the Constitution means and not the reverse.”119 In other words, supreme 
courts or constitutional courts, whatever the form they take, should come “to see 
themselves in relation to the public somewhat as lower court judges now see 
themselves in relation to the court: responsible for interpreting the Constitution 
according to their best judgment, but with an awareness that there is a higher 
authority out there with the power to overturn their decisions.”120 
                                                      
116 And an anomaly in American history, as Kramer saw it. Id., at 233. 
117 Id., at 247. 
118 Id. 
119 Id., at 248. 
120 Id., at 253. 
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Kramer’s book not only elicited revived interest in the role of the people in 
constitutional politics, but sparked heated debate as well. Many of the critiques 
pointed toward his historical account,121 while others focused on the proposal 
itself.122 Perhaps this was what took Kramer to offer a new account of his work 
where, despite defending the main argument, courts play a more relevant role than 
the humble enforcement function depicted in The People Themselves. 
To begin with (I borrow here a doubt posed by Alexander and Solum), when 
Kramer argues the people themselves have authority to interpret and enforce the 
constitution, does he really mean the people “have the authority to resolve 
ambiguities in constitutional meaning or to provide supplemental constructions 
when constitutional language is vague?”123 It might be that Kramer is not talking of 
the people themselves, understood as a collective entity acting by itself, but 
through institutions of representative democracy.124 In fact, in his later work 
Kramer argues the foundations of popular constitutionalism are to be understood 
as linked to majority rule as the result of a deliberative interaction between all 
                                                      
121 L. A. Powe, Jr., Are “The People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)? 83 TEX. L. REV. 855 
(2005) (arguing Kramer’s historical analysis of the past fifty years is deeply flawed); Richard 
Posner, The People’s Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Jul. 19, 2004 (“Kramer's treatment of the history of the 
struggle between popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy after the end of Martin Van 
Buren's presidency in 1841 is just a sketch, occupying only twenty pages in a long book”). 
122 Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism? 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1602 
ff. (2005) (arguing Kramer’s concept of popular constitutionalism is “deeply ambiguous at best and 
deeply confused at worst”). 
123 Id., at 1603. 
124 This is one of the critiques Alexander and Solum made; they ask whether Kramer is using the 
idea of the people as signifying an “organic whole capable of collective action” or as “the collection 
of human persons who are citizens or residents of a particular polity” (Id., at 1606-07). 
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three branches, all “to be subject to popular control.”125 While he remains 
committed to popular constitutionalism, in the sense of seeing the people’s direct 
interventions (protests) as politically legitimate, Kramer also suggests those 
popular readings become institutionally depurated. 
Finally, there are those who, like Robert Post and Reva Siegel, think it is possible to 
reconcile popular constitutionalism with judicial supremacy. The label they have 
chosen is democratic constitutionalism,126 which emphasizes the role of the people 
in culturally shaping constitutional understandings.127 It strongly asserts the role 
of the people as the touchstone of constitutional decisions made by institutional 
actors. Among institutional actors democratic constitutionalism places a strong 
emphasis on courts and judicial review. Its exponents do not see a radical 
opposition between the people as constitutional rulers, on the one hand, and 
judicial supremacy, on the other.128 
First, democratic constitutionalism understands constitutional law as decisively 
influenced by the people through interactions with (judicial) authorities. It sees 
cultural readings of the constitution, “the beliefs and values of nonjudicial 
                                                      
125 Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and the 
Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697 (2006). 
126 I have taken this label from Post & Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, supra note 50. 
127 Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (2003-4). 
128 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departamentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 
92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2004) (“In contrast to Kramer, we do not understand judicial supremacy 
and popular constitutionalism to be mutually exclusive systems of constitutional ordering.”). 
However, they understand constitutional law and popular constitutionalism to stand in a dialectical 
relation. Id., at 1029; Post, Fashioning the legal Constitution, supra note 127, at 8.  
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actors,”129 as informing institutional decisions. These interactions are dialectically 
interconnected;130 the people express their views about constitutional meaning in 
contestation of longstanding readings of the constitution, but they do so in a frame 
of common principles—whose very understanding is in dispute. As Post has put it, 
“constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture.”131 These 
disagreements and interactions thus create a constitutional culture, that is, 
“understandings of role and practices of argument that guide interactions among 
citizens and officials in matters concerning the Constitution’s meaning.”132 
Two further elements are crucial to understand democratic constitutionalism: the 
way in which popular readings of the constitution are advanced and how these 
popular readings limit institutional outcomes. 
Although democratic constitutionalism acknowledges there are formal ways to 
inform courts’ constitutional readings (voting in elections or judicial nominations, 
to name a few),133 it also vindicates the politico-constitutional role social 
movements play. It contends, therefore, that constitutional change may be 
achieved by non-canonical procedures134 of norm contestation.135 Norm 
                                                      
129 Post, Fashioning the legal Constitution, supra note 127, at 8. 
130 Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 50, at 1029. 
131 Post, Fashioning the legal Constitution, supra note 127, at 8. Robert Post has also explained 
different understandings of, and relations among, culture and law. Robert C. Post, Law and Cultural 
Conflict, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 485 (2003). 
132 Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The 
Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006). 
133 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 373, 380 (2007). 
134 Post & Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, supra note 50, at 28 (“Article V amendments, 
however, are so very rare that they cannot provide an effective avenue for connecting 
constitutional to popular commitments.”).  
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contestation through social mobilization rests upon the recognition of the 
jurisgenerative capacity of the people themselves.136 The fact that the people 
themselves are vested with jurisgenerative capacity also shows that the limit 
between law and politics is far from being sharply determined, and thus becomes 
blurred.137 However, this jurisgenerative capacity is limited as not any cultural 
interpretation is constitutional. What indicates that these mobilizations are 
constitutional law is the fact that they are explicitly related to the constitution,138 
for remember that constitutional law comes from below, but at the same time it 
also limits culture. The dialectical nature of constitutional culture is evident; 
                                                                                                                                                           
135 Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 133, at 381. 
136 Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 42. 
137 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 132, at 5 
138 Post, Fashioning the legal Constitution, supra note 127, at 9. What interpretations and proposals 
are related to the constitution can have at least two different, yet complementary, approaches. A 
formal approach would assert that what defines an interpretation as constitutional depends on its 
reference to the text of the constitution. A substantive approach, on the other hand, will emphasize 
the political strength of the claim; it will be constitutional as long as it is related to the fundamental 
issues we most care about. Reva Siegel, for instance, commenting on what she calls the public value 
condition—that popular claims are to be framed as public values to be constitutionally sound—will 
work as long as challengers are able to present their claims (concerns, grievances) framed under 
common values. Where are we to find these common values? Claims, she goes on, should be 
presented as required by the principles that are consistent “with principles and memories of a 
constitutional tradition.” Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 132, at 37. This loose 
understanding of what the constitutional is as located inside-outside the constitutional text has 
been also advocated by TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 37, at 
187 ff. (claiming populist constitutionalism focuses on the thin constitution—beyond the text of the 
thick written constitution—, thus making constitutional politics possible) & WHY THE CONSTITUTION 
MATTERS, supra note 1, at 6 ff. (arguing many of what we would call constitutional commitments are 
not expressed in the text of the constitution, but in laws that, for whatever reason, have acquired a 
constitutional level). If a popular claim is constitutional by reference to its political relevance or 
fundamental character, this should also imply that not every provision in the constitutional text is 
as fundamental as to prevent simple changes (interpretations, detailing, etc.). Attributing 
constitutional character to whatever clause the constitution contains would rest exclusively on the 
constitution’s formal contours—which I just mentioned are not decisive for popular, not even 
institutional, readings. I have taken the distinction between substantive and formal constitutions 
from CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 67-74 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans. & ed., Duke University Press, 
2008). See also, TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW, supra note 40, at 7-14 (“the importance of the distinction 
between written and unwritten constitutions is greatly exaggerated.”). 
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popular readings of the constitution contest longstanding assumptions about 
constitutional law by resorting, but also ardently embracing, longstanding 
constitutional principles (contestation/limit).139 
Finally, democratic constitutionalism does not seek to “take the Constitution away 
from courts”140—as Tushnet proposed—, but rather contends courts’ decisions are 
limited by non-judicial interpretations. This means that courts, just as any other 
governmental branch, operate as an agent of enforcement of culturally held 
constitutional interpretations. In other words, a direct consequence of these 
discursive interactions between the people and courts is that the courts do not act 
on their own (arbitrary) will, but are checked by the people. The argument here 
seeks to clean judicial review from its undemocratic whiff by showing 
constitutional chambers, when properly paying attention to popular readings, do 
not act as a small group of aristocrats imposing their will on that of the people, but 
in accordance with them. As Post put it, 
to the extent that a court views the substance of constitutional law as in 
part dependent upon the outlook of nonjudicial actors, it will exercise … the 
                                                      
139 Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, practices, and social movements, 154 U. OF PA. L. REV. 
927 (2006). These interactions and contestations, democratic constitutionalism holds, also bring 
positive externalities (externalities in the sense that they are positive outcomes different from a 
court embracing the specific interpretation of the constitution posed by a mobilization), for it tells 
the people that they have a say about how common principles are to be understood, thus renewing 
their allegiance to the constitution. Dialectical relations of conflict and disagreement thus become 
essential for democratic legitimacy, rather than disruptive. Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 133, 
at 375. Reva Siegel has also argued the procedural limits cultural readings of the constitution are to 
respect. These are the consent condition—emphasizing argument rather than coercion—and the 
public value condition—highlighting common values embedded in the Constitution are the point of 
departure for any interpretation that aims at becoming constitutional. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, 
supra note 132, at 30-40.  
140 Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 133, at 379.  
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“awesome power” of judicial review with some attention to the 
understandings of those actors.141 
Friedman has called this a model of mediated popular constitutionalism. This is a 
model that says popular constitutionalists are obtaining what they want, namely 
that the people are to have a say regarding constitutional meaning, although “not 
in the precise form in which they ask for it.”142 
C. Avenues (to speak) 
Notwithstanding different ramifications, popular constitutionalism as a whole 
exhibits a common thrust: its emphasis on the paramount role of the people in 
interpreting the constitution. How do the people (themselves) present their 
popular readings? There are many channels through which the people can make 
governmental institutions (courts in particular) aware of their voice on 
constitutional matters. These channels are both institutional (political elections,143 
frontal attacks on courts through regulations,144 presidential elections,145 popular 
                                                      
141 Post, Fashioning the legal Constitution, supra note 127, at 6-7.  
142 Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 50, at 2598-9. 
143 Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 133, at 381 (arguing voting might be insufficient as a means 
to contest constitutional detailing).  
144 KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 49, at 249 (noticing judicial supremacy, and thus 
popular readings, can be advanced through judicial impeachments, reducing courts’ budget and 
ignoring judicial mandates, among others). 
145 David L. Franklin, Popular Constitutionalism as presidential constitutionalism?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1069 (2006) (suggesting, not endorsing, that one possible and plausible interpretation is that 
today popular constitutionalism may well amount to presidential constitutionalism); Jedediah 
Purdy, Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, FORDHAM L. REV. 1837 (2009) (arguing presidential 
rhetoric to be an essential part of any adequate understanding of the practice of popular 
constitutionalism). See also, Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 128, at 1030-1, 
1042-3 (arguing that by choosing the President, and through the President appointing judges, “the 
people retain the final word on the meaning of their Constitution …”). 
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selection of judges,146 and judicial nominations147) and non-institutional (protests, 
boycotts and sit-ins). Social movements resort—as the literature on social 
mobilizations has shown—complementarily to both formal and informal avenues. I 
am here concerned with non-institutional mechanisms, specifically social protests, 
that is, with the people themselves on the streets bawling (in a non-derogatory 
sense) their constitutional reading.  
Is popular constitutionalism sympathetic to these informal and disruptive means 
of constitutional construction? The answer is a resound yes. First, popular 
constitutionalism places great emphasis on popular narratives about 
constitutional meaning.148 Tushnet for one, when presenting a condensed view149 
about what populist constitutionalism stands for, offered some elements among 
which I single out the opportunity (right) to criticize the government and a place to 
form independent views.150 Admittedly, those spaces of critique and independent 
formation of views operate outside the State and its institutions—as Tushnet 
says151—, but not necessarily in private—as Habermas has argued.152 
                                                      
146 David Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047 (2010). 
147 TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 37, at 133-5; Friedman, 
Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 50, at 2609. 
148 See generally, Parker, “Here the People Rule”, supra note 52, at 580-3 (arguing to vindicate 
common language on key politico-constitutional matters). 
149 I say a condensed view, for Tushnet offers these elements when rejecting a procedurally driven 
model of judicial review. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 37, at 
157-63. 
150 Id., at 157-8. 
151 Id. 
152 JÜRGEN HABERMAS: BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS. CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY 360 ff. (1998). 
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Popular constitutionalism goes yet another step further, for it calls to remove these 
instances of political participation from its elitist drapery, thus welcoming 
informal mechanisms of participation deflated from pretentious language. As 
Richard Parker put it when talking about the political relevance of freedom of 
expression, we should enlarge constitutional law comprehension to include forms 
of political intervention other than those which privilege the “modes and styles of 
expression associated with the ‘better’ sort of people—relatively ‘reasonable,’ 
‘orderly,’ ‘articulate’ speech having ‘social importance’.”153 
This extension in the understanding of constitutional law certainly included, 
although cannot be solely reduced to, mobs and protests.154 This is clear in 
Kramer’s work as one goes through the historical episodes he quotes when 
opening The People Themselves.155 As he argues, popular readings of the 
constitution, as well as constitutional changes in understanding, have been 
achieved not only by procedures constitutionally enshrined in the constitution, but 
                                                      
153 Parker, “Here the People Rule,” supra note 52, at 577. Robert Post has also advocated an extended 
vision for freedom of expression. In arguing public opinion is the touchstone of every democratic 
government, he claims protected discourses that shape opinion are to be broadly understood and 
protected. Thus, political speech comes in different forms and shapes, which “[s]ometimes … occurs 
through language, and sometimes, as with picketing and flag burning, it does not.” ROBERT C. POST, 
DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 
14-5 (2012); See also, TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 37, at 
106-7 (“I am convinced that a ban on burning flags as a political protest is inconsistent with 
fundamental free speech principles.”). 
154 Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates: Popular Constitutionalism and the Whiskey 
Rebellion, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883 (2006) (arguing popular constitutionalism encompasses a large 
spectrum of legal strategies, beings mobs and protests just some strategies among different 
options). 
155 KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 49, at 3-5.  
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also by social mobilization outside institutional channels.156 This is in fact most 
obvious, although again not exclusively the case, in situations where, despite 
political challengers are in control of local institutions, changes in law prove 
difficult if not impossible.157  
Post and Siegel hold a similar claim. They acknowledge, as noted above, that 
citizens resort to a myriad of methods when it comes time to shape constitutional 
meaning. Although Post and Siegel recognize the importance of constitutional 
lawmaking and constitutional amendments, they call attention to how citizens 
have “sought to embody their constitutional ideals within the domain of judicially 
enforceable constitutional law” and other forms that permit a more fluid and 
ongoing process of communication between courts and the public.158 Norm 
contestation, as they label this process, includes—as Siegel herself has put it—
informal, disruptive, non-institutional, and sometimes unlawful means. In a similar 
vein—although assessing popular constitutionalism from a legal theory 
viewpoint—, Adler has held that protests, among other mechanisms, establish a 
closer link between citizen engagements, their critical appraisal of the constitution, 
and the work of officials, which certainly includes constitutional exposition.159 
 
II. Popular institutionalism 
                                                      
156 Id. at 8. 
157 Id., at 26. 
158 Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 133, at 380.  
159 Under democratic regimes—he writes—it is almost impossible to think the work of public 
officials as totally detached from citizens’ evaluation. Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism 




This part is intended to clear up some misunderstandings about popular 
constitutionalism. Popular constitutionalism, although promising to give the 
people a say in constitutional understanding, actually proposes a mediated 
process. This means, as I will detail below, that (A) popular readings are channeled 
through formal institutions of politico-constitutional decision-making. In other 
words, what the people say the constitution means is what the Congress, a 
superior court or the President (and his/her administration) says it means when 
the respective body or authority enacts a law, passes a decision or enacts an 
administrative rule. Therefore, popular constitutionalism does not reject 
institutions; rather, it needs them. 
This should not be seen (necessarily) as a democratic shortcoming as long as 
governmental branches are, in line with what popular constitutionalism 
emphasizes, responsive to the people’s views.160 Neither should it prevent us from 
asking popular constitutionalism’s possible limits in light of recent waves of 
protests. Recent movements of protests have rejected engaging with institutional 
politics, thus causing a short circuit with the channels that should supposedly 
mediate popular interpretations. In the last section of this chapter, (B) I argue that 
these popular interpretations of constitutions might end up being politically nude 
views, that is, absent mechanisms of enforcement.  
                                                      
160 As I will show in the next chapter, whereas popular constitutionalism sees this responsiveness 
as desirable, a diarchic approach to constitutional interpretation sees the dialogue or dynamic 
between institutions and non-institutional forms as a necessity. 
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A. The need for institutions (avenues to be heard) 
In Larry Kramer’s depiction of popular constitutionalism the people play a twofold 
role. They interpret the constitution, on the one hand, and they are responsible for 
seeing that those interpretations are properly implemented, on the other.161 
Bearing the people’s interpretative role in mind, I ended the last section noting 
popular constitutionalism is certainly sympathetic to non-institutional forms of 
participation. I suggested social protests are only one informal means (among 
many) of political and constitutional contention or negotiation. While the people 
open avenues to speak through social protests, the question that remains to be 
answered is where those constitutional interpretations, popularly held and 
informally presented, go—if they go somewhere. This is the implementation 
question.  
Some critics have rightly pointed out that closer attention to the implementation 
question may render popular constitutionalism unworkable—or at least not such a 
radical departure from the way current democratic institutions (allegedly) 
operate.162 Alexander and Solum, for instance, ask who is vested with the “ultimate 
authority … to enforce the Constitution.”163 If popular constitutionalism is seen as 
“the view that the people themselves are the agents who … enforce … the 
Constitution,”164 we should doubt whether the people (can) really act in an 
                                                      
161 KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 49, at 7.  
162 Alexander & Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, supra note 122, at 1624-5 (calling this option 
“trivial popular constitutionalism,” a form “every effective constitutional order is”). 
163 Id., at 1603. 
164 Id., at 1617. 
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immediate way. The people certainly do so when reading the constitution. As 
noted above, the people can resort to social protests to advance their own 
constitutional understandings. But how do they enforce those interpretations 
yielded by popular deliberation?   
Alexander and Solum argue there is no way the people can proceed on their own in 
enforcing popular interpretations—unless popular constitutionalism is an excuse 
to simply dispense with the constitution (text) itself.165 Although they fail to see 
the people are not one single body—but comprised of interactions of movements 
and countermovements—they correctly argue that the people (“a multiplicity of 
inconsistent interpretations”) “require[] an institutional mechanism.”166  
To be fair with Kramer—despite his alleged elusiveness in explaining the proper 
way in which popular constitutionalism is to operate167—, neither he nor the other 
readings of popular constitutionalism argue in favor of disregarding the State and 
its institutions. Kramer himself, for instance, notes that it is “‘the people 
themselves’—working through and responding to their agents in the 
government—who [are] responsible for seeing that [the constitution is] properly 
                                                      
165 Id., at 1620-1. It should be noted, however, that there are certain variants of popular 
constitutionalism that do not place such a strong emphasis on the constitution’s text, but call to 
conceive the constitution in a broader fashion. See, TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS, supra note 37. 
166 I take here their emphasis in institutional mechanisms, as I will tell below, simply because that is 
what I think is the correct reading of Kramer’s work. This emphasis is not because of their 
preoccupation: that a constitution understood as a law needs a “single voice of interpretative 
authority.” Id., at 1621. See also, Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) (arguing the Supreme Court is the 
constitution’s final expositor if we want to satisfy one of law’s main functions: the settlement 
function). But see, TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 37, at 27-30 
(discussing the settlement function as solely realizable by a superior court). 
167 Alexander & Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, supra note 122, at 1617-9. 
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interpreted and implemented.”168 Therefore, popular constitutionalism answers 
the implementation question by assigning the people a vigilant role. “Through and 
responding to their agents in the government,”169 the people are to observe 
whether governmental institutions are enforcing their interpretations or not. 
Popular constitutionalism, thus, does not seek to wither away the State. Quite the 
opposite, it seeks a way to inform official readings of the constitution with popular 
interpretations. The emphasis here is on governmental responsiveness. 
This is particularly clear when one pays attention to the emphasis authors such as 
Mark Tushnet170 and Jeremy Wadron171 place on legislatures as the proper forum 
of constitutional interpretation. This is evident when one realizes democratic 
constitutionalism of the kind Post and Siegel endorse sees the Supreme Court as an 
avenue to channel cultural and popular interpretations of the constitution—and 
certainly as an institution whose supremacy is not necessarily conflicting with 
popular constitutionalism.172 Undoubtedly, it is also the view of those who assign 
the President, and with him the whole administrative bureaucracy, a paramount 
role in popular constitutionalist grammar.173 More recent accounts argue popular 
constitutionalism lacks an accurate description as to how it is to operate, thus 
                                                      
168 KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 49, at 7. 
169 Id. 
170 TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 37. 
171 WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 77. 
172 Post & Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, supra note 50; Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 
133; Post, Fashioning the legal Constitution, supra note 127; Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra 
note 132. 
173 Franklin, Popular Constitutionalism as presidential constitutionalism?, supra note 145; Purdy, 
Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 145. 
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offering an institutional mechanism to render it realizable.174 Finally, this is also 
the viewpoint of Kramer himself, who deemed popular constitutionalism to be an 
inter-institutional dialogue happening among different branches—all under the 
people’s supervision.175  
This is precisely what Habermas has argued. Under the conditions of the modern 
State, social power, that is, the political meaning developed by the civil society in 
the autonomous public sphere, remains nude (of legitimacy) were it not to be 
transformed into political power.176 Social power is transformed into political 
power “only through institutionalized procedures.”177  Therefore, institutionalized 
will-formation, such as the parliament, “depends on supplies coming from the 
informal contexts of communication found in the public sphere …”.178 This 
interaction—“this fact,” Habermas writes—“makes it impossible to conceive 
politics and law as autopoietically closed systems.”179 However, there is an 
                                                      
174 Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 159, 162 (2012) 
(arguing “the invisible hand of public opinion is not enough” and that popular constitutionalism 
needs to advance institutional reforms). 
175 KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 49, at 252 (“the authority of judicial decisions 
formally and explicitly depends on the reactions from the other branches and, through them, from 
the public.”); Kramer, “The Interest of the Man,” supra note 125. See also, Post & Siegel, Popular 
Constitutionalism, supra note 27, at 1041 (arguing the boundaries between the judicially 
enforceable constitution—what they call constitutional law—and the non-judicially enforceable 
constitution—what they call the Constitution—is defined by a constitutional dialogue between 
judicial and non-judicial actors). 
176 HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 152, at 352-73. I emphasize in this transition the 
legitimacy viewpoint stressed by Habermas (a model of society where the communicative power of 
public citizens is not bypassed), although he also mentions this transference of social power into 
political power is needed as a way to “relieve the public of the burden of decision making” (Id. at 
362, his emphasis). According to Habermas, the public sphere acts in a signaling fashion as its 
capacity to solve problems “on its own” is limited (359). 
177 Id., at 363. 




important caveat, for, as experience shows, the transfer of social power into 
politically-institutionalized will is not always automatic.180 This is why this 
interplay is not relaxed and pacific. In other words, as Cover pointed out, popular 
jurisgenerative power is always challenging. This interplay creates a latent 
dichotomy between State power (authoritative), on the one hand, and the different 
meanings (narratives) the people advance, on the other.181 Most notably, 
uncontrolled social narratives have a “destabilizing influence upon power.”182 The 
meaning of authoritative precepts, in other words, necessarily “borrow[s] … from 
materials created by the social activity that is not subject to the strictures of 
provenance that characterized what we call formal lawmaking.”183 This is precisely 
the jurisgenerative, and therefore destabilizing, force popular constitutionalism 
aims at rescuing. 
B. Disregarding the State 
Popular constitutionalism rests on the interplay between the people and political 
institutions. This presupposes, as the literature on social movements does, that 
social protesters engage with political institutions. Although this is regularly the 
case, recent waves of protests have taken a different step by disregarding the State 
                                                      
180 I do not want to extend on this point here, but certain readings of popular constitutionalism, as 
the one Post and Siegel present, accept that Supreme Court rulings are not always going to be in 
line with cultural and popular interpretations. The reason to this is not, as some have argued, that 
the people are not a unitary body acting in consensus, but the professional milieu court judges 
work in when addressing politico-constitutional issues. Citizens, they claim, “understand that the 
rule of law is rooted in professional practices that are distinct from popular politics and that will 
often require divergences between the Court’s judgments about the Constitution and their own.” 
Post & Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, supra note 50, at 27-8. 





and its institutions, thus breaking down the interplay popular constitutionalism 
assumes. Almost every commentator of recent waves of protests highlights their 
horizonalism as an internal organization and their rejection to engage in any 
dialogue with the State and its institutions.  
Reviewing the protests in Greece, for instance, Paul Mason noticed that “[i]n the 
people’s minds the regime is already gone … the whole corrupt party system” 
which they saw as inept.184 Although protesters did not seek to break down the 
State, there is an anomic breakdown: “mass refusals to cooperate with the 
system.”185 This is confirmed by Douzinas, who argues anomie appears where 
formal laws and institutions attack popular values. This fracture creates only 
“extensive disenchantment, fear and aggressiveness.”186 The same might be said 
about the indignados in Spain. As Castells reports, the Spanish saw their State as an 
“unresponsive political system.”187 By assuming a horizontalist form of 
organization, they rejected representation and posed neither specific petitions nor 
demands to authorities.188 The different branches of the ‘Occupy’ movement across 
North America have been described in similar terms. Some have claimed ‘Occupy’ 
                                                      
184 MASON, WHY IT’S STILL KICKING OFF EVERYWHERE, supra note 4, at 88-90. There is no reason to 
address the State when the State is already not there (Id., at 229-30). 
185 Id., at 103-4. 
186 DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE, supra note 5, at 50-1. 
187 CASTELLS, NETWORKS OF OUTRAGE, supra note 2, at 111. 
188 Id., at 120-5. 
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is a movement with anarchist roots with emphasis in rejecting the State and its 
institutions, advancing direct action and “acting as if one is already free.”189 
Different authors have coined different, although related, terms to describe, and in 
a sense support, what these movements do. Professor Douzinas, for one, speaks of 
democratic disobedience.190 For him, democratic disobedience seeks a sort of 
political healing neither civil disobedience nor protests can provide. Whereas 
these latter mobilizations are, or could be, rooted in the constitution and certainly 
assume the regime’s legitimacy, democratic disobedience responds to a deeper 
sense of injustice.191 Moreover, Douzinas insists, democratic disobedience resorts 
to a form of manifestation that cannot be accommodated within the current state 
of affairs, but that aims precisely at challenging that very same status quo. As he 
puts it, “[d]emocratic disobedience challenges social hierarchy and the flawed 
democracy that reproduces it,”192 therefore refusing to engage with current 
institutions. Democratic disobedience “challenges current policies,”193 something 
civil disobedience and protests also do in a sense, “but goes beyond them to the 
social conditions and institutional arrangements that [have] allowed their 
dominance.”194 
                                                      
189 David Graeber, Occupy Wall Street’s Anarchist Roots, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK 141, 144-5 (Janet 
Byrne ed., 2012). 
190 DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE, supra note 5, at 93-6. 






Bernard Harcourt, for another, has termed it political disobedience.195 After 
stressing—in line with Douzinas—civil disobedience’s respect for institutions and 
the legal order, Harcourt explains that political disobedience “resists the very way 
in which we are governed.”196 This is why occupiers and indignados, among others, 
have neither an agenda nor a set of petitions to be submitted before political 
authorities, for political disobedience actually “turns its back on the political 
institutions and actors who govern us.”197 Political disobedience refuses to engage 
with authorities in reformist-policy-talk198 which can only result, this position 
contends, in furthering the effects of domination. By quoting Foucault, Harcourt 
argues that “[a]s soon as one ‘proposes’—one proposes a vocabulary, an ideology, 
which can only have effects of domination …”.199  
There are also those who, like Raffaele Laudani, account more generally for 
disobedience.200 Although not explicitly related to current waves of protests,201 
Laudini speaks of destituent power.202 Once again, as both Douzinas and Harcourt 
do, Laudini distances destituent power from civil disobedience, this latter being a 
                                                      
195 Bernard Harcourt, Political Disobedience, in OCCUPY: THREE INQUIRIES IN DISOBEDIENCE 45 (W.J.T. 
Mitchell et al. eds., 2013). 
196 Id., at 47. 
197 Id. 
198 Id., at 59-61. 
199 Id., at 58. 
200 RAFAELLE LAUDANI, DISOBEDIENCE IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT. A GENEALOGY (2013). 
201 Laudini does mention current protest movements when accounting for contemporary forms of 
disobedience. Id., at 6. However, Adam Sitze, who wrote the foreword, directly establishes the link 
between current movements that “consciously refuse[] to carry out the constituted laws and even 
the law-constituting authority of those who hold formal political power,” and Laudini’s destituent 
power. Adam Sitze, Foreword, in LAUDANI, DISOBEDIENCE IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 
200, at vii. 
202 LAUDANI, DISOBEDIENCE IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 200, at 4-5. 
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rather moderate form of dissent which “does not put the existing order in 
discussion.”203 Destituent power is different. It encompasses constituent power’s 
creative energy, in the sense of being a force or will aimed at constituting a new 
order—a new order which is created out of nothing (ex nihilo).204 Nonetheless, it 
also comprehends the possibility of a political potency that takes place not in a 
vacuum, as Laudini sees the constituent power, but against a background of 
“institutional chains that limits its full expression.”205 Furthermore, different from 
the constituent power, which ultimately succeeds as it institutionalizes (i.e. the 
constitution) its goals, destituent power operates as an extra-institutional potency 
that does not have an institutionalizing end.206 
Critical voices have already warned about the dangers of movements falling in love 
with themselves,207 dismissed the political character of movements’ riots,208 and 
criticized their naïve approach to politics.209 I want to argue in a different, although 
related, line. I want to suggest that this withdrawal from institutions—to take 
Mouffe’s terminology210—prevents these movements from speaking properly in 
constitutional terms.211 More concretely, this withdrawal impedes mobilizations 
                                                      
203 Id., at 6-7. 
204 Id., at 4. 
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206 Id., at 5. 
207 SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE YEAR OF DREAMING DANGEROUSLY 77-9 (2012). 
208 ALAIN BADIOU, THE REBIRTH OF HISTORY. TIMES OF RIOTS AND UPRISINGS 22-6 (Gregory Elliott trans., 
Verso 2012). 
209 CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS. THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY 65-84 (2013). 
210 Id., at 65. 
211 As I said at the beginning, I’m not arguing recent movements have sought, but failed to achieve, 
constitutional redemption. What I’m arguing is that their claims are related to structural issues we 
care the most about and that those issues are constitutional precisely in that sense and because—as 
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from contesting hegemonic constitutional readings that stand adamant against 
their claims.  
Popular constitutionalism assumes popular readings are not only to be 
institutionally linked, but also—crucially importantly—public-oriented. As noted 
above, this means popular constitutional readings are not totally free but are to 
respect what Siegel terms the ‘public value condition.’212 Proposing a new 
(counter-hegemonic) constitutional reading presupposes “constitutional 
understandings that the community recognizes and shares.”213 Partisan 
contentions, therefore, are to be translated “into language of a common 
tradition.”214 This is what social movements do. As Claus Offe has put it, new social 
movements do not contend those shared values, “but the mode of implementation 
of values.”215 They do so not by aiming to become isolated or displaced, but 
political; movements want their means to be recognized as legitimate and their 
ends to “become binding for the wider community.”216 In other words, those 
shared constitutional traditions, under which new interpretations are presented 
from below, are the concepts mobilizations (and counter-mobilizations) strive to 
conceptualize. 
                                                                                                                                                           
I shall say now—they should have a broader impact if they do not want to remain as merely 
insulated/tolerated. 
212 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 132, at 34. 
213 Id., at 34. 
214 Id., at 35. As argued before, this common tradition or constitutional understanding is comprised 
not only of the words of the constitution itself, but also of those constitutional (unwritten) 
conventions. 
215 Claus Offe, New Social Movements: Challenging the boundaries of Institutional Politics, 52 SOC. RES. 
817, 849-50 (1985). 
216 Id., at 826-7. 
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This means that popular constitutional meaning is created in a two-step process:  
(a) a first step, where civil society deliberates and acts independently from 
the State (an autonomous public sphere where movements and counter-
movements take place)217 in order to deconstruct hegemonic constitutional 
readings, and 
(b) a second step, where these popular readings (deconstructions and re-
articulations of former interpretations) are taken by the State and its 
institutions to be transformed from social power into political power.218 
Some voices have defended current protest movements taking this withdrawal 
path. I will consider a couple here. Professor Costas Douzinas has argued—against 
Badiou—that recent riots and movements should not be dismissed as non-
political, but understood as a political baptism, a sort of first step preparing, 
although not guaranteeing, the path towards the total reconfiguration of the 
political system.219 In order to achieve this goal movements should first heal the 
social ethos already fractured by a misguided formal regulation so that formal 
institutions can be redesigned.220 In a related vein, Manuel Castells suggests recent 
movements are to be understood, not as seeking short-term benefits, but as 
pursuing deeper changes not achievable through formal politics.221 This is the case, 
he argues, despite local specificities, of Spanish indignados, Greek aganaktismenoi, 
                                                      
217 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 132, at 40-3. 
218 MOUFFE, AGONISTICS, supra note 209, at 79-82. 
219 DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE, supra note 5, at 77-84. 
220 Id., at 50-1. 
221 CASTELLS, NETWORKS OF OUTRAGE, supra note 2, at 133.  
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and the different ‘Occupy’ branches. They have turned their backs on the State in 
order to “raise[] consciousness among its participants and in the population at 
large.”222 Gatherings, protests and public assemblies were not means of pressure 
to call governmental attention, “but a goal in themselves”223 as they collectively 
pursued “cultural change.”224 As Castells puts it, the process is the product, not the 
means.225  
From a popular constitutionalist perspective, above depicted as a two-step 
process, these movements are anchored at, and refuse to leave, the first step.226 
The question is how long they will remain there, provided they stay mobilized. 
Furthermore, and perhaps contradictorily, both Douzinas and Castells argue the 
long-term process of change is likely to lead in last instance to (an unavoidable) 
interaction with the State. Douzinas, as noted above, contends one of the reasons 
that best explains the recent uprisings is precisely the lack of attention formal 
institutions have paid to different social ethoi.227 The great mistake of several 
governments—the Greek included—has been answering protests with legality, 
both criminalizing (and aiming at delegitimizing) social protest and calling the 
people to respect formal rules.228 Castells has put forth a similar defense.229  
                                                      
222 Id. 
223 Id., at 134. 
224 Id., at 193. 
225 Id., at 143-4 (arguing movements saw, and still see, the questioning of concrete 
accomplishments as the logic of capitalism). 
226 I shall note below the dangers of becoming isolated and marginalized from the institutional 
avenues where power relations are crucially defined. 
227 DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE, supra note 5, at 54 (arguing resistance appears where 
formal rules have been passed without having first persuaded the people).  
228 Id., at 50. 
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I agree with all this. What seems unavoidable, however, is eventually engaging 
with the State and its institutions (law included) to bring them in accordance with 
social norms,230 either by pushing current institutions to pay attention to popular 
demands231 or to experiment with institutions—in fact, social movements have 
made, and can make, enormous contributions in helping us to abandon what Unger 
called the “false necessity” of accepting institutions in their current shape.232 In 
other words, current waves of mobilization have had an important role in 
highlighting the gross malfunctioning of Western democracies. But as Chantal 
Mouffe has clearly put it, 
this is only the beginning, and to effectively transform power relations, the 
new consciousness that arises out of those protests requires institutional 
channels.233 
                                                                                                                                                           
229 CASTELLS, NETWORKS OF OUTRAGE, supra note 2, at 5-10, 142. 
230 The relation between institutions, law and culture, however, depends on several variables. First, 
those relations are certainly permeated by what we consider law to be and what we deem as 
cultural. Second, it is worth noticing the relations between culture and law are not unidirectional, 
always flowing from the bottom (from culture) up (to formal institutions), but a mixture of 
interrelations where formal institutions also play their part—as “tool[s] of social engineering to 
accomplish politically desirable purposes … and [also] to revise and reshape culture.” Robert C. 
Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, supra note 131, at 487. See also, Sarat & Simon, who have argued 
legal meanings are not “invented and communicated in a unidirectional process.” Austin Sarat & 
Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism? Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal 
Scholarship, 13 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 3, 19-20 (2001). 
231 MOUFFE, AGONISTICS, supra note 209, at 111 (actual changes in relations of power will not be 
brought about “get[ting] rid of representative institutions but improv[ing] them, so as to make 
them more accountable to the citizenry.”); Robert B. Reich, Occupy Democracy, in OCCUPY HANDBOOK, 
supra note 189, 362 (“Our problem isn’t government; it’s who government is for.”). 
232 ROBERTO UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE 1-27 (1998). 
233 This is clear in the work of Mouffe, who argues the emerging consciousness requires 
institutional channels to effectively transform power relations. MOUFFE, AGONISTICS, supra note 209, 
at 115. In a similar sense see, Sarat & Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?, supra note 230, at 20 
(conceptualizing legal meanings as “moving” hegemonies); UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED, supra note 




There is a second turn the defense of the withdrawal strategy can take. Protesters 
could argue their movements are to remain local constitutional interpretations 
whose target does not need to be the State.234 I’m not saying that this is what 
identity movements claim to be doing, but there is some resemblance and I take 
some insight from them. Van Dyke et al. have argued against those who suggest 
that every social mobilization targets the State, pointing out that certain protests 
instead focus on civil society itself.235 For them, “public protest is also used to 
shape public opinion, identities, and cultural practices and to pressure authorities 
in institutional arenas not directly linked to the state.”236 These expressive or 
identity protests, therefore, are “oriented primarily to cultural transformation and 
identity recognition through expressive actions and alternative institution 
building.”237 Both Douzinas and Castells, as noted above, make a similar claim 
regarding current waves of protests. They emphasize the non-institutional 
processes as the message, which means protesters are not interested in posing any 
specific demands to the State and its institutions. In order to create free 
communities, autonomous from corrupted governments, the targets are their 
fellow citizens238—an objective allegedly realized in local assemblies.  
                                                      
234 Some have persuasively argued that this turn to locality was triggered by a global 
disempowerment. This is the case of Sparke who, although focusing on the use of spaces to increase 
presence, notes this shift also showed global ties. Matthew Sparke, From Global Dispossession to 
Local Repossession: Towards a Worldly Cultural Geography of Occupy Activism, in THE WILEY-
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 387 (Nuala C. Johnson et al., eds. 2013). 
235 Nella Van Dyke et al., The Target of Social Movements: Beyond a focus on the State, 25 RESEARCH IN 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE 27 (2004). 
236 Id., at 27. 
237 Id., at 31. 
238 CASTELLS, NETWORKS OF OUTRAGE, supra note 2, at 6.  
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First of all, as argued above, it is not at all clear that cultural changes occur 
independently from the State and its institutions.239 Second, one could also venture 
that if identity and expressive and consciousness-raising movements are aimed at 
(re)shaping public opinion, in the long (or sometimes in the short) run the State 
should be responding to these transformations.240 What I want to stress here, 
however, is a rather different question. I want to highlight whether these local 
constructions of the constitution can be understood as constitutional 
interpretations or as something else (which is dangerous for the movement itself). 
I think the latter is the case, for these constructions rest on hegemonic 
interpretations that these movements refuse to institutionally contest. By doing 
this they risk becoming marginal and isolated gatherings that are, in the most 
optimistic case, tolerated by the State.241 
Robert Cover is of enormous help again. According to Cover, local communities 
acting autonomously (that is independent from representative avenues) exercise 
their jurisgenerative capacity to create law “as fully as does the judge.”242 
Ultimately, though—Cover writes—, it is “the state’s capacity to tolerate or destroy 
                                                      
239 Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, supra note 131, at 488-9 (arguing how antidiscrimination laws 
have been used to “revise and reshape culture”). 
240 In fact, recent demonstrations impacted electoral processes in Greece, Iceland and Spain. 
However, it should be noted—as Castells does—that these were side effects. CASTELLS, NETWORKS OF 
OUTRAGE, supra note 2, at 138-9. 
241 Legal and constitutional considerations aside (that is, I am not passing judgments as to whether 
governmental decisions were constitutional or not), most of the movements continued to occupy 
public spaces as long as States allowed them to do so. Contradicting their withdrawal discourse, 
many groups sought help from the State itself through courts, even when they declared to be acting 
“as if” the State was already gone. See, Graeber, Occupy Wall Street’s Anarchist Roots, supra note 
189, at 148-9.  
242 Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 42, at 28.  
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this self-contained nomos that dictates the relation” of the local community in 
question and its “political host.”243 Cover notes there are many reasons, partly 
principled (he mentions the freedom of association) and partly prudential (to 
avoid conflicts of certain, although indeterminate, political significance) reasons, to 
accommodate these local nomoi. However, when these reasons are principled and 
adopt the form of constitutional rights protection (the same freedom of association 
Cover mentioned, to name one), it should be noted that the political standing of 
“this self-contained nomos” is extremely precarious. For one, the State’s capacity to 
destroy its local nomos persists—as experience showed, public occupations lasted 
as long as the State tolerated these manifestations. For another, either the 
toleration or destruction of these local nomoi depends on a constitutional 
interpretation which movements that withdraw do not contribute (precisely 
because they do not engage) to shape, but that accept as given. 
In other words, it is not the movement’s mobilization what leads to a constitutional 
reading that grants the movement this (however) precarious toleration; rather, 
what accommodates the movement’s grievances is precisely (what they correctly 
see as a) top-down hegemonic constitutional reading which movements have 
nonetheless refused (sometimes because of reasonable dissatisfaction) to directly 
contend.244 By refusing to engage with the State and its institutions, movements 
                                                      
243 Id., at 30. 
244 As Teubner put it—criticizing those who pay exclusive attention to State-centered and 
institutional solutions—, “[l]iberal constitutionalism could conceal the question in the shadow of 
constitutionally-protected individual freedoms.” GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: 
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undoubtedly run the risk of becoming marginal political actors (what many say is 
the current case of ‘Occupy’) or, at best, being merely tolerated or concealed 
(before being evicted). This is why Cover was concerned about calling local nomoi 
to transcend their inner boundaries and “reach[] out for validation and seek[] to 
extend [their] legitimacy by gaining acceptance from the normative world that lies 
outside its core.”245 Redemptive constitutionalism—a term Cover coined—is 
precisely that: a move from the inner core to overcome isolation and mere 
toleration in order to “change the world in which they live.”246 Redemptive 
constitutionalism calls social movements to leave their sectarian fashion in order 
to advance the vision of the world as they see it. Cover notes that, by moving out of 
sectarianism, redemptive movements aspire to the replacement of one reality with 
another,247 and Mouffe joins him in arguing that counter-hegemonic intervention 
needs institutions “to re-articulate a given situation in a new configuration.”248  
Exodus from institutional politics neglects social movements’ conservative and/or 
transformative capacity.249 Social protest movements that remain insular (by self-
                                                                                                                                                           
SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 6 (Gareth Teubner trans. Oxford University Press 
2012). 
245 Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 42, at 33. 
246 Id. 
247 Id., at 34. 
248 MOUFFE, AGONISTICS, supra note 209, at 79. This is also the argument Claus Offe made. For him, 
“purely social movements” as religious sects “make use of perfectly legitimate and recognized 
forms of action, such as the legally guaranteed freedom of religious practice and cultural freedom.” 
However, these groups do not become political as they “do not intend to win the recognition of 
their specific values and concerns as binding for the wider community but simply claim to be 
allowed to enjoy the rights and freedoms.” Offe, New Social Movements, supra note 215, at 827. 
249 That is the recognition that legal meanings are an ensemble of practices and discourses that can 
be mobilized either to reproduce or transform the conditions of living. Dorothy E. Chunn & Dany 
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choice) will risk bringing their constitutional visions into reality, thus remaining 
subject to the arbitrariness of the State, which they assume to be immutable and 
therefore to be abandoned.250 The best antidote to arbitrariness lies precisely in 
engaging with formal outcomes. As G. A. Cohen put it when commenting on the 
relation between the economic structure and the legal superstructure, 
bases need superstructures … regulation and order are themselves 
indispensable elements of any mode of production, if it is to assume social 




Popular constitutionalism, here roughly presented, is to be praised for having 
sought to rescue the role of (and for) the people in constitutional interpretation. 
Standing against what has been termed ‘juricentric constitutions,’ popular 
constitutionalists, despite the differences noted above, agree on contending the 
view of those who see courts as the exclusive guardians and interpreters of 
constitutions. Under this approach, constitutions are political matters and thus 
open to popular readings. 
The fact that constitutions are opened to popular interpretations does not mean, 
however, that institutional branches are out of the picture. In fact, popular 
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constitutionalism—as I have argued—depends to a large extent on the regime 
remaining in place and therefore on the functioning of governmental institutions. 
Popular constitutionalism contends that these institutions produce their 
constitutional interpretations in a responsive fashion. 
To whom are they to be responsive? To the people. Popular constitutionalism 
requires an active citizenry. It demands an active civil-political society be attentive 
to constitutional matters, on the one hand, and in fluid, although tense, dialogue 
with governmental institutions, on the other. By drawing on the insights from 
popular constitutionalism, I have shown that social protests are but one of the 
means—although currently a very important one—the people themselves resort 
to in order to participate in the popular interpretation of constitutions. Social 
protests are thus a means through which the people take part in shaping public 
opinion, a powerful reason why States should pay more attention to protesters’ 
contentions and why attempts to suppress them are to be regarded with suspicion. 
In the next and final chapter, I will explore the nature of this institutional 
responsiveness. Whereas I think popular constitutionalism sees this 
responsiveness as something desirable, the fact that it is a mediated form of 
popular constitutionalism signals it is also contingent, that is, it may or may not 
happen. By exploring the duty of the people to submit their view to institutional 
avenues (what I term the democratic burdens on social protests), I will explore the 






PROTESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: TAKING THE CONSTITUTION WHERE? 
 
I. Democratic burdens on social protest 
A. The constitutional burdens on social protests 
B. A democratic burden 
II. Institutional popular constitutionalism  
A. The diarchic character of constitutional interpretation 




“ … what would follow is only the demand for a constitution having within itself the 
characteristic and principle of advancing in step with consciousness, with actual man, which 
is possible only when man has become the principle of the constitution.” 
Karl Marx∗ 
 
In Chapter 1, I argued that the sociological literature on social movements, being 
social protest one of the means movements resort to, shows that popular 
                                                        




movements are (almost inextricably) related to the State; the State both influences 
and is influenced by social movements. In this sense the State and its institutions 
are the target of social movements—they seek to influence their march—but not 
their enemies—they do not seek to overthrow them. 
I have included constitutions under this very same analysis and proceeded from 
there to distinguish a mixture of protests and related events that have been taking 
place during the last five years or so. While allegedly based on similar reasons, 
from a constitutional law viewpoint these social protests movements are different. 
On the one hand, I identified revolutionary movements, such as those of the ‘Arab 
Spring,’ that were aimed at overcoming constitutional schemes the people had 
been living under. The constitutional fact—as I termed it in Chapter 2—of having 
produced new constitutions signals that a radical (in constitutional terms) 
objective was achieved. On the other hand, there were social protest movements 
whose aim was more modest, albeit tremendously important. These movements, I 
argued, wanted to influence constitutional interpretation by advancing their own 
readings of constitutions. Different from revolutionary movements, which pursue 
the enactment of brand-new constitutions, these protesters have played within the 
constitutional rules already laid down. This was (and still is) the case, to name one, 
of Chilean students that have been mobilizing since 2006. 
Bearing this difference in mind it is possible to notice that constitutional law 
relates to social protest in, at least, two different ways. Resembling the sociological 
analysis of social movements, and the annotated relation between them and States 
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and vice versa, I argued constitutions influence social protests and social protests 
influence constitutions. First, social protest movements that come to terms with 
the existence of the State and its institutions, the very constitutional scheme they 
seek to influence, can claim institutional protection for their non-institutional 
actions. This is what I argued in Chapters 3 and 4 when showing how Western 
constitutional schemes of rights (should) protect the (positive) right to protest. 
The State and its institutions, seen in this light, permit protests (and limit them as 
well) by opening institutional avenues (such as courts) to redress limitations on 
citizen participation. 
The relation between social protests and constitutions, however, is not merely 
limited to the protection (and regulation) of the right to protest; it also flows in the 
other direction as well. Social protests influence constitutional interpretation. As I 
argued in Chapter 5, citizens’ readings of constitutions that are proposed through 
social protests also impinge constitutional understanding. This is the very sense in 
which social protests influence the way constitutions end up being understood.  
Social protests read through the glass of popular constitutionalism—I ended up 
suggesting in Chapter 5— are forms of playing by the rules1 or, as I argued by 
resorting to the words of Philip Pettit, forms of political contestation that assume 
the regime remaining in place.2 In fact, despite popular constitutionalism 
highlighting the role, many times devaluated, of the people themselves in 
                                                        
1 A form of playing by the rules that seeks to substantively influence those very same rules by 
enhancing both its democratic and political understanding. 




producing constitutional understanding, its many variants also acknowledge the 
need for institutions. Popular constitutionalism certainly democratizes the 
understanding of constitutional law, but it does not replace it with popular 
practices that, getting rid of institutions, ground constitutional law.3 Popular 
constitutionalism is better depicted as a sort of popular institutionalism. Popular 
constitutional readings, such as those the people pose through protests, are 
directed at, and mediated by, institutional politics.4 Put in other words, popular 
readings of constitutions are rather nude interpretations whose normative force 
depends, to a large extent, on their institutional back-up. It is when both popular 
understanding of constitutions and institutional decisions meet—and not 
necessarily when they coincide—that the role of the people is vindicated. 
It is because popular constitutionalism accepts, to the extent it does not radically 
contest, institutional dependence that non-institutional forms of participation, 
such as social protests, are not forms of populism. According to Richard Bellamy, it 
is populism—which tends to be “anti-system … a straight appeal against it”—what 
besets Habermas’ reliance on social movements as democratic input into the 
constitutional system.5 Social movements, Bellamy contends, have little incentive 
                                                        
3 To put it in the words of Matthew Adler, popular constitutionalism is about the “structure of 
constitutional decisionmaking” and its content, and not about the practices constitutional law must 
rest upon. Matthew Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices 
Ground U.S. Law? 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 798 (2006). 
4 I have taken the concept of mediated popular constitutionalism from Barry Friedman, Mediated 
Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596 (2003). 
5 RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
DEMOCRACY 139 (2007). 
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“to relate their demands to those of others within the political community …”.6 
However, this is not what popular constitutionalism is about.7 As I have been 
arguing here, popular constitutionalism needs institutions, and the emphasis it 
places on public opinion is to bring the people back to their crucial constitutional 
role: that of being final arbiters of constitutional disputes. According to popular 
constitutionalists, and depending on their different emphasis, this is a role that the 
people are to play either in the political (legislatures and executives) or the judicial 
branch. At any rate, this is a role to be played not dispensing with institutions but 
engaging with them. Popular constitutionalism’s thrust depends, to a large 
extent—as I ended up arguing in the last section—, on keeping an open, however 
robust, tense, and at times unpleasant, dialogue with formal institutions.  
However, it is this very reliance on institutions and a certain ambiguity as to the 
nature of this institutional responsiveness what may take us to conclude that 
popular constitutionalism does not change things very much. In the best scenario, 
it merely claims institutional avenues should be permeated with popular 
interpretations without contending the sovereign character of institutions as 
constitutional expositors. I believe institutions serve a different purpose. They 
allow popular understandings of constitutions to be open to all citizens by offering 
channels where exclusion is not permissible. Seen in this light, as I proceed to 
                                                        
6 Id. 
7 See generally, NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED: OPINION, TRUTH, AND THE PEOPLE (2014) 
(arguing that, to the extent social movements do not seek to overcome political institutions, but 
rather engage with them, they are “consistent with the diarchic nature of representative 
democracy.”). See also, Hanspeter Kriesi, The Populist Challenge, 37 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 361, 
363 (2014) (arguing that, in general, “populism has a strong anti-institutional impulse …”). 
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argue now, the rule of recognition may, in a sense, be altered—or at least 
democratized. Amid intense popular participation (although of course this is not 
always the case), constitutional interpretation cannot be solely located at the 
institutional level; it needs to be located at the institutional level in conjunction 
with popular and non-institutional practices. It is true that the fact that popular 
meanings are transformed into political power by institutions signals these 
interpretations are constitutional—instead of nude popular readings. However, 
the importance of this process is not the mere fact that these readings have 
become either embraced or accepted by the State and its institutions, but the 
political fact that institutions are under the duty to engage in a dialogue with 
popular readings, therefore rendering these readings attributable to the people 
(the author) as a whole—and not just to a faction of it.8 
The (I) first part of this chapter furthers this argument. It insists on the relation 
between social protests as constitutional interpretations and governmental 
institutions. I will claim that this relation is not merely strategic (it helps to 
consolidate social changes) nor contingent (this is the way our polity is), but a 
necessary step for popular readings to be(come), properly speaking, constitutional 
interpretations. This is what I call a democratic burden on protesters and the only 
                                                        
8 Quentin Skinner, The Genealogy of the Modern State 162 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 325, 344-5 (2009) 
(detailing representation in Hobbes as one of the conditions the modern State exhibits). See also, 
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181-2 (1999) (arguing the 
“Constitution belongs to us collectively, as we act together in political dialogue with each other—
whether we act in the streets, in the voting booths, or in legislatures as representative of others”); 
CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 239-41 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans. & ed., 2008) (noting that there is 
no State without representation and arguing citizenry to be understood as public-, rather than 
private-, interest oriented). 
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way, as I will argue in the second part (II), in which their popular understandings 
can be redirected from a partisan group of protesters to the people as a whole, 
therefore being universalized (in a constitutional fashion). This interplay, I will end 
up arguing, also serves to democratize our constitutional practices. 
 
I. Democratic burdens on social protest 
 
This part contends protesters have democratic burdens they should respect; these 
burdens stem from the fact we are social creatures who organized around common 
institutions and from conceiving constitutions as common commitments. It 
therefore takes constitutions, States, and institutions, and the very fact people are 
social creatures, for granted.9 It assumes “[y]ou are condemned to life in a polity as 
a matter of historical necessity”10 and, at the same time, that that very fact does not 
(automatically) amount to domination.11 In other words, it assumes political 
associations.12 As professor Ronald Dworkin put it,  
                                                        
9 PHILIP PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM. A COMPASS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 116 (2014). 
10 Id. at 117. 
11 Id. at 117-9. 
12 It assumes political associations without assuming the modern “nation-state is … the natural and 
necessary representation of modern society.” Daniel Chernilo, The critique of methodological 
nationalism: Theory and history, 106 THESIS ELEVEN 98, 99 (2011).  
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governments do exist, their boundaries and hence claims of dominion are 
the product of historical accident, and almost all of us are born or brought 
into one of them.13  
What this approach suggests is the possibility of evaluating the State and its 
institutions—in their indifference or subjection to law,14 in the fairness or injustice 
of their decisions,15 in their responsiveness to the people’s views, and so on.16 As 
Axel Honneth has argued, this is a normative account that enables us to test the 
legitimacy of the State and its decisions.17 Otherwise, as he claims, we would be left 
without tools for evaluating (what we now consider) advances such as the 
                                                        
13 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 317-8 (2011) (terming debates about imagining people 
living in a pre-civil State condition as “a philosopher’s parlor game[s]”).  
14 BLANDINE KRIEGEL, THE STATE AND THE RULE OF LAW 5-8 (Marc A. LePain & Jeffrey C. Cohen trans. 
Princeton University Press 1995) (calling “vulgar anti-statism” the approach that considers the 
mere existence of a State as a form of despotism). 
15 PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM, supra note 9, at 116-20. 
16 While here I am not considering, as I have repeated through this work, the political reasons we 
(might) have to obey the constitution, the State, and its institutions—nor when those reasons cease 
to hold—, these are undeniably related topics. In fact, this is, up to a certain point, part of what 
popular constitutionalism holds—and what I analyzed in Chapter 5. To summarize the argument: 
popular constitutionalism sees conflict and popular understandings advanced through non-
institutional means as the necessary inputs constitutions are to permit if they wish to preserve 
their legitimacy. Under this approach conflict is neither to be eradicated nor feared as it is the very 
source of constitutional stability. However, this does not mean that the people are to accept 
whatever constitutional outcomes may come. This is how professor DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR 
HEDGEHOGS, supra note 13, at 323 put it: 
These particular policies may stain the state’s legitimacy without destroying it altogether. 
Its legitimacy then becomes a matter of degree: how deep or dark is that stain? If it is 
contained, and political processes of correction are available, then citizens can protect their 
dignity—avoid becoming tyrants themselves—by refusing so far as possible to be party to 
the injustice, working in politics to erase it, and contesting it through civil disobedience 
when this is appropriate. 
Therefore, faith in constitutions and in the institutional and legal systems citizens live by is one 
thing and shall not be confused with idolatry. Once faith in the actual chances of influencing 
constitutional understandings ceases, “[i]f the stain is dark and very widespread, and … protected 
from cleansing through politics,” (Id.) the legitimacy of the State gets critically shaken. “Revolution 
… is then in the cards” (Id. at 321). 
17 AXEL HONNETH, FREEDOM’S RIGHT. THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC LIFE 306 (Joseph Ganahl 
trans. Columbia University Press 2014). 
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extension of the franchise to women.18 Denying this evaluative stance would leave 
us with no tool to judge “the progress and the regressions” of the State in light of 
its normative achievements.19 Moreover, without this evaluative approach we 
would be forced to accept the State’s extra-legal violence “as entirely normal 
application[] of state power.”20 
The following sections show (A) the constitutional burden is defined by a certain 
understanding of constitutions as common commitments, rather than as empty 
frameworks to be captured by whoever happens to succeed in doing so. It explains 
that (B) this understanding poses on protesters the democratic burden of 
respecting political equality, which—I end up claiming in this section—institutions 
help to secure. Whereas this (political) duty to engage stems from a burden placed 
on citizens, it also explains why institutional openness to dialogue cannot be 
merely optional. 
A. The constitutional burdens on social protests 
When social protesters engage in constitutional interpretation they do so to 
propose an understanding of constitutions. Whether written or not, whether 
limited to a canonical text called ‘The Constitution’ or to a set of important 
practices we regard as constitutional,21 constitutional interpretation requires a 
common point of departure. In this regard, constitutional interpretation amounts 
                                                        
18 Id. at 307. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 308. 
21 What the word constitutional distinguishes, Waldron argued, are “issues in terms of their 
importance.” JEREMY WALDRON, THE LAW 69 (1990). 
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to bringing forward an understanding of what already is a common (yet certainly 
contested as to its specific contours) ground.22 On the other hand, it is only by 
offering an account of common concerns that social movements actually exert a 
popular influence.23 
It is this common ground, along with its practices and concerns, what I think 
professor Reva Siegel had in mind when presenting what she considers to be the 
conditions social movements must meet in order to influence constitutions—
excuse the redundancy—in a constitutional fashion.24 According to Siegel, social 
movements influence constitutional interpretation by guiding, in myriad ways that 
include protests, officials whose actions expound our most basic commitments.25 
This is what she terms constitutional culture: “the understandings of role and 
practices of argument that guide interactions among citizens and officials in 
matters concerning the Constitution’s meaning …”.26 These interactions are what 
ground constitutional understanding.27 
But if a mobilized group brings its interpretation into the constitution, wouldn’t it 
be acting as a faction or an interest group whose influence must be checked? How 
could we distinguish between illegitimate groups advancing their own parochial 
interests, no matter how public-oriented they are presented to be, from those 
                                                        
22 As I hope it is clear, I’m restricting myself to the analysis of constitutional interpretation. This 
emphasis should not mislead our analysis to (falsely) believe that that very framework is placed 
“beyond challenge” (Id. at 81-2). 
23 PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 227 (2012) . 
24 Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case 
of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV.1323 (2006). 
25 Id. at 1323-1325. 




pointing toward the common understanding?  Certainly, “[c]onstitutional culture 
both licenses and limits [constitutional] change.”28 What are the limits? What are 
then the conditions social protests movements must meet to constitutionally 
influence constitutional understanding? Siegel mentions two conditions: the 
consent condition and the public value condition.29 
The consent condition, roughly put, requires those contesting constitutional 
meanings to advance their views “by conviction rather than coercion … [they] must 
advance their views without resort to violent coercion.”30 This does not mean that 
constitutional interpretations cannot be presented “in procedurally irregular, 
disruptive activities in an effort to make themselves heard, at times using unlawful 
conduct for their purposes,”31 as it the case of social protest. Instead, it means 
these disruptive, and sometimes even illegal means, are mobilized in order to 
persuade and convince rather than to impose, coerce and force. 
The public value condition, on the other hand, imposes on popular readings the 
duty to situate their constitutional understandings on the larger constitutional 
picture. In Siegel’s words, it “requires advocates to justify new constitutional 
understandings by appeal to older constitutional understandings that the 
                                                        
28 Id. at 1327. 
29 Others have preferred to distinguish by looking to the substantive differences between social 
movements and interest groups. This is the case of Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the 
Wind: Notes toward a Demosprudence of law and social movements, 123 YALE L. J. 2740, 2745, 2756-
62 (2014). 
30 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 24, at 1352. 
31 Id. at 1355. 
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community recognizes and shares.”32 This condition requires challengers to not 
defer to current understandings, but to consider and engage with them.33 As some 
have argued, this could help trigger an evaluation of whether these current 
understandings better answer our founding constitutional commitments as of 
today.34 However, to insist, for this evaluation to be constitutionally permissible—
or, in the words of professor Dworkin, ‘fair’35—it has to be channeled through 
“principles and memories of a constitutional tradition.”36 
In Siegel’s words, the consent and the public value conditions work as disciplining 
“the way that movements make constitutional claims to others who do not share 
the movement’s interests and aims.”37 These conditions permit taking the 
                                                        
32 Id. at 1356. But see, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 4-9 (2012) (arguing 
our decisions should be guided not by reference to a “deeply flawed, eighteenth-century 
document,” but considering “the merits” of political proposals of each side). 
33 Id. I see an inevitable resemblance with the work of the late professor Ronald Dworkin, who 
argued that  
Fairness in the constitutional context requires that an interpretation of some clause be 
heavily penalized if it relies on principles of justice that have no purchase in American 
history and culture, that have played no part in the rhetoric of national self-examination 
and debate. Fairness demands deference to stable and abstract features of the national 
political culture … not to the views of a local or transient political majority just because 
these have triumphed of a particular political occasion. 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 377 (1996). 
34 Professor Siegel herself, for example, writing on equal protection has argued that 
notwithstanding the constitutional text remains the same, we cannot be totally certain that “the 
body of equal protection law we inherit today is ‘true’ equal protection …”. Reva Siegel, Why Equal 
Protection no Longer Protects: The evolving forms of status-enforcing state action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
1111, 1113-4 (1997). 
35 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 33. 
36 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 24, at 1359. See also, RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: 
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 11 (1996) (“The moral reading asks them [in 
Dworkin’s theory, judges] to find the best conception of constitutional moral principles—the best 
understanding of what moral status for men and women really requires, for example—that fits the 
broad story of America’s historical record.”). Of course, Dworkin is of utility here to signal that 
constitutional interpretations needs to fit within a certain tradition, background, etc. His theory, 
however, was hardly one that showed too much sympathy for popular approaches to constitutional 
understanding. 
37 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 24, at 1357. 
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jurisgenerative capacity of popular mobilizations seriously by acknowledging them 
as authoritative interpretative communities of constitutional interpretation.38 But, 
at the same time, they also rule certain conditions that cultural or popular 
constitutionalism is to take into consideration, if not respect. 
What drives my attention in this, however, is a certain understanding of 
constitutions these conditions lay upon, for here constitutions—understood 
beyond the constitutional text, although certainly including texts—embrace an 
ideal of public good in the sense of common belonging. We care about the 
constitution for many different reasons, but particularly because it designates 
common commitments rather than empty formulas anyone may capture in order 
to secure sectorial benefits. It is this understanding of constitutions what explains 
why we expect constitutional interpretations to be attributed to the people (as a 
whole) and not to some fraction of it.39 If we were to deem the constitution and its 
                                                        
38 Guinier & Gerald, Changing the Wind, supra note 29, at 2745, 2751-5 (2014) (arguing that 
constituencies of non-experts become authoritative interpretative communities as long as they 
both provide the foundation and exert legitimizing power over legal change). 
39 This is not to deny there are group-relative accounts of what constitutional law is, but rather a 
way of allowing these groups to come to the forum and so influence the larger constitutional 
scheme. After all, there are many different groups who advance their own views as to what the 
constitution commands (permits or prohibits), and they claim their group, and their practices, to 
have authority to do so. However, this understanding of constitutions as common belonging does 
deny there are group-relative accounts as to what the recognitional constitutional community 
(group) is. See, Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition, supra note 3, at 798-
802. In other words, this is an approach amenable to legal pluralism as long as a constitutional 
scheme permits a complementary coexistence of different systems, but it rejects legal pluralism 
adopting a more radical approach in order to dispute the authority (i.e. separatists groups) of the 
very constitutional scheme they all inhabit. See generally, Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal 
Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 400-7 (2008). An alternative is 




vision of the public good as “competing private interests,”40 there would be little 
point in being concerned about its subordination to specific sectors of the body 
politic.41 But this is not how we see constitutions. 
B. A democratic burden 
How can we secure those two conditions will be respected? The answer to this 
question brings in what I think is a third condition of social protesters: an 
egalitarian turn that flows, the way I see it, from the understanding of constitutions 
as common commitments. This is none other than a requirement of political 
equality. 
Political equality requires an equal distribution of power among citizens who see 
one another as equals in origin, dignity, and moral and political agency.42 It is the 
normative thrust behind democratic rule that, as Dahl observed some time ago, 
there are no persons seen as better qualified to exclusively conduct public affairs.43 
This is a foundational principle of democracy that, to paraphrase Dworkin, 
demands we are treated with equal concern and respect, and thus accorded equal 
                                                        
40 Zephyr Teachout, The unenforceable corrupt contract: corruption and Nineteenth-Century law, in 
MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 135, 145 (Monica Youn ed. 2011). 
41 This is not to deny that constitutions themselves involve certain a form of closure. In fact, a 
constitutional framework defines a we/they relation upon which politics is based. CHANTAL MOUFFE, 
THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 42-5 (2000). But see, Stefan Rummens, Democracy as a Non-Hegemonic 
Struggle?  Disambiguating Chantal Mouffe’s Agonistic Model of Politics, 16 CONSTELLATIONS 277 
(2009) (arguing that Mouffe herself builds her agonistic theory of politics based on certain 
universal politico-constitutional values). 
42 URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED, supra note 7, at 18-9. 
43 ROBERT A. DAHL, ON POLITICAL EQUALITY 4 (2006) (“Among adults no persons are so definitely 
qualified than others to govern that they should be entrusted with complete and final authority 
over the government of the state.”). 
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political status.44 Political equality is, to further insist, the belief that each of us is 
an ordinary and equal person, a member of a polity45 whose views are to be given 
no more (individual) weight than the (individual) weight everybody else also 
enjoys.46  
Reva Siegel is explicit on the relevance of political equality and the sense of 
belonging. In fact, far from seeing disagreements about constitutional meaning as 
divisive, she believes they help to create a more robust sense of community. 
Contestation as to constitutional meaning promotes forms of collective 
deliberation that are important “not only as a procedure for deciding how we act, 
but also as a practice for articulating who we are.”47 According to what I have been 
arguing so far, it is not only that communities are given the opportunity and space 
to review themselves in light of common commitments, but also that constitutional 
lawmaking depends upon these very same processes.48 Therefore, citizens guide 
officials in charge of applying the constitution (guiding), and precisely because of 
that they get attached to the constitution they see themselves expounding 
(attaching).49 However, they do not play this role in solitude. “Citizens,” Siegel 
                                                        
44 DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 36, 7-8; Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 4: Political 
Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1987-1988). 
45 CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY. AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY xiii (1989). 
46 JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LUCK, AND EQUALITY. CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 128, 
130-31 (2002). 
47 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 24, at 1341.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1341-2. 
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argues, “must enlist the voice and accommodate the views of others if they are to 
persuade officials charged with enforcing the Constitution.”50 
Dworkin concurs. For him integrity—as he pictured it—involves the right of “each 
person or group in the community [to] have a roughly equal share of control over 
the decisions made by Parliament or Congress …”.51 It accepts and expands the role 
of citizens in contributing to shape public standards of the community,52 but it also 
places demands on them; 
It asks the good citizen, deciding how to treat his neighbor when their 
interest conflict, to interpret the common scheme of justice to which they 
are booth committed just in virtue of citizenship.53 
This means that the political exposition of constitutional commitments impose 
associational demands binding on all citizens,54 demands that, at the same time, 
are also open to be shaped by those very same individuals who are bound by 
them.55 In the end, the mutual consideration in constitutional exposition that 
political equality demands comes from an associational obligation where the 
                                                        
50 Id. at 1343. 
51 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 33, at 178.  
52 Id. at 189. 
53 Id. at 189-90. 
54 Id. at 211-215 (arguing a model of principle better serves the objectives of a community that 
accepts to be governed “by common principles … [where] each person is as worthy as any other, 
that each must be treated with equal concern according to some coherent conception of what that 
means.”). 
55 Id. at 190 (arguing there is an expressive value involved when “people in good faith try to treat 
one another in a way appropriate to common membership in a community governed by political 
integrity and to see each other as making this attempt, even when they disagree about exactly what 
integrity requires in particular circumstances.”). 
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dignity,56 liberty,57 justice,58 fairness,59 and self-respect of community members 
are (also) at play.60 
Now we can ask again. Following Reva Siegel, popular readings of constitutions are 
to respect both the consent and the public value conditions. This is so because, 
following Dworkin and others, we assume constitutions represent the common 
principles of justice that picture how we see one another. We are bound by these 
principles and at the same time are invited to interpret them in an egalitarian 
fashion, that is, under the assumption we are but one among many. How can it be 
secured that these conditions will be respected? Here is where the diarchic 
character of constitutional interpretations comes in. 
 
II. Institutional popular constitutionalism 
 
                                                        
56 Here I follow Jeremy Waldron, How law protects dignity, 71 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 200, 201-2 
(2012), who claims dignity to be a relational status: “the standing … that a person has in a society 
and in her dealings with others.” 
57 As Philip Pettit has defended, it is the equal standing (an “equally accessible influence”) we all 
have in controlling government and public affairs what provides for political liberty, the idea that 
citizens “would each be able to walk tall, live without shame or indignity, and look one another in 
the eye without any reason for fear or deference.” PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 23, at 2-
3, 179. See also, BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra 5, at 165 (arguing that the advantage 
that everyone is to be counted equally, the basis upon which democracy is erected, “lies in its non-
dominating character.”). 
58 See, Thomas Christiano, The Authority of Democracy, 11 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 19-
22 (2003) (“A fair way of making decisions … treats each publicly as an equal and respects each 
citizen’s judgment …”). 
59 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 194-5 (1999 rev. ed.) (“the principle of (equal) participation … 
requires that all citizens are to have an equal right to take part in, and to determine the outcomes 
of, the constitutional process that establishes the laws which they are to comply. Justice as fairness 
begins with the idea that where common principles are necessary and to everyone’s advantage, 
they are to be worked out from the viewpoint of a suitably defined initial situation of equality in 
which each person is fairly represented.”). 
60 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 13, at 319-21. 
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This part begins contending (A) that constitutional interpretation rests, just as 
representative democracy, on a diarchy; it rests on the interaction between 
informal and non-institutional avenues, on the one hand, and institutional 
lawmaking procedures, on the other. It also argues, in line with the previous two 
sections, that (B) the interaction between popular readings of constitutions 
advanced through social protests and political institutions not only serves political 
equality (a benefit that only considers the burdens on protesters), but also permits 
democratizing our constitutional understandings (the institutional duty). When 
this interaction occurs, an interaction that I see as mandatory for institutions, 
constitutional decisions carry greater democratic pedigree and attributing them to 
the people is no longer just a matter of superstition.  
A. The diarchic character of constitutional interpretation 
According to Nadia Urbinati, democracy is a diarchy. This means that democracy is 
based on the interplay of two different sovereign powers: that of the democratic 
opinion, on the one hand, and that of democratic will, on the other.61 Whereas the 
latter accounts for “procedures, rules and institutions,”62 the former stands for “the 
opinion of those who obey and participate only indirectly in ruling.”63 While will 
evokes formal avenues of authoritative power (i.e. a congress passing a law), 
public opinion’s force “is external to the institutions and its authority is informal 
(as not translatable into the law directly and not endowed with the signs of 
                                                        





command).”64 Democracy’s legitimacy is erected upon this interplay between will 
and opinion, a relation where each domain influences, and cooperates with, the 
other, but “without merging.”65 Where opinion is overlooked, laws become 
oppressive and pure arbitrary imposition.66 
Constitutional interpretation is also diarchic. As I argued in Chapter 1, social 
movements, protest movements among them, relate with the State and its 
institutions; they influence the State and the State influences them.67 In Chapter 5, I 
insisted that this is the sort of relation popular constitutionalism also entails, for 
popular constitutionalists, contrary to what some have suggested, count on 
institutional avenues—whether courts, legislatures or administrations—as the 
means to channel popular readings, thus rendering them authoritative. 
Institutional politics, in other words, transform public opinion into public will,68 
and social power of influence, as Habermas termed it, into political power.69 
However, whereas popular constitutionalism sees the relation between 
institutions and citizens as contingent, I see it as an unavoidable burden on 
institutions.  
                                                        
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 2. 
66 Id. at 39. 
67 The constitutional implications of this mutual influence, notwithstanding the enormous 
regulatory power of the State, has been analyzed in Mark Tushnet, The Constitutional of Civil 
Society, 75 Chi.-Kent L. rev. 379 (1999-2000). From a social movement perspective, see, Edwin 
Amenta & Neal Caren, The legislative, organizational, and beneficiary consequences of state-oriented 
challengers, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 461 (David Snow et al. eds., 2007). 
68 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM. A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE 
MODERN STATE 14-5 (2012). 
69 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY 363 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1998). 
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There is one pivotal reason that explains why constitutional interpretation cannot 
be but diarchic. This is so because the very act of constitutional foundation 
establishes a system of non-institutional/institutional functioning.70 The state of 
exception, where the true political force of the sovereign is manifested, needs the 
law (and its institutional form) for its own validity; the law, in turn, is the product 
and the reaffirmation of the exceptional moment of decision.71 Just as a 
constitution, along with the legal system that is erected under its auspices, is “the 
inner truth of the revolution … the revolutionary exception is the inner truth of 
constitution,” as Kahn observed.72 This is a clear indicator that “[t]he decision 
concerns neither a quaestio iuris nor a quaestio facti, but rather the very relation 
between law and fact,” as Agamben put it.73 This relation is inescapable—such as 
that of the slave/master divide in Hegel—; as such, constituent power and 
constituted power stay in this relation.74 
This paradox of sovereignty, the very fact that constituent power as a 
manifestation of sovereignty is “at the same time, outside and inside the juridical 
                                                        
70 I utilize the voice system here only to denote the institutional (the State) and non-institutional 
(public opinion) systems are (themselves) individual systems. These systems, although related, do 
not substitute each other, as explained in Habermas (Id. at 372). Still more accurate is the idea put 
forward by Martin Loughlin, who contends “we can overcome the fact-norm divide by treating both 
juristic and sociological sides as dimensions of [the] social practice [of the power of the state].” 
MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 221 (2010). In a similar fashion, professor Nadia 
Urbinati, Free Speech as the citizen’s right, in CITIZENS DIVIDED. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 125, 134 (Robert C. Post 2014) (arguing that in the characterization of democracy as a 
diarchy “‘will’ and ‘opinion’ are the two powers of the democratic sovereign; and that they are 
different and should remain distinct, although in need of constant communication.”). 
71 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 15-25 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 
Stanford University Press 1998). 
72 PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY. FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 47 (2011). 
73 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 71, at 26. 
74 LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW, supra note 70, at 227.  
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order,”75 projects itself along regular (as distinguished from the constituent) 
moments of the constitutional State.76 As Loughlin argues, the State itself can only 
be understood once we consider “both its juristic and sociological sides.”77 Arguing 
exclusively in favor of one of these sides, say rejecting the role of institutions or 
that of public opinion, blurs the fact that the constituent power is both political and 
legally constituted.78 In addition, it also overlooks the reflexive relation of 
collective self-determination these components stay in throughout governmental 
times—times that certainly include constitutional exposition.79 In fact, this process 
of collective self-determination, the process of defining what we (politically) are, 
extends beyond the constitutive moment to encompass the work of constituted 
institutions.80 The words of Loughlin are more illustrative here; he says,  
constituent power cannot be understood without reference to constituted 
power; it acts for the purpose of establishing a constitutional form of 
                                                        
75 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 72, at 15. 
76 This distinction was widely popularized by BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-
10 (1991). 
77 LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW, supra note 70, at 221. 
78 Just as democracy is based on an adequate and balanced relation between public opinion and 
authoritative will formation, constitutional interpretation risks becoming disfigured when one of 
the wills takes over the other. URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED, supra note 7, at 5-12. See also, 
Urbinati, Free Speech as the citizen’s right, supra note 70, at 135 (“in representative democracy, the 
sovereign is not simply the authorized will (franchise), but is instead a dual entity in which the will 
or decision is one component, the other being the opinion of those who obey the law and 
participate only indirectly ruling.”). 
79 Hans Lindahl, Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood, 
in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 9 (Martin 
Loughlin & Neil Walker eds. 2008). 
80 As Webber explains, we usually consider constitutions as an ‘end-state’ and thus we struggle to 
frame every political decision within borders that, we assume, are already determined. Contrary to 
this, “[a] constitution should not be understood as a completed project; rather, consistent with 
political legitimacy, one should conceive of a constitution as an activity.” GRÉGOIRE C. N. WEBBER, THE 
NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION. ON THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 13 (2009) (emphasis in the original). 
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government, and it continues to work through the established 
constitutional form by questioning and modifying the meaning of that 
structure. 81 
 This is what constitutional interpretation—the constant definition and revision of 
what type of political community we are—is about. 
There are other very important reasons—important in light of my discussion 
here—that concur in highlighting the crucial role democratic institutions play. 
First, institutions help to secure political equality. Popular and protest movements 
are not unitary nor have a single will. It is not that once we eliminate the State a 
natural unity will emerge. If we take politics seriously it is hard to believe that in 
the absence of the State “the Multitude can immediately rule itself and act in 
concert without the need of law or the State,”82 as if—as Kriegel put it—society 
were “the antidote to the expanding malignant tumor of the state…”.83 This is 
something Reva Siegel also acknowledges. As she put it when presenting the 
consent condition social protest movements are to respect, this condition “does 
                                                        
81 LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW, supra note 70, at 227. 
82 CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS. THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY 78-9 (2013). 
83 KRIEGEL, THE STATE AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 14, at 7 (arguing against vulgar anti-statism 
and the consequent fetishization of society). This is something that stands even when that anti-
statism is based, as recent waves of discontent were based, in the disconnection between States and 
the people. In fact, those who believe the multitude alone—“a sphere of common affairs that is no 
longer state-run … experimentations of forms non-representative and extra-parliamentary”—can 
provide the answer to current injustices overlook forms of hegemony they themselves (may) adopt. 
MOUFFE, AGONISTICS, supra note 82, at 69-75. For example, the horizontal character many supporters 
of recent mobilizations endorsed and praised—such as ‘Occupy’ and the indignados—implied the 




not guarantee speakers equality of resources or authority…”.84 Furthermore, 
depending on the social structures of power and oppression, this condition can 
actually “naturalize radically antidemocratic forms of subordination.”85 
Therefore, some form of institutional articulation becomes unavoidable. We need 
not refer back to Hobbes’ Leviathan, but to H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law to 
understand why this form of articulation is needed: 
It is plain that only a small community closely knit by ties of kinship, 
common sentiment, and belief, and placed in a stable environment, could 
live successfully by such a regime of unofficial rules.86 
The same applies to constitutions.87 For this is precisely the kind of common 
normative (not necessarily in a legalistic sense) background constitutions provide, 
“mak[ing] politics possible among people who disagree, often quite radically, about 
values, principles, rights, justice, and the common good.”88 This frame cannot be 
solely based on a sort of tacit or consensual fashion, for—as Jeremy Waldron put 
it—when there is 
a large and complex polity … where members are diverse, it may be 
doubtful whether stable political practices can be identified just by implicit 
know-how. In those circumstances, written norms seem necessary; 
formality has to take the place of tacit or clubbish understanding, and 
                                                        
84 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 24, at 1356. 
85 Id. 
86 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91 (1997). 
87 See generally, WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 80, at 19-21. 
88 Jeremy Waldron, Book Review: Never Mind the Constitution, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1169 (2014).   
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constitutional formulations themselves have to serve as a focus of unity in 
an otherwise pluralistic community.89 
Whereas the informal public sphere is (not only relevant, but) crucial in providing 
the State, its institutions, and its decisions with legitimacy, this work cannot be 
done in an egalitarian (=mutual understanding) fashion without the State and its 
institutions.90 Whether by opening institutional channels to all so they may 
collectively concur91 or providing material access to the public sphere so that 
material inequalities will not dominate,92 the State and its institutions offer their 
avenues as a common depository of recognition and dignity everyone is to enjoy.93 
As Honneth explains, the democratic constitutional State institutionalizes and 
expands “the right that citizens have already accorded to each other for the 
purpose of unforced self-legislation.”94 Following Habermas, the constitutional 
State is meant to enable “effective utilization of equal communicative freedom”95 
                                                        
89 Id. at 1171. The same has been held from a republican perspective. Consider the words of PETTIT, 
JUST FREEDOM, supra note 9, at 111: 
But it is hard to see how such a spontaneous, state-independent order could identify basic 
liberties reliably and maintain equal resourcing and protection of those liberties that is 
required by social justice. 
90 HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 69, at 132 (“The moment of a reciprocal 
conferral of rights remains a metaphorical event. It can perhaps be recalled and ritualized, but it 
cannot become permanent unless state power is established and put to work.”). 
91 WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 80, at 19 (“The actualization of the principle of 
democracy requires a system of rules, procedures, and institutions to allow citizens to speak and 
collectively to act.”). 
92 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE. AN INQUIRY INTO A 
CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 227-8 (Thomas Burger trans. MIT Press 1991). 
93 See, Charles Taylor, Some Conditions of a Viable Democracy, in DEMOCRACIA REPUBLICANA / 
REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACY 67, 74-5 (Renato Cristi & Ricardo Tranjan eds. 2012). See also, JEREMY 
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 111, 116-8 (1999). 
94 HONNETH, FREEDOM’S RIGHT, supra note 17, at 305. 
95 HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 69, at 170. 
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and “to secure”—as he explains—“an effective exercise of the political autonomy of 
socially autonomous citizens.”96 
The egalitarian value the State and its institutions serve is further noticed once we 
pay attention to the special, as opposed to common, status those who fail to 
comply with common rules and procedures claim for them, for in that case such a 
person is not only “violating a duty of justice to his [her] fellow citizens,”97 but also 
asking to be assumed of a special kind. For one, Pettit has argued that a 
contestatory citizen requires “a commitment to living under an arrangement 
where all members of the community can share in a system of equal popular 
influence.”98 This virtue—recall Pettit talks from the republican tradition—
supposes not a sectarian disposition, but one of “compromise and 
accommodation.”99 Otherwise, rejecting interaction and submitting your sense of 
justice to others’ views assumes you, and your group, are of a special kind.100 As 
Christiano put it, this rejection to engage supposes that one is not considering 
others as equals but “in effect expressing the superiority of one’s interests over 
others.”101  
                                                        
96 Id. at 176. 
97 Christiano, The Authority of Democracy, supra at 58, at 18. 
98 PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 23, at 228. 
99 Id. 
100 PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM, supra note 9, at 114. 
101 Christiano, The Authority of Democracy, supra at 58, at 12. 
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Second, institutions help make social changes effective and secure.102 As Guinier 
has argued, effective social change, including advancing a new constitutional 
understanding, demands decoupling previous assumptions. To be sustainable, 
these changes at both social and cultural levels are to be “institutionalized” so that 
it would be easier to oversee them. As she puts it, change is “a process that must be 
continuously monitored under the watchful eye of engaged political and social 
actors.”103 Thus, change in public opinion alone is not enough104—or at best it is 
only the beginning,105 for rights alone, or alleged social change, provide no set of 
policies to implement these (new) understandings.106  
Again, you may consider these implementations unnecessary if you believe it is up 
to society itself to enforce its own interpretations. But how? Whose decisions will 
be reputed to be those of society? How will changes become tangible? The diarchic 
nature of constitutional interpretation solves these problems by requiring social 
changes to move through institutional politics until they transform into political 
                                                        
102 In fact, as Honneth illustrates, it is the State the organ we have charged with the duty of 
“implementing the democratically negotiated will of the people.” HONNETH, FREEDOM’S RIGHT, supra 
note 17, at, at 304. 
103 Lani Guinier, Beyond Legislatures: social movements, social change, and the possibilities of 
demosprudence. Courting the people: demosprudence and the law/politics divide, 89 BOSTON U. L. REV. 
539, 551 (2009). 
104 Guinier & Torres, Changing the Wind, supra note 29, at 2758. See also, Guinier, Beyond 
Legislatures, supra note 103, at 551 (“social change is only sustainable if it succeeds in changing 
cultural norms, is institutionalized through policy decisions and the oversight of administrative 
actors …”). 
105 MOUFFE, AGONISTICS, supra note 82, at 115-6. 
106 Guinier & Torres, Changing the Wind, supra note 29, at 2759. 
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power. This political power, in turn, will produce policies “that can be converted 
into binding decisions and programs to be implemented.”107 
D. Democratic internal viewpoint 
Formal changes (expressed either in laws or in constitutional amendments) 
account for the political fights displaced voices have fought and serve as 
testimonies of the struggles we have experienced. Institutions, as argued above, 
contribute (sometimes decisively) to secure these social changes, but this does not 
mean that institutions replace public opinion, just as public opinion does not 
replace institutions. What institutional outcomes do is validate social rhetoric 
offering a new constitutional vision.108 This diarchic nature of constitutional 
interpretation, as I have argued, is far from being purely contingent, but a 
democratic requirement that stems from the understanding of constitutions as 
common commitments—an understanding that invites what some call an “ongoing 
dialogue between constitutional law and constitutional culture … [a] public debate 
about the meaning of constitutional principles.”109 
That political institutions help us deal with the requirements of political equality is 
something the different variants of popular constitutionalism accept. As I 
explained in Chapter 5, popular constitutionalists themselves rely on institutions. 
Theirs, as it has been put, is not a “philosophy of unmediated preference gathering 
                                                        
107 HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 69, at 331. 
108 Guinier & Torres, Changing the Wind, supra note 29, at 2798. 
109 Guinier, Beyond Legislatures, supra note 103, at 559. 
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(like the populist initiative process or the market).”110 Rather, as Guinier and 
Torres explain, theirs is a “commitment to the lawmaking force of meaningful 
participatory democracy.”111 
Whereas it is therefore true that social changes alone lay no constitutional 
interpretation but when complemented with institutional change, the opposite 
holds true as well: “rule shifting without culture shifting” is neither capable of 
producing “real and sustainable change”112 nor of encouraging “popular ownership 
of the Constitution’s text.”113 In fact, when changes are only formal—as Douzinas 
has convincingly argued—we risk the total collapse of our institutions by 
increasing (if not fueling) the gap between common and conventional (sometimes 
unspoken) social commitments, on the one hand, and social and economic policies 
and laws, on the other.114 
The interplay between popular readings of constitutions and institutional 
outcomes I am talking about here seeks precisely to overcome this mismatch. It 
permits a process that enhances democratic credentials of our constitutional 
commitments by giving the people a crucial say on what the constitution is. In 
other words, by inviting the people to directly be involved in constitutional 
exposition, institutional outcomes become democratized and thus legitimized. 
When we see social mobilizations as complementing institutional outcomes we can 
                                                        
110 Id. at 553 n.97. 
111 Guinier & Torres, Changing the Wind, supra note 29, at 2751. 
112 Id. at 2797-8. 
113 Gerald Torres & Lani Guinier, The Constitutional Imaginary: just stories about we the people, 71 
MD. L. REV. 1052, 1054-5 (2012).  
114 COSTAS DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE IN THE CRISIS 49-51 (2013).  
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appreciate this interaction deepens—to the extent this is possible—the 
correspondence between what Nadia Urbinati terms the ‘legal’ country and the 
‘real’ country, thus emancipating power “from the plague of being identified with a 
command-obedience relationship …”.115 
As can be seen, the interaction that a diarchic constitutional interpretation 
produces democratizes—going back to Hart once again—the internal viewpoint. 
According to Hart, we are participants in a legal system, rather than mere 
observers in search of certain regularities, when we “use the rules as standards for 
the appraisal of their own and others’ behaviour.”116 The violation of a rule, 
accordingly, justifies a hostile reaction that will follow—it is “a reason for 
hostility.”117 Of course, as Hart himself made it clear, there are many reasons—
other than a moral or a political commitment—to hold such a view: 
their allegiance to the system may be based on many different 
considerations: calculation of long-term interest; disinterested interest in 
others; an unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere wish to 
do as others do.118 
Notably, as Hutchinson elaborated, the democratic credentials of legal decisions 
seemed irrelevant,119 which, at least in the contexts we talk from now, is plainly 
                                                        
115 URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED, supra note 7, at 36-8 
116 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 86, at 98 (emphasis in the original). 
117 Id. at 90. 
118 Id. at 203. 
119 ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATIZED 45-63 (2009). See also, SCOTT J. 
SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 96 (2011) (commenting on Hart’s Concept of Law and noticing that “[t]he 
existence of legal authority need not depend on the moral legitimacy of the body claiming power.”). 
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inadmissible. A model where citizens are not required to take stance toward 
institutional decisions based on these decisions’ democratic pedigree is “ill suited 
to the institutional demands of strong democracy.”120 In fact, a democracy 
committed to self-government aims at reducing the gap between institutional 
decisions and society.121 In such a context citizens evaluate decisions—laws 
included—precisely considering their legitimacy. In the words of Hutchinson:  
A strong democracy depends upon its citizen’s willing acceptance of the 
system’s overall legitimacy through their own participation rather than a 
begrudging resignation to rules developed and administered by official 
others.122 
Consequently, a participatory-based (substantive) bound to the rules does much 
more than merely increasing the stability of the system, as Hart pointed out.123 
Political participation actually is the condition of its legitimate existence.124 This is 
critical for constitutions and their interpretations. As Waldron argued,  
the constitution cannot do any of the work it is supposed to do in framing 
and defining a political system unless people are prepared to accept it, for 
the time being, as authoritative.125 
The diarchic interpretation of constitutions brings democracy in. It claims, as 
noted above, that institutional interpretations of constitutions can be attributed to 
                                                        
120 HUTCHINSON, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATIZED, supra note 119, at 54. 
121 Id. at 55. 
122 Id. 
123 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 86, at 203. 
124 HUTCHINSON, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATIZED, supra note 119, at 56. 
125 Waldron, Book Review: Never Mind the Constitution, supra note 88, at 1169. 
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the people as a whole only when having been spurred by political participation—
included that carried out through protests. Does this mean that those institutional 
interpretations of constitutions approved without contentions from the citizenry 
are not (legally) valid? Of course not. They are as valid as those primary rules Hart 
talked about—rules that, for a variety of reasons, will be deemed as standards of 
critique for one’s own and others’ actions.126 However, they will not be regarded as 
expressions of the people themselves and their constitutional credentials will 
certainly be poor.127 If, as I started arguing in this chapter, a State’s intervention 
can be evaluated in terms of justice, fairness, and responsiveness to the people’s 
views, the same can be done for institutional readings of constitutions: some will 
be formal, although valid, decisions.128 Others, instead, will be attributed to, and 




My concern in this chapter has been that of securing both horizontal as well as 
vertical power in interpreting constitutions. Whereas horizontal power refers to 
the distribution of power among different private citizens, vertical power answers 
                                                        
126 Jeremy Waldron, Are constitutional norms legal norms? 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697, 1709 (2006). 
127 As Hutchinson notices, mere acquiescence is not enough. HUTCHINSON, THE PROVINCE OF 
JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATIZED, supra note 119, at 56. 
128 After all, as Webber has insisted, legitimacy is a matter of degree. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 80, at 16-8. 
129 As Waldron has argued criticizing the way Hart saw fundamental secondary rules, there is “little 
or nothing in Hart’s account to characterize, explain, or make plausible the existence of a similarly 
clear distinction between the positive moral aspects and the legal aspects of the secondary rules of 
a political system.” Waldron, Are constitutional norms legal norms? Supra note 126, at 1710-1. 
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the relations of power of citizens vis-à-vis governmental officials.130  I have argued 
that constitutional interpretation that works in a diarchic fashion meets this 
objective. A diarchic constitutional interpretation requires popular constitutional 
readings advanced through protests to be complemented, not replaced, with 
institutional avenues where those cultural opinions can be openly discussed. While 
institutions serve political equality by offering avenues open to all to concur, they 
also provide stable social changes and allow the people to appropriate the 
constitution. 
 
                                                        
130 I have taken this distinction from Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 4, supra note 44, at 8-9. 
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CONCLUSIONS: PROTESTS AS NEGOTIATING TOOLS 
 
Constitutions are normally depicted as end-states. Not surprisingly, constitutions’ 
political understanding has turned around its limiting and constraining character 
on political actions—including those of the people themselves. Hence, that 
democracy, so we are usually told, is to move within certain borders whose true 
comprehension is placed beyond the reach of the people and their representatives. 
In fact, under this prism constitutions are legal texts and their understating is 
therefore reserved to an elite trained in reading and explaining legal materials. 
This is the reason why, when the channels of political life that constitutions 
establish are to be clarified, an elite (normally of judges) exposes those principles 
for, and instead of, us. Furthermore, this is an activity that takes place in chambers 
shielded from politics and suited to discuss in a principled fashion.1 
This work has held a different approach. It has conceived constitutions as an 
activity.2 It has presented constitutions as open-ended projects where basic 
commitments are recognized, although inevitably left open.3 Despite the fact 
constitutions normally assert basic political principles all concur in celebrating, 
                                                        
1 As the school of critical legal studies has amply demonstrated, we know that courts do make 
political decisions. However, precisely because mainstream constitutional approaches deny this, 
these political decisions—critical, as constitutional exposition happens to be—take place in a 
context with a lack of transparency (courts) and which only furthers obstacles for popular 
engagement with them, at least when we compare them with legislatures. See generally, Jeremy 
Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B.U. L. REV. 335, 336-40 (2009) (“Parliaments and 
congresses and state assemblies are set up and publicly identified as lawmaking bodies.”). 
2 GRÉGOIRE C. N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION. ON THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 13 (2009). 
3 Id. at 7. 
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these principles are not self-evident in their specific content. “[N]o definitive 
account of the principles of political legitimacy or of their reconciliation—as 
Grégoire Webber has put it—is readily available.”4 The content of those principles 
and the relations among them are therefore to be actualized. 
This is why, rather than highlighting constitutions as mere constrains, this work 
has understood constitutions as open projects whose contours are the subject of 
an ongoing reflection and development. In this sense democratic constitutionalism 
is better seen, and more accurately described, as an activity through which 
constant agreements are worked out.5 Constitutions, in other words, do not have 
fixed meanings. In fact, their understandings are being constantly negotiated or 
“continuously ‘conciliated’.”6 This is what bestows legitimacy on constitutional 
orders.7 
I have joined others in remarking this political comprehension of constitutions. A 
political (as opposed to an exclusively legal) constitutionalism highlights the role 
of politics and democratic avenues, and it also welcomes people to have a say 
about it—something the more sophisticated and juridified approaches would not.8 
                                                        
4 Id. at 14. 
5 James Tully, The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional 
Democracy, 65 MOD. L. REV. 204, 208 (2002). 
6 Id. 
7 “The constitution or the principles justifying it cannot be seen as a permanent foundation or 
framework which underlies democratic debate and legislation. They must be reciprocally subject to 
legitimation through practices of the democratic exchange of reasons by those subject to them over 
time” (Id). 
8 Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, supra note 1, at 340 (“Because they are at pains to conceal 
the fact that lawmaking is what they are engaged in, courts are not as open to the sort of reasons 




As Bellamy has put it, a legalist understanding of constitutions places key political 
decisions out of the reach of the people, therefore risking political domination of 
one sort (we cannot decide upon constitutions) or another (it is possible to make 
decisions about constitutions, but that is a task we cannot perform).9 A political 
conception, on the other hand, warns against depoliticizing constitutional 
negotiations precisely to enable a self-governing political order that can do justice 
to political equality.10 
Constitutions therefore are to be seen as not only restricting power and politics; 
they have a positive, enabling, face as well. They permit politics—they set “the 
terms of discourse”11—and actually demand it in order to actualize the relations 
among the principles they establish. In fact, the very acts of offering and deciding a 
certain “relationship between the principles of political legitimacy is [itself] 
another instance of political judgment.”12 Seen in this light, politics is the very 
activity through which communities constantly negotiate and continuously 
conciliate their own political understanding. Politics, as I argued in Chapter 6, is 
the very activity through which constitutions are continually being developed, 
detailed and deepen. As I put it there, the process of collective self-determination, 
the process through which we keep on defining what we are, extends beyond the 
                                                        
9 RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM. A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
DEMOCRACY 147-54 (2007). 
10 Id. at 146. As Adam Tomkins put it, republicanism—the theoretical basis where he rests his 
political constitutionalist conception—“is concerned not with government-through-judiciary but 
with self-government through processes of informed, public-spirited deliberation.” ADAM TOMKINS, 
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 45 (2005). 
11 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 185 (1999). 
12 WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 26.  
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constitutive moment to encompass the work of constituted institutions and 
regular politics. In the words of Loughlin—already quoted in Chapter 6—,  
constituent power cannot be understood without reference to constituted 
power; it acts for the purpose of establishing a constitutional form of 
government, and it continues to work through the established 
constitutional form by questioning and modifying the meaning of that 
structure. 13 
Clearly, this is a comprehension of constitutions that can be as elitist and a source 
of domination as strong as the legal understanding before explained, for if avenues 
of political engagement are to be reduced exclusively to institutional avenues the 
risks of domination persists.14 To prevent authoritative decisions from becoming 
“purely formal norm[s] with no conscious acceptance by the citizens,”15 a 
supplement of legitimacy is needed here. This is why I have argued the people are 
to play a crucial role in expounding those principles. Traditional liberal approaches 
present courts (or in the best scenario any other institutional avenue) as 
exclusively entitled to work out constitutional meaning. Even when these 
approaches contend that these institutional avenues should be permeated with 
popular readings of the constitution, institutional avenues and formal procedures 
remain the sovereign practices that produce constitutional understanding.  
                                                        
13 MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 227 (2010). 
14 As I explained in Chapter 2, this was one of the main contentions recent waves of popular unrest 
expressed. 
15 NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED: OPINION, TRUTH, AND THE PEOPLE 38-9 (2014). 
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Instead, I have showed there are others political fora where constitutional 
negotiations also take place. If the thrust behind popular constitutionalism is to 
“return[] constitutional law to the people, acting through politics,”16 then 
institutional avenues are to be supplemented with fora laypeople usually resort to. 
These fora are informal, non-institutional and less-stylized when compared to 
courts or other institutional avenues.17 
This is why the places where constitutional negotiations take place and the actors 
that get to participate in those negotiations become important indicators of 
democratic legitimacy. Of course this concern for democratic legitimacy depends 
to a large extent on the concept of constitutional negotiation and that of the 
constitution behind it.18 On the one hand, a negotiation may be understood as an 
activity where participants intervene speaking for, and pursuing, their own 
individual interests. This is a business-like negotiation or bargaining. As I 
explained in chapter 6, this sense of constitutional negotiation would imply that 
constitutions are a political booty that, despite their inviting (and at times 
fraternal) language, are to be appropriated by whoever succeeds in translating his 
or her private interests into ruling political understandings. 
There is, however, a second sense—the one I have privileged in this work—in 
which constitutions could be understood. Indeed constitutions could be, and are 
                                                        
16 TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 11, at 186. 
17 These informal fora, as noted through this work, “do[] not operate in the presence of the 
institutional sovereign (the assembly) but underneath it and through sympathetic imagination 
rather than rational inference.” URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED, supra note 15, at 38-9. 
18 I rely here on the two senses of constitutional negotiations identified in WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 27-8. 
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normally, understood as common commitments setting a common framework for 
politics. In this sense constitutions distribute power and we expect them to 
distribute it evenly.19 This concept of constitutions is followed by a different sense 
of constitutional negotiations. One where citizens communicate with others “for 
the purposes of arranging a shared goal by mutual agreement, by compromise, by 
settlement.”20 In this second sense, citizens come to constitutional negotiations in 
order to share their own constitutional understanding with others.21 
We know, however, that constitutional landscapes show, and have been erected 
upon, traces of exclusion of certain minorities; hegemonic imposition of 
constitutional understandings; and limited recognition of those, and the means, 
welcome to appear in constitutional negotiations. As I explained at the beginning 
of this work, reigning constitutional understandings—a specific configuration of 
power relations—have restricted, and privileged certain, means of “political 
engagement to the constitutional”.22 
Social protests, as I have argued throughout this work, function as a negotiating 
tool in the second sense aforementioned. It is a means that permits citizens to 
appear politically in a space where they were before excluded and to express their 
views about common constitutive commitments that no one bothered to ask 
                                                        
19 This explains the emphasis I placed on the political equality and moral agency of all members of a 
political community to have a say as to what these common commitments entail. 
20 WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 28. 
21 Id.  
22 Christopher May, The rule of law as the Grundnorm of the new constitutionalism, in NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER 63, 69 (Stephen Gill & A. Claire Cutler eds. 2014). 
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before.23 Seen in this light, social protests allow citizens to be included and enable 
them to renegotiate current constitutional understandings. They become—to 
insist with Tully—“practices of freedom in which democratic actors seek, by 
means of traditional and new forms of deliberation and negotiation, to challenge 
and modify the non-democratic ways they are governed.”24 Social protests, as the 
examples I drew from Chile and Québec show, facilitated the voices of adolescents, 
who are seldom considered to have a political say, to be heard. In this way protests 
permitted the constitutions to be sensitive to voices seldom listened to, thus 
enhancing the “polyphonic articulation[s] of social autonomy” plural societies 
show.25 It was the tool of protest what triggered a process of renegotiation of 
constitutional understanding, thus permitting off-the-wall considerations to step 
in and eventually become ruling understandings. 
These interactions were possible thanks to the diarchic character of democracy, 
which, as I have argued in this work—particularly in Chapters 5 and 6—, extends 
to constitutional negotiations. The diarchic nature of both democracy and 
constitutional interpretation demands a virtuous, although tense and conflicting, 
equilibrium between institutional and non-institutional avenues. The emphasis I 
have placed specifically on protests therefore aims not at replacing institutions, 
                                                        
23 Protests allow those previously excluded to fight so that they may be taken into account. As 
Arendt put it, “a space of appearances is not to be taken for granted wherever men live together in a 
community”. HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 152 
(2006). 
24 Tully, The Unfreedom of the Moderns. supra note 5, at 221.  
25 See, GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 3 
(Gareth Teubner trans. Oxford University Press 2012). 
340 
 
but to complement them, thus enhancing democratic credentials. The kind of 
protests I have focused on throughout this work seek—as I explained in Chapter 
2—not to overthrow governments, but to contest relations of exclusion (power) 
and bring those formerly excluded “into practices of democratic negotiations.”26 
This is why the protests that in this work I have qualified as events taking place 
within the rules of the game, rather than favoring a form of direct democracy, 
actually aim at restoring the diarchic equilibrium between formal and informal 
avenues. In the words of Nadia Urbinati, these events 
bring[] us somehow back to the Roman plebs that used to interact with 
their leaders in the forum, not in order to replace them in ruling, but to feel 
they could control them by imposing the burden of inspection on them.27  
This discord between the rulers and the ruled (and also among these latter) far 
from posing a threat to democracy is actually a condition for its deepening. The 
frictions these interactions generate—frictions in front of which authorities seem 
to have stopped in their appreciations—are, as Machiavelli put it centuries ago, the 
conditions to secure the liberty of republics and good outcomes. “Good laws,” he 
wrote back in 1531, proceed “from those very tumults which many so 
inconsiderately damn.”28 Furthermore, those very tumults are the means through 
which many of those who were before excluded got a voice and a share in common 
matters: 
                                                        
26 Tully, The Unfreedom of the Moderns. supra note 5, at 221. 
27 Nadia Urbinati, A Revolt against Intermediary Bodies, 22 CONSTELLATIONS 477, 478 (2015). 
28 NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 114 (Bernard Crick ed., repr., Penguin Classics 2003) (1531). 
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if tumults led to the creation of the tribunes, tumults deserve the highest 
praise, since, besides giving the populace a share in the administration, they 
served as the guardian of Roman liberties.29 
Tumults, in the words of Machiavelli, or protests, in the words of this work, open 
constitutional negotiations, thus allowing new voices to step in. This openness, in 
turn, triggers a “dynamic and politically potent relationship between [legal elites] 
and aggrieved communities.”30 By doing so, protests contribute to establish a 
dynamic equilibrium between institutional avenues of lawmaking and 
constitutional detailing, on the one hand, and citizens, on the other.31 Therefore, 
courts, legislatures, administrations, or any other institutional forum “are not the 
sole expositors of constitutional or legal meaning.”32 
This is precisely the sense in which social protests are a form of constitutional 
interpretation. They are so not by simply moving institutional avenues to produce 
new legislation or by altering public opinion, thus ultimately changing and 
“creating an alternative narrative of constitutional meaning,”33 but by showing that 
constitutional meanings are the result and “the work of mobilized citizens in 
conjunction with, not separate from, legal professionals” and institutional 
                                                        
29 Id. at 115. 
30 Lani Guinier, Beyond Legislatures: social movements, social change, and the possibilities of 
demosprudence, 89 B. U. L. REV. 539, 548 (2009). 
31 Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and 
Social Movements, 123 YALE L. J. 2740, 2759-60 (2014). 
32 Id. at 2759. 
33 Id. at 2757. 
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avenues.34 Far from destabilizing constitutional schemes, social protests further 
the stability and legitimacy of constitutional orders by, while operating as a tool 
for negotiating interpretations, also becoming a means by which the people 
appropriate and attach to their constitutional orders.35 As Tushnet put it, “the 
Constitution belongs to us collectively, as we act together in political dialogue with 
each other—whether we act in the streets, in the voting booths, or in the 
legislatures as representative of others.”36  
 
 
                                                        
34 Id. at 2760. 
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